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summary^
The title o i^s. was conferred on
Euripides by an age which had forgotten the * ancient 
quarrel’ between poetry and philosophy - a difference 
which has been strongly reaffirmed in our own age. in 
undertaking to show the influence of pre-Socratic 
philosophy on Euripides, I hope also to show how much 
or how little sense there is in bestowing the name 
’philosopher’ upon a poet.
At an early stage, the separate spheres of 
poetry and philosophy are not clearly defined. Drama 
in any case involves notions of character and action that 
are essentially philosophical. Euripides’ psychology is 
based not only on the work of his predecessors in drama 
and on his own observation of human nature, but also 
(directly or indirectly) upon the speculations of the 
physical philosophers. He also owes much to the sophists 
and to religious and medical writers. His theology is 
bound up with his psychology, inconsistencies being due 
to a dramatic method which is in effect an early dialectic, 
comparable to the Socratic and with a direct
bearing upon Aristotle’s theory of *
The first two chapters. Interaction between Drama 
and philosophy (1) and (2), are introductory; the first 
deals with the evolution, through drama, of the notion of 
psychological determinism; the second traces the 
development by the pre-Socratics of certain concepts and 
ideas which have significance for drama as well as for 
philosophy. This is followed by an exegesis of five major 
tragedies, Medea, Hippolytus, Hecuba, Heracles and Bacchae, 
with shorter reference to the Troades and plays featuring 
Apollo. The concluding chapter attempts to classify and 
describe the general tendency of the thought which is to 
be grasped intuitively through the antilogies of the 
dramatic presentation.
^A8 required by the regulations of the university.
Abbreviations
N. Nauck, Tragicorum Qaecorum Fragmenta (Teubner).
I have also used page, Greek Literary papyri vol.i 
(Loeb).
D. Diels, pragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th edition.
The numbers indicate passages, A or B- I have not 
repeated the name of the philosopher if clear from 
the context, por Heraclitus I have chiefly used 
Bywater.
R.P. Ritter & preller, Historia philosophiae Graecae.
I have referred to this work only if the passages 
concerned are not in Diels- 
K . Kern, Qrphicorum pragmenta (Berlin).
I have used throughout the Oxford Classical Text 
of Euripides, ed. Murray.
Note
This thesis was begun in 19 45, and written in its 
present order, over a period of six years.
I.M.G.
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT IN EURIPIDES 
Apology and Explanation
The title of this thesis needs an explanation, 
if not an apology, it suggests that I am going to treat 
Euripides as a philosopher and not as a poet.
But this is not the case. It is indeed my aim 
to discover the dramatic use he makes of philosophical 
ideas, and to consider any interest this use may have for 
philosophers. But I do not wish to revive at the present 
day the doubtful compliment ’philosophus scenicus'.^
My first task will be to collect and refer to 
their source the traces of current philosophical theory 
which appear in the plays
It is often remarked that this in itself would be 
a legitimate and even a praiseworthy occupation, but it is 
at the same time assumed that the so-called ’philosophical 
passages’ are of no special concern to one who is interested 
in the poetry of Euripides, and that it is in fact a pity 
that Euripides was interested in so many things besides 
poetry. It is a pity that his characters ’philosophise’ or 
that they ’debate’. Haigh,^ for instance, condemns both the 
philosophy and the rhetoric as ’indisputable blemishes and 
symptoms of degeneracy’, though he adds, paradoxically 
enough, that the Athenian audience did not so regard them.
Modern lovers of Euripides usually remain on the 
defensive when they come to these passages, and content 
themselves with rebutting (where possible) the charge of 
’irrelevance’. They appear to accept the fundamental 
premiss that poetry and rhetoric, or that poetry and 
philosophy, are two different things and can have nothing 
in common: that Euripides’ ’philosophy’ (if such he had) 
must be a different thing from his ’poetry’, and that the 
one could not possibly help us to an imderstanding of the 
other.
^Vitruv.8.praef.l. Clem.Alex.Strom.688 ; z*;
^This task (for reasons which will be immediately obvious) 
is not represented in the thesis as it stands at present. 
 ^Tragic Drama p.236-7.
with the proposition that poetry and philosophy , 
are (or should be) two things and not one and the same 
thing, I am in complete agreement. J would even subscribe 
to the view that (nowadays) poet and philosopher speak 
two languages and can have nothing whatever to say to one 
another - that (nowadays) the philosopher-poet is a freak 
and the poet-philosopher a positive menace.
But I would plead that the sharpness of the 
dividing line, like the line between philosophy and science, 
is modern; in the fifth century B.C., much reputable 
philosophy was still written in verse, and few questioned 
the poet's right to dictate in the field of morals and 
politics.^ Protagoras the sophist, if we believe Plato, 
claimed spiritual kinship with the poets as far back as 
Homer and even farther/"and much of the thought which we 
now label 'philosophical' was viewed by the ancients as 
the common stock of poets.^
The issue between poetry and philosophy was not 
forced until plato. But Euripides wrote a generation and 
more before plato, though the dramatic date of some of 
Plato’s dialogues tends to make us feel that they were 
contemporaries.
If I were to propose the title 'Dramatic porm in 
plato’, I should barely need to apologise, since it is 
generally agreed that some at least of Plato’s dialogues 
cannot be understood unless they are considered as dramatic 
compositions. I should not be taken to mean that Plato’s 
philosophy was influenced by the Athenian stage. Similarly, 
if I try to show that some at least of Euripides’ plays 
cannot be understood without a reference to what I have 
chosen to call the ’philosophical thought’ in them, I do 
not mean to credit Euripides with the dramatic presentation 
of a philosophical theory. The philosopher uses the 
dramatic form; the dramatist uses the philosophical 
conceptions, as Aristotle might have said, it all depends, 
which is for the sake of which.
^ Cf. the frequent poetical quotations in the ethical works 
of Aristotle.
plat.prot.316 d, cf .Diog.Laert.i .12 
^Cf. A.B.Cook %eu8 iii, p.451 f.
If the reader believes that any attempt to enlist 
the aid of philosophy to interpret poetry is essentially 
misguided, I can only appeal to the authority of Aristotle. 
NO one believed more firmly than Aristotle that a poet is 
a poet and not, for instance, a physical philosopher/ Yet 
he insists that there is common ground, not only between 
poetry and rhetoric but between poetry and philosophy.*
His own attempt, qua philosopher, to deduce and prescribe 
for poets the fairest form of their art, is itself a 
demonstration that psychological and moral analysis may 
have a direct bearing upon the development of a dramatic 
conception.
By 'philosophical thought» i do not mean any 
special kind of thinking, but thought directed upon certain 
problems which may be called » philosophical », either because 
they were of interest to philosophers then, or because they 
are of interest to philosophers now. Not that I wish to 
discover Euripides' own views on philosophical questions - 
this, even if possible, would be superfluous - but only, 
which views he used for dramatic purposes, and why.
I shall try to show that Euripides' psychology, 
like a good deal of his theology, is based not simply on 
his observations of human nature, as is often supposed, but 
also on the speculations of the physical philosophers. It 
is a psychology which Aristotle is at pains to refute 
as inconsistent with the ordinary moral judgment, but which 
modern philosophers are increasingly tempted to adopt, in 
spite of these unhappy consequences. The inferences which 
Euripides himself draws for morals are hard to determine 
precisely. it seems to depend on the exact relation 
between the divine and human agency in the plays - between 
what we might call the theocratic and the psychological 
elements of compulsion which are brought to bear upon the 
individual - and this is even harder to determine precisely. 
The result is an uneven and variable distribution of blame, 
which varies according to the particular emphasis and 
interpretation of each play. Euripides certainly does not 
remove the moral judgment altogether, or the distinction
ipoet.1447 b 19.
^poet.1456 a 35. Rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and 
ethics (r politics) and includes a knowledge of psychology, 
Rhet.1356 a 22-7.
^roet.1451 b 5, cf * Mat .982 b 18 o S o k - j^
between right and wrong in conduct, if the human agents do 
not get the blame, the gods do. This alternative is not, 
however, open to the moral philosopher, if he accepts the 
psychology without the theology.
But I wish to do more than show the 'influence' of 
contemporary philosophy on Euripides, i want to show, if I 
can, that he has himself made a contribution to the history 
of philosophy - not because he was a philosopher, but 
because he was a dramatist, and in developing drama he made 
discoveries which are, at the same time, a contribution to 
the development of thought. I shall explain this further 
in the chapter which follows. The discovery seems to lie 
mainly within the field of moral psychology, and to arise 
from a refusal to dismiss natural philosophy as irrelevant 
to the study of conduct, gocrates, on the contrary, turned 
away from natural philosophy after his disappointment with 
Anaxagoras, and the result is a moral theory which is simply 
psychologically false - because its assumptions conflict, 
not only with the mechanical explanations of the physicist, 
but also with the observed facts of human nature.^
I do not mean that Aristotle must have had the 
dramatic presentation in mind when he rejected the view 
that action should rank as involuntary because it is done 
from a particular motive, e.g. some forms of desire, or 
passion/ The view which he refutes might have been argued 
by any follower of Gorgias, whose famous praise of Helen 
could hardly fail to evoke enthusiastic imitation; Euripides 
himself makes Helen advance similar pleas in the Troades/
SO nowadays it is sometimes maintained that only action 
done from a sense of duty is 'free'.^
Ar.E.N.1145 b 27 o-Gtb^ oOv o u
A  X  . V Y ^  U \roy^c-v o wy  .
The assumption on which Socrates parts company with Anaxag­
oras is that mind decides everything for the best, plat. 
phaed.97 c 5, 99 a 9 - b 1. His second assumption is that 
reason is the strongest principle in man, prot.352 b f., 
cf.Ar.E^E.1246^b 34.
El * N . 1 111 a 2 4 Ou- /CoC J j ec crv i" I ^  T X'o*  ^ f fA 5 O’yOK /«t
Cf7E^Kl223 a 28 f., where passionate action is allowed to 
be sometimes involuntary, though not always.
 ^EUr.Tro.940, cf.Gorg.Hel.19.
^I.e. by Kantians.
Yet there is no reason why Aristotle should not 
take account of the dramatist's presentation, and some 
reason to think that he did. in his account of voluntary 
action in E.N.3 he cites Euripides' Alcmeon and mentions 
Merope.* Some of his other examples of involuntary or 
'mixed' subjects might well be tragic subjects. And we 
know from the poetics that he was specially interested in 
the relation of the moral judgment to the tragic effect of 
certain combinations of situation and character, and that 
in the end he pronounces in favour of a tragic act on 
which the moral judgment cannot be passed at all.^
As we might have expected, the philosopher's 
conception of dramatic action is simpler and clearer than 
the poet's, and he was no doubt wise to recommend it to 
his pupils. If Euripides had been a philosopher I do not 
think he would have tolerated the deliberate confusion of 
ideas which nevertheless makes him 'the most tragic of 
the poets'.
^ E.N.lllQ a 28, 1111 a 12, cf. Poet.1453 a 5. These 
examples are discussed in Tragic Error, C.q.xliii.47 f.
^Sc. the act done or intended in ignorance. Poet.1454 a 2 f, 
cf.E.N.llll a 2
INTERACTION BETWEEN DRAMA AND PHILOSOPHY (1) 
(i) Mainly Sophocles '
Divine intervention in Sophocles 
{ii) Mainly Euripides 
Character as a ’force*.
Characterisation and psychology.
(iii) Aeschylus and Euripides 
Supernatural causation.
supernatural Causation in Drama. Aeschylus. 
Transition to the Human Motive.
Euripides.
INTERACTION BETWEEN DRAMA AND PHILOSOPHY (1)
(i) Mainly Sophocles
In this chapter I shall try to explain further 
what I mean by saying that a contribution to the development 
of drama might at the same time be a contribution to the 
development of philosophy, that a fact in the history of the 
one might also be a fact in the history of the other.
This is obviously a phenomenon unlikely to occur 
in the modern world, at the present stage of the history of 
each. But at an early stage, it seems not impossible to 
imagine that a dramatist might, in developing his own art, 
bring to light or throw emphasis upon certain facts or 
ideas which would give a different turn to the development 
of philosophical speculation. Similarly, at an early stage, 
new philosophical speculation might be such as to give a 
different direction to the progress of drama.
The influence of philosophy on drama is generally 
admitted, at least in the case of Aeschylus and Euripides, 
but it is certainly more difficult to find support for the 
view that drama might in its turn influence philosophy - 
that a discovery appropriately and not accidentally made in 
the field of drama could be of any philosophical importance. 
It is usually supposed that dramatists ’reflect* the thought 
of their day, without in any sense adding to it.
Again, I can only plead the difference between 
ancient and modern in this respect. It seems, for instance, 
so obvious to us that the proper subject of drama is human 
life and conduct, and that human character and motive play 
the chief part therein, that we forget what an innovation 
it was when Sophocles displayed the traditional stories as 
the outcome of the characters and beliefs of the men and 
women concerned in them. This is a dramatic innovation, 
and yet it is, in this special sense, a 'philosophical* 
discovery^too, the harder to appreciate because it is so 
fundamental. To ascribe a tyrant’s misery to neglect of
^In using this word I do not mean that Sophocles was the 
first person to whom the thought occurred I././.,
I mean that his concentration upon character in a dramatic 
presentation constitutes a ’discovery* for both drama and 
philosophy, because it leads to a new and detailed analysis
the principle of geometric equality would strike us at once 
as a philosophical statement/ But it was a significant 
moment too for philosophy when a tyrant's misery was 
attributed, not to divine jealousy of his eminent position, 
not to a hereditary taint in his blood, but to twowrong 
applications of the same apparently harmless maxim that a 
man should have the same friends and enemies as the city, 
combined with a stubborn refusal to admit himself in the 
wrong for fear of showing weakness and inconsistency at the 
very outset of his rule.* it was the dramatist, not the 
philosopher, who chose to concentrate upon character and 
motive, and to exclude other kinds of causation as for his 
purposes irrelevant. But the importance for moral theory 
is immense. For it is only when man's own nature is made 
the object of attention, when his character and motives and 
beliefs are viewed as sufficient causal explanation of his 
actions in any given set of circumstances, that moral 
philosophy, as we understand it, is possible.
When Shakespeare shows us the working of jealousy 
in the human breast, we admire it for itself, as a great 
artistic and dramatic spectacle. But when Euripides shows 
us a similar psychological condition in a Medea or phaedra, 
this not only marks an epoch in drama, but it is also a 
demonstration that human beings do not always act ration­
ally - that perhaps they cannot always act rationally even 
if they would - and this is an important discovery for 
morals.
(cont.)
of character and motive and their connexion with action 
and happiness. There is no real parallel in epic, which 
is dramatic only in single scenes and where no attempt is 
made to concentrate upon the purely human causes of action. 
Epicharmus echoes the Heraclitean maxim, but it is doubtful 
whether he used it in any other sense than that a man fares 
according to his deserts (fr.l7, cf.22, Diels).
:Cf. plat.Gorg.507 e 6 f., and jocasta's praise of ,
Eur.phoen.535 f.
 ^ soph.^^g.191.
8It is of course possible to admit the importance 
of such discoveries for philosophy, without giving the 
dramatist the credit of discovering them, but only of 
using them. Sophocles, we may say, merely 'reflects* the 
interest in character which was in any case 'increasing' 
in the periclean age. And Euripides certainly did not 
invent the contrast of the rational and the irrational in 
the soul. The concentrated study of character and motive 
is, it may be said, appropriate to the dramatist, but the 
ideas are already there for both dramatist and philosopher 
to use, and the philosopher need not go to the dramatist 
to be shown that they are relevant to moral theory.
This is precisely what I do not believe. I 
believe that it was an artistic and dramatic need that led 
to a presentation in which the special and intimate 
relation between character and action is clearly shown.
It is this relation, shown as subsisting directly, and as 
connected with happiness directly, not through the medium 
of other 'powers', that is morally significant, and this 
a vague 'interest in character', however engrossing, would 
not show.
'Interest in character' as such would not 
necessarily lead to a clearer appreciation of moral values, 
or of the facts which are morally significant. The 
Athenians themselves (if we believe Thucydides) commonly 
made their superiority in character an argument to justify 
a national policy of aggression.^ The moral theory of
partly depends on the conception of a certain type 
of 'strong' character and its deserts.* During the war 
period, Thucydides tells us, the very names of qualities 
and characteristics changed their meaning.^
The rise of rhetoric especially must have given a 
powerful impulse to the study of ethically relevant data. 
The speeches of Thucydides show that generalisations about 
human nature, human motive, the character of different 
classes of men and peoples, were on the lips of every 
orator. Yet the rhetorician of this period is not primar­
^Thuc.1.75.1, 76.2 f., 2.41.2, cf.1.144.4.
*E.g. as advanced by callicles, piat.gorg.483 b 3 f., and 
by Thrasymachus in Rep.337 c 1 - 2, 343 c, 344 a 1. c f . 
Thuc.1.76.2, 5.105.2; Anon.iambi.6 p.100 5.1; Eur.phoen. 
509-10.
^Thuc.3.82.4.
ily concerned with sober search into the facts of human 
nature, and makes no real attempt to produce a coherent 
theory of morals. His aim is, after all, plausibility 
rather than truth. He does not need to substantiate his 
generalisations in a presentation, where the implications 
of his views are clearly demonstrated, where lack of 
verisimilitude is at once detected, and where distortion 
of values cannot be made specious by an appeal to interest. 
The nearest approach to the analysis of drama is to be 
found in the great work of Thucydides himself.
The historian aims at increasing our knowledge of 
the laws which govern events to a maximum, and decreasing 
the unpredictable element to a minimum, so he too concen­
trates on the only pattern which is, so far, intelligible: 
the causal sequence of character or motive and action, 
leading, in combination with other causal sequences of the 
same kind, to happiness or unhappiness. But for obvious 
reasons he cannot show the connexion as clearly as the 
dramatist. Either the scale is too large - national 
character does not determine national action in quite the 
same way as individual character determines individual 
action - or the pattern is too intricate. The dramatist 
can select and combine a few specially illustrative causal 
connexions; the historian has before him too many combin­
ations - too many facts, too many people, and above all 
the incalculable element of chance. Real particular 
events, as well as the reasoning of men, may proceed 
'unintelligently'  ^ that is, they do not always
obey the causal laws which we have come to think signif­
icant; they are determined by other 'accidental' causes - 
by the operation of factors which the politician cannot 
foresee, but must always allow for. The historian has 
first to seek, among the multiplicity of events, the 
intelligible pattern, which alone can be repeated (with 
variations according to particular circumstances) and 
which alone makes it possible to predict the course of 
events (within certain general limits). Then he has to 
present the pattern along with the multiplicity of events.
^Thuc.1.140*1 (poricles)
t^ceov y ToZ ' X  ' O (T~f ç rCotv V
Of.1.78.1, 2.61.2, 3.45.5-6.
J
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The dramatist has only to present the pattern.
He can (if he wishes) exclude chance, he can exclude the 
interaction of too many sets of events; he can concentrate 
upon the precise number of persons needed to make the set 
he chooses significant. He can present motive and action, 
character and happiness or unhappiness together, in a single 
interrelation^ 'action* or series of actions; and so he shows 
the philosopher the field where the moral judgment can be 
applied, and the material on which moral analysis can 
begin.
This field is (1) the actions, character and 
motives of the individual, considered in relation to a 
carefully limited set of circumstances, or in relation to 
other individuals who have some special claim upon him.
(2) The dramatist may also present the group, but rather as 
feeling collectively than as acting collectively. The 
philosopher too considers but has not yet solved the 
problem of collective action and collective responsibility.
(3) The dramatist will sometimes present together two or 
more individuals who are in some way inextricably linked 
in the same set of circumstances. Two individuals can 
share the same tragic destiny; can they ever share the same 
moral judgment? can we ever consider the action as joint 
action and pass, not the same verdict on each, but one on 
both? This would be relevant not only to some acts of 
individuals, but also to the larger problems of social and 
political action and responsibility.
The moral judgment is passed, in the first place, 
on the individual, but only in so far as he resembles other 
individuals in possessing general characteristics, which 
enable us to classify his acts and motives as good or bad, 
right or wrong, or if his acts themselves are judged right 
or wrong in virtue of their own character, it is because 
they have that character, in common with other acts of the 
same kind. The philosopher, in analysing motive and action, 
can take account only of the general connexions between 
them, and the broad types of character and situation, which 
have now come to form the major premisses for most of our 
particular judgments about right and wrong.
The dramatist shows these general connexions so 
clearly, not because he recognises it as a duty to portray 
types rather than individuals, but because artistic unity 
requires that action should proceed from character, and 
the dramatic effect is greater if certain combinations are 
repeated in distinct and easily recognisable forms.
11
when I say that>artistic unity requires’that 
action should proceed from character, I do not mean that 
here either Sophocles was consciously anticipating Arist- 
totle's rule/ The artistic need could hardly be felt, 
unless character were already regarded as the main cause 
of action. The artist would not, of course, be likely to 
show action proceeding contrary to character, unless for a 
special reason; but there are some tragic situations where 
the portrayal of character is almost superfluous. Jn the 
Qhoephori, since Apollo ordered the crime, Orestea and 
Electra need not be characterised as natural murderers, in 
a drama where plot, not character, is * given', the primary 
dramatic need is that the characters shall be such as to
play the part required of them, whatever that part is.
They will be shown fully as agents, and the exact relation 
between character and action will be seen, only if the 
dramatist's conception of the 'action' is such that human 
causation receives its full share of interest and attention.
The primary need of drama is that the persons 
shall be such as to contribute just so much to the 'action' 
as the nature of the other causes permit. If character is
shown at all, it will appear to contribute to the action,
or at least to influence the construction we are to put 
upon events.
In history - or any form of narrative - this is 
not so. The tyrant's misery may be due merely to divine 
jealousy of his former happinessor if it is a question of 
punishment, it may be simply his action that offends, or 
even the action of one of his ancestors;^ his own character 
may be admirable. Herodotus presents us with this sort of 
picture, where character has little or no significance for 
either action or suffering. But the possibility of this 
depends entirely on the discursive method of history - the 
'narrative manner' need not show character at all. The 
dramatist, who concentrates upon a single scene or even a
/(/Li O UK
ipoet. 1454 a 53, 1451 b 8, 1449 b 36 -5o a 2. ,
‘Hd.t.3.40-2 (Aiaasis to polycrates) V"
X ^C ' CK rv C i   ^ ^ ^  fn O V S r> Bov f -^ o v  . of. 7.10 G , 1 . 207 . 2
( Croesus to Q y r u s  j  u,^ KutcJ»s tujv r^? ^
*Hdt.1.91.1 (reply of the Delphic oracle to Croesus) 
thfyuTT7TTV ^at- 7u-Ç rT/(^ éf. n.-rii. Cf • Eur.Hlpp.831"“3, 1379 —83 ,
soph.0,C.965.
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single action, and actually shows us the persons as they 
perform it, cannot tolerate this lack of connexion between 
character and action. Action must have some motive, and if 
action is shown before our eyes,this motive must be included 
in the presentation, and so will acquire significance.
Detail may be excluded because it is irrelevant, but any 
that is there cannot but become relevant, if character is 
said to be lacking, or to be merely functional, it means 
that there is just so much of it as is needed to explain 
the action and no more. If character is shown at all, we 
shall inevitably use it to explain the action.
Irrelevant characterisation is moreover unlikely, 
when only the story is fixed by tradition. The characters ' 
are then simply deduced from the actions they perform - 
how else could we form an idea of them except by imagining 
them such as to perform the actions? The result is that in 
the presentation action appears to follow from character 
and character to account for action.
The 'clue' to character may be the one 'tragic' ,
act which is the main feature in the traditional story, |
But if character is to be consistent it must be such as to '
account for all the action that is presented in the play 
and not only the one tragic act. If character had been the
starting point of the plot, we might have had different
actions chosen to illustrate different traits ; but as it 
is, the different actions tend to be shown rather as 
repetitions of the original 'tragic' motive. This repetit­
ion, whether intentionally or unintentionally, serves to 
isolate and to emphasise the characteristic motive and to 
show it, not only as a permanent feature of the character, 
but also as the chief operating cause mn the action.
^Sophocles frequently illustrates different aspects of a 
character at the same time, but the main tragic motive is 
always kept clear, e.g. Electra 8o4 f., where Electra, 
mourning Orestes' death, reveals her affection for her 
brother, but at the same time the bitterness of her hatred 
against her mother is increased.
13
The dramatist might succeed in showing this direct 
relation between motive, action and character, and so 
between character and happiness or unhappiness, without 
holding any special theory. It will depend rather on the 
point where he chooses to focus the dramatic interest, on 
the amount of attention he has to spare for the human side 
of events. in Aeschylus, tragic victims are at least 
partly responsible for their own doom, since they are such 
as to cooperate with the transcendental powers which are 
directly responsible, character is presented, and human 
responsibility is asserted, but the supernatural causation 
is the chief thing, on which he concentrates both the 
thought and the emotional atmosphere of a play. The result 
is that, apart from any special theory he may hold, human 
character does not appear as a direct or sufficient cause 
for action or happiness, because its relation to it is not 
dramatically shown.
If, however, the transcendental laws are excluded 
from the presentation, and human acts, motives, character 
receive almost exclusive attention, the inevitable result 
is that these do appear as the direct and sufficient cause 
of action in any given situation, and the supernatural 
causation, even if it is still there in theory, is left 
somehow floating and disconnected, relevant mainly through 
the beliefs and emotions of the human agents. Sophocles 
never quite succeeds in eliminating the supernatural 
altogether - perhaps he succeeds a good deal better than 
he intended, oracles are fulfilled, divine guidance is 
asserted, but at the same time there is no break in the 
causal chain leading from character to action and from 
action to happiness or unhappiness. Human responsibility 
is limited only by ignorance, instances of divine 
intervention are there - in the Ajax for instance - buji 
they never appear sufficient in themselves to determine 
the whole course of events.
What does appear sufficient to determine the 
course of events is the set of actions, which are the 
repeated manifestations of the same human motive and 
character.
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Hence the puzzle of the part played by the gods in 
Sophocles* plays. It is a puzzle, not because Sophocles 
displays the vagueness of Greek orthodox belief, but because, 
having no general theory of divine causation to present, he 
concentrates on human causation, and owing to the artistic 
need to deduce character from action, he shows no break in 
the causal chain, excp&t where ignorance or chance limits 
human responsibility. Here, if anywhere, the relation 
between the divine and human agency is seen, in the chance 
combinations, where ignorance removes from man the control 
of his actions. Yet this is hardly a comforting thought to 
the religious mind, since it merely means that the behaviour 
of the gods is unpredictable - not part of the intelligible 
pattern at all.
Because, as a dramatist, he concentrates upon the 
intelligible pattern, Sophocles has shown the moralist a 
solution which he himself does not appear to have fully 
accepted. Let us take the case of Oedipus. Oedipus acted 
in ignorance, therefore in one sense he did not fully cause 
his action, can it be said that the gods did? if so, he 
requires compensation from the gods and he gets it in the 
second play. The action remains a crime and Oedipus pays 
for it, but the gods caused it and they give satisfaction 
in the end. This is the first religious belief, resting on 
a moral principle of strict justice. But there is another 
religious belief, resting on another moral feeling, which 
remains even when the religious belief which it supports 
disappears. Oedipus acted in ignorance, therefore he is 
morally innocent, therefore he does not deserve his misery. 
(That virtue deserves happiness and vice unhappiness is 
still usually regarded as one of our few remaining moral 
«intuitions’.)^  The moralist can go no further, except to 
remark that here the moral judgment cannot be pronounced 
and only an emotion remains But the religious mind will 
go further and attribute moral feeling to the gods, who,
even if they did not cause the action, must feel as we do
and have the power to translate their feeling into action. 
Therefore Oedipus must be justified by the gods, but the 
fact remains that his life has been wasted,^ and if the gods
^ OfTsroad^ffIve^Typesthical~"The 0ry p.134, Ross The Right 
and the Good p.135 (argt.2b), Foundations of Ethics p.72 
(argt.2 end). Cf.Kant's notion of the 'bonum consummatum', 
and Aristotle's view that suffering virtue is not a fit
subject for tragedy, poet.1452 b 34 f.
Ej^ N .1111 a 1 f «f - T o u T b i ^  • O T O u T u i V T-  l i n  o o  I T ^ n T r é ,
0.0.395 p y T ^ oi \r f-o  ^ 7 T I - ^  ■
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had the power to interfere then, they presumably had the 
power to interfere before, if they had wished. The 
religious solution therefore fails to give satisfaction, 
and we are left with the same feeling of moral discomfort, 
that happiness ought to be, but is not, proportionate to 
virtue - and again, with an emotion.
Sophocles does not clearly distinguish between 
these two beliefs, jn the first play, the guilt of Oedipus 
is taken for granted by both gods and men, including 
himself, but at the same time he attributes his misfortunes 
to Apollo, in the second play he repeatedly asserts his 
own innocence, on the ground (1) that he acted in ignorance^ 
and (2) in the case of his father, in self-defence.* But he 
still believes that the gods guided him. The justice of 
the gods seems to be assumed in 279-80, yet this is hard to 
reconcile with their earlier condemnation, still harder if 
we believe, with Oedipus, that they led him into evil. 
Oedipus himself falls back on the old theory of divine 
anger against his race (P.O.964-5). But the old belief, 
though it suits the facts of the story, conflicts with our 
new moral insight; for if ignorance, instead of merely 
exonerating the agent from blame, transfers it to the gods, 
how is this consistent with divine justice? The innocent 
man is nevertheless plunged into misery, and even if this 
does not imply a divine condemnation, there is no moral 
principle on which it can be justified. This doubt and 
inconsistency lead us to the other explanation, which the 
drama shows so clearly, i.e. the causal sequence of 
character and action which, taken with his ignorance, is 
sufficient in itself to account for the misery of Oedipus.
Sophocles has shown that Oedipus' sufferings arose 
from a series of acts all proceeding from the same general 
character - a quickness of temper and an intellectual pride 
- which could and did lead to morally wrong action in 
certain cases, though the fatal act itself could not be 
described as morally wrong, since it was done in ignorance. 
This character, even if not morally wrong, is always 
morally dangerous, since it is always liable to lead to 
wrong acts. So the fatal act, even if not wrong in itself, 
did proceed from a disposition, which is certainly not 
right, to perform acts which are always liable to be wrong.
'O^G.273,5 47-8,522-3,946-8,976,983,987.
*0.C. 271,992 f. in the 0_^ T. it appears rather as a typical 
act of anger, 8q 4 f ., cf.Ar.£,N.H35 a 28, 1148 a 25 f.
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Any character who comes to disaster in Sophocles 
does so owing to lack of the saving quality of moral 
understanding (to ). This (like Butler's Conscience,
either a 'perception of the heart or a sentiment of the 
understanding') is both an intuitive perception of what 
is right and fitting conduct in a man (namely respect for 
the gods and for the rights of other men), and an emotional 
restraint. Odysseus in the Ajax has this quality.The 
lack of it seems to take various positive forms, all of 
them liable to lead to disaster : common to all is disregard 
for the rights and opinions of other people. Even 
Antigone, who does nothing but what is right, sees no 
point of view but her own.
It is not represented as the whole of virtue by 
any means. Lack of it is usually represented in combin­
ation with other virtuous qualities - heroic courage, for 
instance, in Ajax and Heracles - and not all the acts 
which proceed from it are wrong. Not all Oedipus' 
impetuous acts are morally blameworthy. Antigone's first 
act, the burial, is morally right; her second, hanging 
herself, is not morally wrong.
But it is represented as the supreme moral 
quality, and as directly connected with happiness. The 
contrary character, even when not immediately perceived 
as a moral fault, may always lead to unhappiness, when 
it is not a moral fault, we bestow the blame on others, 
but we recognise that even here it is the victim's own 
character which is the direct cause of misfortune. This 
is shown because the catastrophe is caused, not usually 
by a single act, but by a cumulative series of acts, all 
arising from the same disposition. One of these acts by 
itself would not have precipitated disaster. Antigone 
would have escaped the consequences of her defiance of 
authority if she had not been so swift to hang herself;
Ajax might have escaped the consequences of the sheep- 
slaying, if the same spirit had not led him to suicide. 
Heracles would have avoided the penalty for sacking 
Qechalia, if he had not sent lole to live under the same
 ^A j . 1332 f.,Cf.l2Q-6. cf • Hdt . 1 • 86 . 6 kA t .v o-n
aLuTVS V t f - f  to T rO j 6 w y  yrlAo/ qt-vCff>uJ7r  6 y  ^ y  é-v A Alroy C-oL u , ou e-u o r  >2 O U K  É-,{ oi ^
77 I , 77 ^  0 i  T7- T  O u ro i  «■ ( Xf-» ^ t>c .  T n». Ty y TI CIV /to»-» ^  TT"» r /  ^ (Hr «> V Cuj *~\J S f-V
>! n 3 3 / * J I  '  '  / )  /  \  /
6"; Ji^v (~v <X 8  ^  (»■ r< f-xo ^  Cy' ^  €l V S'/'i é V r tv y 70 o jv e-u ov
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roof with his wife. Oedipus* misery is the result of a 
whole series of actions, culminating in the self-blinding. 
Creon, after his first resolution not to favour his 
relations, is led into a whole series of crimes against his 
family. Clytmmnestra is not only an unnatural wife, but an 
unnatural mother. The one exception is Deianeira, whose 
one rash act does not arise from a disposition to perform 
such a c t s b u t  leads directly to her catastrophe.
It will have been clear for some time that I mean 
to point out that this conception of a moral understanding 
which is at the same time an intellectual perception and an 
emotional control, which is not the whole of virtue but on 
which the virtuousness of the whole depends, is strongly 
reminiscent of the Aristotelian . Aristotle also
holds that ignorance of fact exonerates from blame. And in 
Aristotle's account character is a disposition to perform 
certain actions ; the disposition, rather than the single 
act, is morally significant and most intimately connected 
with happiness.
The dramatist does not, indeed, see the moral 
significance of character and its connexion with happiness 
quite as the philosopher sees them. That is what I mean 
by saying that the dramatist, who makes the discovery, does 
not use it to provide a moral solution for the action which 
he represents. For him it is tragically, not morally, 
significant.
The discovery is this, since action arises from 
character, or from one element in the whole character, and 
since this has been repeatedly shown in the dramatic 
presentation, character is now clearly seen as a disposition 
to perform acts of a certain kind. It is the whole series 
of such acts which, in the dramatic presentation, gives 
tragic significance to the character from which they arise, 
since they lead collectively, not singly, to disaster. But 
the moral significance of this is not yet shown.
^It arises nevertheless from her excessive timidity and lack 
of worldly wisdom, gee Bowra, gophoclean Tragedy p.127-8, 
on the legal aspect of her offence.
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in the series, there is usually one act which is 
more significant than the rest, which, in the current 
story, leads directly to the disaster, in the gophoclean 
presentation, it remains the chief object of attention, and 
it usually gives the clue to character, but the character 
itself, shown through the whole series, is seen to be 
responsible for the disaster. This character is often a 
moral defect. Yet, when we pass judgment on the single 
act, that it proceeds from such a character is not taken 
into consideration. Apart from the mere feeling of horror 
at what is done, the only morally significant fact about 
the 'crime* of Oedipus, or of peianeira, is that it was 
committed in ignorance. The morally significant fact about 
Antigone*s action is that it coincided with the laws of 
heaven; the morally significant fact about creon*s that it 
violated them. The same disposition, which is itself wrong, 
can lead not only to action that is morally wrong but also 
to action that is morally indifferent or even right. This 
is a definite difference from the Aristotelian view, and it 
certainly obscures the moral interpretation of the plays.
This lack of clarity I take to be a sign that 
gophocles was not specially interested in the moral 
implications of his discovery - that it is, in fact, simply
an artistic and dramatic discovery, in drama, as we have
seen, character must be such as to account for the action,
if not directly and wholly, at least in that measure and
degree which is required by the presence or absence of 
other * causes*, if there are no competitive causes, and 
our attention is directed upon the human actions in greater 
detail, then the single * tragic * act is likely to be shown 
in an environment of other actions, also arising from 
character, and the whole series will appear as a single 
chain of cause and effect leading cumulatively to disaster. 
Character will seem responsible for this disaster, because 
all the acts happen to proceed from the same feature in 
the character.
Why is this? why are all the actions in the 
tragic series shown proceeding from the same feature in 
character? Is it because gophocles was consciously 
developing a dramatic conception in which laws of human 
behaviour were to take the place of transcendental laws?
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I do not wish to maintain that this was not his 
motive, but to suggest that there might have been other 
motives. (1) To show each act proceeding from the same 
characteristic gives the necessary unity to what might not 
otherwise be seen as a single chain. (2) To depict other 
motives would not only be irrelevant but would detract 
from the clearness with which the main tragic motive is 
shown, similarly any action that is represented cannot 
be irrelevant, but must either lead directly to the 
disaster or at least contribute to the emotional effect 
of the disaster. (3) Sophocles may have really wished to 
isolate and emphasise the original motive, in order to 
show clearly that this human fact was the real and 
sufficient cause of catastrophe. (4) Or he may simply 
have liked the repetition for its own sake.
Repetition is a common dramatic device, because 
it has a peculiarly strong emotional effect. Sophocles 
uses it more than either of the other two dramatists, and 
not only to illustrate character. Greon, after forbidding 
his nephew’s burial on the ground that the bad should not 
receive the same treatment as the good,^ and that one must 
disregard personal ties in the city’s interestfinds 
himself obliged, in order to be consistent, to ignore 
these claims of kinship three times over in the play. This 
kind of repetition is dramatically as effective as the 
repeated demonstration of opinionated stubbornness which 
accompanies it. And as this characteristic motive 
intensifies with opposition, so the action itself rises 
to a climax, as the personal ties which he sacrifices come 
closer and closer to himself : his nephew - his niece and 
son’s betrothed - his own son - and last, his wife, just 
as Antigone chose to remember love rather than hate, and 
so in death will be dear to those she l o v e s s o  Greon, 
who chose to remember hate, lives to be hated himself by 
all his most intimate family.
^Antig.207-8, cf.520. 
1182-3, 187-90.
"73, 522-4, 897-9.
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SO in the Oedipus the contrast between blindness 
and sight, moral and physical, recurs like a theme 
throughout the play/ Teiresias, the blind man, sees; 
Oedipus, who sees, is blind. And when Oedipus sees with 
his eyes he is blind with his mind - when he sees with his 
mind, he blinds himself. Re credits himself with exactly 
that insight which he does not possess;^he thought he had 
found good fortune exactly where he had found disaster, 
and that he had avoided catastrophe for ever, at the 
precise moment when the catastrophe was about to be 
revealed.
This kind of repetition tightens the dramatic 
unity, and as an artistic device, explains and justifies 
itself. If the repetition of character and motive is a 
similar device, it is not surprising that Sophocles failed 
to emphasise the moral significance of the relation which 
he himself has shown between the character and the 
disaster to which the whole series of actions leads. The 
character itself he shows as a moral defect and as leading 
to unhappiness. But he does not connect these two facts 
in any single moral judgment.
This is, of course, exactly what we should expect 
from the dramatist. The dramatist could not say, for 
instance, that because the character is defective, it 
deserves the unhappiness. The tragic emotion requires 
that the amount of suffering should be at least disprop­
ortionate to the moral fault, jn Sophocles, either the 
other virtues of the hero appear to deserve a better 
fate, or if action alone be considered, we forget the 
contributory actions and the motive from which all 
proceeded, and insist that an act done in ignorance is 
morally blameless and cannot deserve the unhappiness it 
caused. But our own presentation has shown that this act 
alone did not cause the unhappiness.
"O^T.316 f., 367, 371-5, 413, 419, 454, 749.
^Oedipus prides himself on his flair for reading riddles 
(441 ), and this claim is, in
a sense, justified, for his remarkable lack of foresight, 
on the ordinary level, amounts to an intuitive and 
unconscious perception of the evil divine purpose which 
will destroy him - an equivalence which is made explicit 
in the self-blinding. Re misreads creon and jocasta (382, 
1q 62), but his instantaneous response to the requirements 
of his own is a form of moral genius.
21
The dramatist will always deceive us in this way, 
for it is part of his art to make some things seem 'big' 
and others ’ small'/jt is part of his art to make us forget 
that Oedipus acted in anger when he killed his father, and 
that the same anger led him later to curse his sons. But 
the philosopher will not forget. He will note the dramatic 
sequence of character - action - happiness or unhappiness, 
and he will preserve this sequence intact in his moral 
theory. He may even form a fresh theory about drama on the 
basis of it.
30 , for Aristotle, happiness simply ^  the virtuous 
activity, manifested in the action series, which is the 
actualisation of the character, which is the disposition to 
perform the actions. This potentiality is not realised in 
a single virtuous action, but only in a series, the limits 
of which are hard to define - we can only say, that it ends 
with the individual's life.^
Sophocles certainly did not mean by 'happiness' 
virtuous activity, and it may be doubted whether Aristotle 
did either, but on both their showings, completely virtuous 
activity would coincide with happiness, it is where virtue 
is incomplete that the disproportion is felt; evidently, 
where happiness is concerned, a miss is as good as a mile. 
But for Sophocles too, happiness or unhappiness depends on 
a series of actions arising from the same disposition, 
limited by the length of the play if not by the length of 
life - though this is in many cases the same.
The dramatist's presentation may, then, provide 
the clue, not only to Aristotle's classification .of 
voluntary and involuntary action, but also to his view of 
as a relation between character and action that 
is made manifest, not in the single act, but only in a 
complete life. The action of a sophoclean tragedy is, in 
this sense, complete; it is one on which the moral judgment 
cannot be passed, but which 'represents' life and happiness 
by showing^not happiness itself but its limitations, not 
virtue but its natural counterpart, the ^ B o ç which, 
combined with ignorance of fact, leads man by the unseen 
way of the divine.^
^poet.1456 b 1 /c/j; ^ n ^ ^ o r < j T ^
^17n7i o 98 a 16-8, llQO a 5 f.
 ^see especially E.E.1246 b 37 f.
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Divine Intervention in Sophocles
Did Sophocles wish to present together both the 
ultimate conti&l of the gods and individual human freedom? 
Dramatically these are hard to combine and in Aeschylus 
and Euripides they are incompatible. But in Sophocles, 
even if the plot turns on an oracle or a prophecy, there 
is no driving and compelling force moulding events step by 
step in accordance with its decree, jn the Electra, the 
oracle is a divine sanction, not a divine command.^ The 
forecast may admit an alternative, as in the Trachiniae 
(79-80); it is only after the catastrophe that we come to 
learn of other converging prophecies (1159) and so to 
attribute the whole to Zeus (1278). Dramatically this 
difference is essential; for although later reflection on 
the coincidence of the outcome with prophecy may lead us 
to ascribe the antecedent events to heaven, as they occur 
they are not seen as a^cts of divine vengeance or as part 
of a divine plan, but as human acts performed by human 
agents from human motives.^
If, on the other hand, divine intervention occurs 
at the beginning of a play, as in the Ajax, this does not 
in itself necessitate the catastrophe. Athena herself 
makes no promise of disaster, and we are expressly told 
that there is a chance of escape, since her anger is to 
pursue Ajax for one day only (756-7). Here, as in the 
other plays, the final catastrophe is brought about only 
by the complete series of human actions. In the psychology 
of these actions, apart farom the special cases, no divine 
compulsion can be detected, and although they may fulfil 
a particular prophecy, they are not necessitated by any 
metaphysical law.
 ^El *37 ■’e-v'///TTo
^SO in the philoctetes, although Heracles appears (? LzA 
) to arrange the ending of the play, he does not 
participate in the earlier action, which is so little 
controlled that it proceeds in a direction quite contrary 
to the final result; we know from 68-9 that Troy cannot 
be taken without philoctetes, but it is not until the 
end that we learn that its capture is the will of Zeus 
(1415 f.), since we need not believe Odysseus (889-90).
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Even in the special cases, we are more conscious 
of the human action than of the divine instigation. Athena 
does not inspire Ajax* anger (Aj.41), but merely deludes 
him (43) and encourages him (59-60, 114-5).
When the messenger relates that the frantic 
Oedipus is guided by some to the scene of jocasta*s
death (0.T.1258-6Q), and Oedipus himself attributes the 
inspiration of his self-blinding to Apollo (1329-30), in 
the same breath he claims the action as his own and gives 
good reasons for it (1331-5, 1369 f.). As a reaction of 
Oedipus, it is entirely consistent with the wild nature 
and strange genius^that we know; moreover, this and his 
later misery is the direct result of his own curse upon 
the murderer of laius (1381-3, 246 f.). with the same 
fervour and efficacy he later curses his sons.
SO, at the last, when he feels the divine urgency 
again upon him (0.C.1540 f.), it appears as the consummat­
ion of the nobility and force of character which has, like 
the Aristotelian triumphed over adverse circum­
stances. just as the first instance of divine intervention 
coincides with his self-condemnation, so the second is a 
divine confirmation (long delayed) of his self-vindication. 
But this is not in itself an indication that all Oedipus* 
previous acts are to be attributed to the divine will.
Oedipus himself believes that his life has been, 
from the first, divinely guided,^ and that Apollo is 
directly responsible for his misery.^ But apart from the 
two instances already mentioned, and the replies of the 
oracle, there is no evidence of direct divine iKjüüOüüÜüaK 
interference with the course of events. The only other 
way in which they might be influenced is through human 
ignorance and chance. These two, taken together, form the 
field of the incalculable, to which, now as then, we are 
only too ready to assign the divine.
 ^see note 2 on page 20.
 ^E^N.llOO b 20 f.
 ^O.T.145T tty ^ 077- j  d T/C loy eCui  9 ^ v , '  iTi' Ti^ ^ K  . C f  . / 3 .
^07t .1329-30, cf.377. ‘That Teiresias, as Apollo's priest, 
knows the secret but refuses to utter it, may be a sign 
both of the god's complicity and of his method: the 
denouement is to be brought about by human means.
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Lock (C.R.ix p.252 on ) argues that
whenever an agent produces an effect which is the opposite 
of the effect intended, the impression of an overruling 
destiny is received. This is not, I think, the case unless 
the result is foretold by prophecy or there is some other 
clear indication of divine purpose or necessity. Failing 
this, the outcome is more readily ascribed to (as Lock 
notes later), whether this is thought of as proceeding from 
the gods or not. If it is thought of as proceeding from 
the gods, the issue then is, whether such“instances of 
divine intervention can be brought under some rule. If 
they cannot, if we cannot believe that heaven acts either 
morally or malignantly, but at least intelligibly, there is 
little point in ascribing 'chance* coincidences to heaven.
in the story of Oedipus these coincidences play 
no small part. But, in the drama, their place is ceded to 
the known causes of events, the character, motive and 
beliefs of the human agents, by means of which the poet 
seeks to mould the events of the story into a single 
interrelated human 'action*. in so doing he provides an 
alternative explanation for the disastrous outcome.
Divine action can then be thought of in two ways, 
either (a) as the residuum, co-extensive with human 
ignorance and chance, or (b) as the whole causal process, 
including both chance and human activity.
Human and divine action are thus relatively 
independent, the one enfolding the other - or, if human 
action be subtracted from the major pattern, there is 
little left except the interplay of circumstance.
1 have argued elsewhere^that the element of 
dramatic probability in the plot can be made to support 
the idea of a deliberate divine purpose, working in 
opposition to the human. Yet it is hard to explain how 
an: d why such a purpose should have existed.
we shall need a new conception of the divine, 
before the intervention of the gods can be used to provide 
an explanation of the human action itself, and so find a 
new and vital place in drama.
 ^Tr âgî"Êr rôr7""c7Q7xî i i ITpTB 47 This sub-sect ion was revised 
in 1950.
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(ii) Mainly Euripides 
Character as a 'force*.
I have suggested that Sophocles' presentation of 
character may be due simply to an artistic and dramatic 
need to exclude the irrelevant, or to gain the dramatic 
effect of repetition, without conscious substitution of 
character as the determining factor in action or suffering, 
in place of supernatural causes. I have suggested that it 
may merely appear as the determining factor, because in 
the dramatic presentation he has shown a complete causal 
series sufficient in itself to account for the catastrophe, 
without divine intervention.
But it is easy to see that character might come to 
be thought of as a 'determining' factor, in another sense, 
properly speaking, if action proceeds from character, it 
does not follow that character determines action, in the 
sense of compelling it. But in the older dramatic concept­
ion of Aeschylus, there really are forces which compel 
action in this way. when these forces disappear from thé 
stage, it is easy for character to slip into their place.
SO, once we have chosen to exclude the supernatural and to 
present only the human side of the picture, human character 
and motive may themselves appear as 'forces', exerting the 
same sort of influence as the supernatural forces exerted, 
because they are a dramatic substitute for them.
In Sophocles this does sometimes seem to happen. 
Oedipus, Ajax, Heracles, even Deianeira and Antigone, are 
all victims of their own nature, as well as of circum­
stances. Yet in Sophocles the essential difference between 
the two kinds of causation is still kept clear. Sophocles* 
agents may act in virtue of their character, but they still 
appear 'free'. They act with their whole nature, that is, 
they will their actions. Even if character is altered, or 
if one passion or mood predominates, they do not appear 
'overmastered' or 'driven* either by circumstances or by a 
single element in their nature in opposition to the rest. 
The one exception is Ajax.
But Euripides does sometimes show the sort of 
psychology which is inconsistent with freedom. Not only 
does he isolate and exaggerate single motives beyond power 
of human resistance, but he deliberately presents alongside 
with them the corresponding principles in the shape of gods, 
So he uses the older dramatic conception of a supernatural
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cause, not in order to supplant the psychical causation, 
but to reinforce it; to increase the sense of * internal * 
necessity by showing with it an 'external* necessity - 
whether this should be regarded as a divine will or as a 
natural force. The parallel presentation seems to be a 
dramatic device with deliberate intent to confuse the two 
kinds of causation - or perhaps i should rather say to 
show what Euripides believes to be a real resemblance 
between them.
In Euripides the 'necessity' appears only in extra­
ordinary cases. But the effect of this kind of confusion 
on moral psychology is obvious. if motives, passions and 
desires are conceived like agents within the agent, or if 
man's own nature is analysed into different elemen^ts which 
fight and master and enslave one another, character becomes 
not a disposition to perform quite freely certain actions 
from certain motives, but a compelling force inconsistent 
with freedom. It will be regarded as self-evident that we 
always act from the 'strongest' motive, and that therefore 
we cannot act otherwise than as we do. The causation that 
began by being thought of as belonging to other wills or 
to natural forces ends by being thought of as exisiting 
within the man himself, so that his own will becomes an 
illusion and morality disappears.
Since this is also one tendency of moral psychology 
at the present time, it will perhaps seem unconvincing to 
attribute it to a dramatic presentation in the fifth 
century B.C. Yet moralists who point out the fallacy of 
this way of thinking agree in attributing it to a confusion 
between the influence of motives (desires, emotions etc.) 
and the influence exerted by physical forces : mental 
causation has, they say, been confused with physical 
causation.^ If so, it is perhaps less unconvincing to 
suggest that a similar tendency in the fifth century B.C. 
arose from a similar confusion, and that it is an 
inheritance from the poets who treated character and 
motive as a substitute for other kinds of causation.
^See especially the following passages : (1) Ross, The 
Foundations of Ethics ch.x p.224: *We are aware that a 
certain kind of activity called choice or resolution takes 
place; ; and we are aware that it is we aiiel not anything 
else that performs this activity, we are aware that 
desires are not like physical forces beating on a physical
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Characterisation and psychology
I have so far used the word character to refer 
either to the sum-total of qualities and motives which 
exist in the individual, including those which are from 
time to time uppermost, or (in Aristotle's sense) to a 
more or less permanent disposition to perform certain 
actions rather than others. I have suggested that 
Sophocles, in showing action as repeatedly proceeding 
from the same motive, or feature in character, has 
presented a view of character resembling Aristotle's.
(cont.)
body from without, to which it is merely passive. They 
are occurences happening in the very same being which 
chooses among them; and they are occurrences such that the 
mere occurrence of one stronger than all the others does 
not ipso facto lead to corresponding action.' (2) Ibid. p. 
228: 'What choice depends on, and reveals, is not the 
strength of isolated desires, but the trend of the whole 
character, of the whole system of more or less permanent 
desires, including of course the desire to do one's duty, 
(p.229) .. But, on the other hand, it must not be supposed 
that all the desires that are present in me co-operate to 
determine my action, as the movement of a body is determ­
ined, in accordance with the parallelogram of forces, by 
all the forces that are acting upon it.. (p.229-30) This, 
it seems to me, is the great difference between physical 
and mental causation, that in the latter there is no law 
of the composition of all the forces concerned, but some 
of the forces concerned are, by an act of ISXXX choice, 
deprived of any effect on action.' (3) Joseph, gome
problems in Ethics, p.128: 'That my choice is free does 
not mean that it does not proceed from what i am, or from 
my nature. It means that what i am is not to be explained 
from the nature of something else acting on me, or from 
the nature of the elements now composing me, which these 
elements had before entering into the composition which 
is I, and retain although from time to time they vary 
their combinations in different aggregates. For then 
these elements would be the genuine entities, whereas it 
must be I that am, if the choice is mine.' (4) Ibid.p.43 :
'Take away the single man's purpose, and there is no act, 
and nothing right or wrong.'
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But when Sophocles shows action as proceeding from 
one motive, or feature in character, I have argued that 
this does not mean that action is caused or produced by it 
in any other sense than that the whole man acts, from that 
particular motive, but in virtue of what he is as a~whole - 
a 'free agent*, with will, emotions, desires, beliefs 
determined, at that moment and more or less permanently, 
in a certain way. The particular motive is not presented 
as determining character in any sense which conflicts with 
the normal agency of the individual, we do not, for 
instance, see action as if it were contarolled or produced 
by passion alone, or desire alone, without the reason, 
.viewed as elements or 'parts’ of our nature, which can act 
in isolation, apart from an^even in conflict with each 
XX other.
To show action as proceeding from passion or 
desire is not the same as to show it as proceeding from 
character. Reason, passion and desire are not part^ of 
character as such, but only In so far as they are 
determined in a certain way. Action might proceed from 
passion, and be at the same time contrary to character. 
Action which is in accordance with character normally 
proceeds from all the parts of the nature, considered as 
a whole - unless it is a feature of the character that one 
part should be regularly submerged. To show action not 
merely as the result of some special tendency or character­
istic in the individual, but as entirely caused by one 
part of his nature in distinction from the other parts, is 
to show a new interest in the psychological analysis of 
motive and action.
The type of character which Sophocles presents 
is usually the type in which 'passion* of some kind 
predominates, in the sense that it determines the will 
more or less regularly in certain ways, we see it as 
repeatedly influencing speech and action, and so as a 
more or less permanent disposition of the mind, we do not 
see it (except possibly in the Ajax) as acquiring this 
influence and predominance over the other elements in t h h  
nature, as an exceptional state, so that it appears to 
cause action rather directly, as a single, almost separable 
element, than as an aspect of a character which causes' 
action as a whole.
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For this sort of analysis we need not a series of 
actions, but rather a single action, which is the climax of 
a series of events which are not themselves manifestations 
of this state of mind, but actually produce it. it is the 
conception, not of the permanent character of an individual 
- resembling perhaps that of other individuals - but of a 
permanent part of human nature, determining action, not 
regularly as the regular disposition of the single will, 
but in a single tragic moment, in response to special 
provocation. The pattern may indeed be repeated, but it 
is unlikely to recur within the experience of the same 
individual. It is a 'universal* thing, not as remaining 
a permanent possibility in the same individual, but as a 
permanent possibility in any human being, given the 
special provocation.
But what we gain for psychology we lose for 
characterisation. If we were to isolate a certain aspect 
of the character of Oedipus, Heracles, Electra, philoctetes, 
and call it ^ we should gain in simplicity, but we
should lose in truth, in the particularisation of the 
portrait of each character. For this feature is not the 
same in every case, but affects and is affected by the rest 
of the character. Oedipus' passion is not separable from 
Oedipus, and in Antigone the inherited characteristic takes 
a different form. The passion of Ajax and Heracles, though 
the character type is similar, differs in each; in Ajax it 
is more a recurring mood, in Heracles a permanent disposit­
ion to take account of nothing but his own desires. Electra 
and Antigone have a similar kind of passionate feeling, but 
the reaction of the one is love, of the other, hate.
If we abstract what is common to all these 
characters, the passionate reaction to their different 
circumstances, and isolate it from the rest of their nature 
in order to show it as an element which exists in all human 
beings and is essentially the same in all, we must not at 
the same time show it as influenced by and bound up with 
the detail of an individual character, and an extraordinary 
character at that, but in its purest and simplest and most 
easily recognisable form, in a nature which is either 
equally simple and elemental, or whose other characteristics 
are not such as to affect and alter the tendency of the 
simple, elemental passion.
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Furthermore, in order to show it as a cause 
directly operating on its own account, not as ’influencing» 
but as 'mastering’ the rest of the nature, it is clearer 
not to show it as a permanent disposition of the will,
where the whole nature contributes to the action even if
one element is in control; it is clearer to show it as an 
extraordinary state, in response to special provocation, 
leading to a single tragic act, and to show it literally 
overpowering the other elements, which are not obedient to 
it, but rather in conflict with it, so that the act is not 
specially in accordance with, but even contrary to, the 
usual character of the agent.
And in order to show this psychological state
clearly, characterisation must be carefully controlled, 
even at the cost of inconsistency in personality and 
dramatic detail.^
The realism of Euripides is concerned, not with 
the way in which persons of a certain kind would normally 
speak or behave, but with the true nature of certain 
principles and motives common to all or most men, i.e. 
their strict consequences and the connexions between them. 
This study demands harmony of thought rather than of 
character, and the portrayal of persons in whom the single 
passion may be shown, not ’mixed’ with the richness of the 
individual personality as part of its special character 
and disposition, but in that extreme and ultimate form, 
which is abnormal in a human being, but which is liable 
to overpower any human being, given the necessary stimulus 
and provocation.
Secondly, in order to show it as a directly 
operative cause, not as merging with the rest but as 
overpowering the rest, there is need to analyse only the 
particular action, and for this we need only a sectional 
view of the soul, so to speak, we need to see only the 
'arrangement of the parts' at that particular time, not 
the complete picture of the usual disposition and whole 
character of the agent. It is clearer to present only the 
bare elements and their relations in the unparticularised 
form in which we might meet them in the text book; in 
order not to disturb the general pattern, character and 
any individual features should be as general, or as 
elementary, as possible.
 ^E.g. Medea’s partial conformity with Greek ways in Corinth. 
Phaedra’s sacrifice of Hippolytus has been thought incon-
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psychology, as the science of mental phenomena 
rather than of mi nd stends to disregard those variations 
which it cannot classify, and seeks causal connexions that 
are but dimly reflected in the normal thought and behaviour 
of human beings, in the dramatist, this analysis is not the 
same as characterisation, and convincing characterisation 
need not follow from ’psychological insight’ and ’realism’. 
Nor does it mean that human character is thought of as the 
determining cause of human action.
Sophocles, intentionally or unintentionally, 
substituted character for supernatural laws as providing 
the explanation for tragic events, and showed this sort 
of psychological determinism in place of the metaphysical 
necessity of Aeschylus. But he does not show the one as 
the full substitute for the other, since the type of ^
causation is not the same.
Euripides does show us the kind of psychological 
determinism which is a real ’necessity’, and so a cpmplete 
substitute, causally as well as dramatically, for the 
necessity of Aeschylus. He takes pains to show this by 
presenting both types of causation together as a single 
force, internally and externally active, so that each kind 
of compulsion both reinforces and explains the other.
But this kind of psychological necessity is not 
the necessity of acting in accordance with one’s character 
in the particular given circumstances - the kind of 
determinism that Ross, for instance, believes in. in 
Euripides, necessity only appears when we are dealing with 
something far more basic than character, with the primitve 
stuff of which human nature is composed and the elements 
which are combined in it. It is one of these elements 
which may destroy and overpower the rest, not a feature of 
’character’, which presupposes a regular and distinctive 
arrangement of those elements.
(cont.)
M â X M X  sistent with the ’delicacy of mind’ which she shows 
in her first speech to the Chorus.
1 rSc. the mind itself may be a ’fiction’.
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The predictability of human behaviour, which is 
usually thought of as part of the idea of determinism, 
does depend on these regular patterns. But quasi-mechanical 
causation is not an idea which necessarily goes with 
determinism. m  fact, the possibility of this sort of 
causation within the soul would tend to make human 
behaviour unpredictable.
To show this kind of causation is to show that it 
is not ’character* that is being analysed, but the ’soul 
of man*. This analysis, in seeking to discover the precise 
causal relation between motive and action, does not display 
the normal ’active* causation of the individual - a single 
indivisible act of will - but tries to explain that 
causation in terms of a different series of cause and 
effect.
If Euripides’ dramatic purpose induced him to 
present this analysis, a dramatist’s discovery has again 
given the lead to moral philosophy.
What led him to make the discovery? was it simply 
a dramatic development for which, as Haigh so beautifully 
puts it, ’the time had now come’?
Or did Euripides deliberately apply new 
philosophical ideas to the older dramatic conceptions?
I shall attempt to answer these questions in a later 
section.
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(i i i) Aeschylus and Euripides 
supernatural causation
in the last section I argued that Euripides, but 
not Sophocles, presents a psychological analysis which is 
inconsistent with freedom, and that this is partly the 
result of a fresh dramatic use of the supernatural forces 
or powers which in Aeschylus play the chief part in 
determining tragic events.
I have tried to show that in Sophocles there is 
no direct relation between human character and volitions 
and the divine forces which are assumed but not shown to 
govern events. Although events do proceed as oracles 
predict and so presumably in accordance with divine will, 
the nature of the causation which brings this about is left 
obscure, and in the dramatic presentation human character 
and action are shown to be sufficient in themselves to 
determine the course of events, within the limits set by 
circumstances and by ignorance, within these limits men 
appear to act freely, in virtue of their own nature and 
what they are in themselves. They are not regarded as 
compelled or driven by their own nature, or by an element 
in their nature, until this is related afresh to the 
supernatural causation, which in Aeschylus has operated 
as a distinct factor, but in part cooperation with the 
human will.
By supernatural causation I mean the way in which 
events are determined otherwise than by human agency and 
ordinary natural causation. I use it to include (1) the 
direct intervention of divine beings - gods, daemons, 
fates, furies - in so far as these are personalised or 
semi-personalised and active forces; (2) the operation of 
any causal laws which involve a reference to a metaphysical 
principle such as justice or Destiny; (3) the universal 
control of the ultimate or supreme power, Necessity or 
Zeus,"in so far as this does not merely maintain the 
world-order in general but also directs the course of 
events in detail.
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These three types of causality are not always 
distinct, but overlap and supplement one another. For 
instance, the notion of a supreme power to which all 
occurrences are directly attributable over and above their 
particular causes, although a familiar object of religious 
veneration, does not help us to understand the way things 
happen unless we can assert some principle on which this 
power acts. It is usually supposed to act morally, either 
itself legislating or at least administering ïâws~of 
justice.^ SO the causal laws referred to in (2) will also 
be modes of behaviour of the supreme power, and it is from 
this fact that they derive their necessity. The result is 
that the supreme power tends to be invoked not as the cause 
of everything, but of certain occurrences rather than 
others and these occurrences alone are necessary in the 
strict sense. They could not have happened otherwise, even 
if the human agents had wished to act differently.^
Moreover, in the case of these exceptional occur­
rences , the particular result is often effected through 
the action of some of the departmental powers referred to 
in (1), for instance the wrathful Erinyes which blight the 
sinner. An Erinys may be sent by zous as the executor of 
his justice.^ Alternatively they may be immediately roused 
by the nature of the crime, deriving their function direct 
from Destiny.^ This regularity of function can itself be 
made the basis of a causal law that acts of a certain kind 
are always followed by consequences of a certain kind.  ^
Similarly a god like Apollo may be the minister of Zeus 
but he also has a will and opinion of his own and can act 
in his own right. And in so far as the character and 
attributes of the gods are Known, these two can be made 
the basis of more or less reliable predictions about the 
future.
 ^So the Mo irai are called in Eum.963.
 ^Aesch. suppl. 91-2 S ' o i S " f
rr^ <*■ fn a V .
 ^Cf.Russell Mysticism and logic p.207: ’An action is 
necessary when it will be performed however much the agent 
may wish to do otherwise.’ Determinism, as ordinarily held, 
does not imply that actions are necessary in this sense. 
^.59.
^Eum.335-6, 347.
 ^Qh. 400"“4 W f i j  ^ f - v  CT<^Y TT^o
 ^Eum , 19 A n - ç o ^ T i j i f A o ^ / ^ ç  r r ^ i ç o ç ^ cf. 616-8.
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The interpretation of these causes, their relation 
to the events on which human welfare and happiness depend, 
and to the human wills which are also causes, is the 
beginning of the psychological and moral problem which 
drama brings to light.
supernatural causation in Drama. Aeschylus.
In the drama of Aeschylus, Zeus is depicted as 
supreme ruler of the universe as it now is. As such he 
is the cause of everything and brings everything to pass 
in accordance with rules of right which he has himself 
established,^ in a way which is quite obscure to the human 
rnind.^  He is hymned by Choruses in language which has been 
called monotheistic.
Nevertheless, his is not the only power that 
influences events. In addition to the other Olympians, 
there are the older generations of chthonian deities, 
notably represented by the Erinyes, daughters of Night.
There is also the ultimate and underived force of Necessity, 
and of Moira,^ the original and essentially unalterable 
determination of it. Zeus is supreme, not by definition, 
but by conquest, in so far as he has mobilised and 
harmonised the existing resources of the universe. ^
^Ag.1486—9 n ' t ' 0\j n ( r ^  Y cf. Quppl. 823 — 4.
 ^Ag .176 T o v  k A y  ttZ  TTo^  ^  ^  è e> ç / Ô & \ r T ^  .
cf.250, 1563. Dike is daughter of Zeus, Ch.949,Sept.662.
^Suppl.93, l o i .
"^E.g. by Haigh, p.63. ^.l6o-83, Suppl.86-105, cf.fr.70N.
^"prom. 511-8.
^ prom.551 A/%; . The synthesis is illustrât
êd by the prayer of the chorus, Ch.306;  ^ 3
T^i^f n-ri/^rZv' j T r-1 .
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Theoretically, the action of the gods can be 
distinguished from the decree of destiny, prom the human 
point of view, however, and for practical purposes, there 
is barely a difference between T: and 7^  ^  ,
Both represent a power by which particular events are
determined irrespective of human desires and feelings. 
Moreover in both cases there is usually the implication 
that the issue has been fixed a considerable length of 
time beforehand.^ This means not merely that single 
unrelated occurrences are brought about by non-human 
factors (as happens, for instances, v/hen they are ascribed 
to j but also that there are certain causal sequences
by which one event leads inevitably to another, through 
a series of interconnecting events which are all controlled 
in the same way.^
For instance, Zeus does not as a rule punish the 
transgressor immediately and directly (if so, divine 
justice would present few problems), but only after a 
lapse of time and through the action of other human beings. 
All through this time-lapse events are being so ordered as
to converge upon the fatal and predestined issue. The
action^^of a drama often extends over such a period: so 
that the unity of the events presented consists in their 
being part of a series in which particular connexions are 
established according to an overruling necessity that a 
certain end should follow from a certain beginning. These 
connexions are effected partly through the motive and 
action of human beings, but they are also arranged in 
larger patterns according to which they are seen as part 
of an independent scheme of cause and effect.
^These two ideas are combined in Ag.60-71, Ch.3o6, 462-5, 
Eum.390.
^An issue which men cannot avoid (Sept.719) although they 
may assist and even hasten its coming (Ch.464-5).
^ ^ . 6 8  S ' h  -r: . cf "19  i vZ. Try/-/. v^ySy 4
‘'"I use ’action’ to include (Ar.poet.1455 b 25),
antecedent events not actually presented on the stage, if 
these are the subject matter of choruses or speeches 
within the play.
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So in the Agamemnon we pass from one crime to 
another, in a direct succession which ignores the complex­
ity of human motive, but effectively isolates the essential 
character of the story as a series of retributive acts. 
First, the crime of paris leads to the expedition against 
Troy, but this in turn involves the murder of iphigenia 
(a reprisal demanded by Artemis), the curse of lost lives ^ 
and of the temples destroyed at T r o y T h e  death of 
Agamemnon is in part a consummation of this series, as is 
shown by the musings of the Chorus and by the speeches in 
the first half of the play. But there is also the crime 
of Atreus which has doomed the house, and of which the 
present murder is the immediate lineal descendent. This 
is seen through the eyes of Cassandra in the second half 
of the play, linking the two successions is the dominant 
figure of clytemnestra, her hate of Agamemnon roused by 
the murder of her child, her love for the treacherous 
Aegisthus for whose sake she takes upon herself the work 
of the avenging fiend, which properly belongs to Thyestes’ 
side of the family. And in so far as she has implicated 
herself with Aegisthus, she is doomed, so in the next 
play all the other antecedents of her crime are swept away 
and she has to face full responsibility with him^for the 
murder of her husband. Orestes* motives are varied,"^ but 
the retributive character of his act is stressed by the 
command of Apollo, the appeal to Agamemnon * s shade, and 
by the interpregtations of the chorus. And this is the 
substance of his plea before the Areopagus.^
All these events take place under the just law 
of zous, expressed in the formula, that the doer shall 
suffer.^ It is zeus who, in the first instance, sends the 
Atreidae to pursue paris. Artemis sees that the work of 
destruction is itself a sin, and involves the avengers 
in another crime, leaving a legacy of destruction to
^^.461 f., cf.568. ^Ag.338-44, 526.
 ^Ch.117 ToTf c A i t ' o i ^ TOu C l .  273 ToZ; x A i T i o o ç .
‘^ Listed in Ch. 209-304, r r t^ÀÀo, y d ç ev e-.v ■
These are the command of Apollo, grief for his father, 
poverty, and the wish to save the Argives from the domin­
ation of * two women*, c f  # 249 ^ 4 . y ^ ô ^ .
and his reproach to his mother 913 ^
 ^Enm . 60 2 e •
 ^v d S f n v  T o v Ag.1562, 313, cf.177, 250.
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themselves. Clytemnestra prays to zeus £ and even
the chorus own that Agamemnon has received his due.^ Never­
theless zeus exacts punishment for the murder; he is the 
source of Apollo’s oracle;^he is prayed to passim by both 
Orestes and the chorus.But in spite of his authority, 
even Orestes finds it hard to escape the consequences of 
his act.
When by the wisdom of Athena (which she derives 
from zeus)^ the hostile Erinyes are reconciled and the court 
of the Areopagus established as a permanent substitute for 
their original function, this formula - yrocSAZ.v tov 
becomes indeed a law of justice, in the earlier days it is 
barely distinct from the principle of retaliation, and is 
automatically put into effect by purely parochial spirits 
of hate and anger, roused by that particular crime and 
regardless of any wider aspects of the case. Even when 
Zeus sends the Erinys, a force is let loose which causes 
evil rather than good.
As retribution, Dike is half-way between 
retaliation and justice, it is thought of as falling under 
a legitimate and indeed a necessary principle, but it is 
prompted by anger.^ This anger may not always be clearly 
attached to a perceiving mind. It may be felt by the gods 
by the shade of the dead man,^ or it may be simply anger, 
projected by the nature of the act itself and demanding 
satisfaction in another act of the same kind. As such it 
is an Erinys or an , a destructive force rather than
a feeling. And as the deed is irrevocable, so the anger 
is implacable. The wrath of the gods, where this can be 
distinguished from the Erinyes, is equally inexorable and 
inescapable. Both command the force of destiny : indeed 
in these cases it may be said that the force of destiny 
is equivalent to the force of the anger, which inevitably 
hunts down and destroys its victim without regard to 
circumstances, means or consequences.
^Ag.973. ^Ag.l562
^Eum.616-8. ^Ch.246, 382, 783 f., 855 etc.
Eum. 850.
 ^of . Ch.952 o i ( ' - 9 ^ , o v  V  c-o O C " /corp» J ( - 4 //t K 7 ■
(?Zeus) ^ . 7 1 , cf.138 (Artemis) O
Ch. 4Q - T o l s  P
This is felt in dreams, cf.Ch.278, 293, 324-6.
Ug.15 4-5
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Euripides is the first to criticise this 
conception on moral grounds. In Aeschylus it seems to be 
the result of a concrete representation of the abstract 
idea of the moral law; a combination of the necessity of 
the law with the effectiveness of the motive lying behind 
individual acts of punishment; a motive which is thus 
raised to a universal principle and endowed with a 
sinister, even an immoral degree of vindictiveness and 
aggressiveness, although, as a motive, it should itself 
be subject to the control and guidance of the moral law.
It is also no doubt the relic of an anthropomorph­
ic religion which explains the unfailing application of a 
universal law as the persistence of the deity administering 
it, a deity capable of both perception and feeling. But 
the mere existence of this idea in religion would not be 
sufficient to account for its preservation in drama, if it 
were not otherwise appropriate, in the vivid and sensuous 
presentation of drama it is appropriate that a metaphysical 
idea should be given an emotional content; that a 
transcendental cause should be interpreted in such a way 
as to make it not only intelligible but also dramatically 
discernible in the story presented as an illustration of 
it. Drama cannot merely state a law as a principle. If 
a law is to be shown operating, it must be shown in the 
form which most clearly accounts for the events before us, 
and which harmonises best with the emotional atmosphere 
of the play and with the motives and action of the human 
agents in the story.
Nevertheless, the implications of such a 
presentation may not always be entirely acceptable, either 
metaphysically or morally. So in Sophocles the divine 
anger practically disappears, with the result that,although 
human character may be to some extent a substitute, the 
transcendental causation remains obscure and dramatically 
indiscernible. In Euripides it reappears, but on a 
different basis and with a full understanding of all its 
implications.
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Transition to the Human Motive
In so far, then, as the action of an Aeschylean 
drama is retributive in character, it is governed by the 
thought of an implacable anger, springing from the first 
crime in the series and actively producing all the rest.
It is a cause independent of the human desire for vengeance 
with which it may cooperate.
so Aeschylus speaks of the old violence bringing 
forth a new generation, sooner or later, when the fated 
day of birth arrives - children like their parents/ This 
language cannot be dismissed as a mere poetical metaphor, 
since it implies not only some inner principle that like 
is produced by like, but also a continuum of activity 
between the crimes thus related, analogous to the process 
of growth in the unborn young. This can only be the anger 
of the Erinys or which is active in each successive
crime and also persisteras a constant factor through the 
interval.
This anger is distinct from the motive of the 
human agent, since it emanates either from the gods or 
from the dead man, and recoils against the avenger himself 
when his victim in turn demands blood. Anger and hate are 
not always part of the human motive, and they are rarely, 
if ever, the only motives. They were not among Agamemnon’s 
motives for killing iphigenia,^ except indirectly, since 
this was a means to the punishment of paris.'’" Helen is 
said to be an Erinys because of the destruction she causes, 
not because of her motive (Ag.749).
Ag .758 To fu I y - t 'V  T l/CTfi j  Ç d  9
7 6 3  ^  T i k . ' T H V  I  T T d -X d ^d  V f - d  I T itm- e  d y  €<f K d f t A i f  ^  ‘
'  Ù > s. , ' y , / , / , d '
l o T  5 T o V  , a-rt Tb < j do i Tb/cou, 7 ’ e P d v/ /  , ■>' J ' / / ^ _ < y u ^ o v  d  7  6- T d Y  d y -  .  y  ^ d  TTt> X f-y*- o /
I (- Ç  OY ■ B Ç d  S' t tç  ^ y * - f - d d f Y d  f  y ^ C - \ .C 0 / f  V d r  d < i j ^ y ^ f -  T o  Av S' I
0 f . 0h .649 7?- K  Y O Y  Ç  (■ ir~(n S' tj (-Ç Ç  0 f  I V . . E  ^  I V  l> ^
^Sept.742 7Î  d i  d i  y  W  ^ ^  i r t w m x v o v ,  d iC ^ Y d  I  ^  T Ç  iT b Y  y ^ f 'Y & y Y  •
Ag .154 A  '/ * ^  ^  '7~hK Y O  T T O  I Y  O S  .
^set forth 206-17. Mainly he wishes to avoid the anger 
of the army.
 ^y v Y d  t K  O T r t  lY  u iV 7Tb 4 &y*. Y jd  ^  d Y  Ag . 2 25 6 .
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Moreover, even as emanating from the dead, it is 
a blind craving for vengeance which the living subject 
would not in every case have been capable of feeling, in 
the ghost of Agamemnon or of clytemnestra such savage anger 
is indeed appropriate; in the babes of Thyestes not so 
appropriate, s o  in Ag.l096 they are seen by Cassandra 
merely , and in 1217 they issue a tacit
appeal to pity, similarly in the case of Iphigenia, the 
d ç d î o v  which heré murderers muffled is not the
utterance of a curse, but the appeal to her father which 
would have involved him in a curse; and she wounds with a 
look that is piteous rather than reproachful (
241). Yet from her too is projected an and an
(1433).
Human motives are as a rule more complex.^ Anger, 
hate and desire for revenge may be among them, but these 
would not normally be sufficient to prompt to so monstrous 
an act unless reinforced by other motives or by some super­
natural necessity. As motives, they owe their prominence 
rather to their relation to the supernatural anger than to 
the amount of influence which they would otherwise have 
exerted upon the agent.
ipor Agamemnon, see ^ . 2 q 6 f. clytemnestra, as far as we 
can read her motives, seems to be actuated by (1) hate 
roused by Iphigenia* s death (^.1415-8); (2) fear of the 
consequences of the discovery of her intrigue (if her own 
description of her nervous state of mind, &887-9 4, may be 
reinterpreted); (3) confidence in the love of Aegisthus 
(1434-7) dv-rr; ( 4) jsalousy
(1439, 1446-7). For Orestes, see Ch.209-304. Eteocles, 
in addition to hatred of his brother (Sept.664 f.), is 
concerned to provide for the safety of the city (271-87). 
To draw back would involve him in disgrace and also be a 
bad example to the city, Sept.683-4, 656-7.
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Nevertheless, since anger is also a human passion, 
it provides us with a transition, in some cases to the main 
motive of the murder, in every case to the psychology of 
the murderer.
common to all these crimes is B ç i e . ç  (Ag.770)
and T T d ç d H i o r r ^  (  223) which emboldens the criminal ( ,
222). This madness seems derived from the fatal purpose 
itself, rather than from any special motive. So Agamemnon, 
after his decision to sacrifice Iphigenia for other reasons, 
changes his mind ( ) to a spirit of unholy daring.^
Whatever the original motive, whatever the nature of the 
agent, once he has decided upon his course he is filled 
with an unnatural savagery and recklessness which either 
blind him to the consequences of his action or impel him 
to carry it through in spite of them.
As a state of mind, this reckless indifference 
corresponds to the uncompromising persistence of the super­
natural anger. It is a phenomenon which cannot be wholly 
explained as the growth of passion in the individual, even 
where motives of hate and anger are present, as in the 
case of Agamemnon, it usually coincides with the acceptance 
of a course of action which is in any case decreed by the 
supernatural necessity.^ The pressure of this necessity may 
be consciously felt by the human agent, j.n addition to his 
own motives. Orestes inflames his own desire for vengeance 
by appeals to his father and to zcus.^ Eteocles, in addition 
to his own hate against his brother, feels himself driven 
by the ’black curse* of his fathep.^ Clytemnestra is aided 
by the and " E ^ y J ^  of Iphigenia,'’" and claims to be the
visible presence of the of A t r e u s M a d n e s s  is also
the invariable effect of the pursuit of the Erinyes after 
the murder.^
4 Ag . 218—23 r d Y Y y r C d ^ élu 3  f-Pd- ^ y o Y <Tir cT <?  ^ T y o T T d i  < < Y
>1 3 / ''/) ■'■ / I : r. ' / A V
d Y d y r O Y ,  o C y i ^ ç o y  ^ T O  t / ( - Y   ^ - n ,  7 r < ^ Y - r t T x >  A  y ^ o Y  y ^ t ~ T P y Y d >  .
7 / J I  T d t i d ' Y u .  7T ^  Y-/C o r r \ L  T T ^  v •
 ^ch. 382 (-C ,  K . d . l T >  B y y  d y ^ r r f - y ^ l i X o Y  j  ^  T n > i Y O  Y  d . T c < Y  ■ •
^Sept.695-8, 709-11 etc.
' ^ A g . 1 4 3 3  y - d  T y  ■t t À , - , oy 7 ^ ;  A  i k^ i^y  E ^ . y Zy d \ j d ' ' , c i > r  t o y ^ ^  ' V  ‘
 ^ 1500- 4 •
^ch.287, cf. the refrain in Eum.328-33.
43
In some cases the himself seems to be
almost identical with the spirit of murderous madness in 
the race,which is successively manifested in one generation 
after another/ But it is not, in Aeschylus, an inherited 
characteristic. If so, clytemnestra could have no part in 
it. The curse of Oedipus was uttered after the birth of 
his sons, and the source of Eteocles* madness is not an 
inherited tendency but the anger of the gods against his 
race."' Electra compares her spirit to a savage wolf and 
claims that it is inherited from her mother,^ but the murder 
is necessitated, not by her nature, but by the anger of 
Agamemnon*s shade and by the law of Zeus.
In Aeschylus, therefore, these abnormal states of
mind can be re&garded in two ways : both as the growth of
passion in the individual, though not purely as the result 
of original motives of his own or of his own nature, and 
also as the possession of his will by a supernatural force 
which is the same in kind as his own anger but more 
destructive and quite uncontrollable.^ They may be looked 
on either as a mental condition caused by the ,
or as the 1 ^ 4 himself, temporarily located in the 
individual.
In either case the cooperation of the is
taken into account without (apparently) affecting the
estimate of the agent’s responsibility.  ^He is not driven 
by the to choose the action, excgept in so far as
he is offered a very hard choice,^ and may choose partly in 
ignorance.^ Nor is he driven by his own motives or his own 
nature. But once he has chosen, he is inspired by a 
savage wildness and indifference to consequences, which 
are a sign that his will is now gripped by the invisible 
force of the and that he is no longer free to go
back on his choice. This is a form of madness, produced 
by the fact that the too is urging on the deed.
y t L v  y . , ^Ag.1569 — 77 7w T / À ( - ,c S f - Y > . .
^OYOV^ d  <1 f-ri (TY Sij of . 7 6 7 .
^Sept.633-4.
" Ch.421-2.
 ^Ag .768 o L i r& À ( ,y o Y
^ Ag .  13 0 5 f . ^ ToZ Çf l > O Y 0 v  T iJ  0 ^
77 7710 •, Ç  (.  c  v  ÀÀ -j T T T X O ^  y & Y O l T ^  d - Y  ' d . À o i  < P T  t o jo  ■
cf.ch. 117, 273, Eum. 463 .
^S^^.442, ^•21l7"’ch.337. ^
■^Eteocles.
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Euripides
To recapitulate, in Aeschylus the following 
factors can be distinguished: (1) A formula, the doer shall 
suffer, ascribed to Zeus but also underlying the action of 
the Erinyes. (2) The wrath of the gods (often finding 
expression in some occurrence in external nature, e.g. 
Artemis* restraint of the winds, or the storm in which the 
Greeks were shipwrecked). (3) Vindictive spirits of hate 
and anger, Erinyes o r  . (4) The human motives of
hate and anger, present among other motives, and perhaps a 
trait of character. (5) Cettain psychological states, 
apparently caused by the fact that the is cooperating
with the human being to effect the deed of horror, pear 
and madness are also produced by the Erinyes haunting the 
murderer after the deed.
The action of Aeschylean drama exhibits the 
formula of justice as a metaphysical, not as a psychological 
necessity. It is applied in the wrath of the gods and in 
the pursuit of the Erinyes.
pathological states in the individual, in so far 
as they are beyond the control of the will, are not caused 
solely by the violence of a human passion, but also by the 
influence of an external force which is brought to bear 
upon the mind.
■j.
in Aeschylusj/is the which drives, not the
human motive.
in Sophocles, except in rare and exceptional 
c a s e s w e  have only the human motive and character, and 
they do not drive.
In some plays of Euripides (Medea and Hecuba), we 
have only the human motive, but a motive of a very special 
kind. Like the original hate of the dead in Aeschylus, it 
is roused by a sense of personal injury and is the desire 
to inflict injury in return. This motive is so strong and 
so destructive that the mind which yields to it becomes 
itself an , satisfying the single passion which
dominates it regardless of means or circumstances. So in
^Athena in the Ajax, and the in Q.T.1258.
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destroying its victim it also destroys the essentially 
human qualities in itself. It cannot, therefore, suffer 
punishment for its crime in the ordinary way; since it has 
become entirely absorbed in the single passion, it is as 
immune as a real avenging fiend - and is explicitly or 
implicitly identified with one in the * apotheosis’ or 
prophecy at the end of the plays
SO the formula of justice becomes the psycholog­
ical principle of retaliation. All the necessity, all the 
inevitability which in Aeschylus were associated with the 
decrees of destiny and the law of the universe, are now 
centred in the human soul. All the driving power of the 
Erinyes is inherited by the human anger which not only 
violently destroys its victim, but with equal violence 
overpowers the reason and the rest of the nature of the 
agent.^ Originally an external force separate from the 
human mind though acting upon it, its use as an internal 
principle implies division in the soul, one part set 
against the rest as ’dominating’ and ’dominated’. This 
may produce mental conflict during which the action is held 
in suspense, or the whole soul may be drawn from the first 
in the direction of vengeance. But in either case the 
agent appears driven by the overmastering desire, and to be 
acting under a psychological law rather than by free choice.
In other plays (Hippolytus, Heracles, Bacchae), 
the idea of possession is revived and extended beyond the 
Aeschylean use. The human agent is not merely possessed 
by a particular spirit of revenge prompting to an action 
which he is in any case bent upon, but by a clearly
^Hec. 12b5 ^wv y c^  tt^ ç c  '
1274 y * -o  » (T o w  y f -  ^ o i  i  ^  V
cf.1173 (polymnestor) ^ -
(cf. Aesch.ch.924 sc. the Erinyes).
Med.1342—3 ( Jason)  ^  ^ Cos
and 1361—2 / < < .  y<f- ^
C ^ T T ^  ^ 'y A*? •
For Medea as an Erinys, see Chorus, Med.1258-60•
 ^Med.1078-80.
Cf .Ar.E^.1224 b 22 A r/'
d i U  T * j y  7 ~ b v  o < ./ to u -T « < . vm 7<=- TT y >  t i  r  T -c~ t v  ' X  f - u >  U .
' - /  O /  ^  ^  ^ J I ' I  C'/O I X «; / J ^
ye<-^ CJyTo*. & t<oL 'n-^U  C -K K Ç otj c-TaL, (/<T <<i\A^nus^ • o { /f-v X. ^  i-m  y> 0~u e t
/» A J
■» f  ^  T w y  ev '* ’ * TT)' Ttv /t 7 ^  .
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characterised, deity capable of producing an appropriate 
human which the agent would not otherwise be
experiencing, and leading to action which he would not 
otherwise have contemplated, jn these cases the instinct 
for retaliation becomes a characteristic of divine rather 
than of human behaviour.
in these plays the relation between the human 
and the divinity is one of extreme interest, it explains 
the causality of the gods, in so far as they aim at 
producing results through human instruments. It explains 
the causality of the , in so far as these are capable
of overpowering the reason and compelling a man to act 
against his better judgment.
Aphrodite cannot destroy Hippolytus directly, 
since love is a passion which he cannot f e e l s h e  can only 
destroy him through phaedra’s love. Phaedra’s passion (so 
we are led to believe) would not have taken hold of her 
mind so irrevocably if it had not been inspired and main­
tained by the deity, whether the further links which lead 
to the destruction of Hippolytus are forged by Aphrodite 
or merely foreseen, is a question which we cannot at 
present answer.
How is this connexion between the divine and human 
mind possible? -How is it that human beings can be made to 
behave in a way that conflicts with their ordinary opinions 
and habits, indeed with what in one sense we should call 
their ’character’ and their ’nature’? Against their nature 
in another sense they cannot act. it is not enough to 
attribute omnipotence to the deity; the action of the gods 
must be made explicable in a natural, almost a physical 
sense if we are to believe in it and allow for it in our 
interpretations of human events and the world around us.
I hope to show that behind Euripides’ explanation 
lies the application to theology and psychology of certain 
principles and ideas that were familiar to him from the 
speculations of the physical philosophers.
 ^JtlipP*l006 Sf-yov
INTERACTION BETWEEN DRAMA AND PHILOSOPHY (2)
A • primary Substance and the Divine 
The Monistic Assumption. Anaximander.
control a Spatio-Temporal Necessity. Aggression and 
its Control both depend on the original Unity.
NO Moral Order in Anaximander.
Anaximenes. Control a soul-property.
The immortal soul. Pythagoras.
Dualism. Mathematical Necessity and the Moral Law. 
Xenophanes. ’One God’.
Heraclitus. ’One wisdom’, 
parmenidean Necessity. ’One Being’.
Theistic pluralism. Empedocles.
Divine Equality. Rule a Relation between Divine and 
Mortal Aspects of the Elements. Unity and Love as 
Moral and Religious ideals.
Recapitulation and Transition : Mind or Necessity?
Divine Control. Monism and pluralism. Necessity. 
Mind. Anaxagoras, Diogenes.
IS Control a soul-property?
(i) Directive Thought.
(ii) The irrational. Transition between Soul and 
Material Substance.
Summary.
B . primary Substance and Soul 
The Human Soul: Unity and Analysis.
philosophical Conceptions of the ’Nature’ of Man (psycho­
physical and Moral). The individual (Composite) 
and its Relations. No Original Self-Consciousness of 
the Elements.
Number Theories. The Soul a Harmony.
Alcmaeon. philolaus.
The practice of immortality. ’Separation’.
’partition’ psychology. Language.
48
INTERACTION BETWEEN DRAivIA AND PHILOSOPHY (2)
Foreword
This chapter will fall into two main divisions:
A . primary substance and the Divine.
B . primary Substance and Soul.
In the first of these I shall try to show how the
idea of the divine was used in the physical philosophy of
the pre-socratics, and how it developed according to the 
requirements of different systems.
In the second, i shall discuss the psychological 
conceptions which were either presupposed in these theories 
or the direct consequence of them.
The aim of the whole chapter is to indicate where, 
in adapting the assumptions of myth to his own dramatic
presentation of the springs of human action, Euripides was
following lines of thought suggested not only by his 
predecessors in drama, but by the philosophers. I have not 
attempted to give a complete account of these philosophers, 
but to emphasise the ideas which seem to me to link 
Euripidean drama with the pre-gocratics, and even in some 
cases to provide a transition to plato and Aristotle.
I shall be mainly concerned to trace the ideas 
which relate the divine nature, through its physical 
identification with primary substance, to the human soul 
and its functions,. The connexion with Euripidean drama 
will be made clear in following chapters.
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A. PRIMARY SUBSTANCE AND THE DIVINE 
The Monistic Assumption. Anaximander.
Aristotle (Met.983 b 6 f.), attributing the 
notion of a material cause to ’most of the earliest 
philosophers’, explains that the idea of an original and 
permanent nature ( ) ,  from which all existing things 
arise and into which they perish, seemed to them to be 
necessarily connected with the idea of becoming: (b 17)
T _  J ' / r,'' ^   ^ ^ a _ T' ' T  / /
 ^ Tiv'ot.  ^ ^  t <;  ^ C-'C ^  ^  ^ k- Tct-AAal
f  ' J /
Why the Milesians postulated a single such 
nature he does not tell us, but in phys.2p3 b 6 f. he 
recognises that the properties ascribed to it go beyond 
his own notion of a material cause. ’It has no source, 
but is thought to be the source of the rest of things, 
and to embrace all things and to steer all things, as say 
those who do not postulate other causes (e.g. mind or love) 
besides the unlimited. And this is the divine : for it is 
immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander says and most 
of the physical philosophers.’ ^
So the divine is reinterpreted to become a 
scientific hypothesis. But not yet an empirical 
hypothesis: stripped of purely decorative features, freed 
from dependence on the human imagination and desire, it 
remains an a priori necessity, not only the source of 
becoming but its logical condition, a physical reality 
not observed but presupposed in the existence of the 
natural world.
phys .  2o3 b 6 / c ^  at. ^  d
- A  C t r i n ^ o v  ^  • T V  - rz -  t t A  o ç  ^ ' T T - A
€  S 7n . Ç  CO X a C - B ' ^ ^ Ç  ^ O y  ' l * x A À
T w / -  K t - r / 4  t o  C  o rc: Û-1 K - t c ^  T T l - ^  ' &  ^  <*-> ✓__ rTp*. v  T  ^  X  \ r ^  a- ,  t o (
J ' c' * '  !  ! y y r' ^  ^  , / /
Y «L ^  / y o  C  {, ! TTo I o u  <r I 7T 7~t> <K. u  c-t y  c< -I A  ac. Ç o< I 7~ I ac f o  I o y  1^ 0 y  y  'j ^ / <4 / «<
S  ^ o y  • c< y  ^  ij c - S  (> o y ^  cj yj <T, y  pfC sC-/ T t-y  ; fn  v  oto TO
A < r , y . ^ c ^  o i - y  Ç ç  0 ^  £ » r  f~> cT  T t ,  /  t t o  u  j - y  < r < o  c {  ^
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For physics (as Aristotle has shown) this has 
two consequences. (1 ) predicated of the primary substance, 
divine characteristics and functions acquire a new and 
relatively clear meaning, which can be used to explain 
the world directly, without the crude anthropomorphic 
associations of religious cosmogony. (2) At the same 
time primary substance, in so far as it is thought to be 
divine, is taken beyond the strict notion of the material 
and endowed with properties sufficient in themselves to 
account for the origin and maintenance of life, without 
the intervention of any other kind of cause.
TO be divine is to be’immortal and indestructible’t 
With Anaximander, this is transformed into the permanence 
of an underived^and inexhaustible^store of matter, 
presupposed in the becoming and perishing of mortal things : 
a permanence which is reflected, not in a permanent world, 
but in the perpetuity of the processes by which alone a 
world of becoming and perishing can exhibit the further 
divine properties of constancy and control.
control a Spatio-Temporal Necessity
Anaximander’s , in time cZ:r,o^ , in space
70 , is divine because it is (as matter) inexhaust­
ible. It also has the divine properties of embracing and 
steering all things, not in virtue of mind or will or 
desire, but according to the inner necessity of its own 
unlimitedness. For Anaximander (like Anaxagoras) seems 
to find in the unlimited the idea also of equality.^ (1) 
in space : the poise of the earth seems to be due to the
, cf. Hippol. Ref. i . 6 .1 A ' C . o y /cA
(D.B.2,3).
is also ’unborn’ phys. 2Q3 b 7).
This is a contribution of physics to theology.
 ^phys . 203 b 16 ^ 'n i Ç  «Û'rv-f Ax y i r o X f - ' i r ^ v 7^
A (Of. Anaximenes D.B.3).
"^Anaxagoras D.B.3,6
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unlimitedness of which is equidistant from it
in every direction^and so not merely ’surrounds’ but also 
supports'and ’embraces’. This is a divine protective and 
generative function/ reinterpreted by Anaximander as a 
spatial property, retaining the association of support and 
control through the idea of equality. (2) In time : the 
warfare of the opposites is in the long run kept even by 
the unlimitedness of the common source, from which all are 
equally renewed.^ This is seen in the ’order of time’, 
itself a determination of 7  ^ ^ according to which the
opposites emerge and prevail successively, and so maintain 
the regularities which we observe in the physical world.
 ^Hippol.Ref .i.6 .3 (D.A.ll) r y  t rn>
X ^  p< r eu y- Oj^ o i y TT y Tiuv I7T> S' T at C iv - T hi S C UU hardly
refer to the position of the earth within our world only.
^Cf. Aristotle’s own notion of matter as 7: . He
shows the connexion himself in the case of Thales, by 
pointing out that primary substance is given the function 
of supporting the earth (Met.983 b 20): ^  rÇ s
<j 1 X 0  e - o  j  'ç u (  « l E -  y ' ^ y  6- t j  '  v  C - . V ^  ^
"similarly Anaximenes supposes the earth to ride on air 
(D.A.6,7), but brings mn the idea of support and control 
as a soul-property.
of . Hes . Theog .126 C c- t o . t y e ^ y r ^ T ~ t >  l ^ o y  C-*>^u T ‘j
0  o y  D £rv $  , i y / -  i<. , t A  u n T  T b  , . Qf . 177 .
Aristoph.Birds 69 4 k U ztzxs
EUr.fr.9 4lN -A v
\  rt /  _ A f ^  ^ \   ^ I
c-y^ox^O (Sf ;
of .phys. 2Q4 b 14 A ut^ v
b 28 S y cA Y  Gy *Ctn-^^ov , "e jS y-^T t ,  r ^ À X  y~ ■ Ç '  c -n -^n y  c-AyoJ c-^ o5  Tc^ C t
If no opposite can be destroyed, none can finally prevail; 
from this Anaximander seems to have inferred alternation 
of opposites (which we also observe in the physical world)
 ^The ’ order’ of time ( ^ ) i take to be the
regular succession of opposites which determines growth 
and decay in the natural world. Hippol.Ref.i. 6.1 Ir
'  ® *" / r-  ^ v
^ ^ o v o v  yc-v(-6 f-^Ç  fCec., < ^  ^ /Coc T<j f  .
oy-
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In this way becomes a governing principle
akin to Destiny. For only indeterminate matter can be 
unlimited; its determinate forms are limited both by each 
other and by their mutual dependence on the primary source. 
This limitation is seen, not in a common nature, but in a 
universal law, by which both are controlled in a spatio- 
temporal scheme which is the expression, in our world, of 
the necessary and formal properties of the primary 
substance.
A ^ ession and its Control both depend on the Original Unity 
NO ’Moral Order ’ in Anaximander .
AS determined in the form of opposites, matter 
develops a behaviour which cannot be inferred from its 
original nature alone, yet depends upon it as the unity 
in virtue of which the opposites can be paired and 
related to each other. Aggression is the assertion of 
the individual concrete quality of each opposite, yet as 
directed against and combated by its fellow, it becomes 
a general active principle through which the whole nature 
of the primary substance is developed and expressed.
Opposition, as a reversible relation, involves 
reciprocity: for Anaximander this is shown, not in tension 
or harmony, but in a scheme of alternation and retaliation 
through which aggression itself appears to be resisted and 
controlled. But this control is not that of a distinct 
and superior force, contradicting and coercing the natural 
behaviour of the opposites; it is rather the general 
principle of their own aggression, made into a law by its 
conformity with the necessary and a priori properties of 
the x r r z Y o y : separable and discernible as a law because it 
is contrary to the individual self-assertion of each 
opposite in turn, yet obeyed by all as the expression of 
that unity which is both the source and the condition of 
their particular mode of existence and activity.
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The statement of this principle involves a 
dualism, only if it is thought of in theological or moral 
terms. The primary substance is divine and its law a 
necessity, yet in spite of his ’poetical* language,"^ there 
is no moral order in Anaximander, injustice and justice 
(the crime and the penalty) are merely the names for two 
successive acts of aggression, in so far as they are 
ordered in the time series. The order of time is not a 
harmony, superimposed from a separate source, but an 
arrangement, depending upon an alternation which, like 
the original pairing into opposites, gives concrete and 
positive form to an a priori idea of the unlimited.^ It 
is an order which seeks, not to end strife, but to render 
it eternal.
That such a view fails to satisfy the moral and 
religious sense is not in itself an objection to it.
The difficulty occurs, both for theology and for physics, 
when we try to think of the relation of the v/orld of 
becoming and perishing to the eternal divine nature from 
which it arises and to which it is reducible, without 
being itself eternal or divine : when we ask how a single 
simple substance can yet develop conflict between pairs 
of aggressive antagonists : how the tendency to aggression 
and the control of aggression can both ultimately be 
traced to one and the same source : finally, if aggression 
is natural to matter in so far as it is determined in the 
form of opposites, and the control of aggression depends 
on the original undetermined nature of the , how
both can be exhibited together in a world which knows the 
original undetermined nature of the only as a mere
idea, and owes its very existence to the encroaching of 
one opposite upon another.
B i mpl i C . T hy S . 24.13 7r. I ^  o u rw ^  A y o ^ x c iy  a i t - r X  X / y u j v  (sc.D.B.l)
^ A s  7^ A .  C o y . Time, as we know it, is an unending series of 
more or less regular natural occurrences made possible by 
the alternation of the opposites. ■
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Anaximenes. Control a Soul-property.
So Anaximenes, to preserve the unity of matter, 
eliminates the conflict of the opposites by making them 
mere of the primary substance consequent upon changes 
in its density. This substance (Air) retains its essential 
nature in the physical world, not only surrounding it but 
also pervading it like a soul or breath, which, as the 
primary form of matter, is able to control and support its 
modifications as the human soul controls and supports the 
body. As source, Air is still spatially and temporally 
unlimited, but as constituent substance it is determinate 
in form: its nature is not to be inferred from the mere 
idea of the unlimited, but is to be observed in the 
physical world.^ Its primary physical property, variation 
of density, is not only entirely consistent with its unity, 
but also an empirical hypothesis based on a (supposedly) 
observed natural f a c t E v e n  its divine nature and charact­
eristics are retained through some of its modifications; 
unlike it is both divine itself and able to give
birth to divine things [ S e A s  x A  S A p c )  f  And the essentially 
divine function of control can be empirically ascertained 
from the familiar parallel of the human soul.
X —. c ' I  ' C c -  ! 7 n C..D. B# 2 oTew ^  f ' A ' 7  > 1 a u g a c  cr U y  n: ^  ai. rr~, o A c y
 ^  ^ \  ^\   '
T iv  Tr\r p-y. a.. ^ C '
^In its primary form Air is still also in the sense of
not being qualified by any of the opposites; hence it is 
’J c C i jÀ o y ( Hippol. Ref. i . 7. 2. D.A.7) .
’û.B.l.
Hippol.Ref.i.7.1. p.A.7. Gf.A.lQ.
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The immortal soul. Pythagoras.
Pythagoras is reputed to have taught his 
associates that (1) the soul is immortal (2) it changes 
into other kinds of living c r e a t u r e 3) everything is 
reborn according to periods (4) all living things are one 
kindred (Porphyry, yit.pyth.19).^
These doctrines imply that, though there are 
many souls, there is only one kind of soul, the immortal 
essence persisting through its series of lives, invisible, 
indestructible and, in its purest incorporeal state, 
divine, soul is not, like Anaximenes’ Air, the source of 
the rest of things, but it is itself a unity, underlying 
the change and variety of the natural world. Mortal is 
not born from immortal, but they may co-exist and influence 
one another, according to laws that are ethical and 
mystical rather than physical or empirical.
The theory of A requires, in addition
to the idea of a homogeneous substance, a principle of 
individuation^ by which each soul can become a permanent 
entity in the same way as the whole : not a world-life in 
which there is no limit or division, but a soul-atomism 
which can be organised as a totality of individual souls.
This a dualistic number-system can provide.
Xenophanes D.B«7* Cf*Hdt.ii. 123 t u r ^ i  Ct- /ckZ t o v Ci-  t o v  A o y o y
4 * '  ^ c a / c . » / ! ' '  '  j  yO /  a ^  /  A .
/ ^ ly -v f îT iD i Grt C I (ii G-! u O  ^ 0’^  (a>Tf-V u 'f ' ' ' X ^ C’ S Tl ^ TTrv <T 7~p f ^  a-
I a I ’ ■**// /'''  ^ C  * '* '■ C ^ ^ i r\
K  tC 7 P- A 9ive> \rT0 Ç ^  aCrlA O ^  c y  pGf e~i ^  < V 0 ^  f-a c y  (r S  à O  C~T , ( - T r T - y  if- fTy. y  Ta- • C~A ft' y
V '  '  ^  ^ ' '  ^ A- /• O’
fA )( e-f G  t<4 mi. ai (TG I aO H./OT T * .  rrt-TT-\ y A.  ^ aC y  n j  y  laj "  (T i y (\~o y
y / V  X y ,  ^. / /; > , ' '  ^
fiC S i/ y  c-t y  ^ 7*7*' ^ ^ i "jA i/ £' i y  c- « "7 r'*' 1/ *C< 1 <c^  / A < o 1 G"  ^ <rT j- €  1
The xenophanic verse shows that the transition to animal
life must have been almost immediate, i.e. without an 
intervening disembodied period, cf.Empedocles D.B.137.
• i  '  °  CTP-lf^ r - u a y  f -  C o  U l i  G  1 /y  f - , {  {<  I T *  y y  y  77 -
Cf.plat. Gorg. 508 a f^» S '  o t  o a (pK .yoy  « A
mC V B f  w rrvy j Tk^y- K.D > V yj y  i y  (Pii a c-i y  r C ^  (f • ti I a-y  CCj k j X  o  oTtj j-po (C-aZ
C  XA-t oT i^ r P- , x A  to  a X o y  TtrCr T-a f' Ta-u Ta  Xac.Xp» e» y /c.r?f .
Ar .phys . 213 b 22  ^ Cm ^e'.r-yA^ a I cZ rw tX ; T>
/yy.?irf-rvT7 X m  Th Xf'n oy   ^ c fiCjf «I<s TV-i g c i (  n .-r '{ / D . /4k/»v. . /j /C. . & O ^
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Dualism. Mathematical Necessity and the Moral Law.
Pythagorean cosmology bisects the Milesian notion 
of the one unlimited into the one on the one hand and the 
the other.^ These are primitive elements in 
a duality which ranges itself into opposition as the new 
generative process begins.
The necessary and formal properties of the 
are abstracted as a separate principle, the limit : the 
numerical priority of the one is made the basis~for a 
mathematical deduction of the world.'"
For the scientist, this procedure has no immediate 
reward. For the philosopher (as for the poet) the 
importance of the Pythagorean approach lies in the 
thoroughness with which a single principle of explanation 
is carried through and applied in every branch of inquiry: 
physiology and psychology, morals and medicine, are all 
developed along similar lines, not on any physical or 
empirical hypothesis, but because the same formal relations 
can be discovered in all, and the same symbolism used to 
express them.
^R.P. p.61-2. Theophr.Met.33 x / , t o < - n - b ic Z s ,
^ 1  C T 'O u  C o e i CaC, Xou> T Z r ?  W  o J S  t  m p l  1  C  . P h y  S  . 1 8 1  T O  n -  f-V
Çy 'TiruTUP ( j u g , y C f • •  M® t .  9 8T U  15 TO -rrC'vr-fX(P}AC~yov / Ow -rt n-7-ijPo
V  ^7 - , / A r~ . ; Tv  ^^
T t  J  u > i j  S r  i j i i ’oO y  G - ty g u H  ^  y  6  f-> S  ' •  o A A  p ^ r~o - t t .  U T T t - i t f P o v  f x  -r~b
cry g € \  t S r y  K  yt) ^ crv vT^-i G  f  . 9 8 7  b  2 2  T t  y U  t y i '  f v  < T V  g  igLy g -ty  ■ 7~b C t
r i . y j - >  - n n o  o C 7 r i h f ^  p - y  / c r " X  •
^I cannot agree with prof.Qornford that in early Pythagor- 
eanism the one or Monad is an original unity from which 
the opposites. Limit and Unlimited, both emerge (C.q.xvii, 
p.3). I have here supposed the Limit to be the limiting 
function of the One, and the One to be the same as the 
unit or monad from which numbers are derived. E.g. Ar.Met.
l091 a 15 <1 tf-ic TTrv (Vof (pyCTT pi B f^ - ro  s € -,T ’ C"C G-ninr-Ci.
A ' a //'■ >•»'
CnT cnc e-t r  C-Tc g'-iTT g> A r rC T TO ^cryg iy  TJT-t y É-u tc OJ, ( '
/ cy I ' (  ^ / ' c _ V  ' '
Ten) Ctcjrf-, try/ o 71 f r  r { / r  (--fn /C-oy ÇrTT-^cor'O  Td  otTo «T-Çoi.7T>J .
57
This is the beginning of analogythe comparison 
of two things of a different kind by means of a formal 
structure common to both. At the same time it gives rise 
to a belief that the two things so compared are related 
in a quasi-material identity, and so capable of affecting 
one another causally, if things behave mathematically, 
they are like number; from several of these likenesses in 
different fields it can be inferred that number is the 
common substance of all things : they are like number, 
because they are number. Number can therefore relate not 
only what is already alike or materially the same (two 
acorns, an acorn and an oak, the hand and the fingers), 
but also what is otherwise unlike, or materially different 
(soul and body, a man and his due, music and emotion).
In this relation their essential nature (or definition) 
is expressed; change in the one term will correspond to 
change in the other; this can be causally interpreted 
either as the effect of one upon the other, or as the 
interaction of both, or as the response of both to a 
third thing: the number which holds them, like a primary 
substance, in a single formula.''
so the divine is not in the beginningJ but in 
the perfect number, which comprises all the rest.
 ^E.g. as used in plat.Rep., where it is a method of defin­
ition rather than of scientific inference. Cf.Aristotle’s 
criticisms of Pythagorean physics. Met.985 b 23 f., 1090 
a 20, de Çaelo 293 a 18, and Joseph, An Introduction to 
Logic, ch.xxiv.
Ar.Met. 987 b 22 7» y / r - n > i  y f - f o - v S i y . y  ^ yu-ij C-TT-^o V/ T i  o y  X / t y  f - f A' ,
r f X B a i  ^  e Ç  ( y  J To T V v x  T o L S  y  o u  £  i / ~ g  /c T r f  •
^ Met . l07 2 b 28  ^ ootme-y "Vj Ô ^Tn-yS,m Tog ^ T» h-scIÀ ’ 6 r-oy
\ ' ? J  ^ 1 ~
t c ^ 4  V  r  /  t ' lV p w  . . iT v  rc  '
prof.cornford accepts the view that the one was God, C.q. 
xvii, p.5, note i. (R.p. p.6o-2).
Divine properties are ascribed to the decad, although it is 
not named as 1 (4 ^ . Theolog.Arithm.10.60 /cL
S H > X ( r y  f v v T h ^  O '  / / .  773 7 ?  ^  C y  «  o <Sy>-0 v  ^ TTO TT- S i 0  o y  ,  TTB / ?  L T a  y  ,  7 7 3 7 ?  S  f -  1
X c iA  oL i i y  y  A  ^  T T - IX. a a  T7 i  f r y  y  X . p y  a i \ r  tA  y  IX  - Phl 101 aUS D . B .  Il f /  A  Ç
' /' \ \ X) / \ ^
ft «Cf TTpi irTf-A ^ hctu 7T i/-7-0 e ^  ^ ^  /t l / ^ t O  /t ^  »<-v cV^u/inv«v w  •
Cf.the Pythagorean oath o i rL - r rK ^A S o 'y -^  r r - T ^ A n r y ^
sc. the tetractys of the decad, Aet.l.3.8 (D.Anon.pyth. 
B.15).
*
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This ascendancy of the perfect number suggests 
why the Pythagoreans at least were content to forego an 
original unity and to adumbrate the idea of a final cause. 
The cosmos is drawn into being by the same law which 
sustains it in its perfection, a law which rests, not on 
a previous necessity, but on the realisation of a moral 
claim, where opposition is carried back to the first 
principles, an eternal order can only depend, not on a 
test of strength between them, but on the ultimate 
superiority of the one to the other, an irreversible 
relation which determines, once and for all, their 
respective roles.
Dualism can explain both the universality of 
the moral law and its formulation,”^ for a world that still 
knows perfection only as an astronomical fact: the anomaly 
of a justice which is itself good, yet responds, like for 
like, to both good and evil: a virtue which is its own 
reward, and a penalty which is not the mere return of 
injury, the perpetuation of conflict, but the demand of 
a harmony which has failed to reproduce itself in an 
ordered soul.
punishment shows the necessity of the moral law; 
virtue shows its nature, and its justification. A law by 
which the wicked were always punished would have no moral 
base, if that were all. The law is transgressed, but it 
does not retaliate, organised injustice will not yield 
an ordered world.
AS (" f o Ar.M.M.1182 a 11), or t» <9/^
- T t  Ç t r x p i A o v  (E,N.1132 b 21, M.M.1194 a 28, cf.Aasch.Ag*1562).
The same formula covers both the obligation to virtue and 
the necessity of punishment, cf. Archytas* view of A e y .T Y o s  
as KKfLf /oO r Z t r cithcr before or after the
act: (D.B.2 end) S i  " frn  T -n ^ S y v a iG 'o Z y T o y
rL A ^ ^ oi u 7T^ C  tj r (  i-J g  rC f  pC S  ! IX C~v , Cn. lO o g-y oC S  ' /*■ y g~ pAj • JBO t lUa^ y "bC
deduced from the cosmic principle of harmony, plat.Gorg.
508 a, cf. Diog.Laert.viii .33  ^ -7^
A ' “  , 9  \ \ -  / \ '
A4 /A o - ^ f X t o i C  r {  & y T - g  t )  aC* ' r r y -  C-t x  t g j  X cAj  ^ 7 ^  ' ' y  > xA y  rc ja y . TT>
\  ^ JO ' ' ' A ‘ \ /
a i  ^  a .  V  0  V  o t ,T  pL /  f X a u  T t  V (A C-x> v  • ^  t o  tX p u p  K p t ^ V  o i y  f  ol. y  g '  o  y  g— 6  /■ po y  p u t t a  & r i  A
I i ^ 'T- ^ t 7
Ÿ I n I  A  V I (C, y a -p  e- y  t i  ç j A  0 y  t t A /  < g  o T  T 'A -
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Xenophanes. ’One God’
’One God, greatest among gods and men, not like 
mortals in figure or in thought’ (D.B.23). Aristotle tells 
us that Xenophanes was referring to the universe as a 
whole/ This God is in need of nothing;'"he is~not born; he 
does not move in space; he has sight, hearing and thought 
as a whole; by this thought he rules all things without 
effort or endeavour/
The whole is God, but not the parts; the whole 
is greatest, and it is a sentient being whose thought 
rules all things. Xenophanes’ monism is not a scientific 
hypothesis, but a religious polemic: against Homer and 
Hesiod,^ against Pythagoras,^ against the grotesque 
imagination of mystery religion.^ It contradicts the 
scientific interpretation of divinity.^ It is almost, but 
not quite, a ’metaphysical intuition’.
Aristotle regards Xenophanes as the forerunner 
of parmenidean monism (Met.986 b 21). Heraclitus, in 
arms against Pythagorean dualism, rethinks the new 
monotheism in terras of a scientific v-y.-r.x .
Met.986 b 24
(PlutX)strom.4 (D.A.32), Qf.£ur.H.P.1345.
'd .B.14, 26, 24, 25.
12.
'^D.B.?.
^E.g. Kern Qrph.pr. pp.91, 2ol.
^I.e. as a primary substance capable of change and 
development.
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HS• * one wisdom *
Heraclitus returns to strife as the world force, 
but since it maintains itself only by an exact equivalence 
of gains and losses, it is a strife which embodies justice 
without the human notions of right and wrong. There is 
no "IcTrz-p^ov , except in the sense of a continuous process 
the world is not a series of episodes in the order of 
time, but the eternal co-functioning of a self-supplied 
and self-adjusting whole.
Strife is the incompatibility of the opposites, 
justice their equivalence, as they pull one against the 
other in the harmony of mutually adjusted ways.
The unity of opposites is both a material 
continuity and a law, a rational idea with the force of 
destiny.^ In the divine substantial intelligence of Fire 
both aspects of this unity are to be found.
All the elements are mortal and immortal in the 
same sense (dying each other’s life and living each 
other’s death)/ but Fire is primary, as the constant 
value or measure of the rest, the ’gold’ that is handed 
on in all exchanges/ a quantity that must be preserved 
and a law that must be obeyed, even if it is not under­
stood. This is the transition to regarding the
changes of Fire as successive states of soul, varying 
between divine understanding of the one wisdom and 
unconscious conformity with it. water is death to soul 
as it is to fire, but even in death a form of soul is 
handed on.*^
 ^yvoV '^C 7 É m /c u ic À ry  ot ^ ( D* B» l03 , By W . 70 ) >
cf. Ar. phys. 207 a 2 L/crv/Lf .
^  r r A i iy y - D y o i ( ByW .56), ’otytO n.yru> CX S (69)*
^D.A.8, cf.B.137 (Byw.63), A.I.
* Byw.67, 25.
^'Byw.22, cf.8.
Byw.68, cf.103.
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The one wisdom is to know the thought that steers 
all things through all things (Byw.l9). Fire as it comes 
on will judge and convict all things; it never sets (26-7) 
The thunderbolt steers all things (28). The one wisdom 
alone is willing and unwilling to be called Zeus (65).
God is day and night, winter summer, war peace, fullness 
want, changing as fire mingles with incense and takes its 
name from the fragrance of each (36). For God all things 
are fair and good and just, but men think some things 
unjust, others just (61). Human, nature has no understand­
ing, but the divine has (96). Man is a child compared 
with Sod (97).
parmenidean Necessity. * one Being»
The One is necessarily a solid immovable sphere, 
finite, homogeneous, indivisible.^ From this ’unshaken 
heart of well-rounded truth’ both priest and poet will 
hold back their wandering thought. It is an object of 
thought and speech,'” but not a thinker; it is in nedd of 
nothing/ but it is not divine. Divinity is found on the 
’way of seeming»: the goddess who steers all things from 
the centre of the fiery bands, who ordains all birth and 
union, who contrived Eros first of all the gods, who holds 
the lots, with justice and Necessity."
There is necessity in both ways, but it is not 
the same in each.^ True parmenidean necessity is not the 
control of the natural world, but the application to it 
of the logical rule that if a thing is so, it cannot be 
otherwise.^ His real is timeless, without past or future 
but, applied to a process, the same rule leads to a 
determinism in which neither mind nor deity can play any 
decisive role.
D.B.8.
’'D.B.3;6; cf.2.7;8.34.
" D.B.8.33, cf.line 9-10.
*' D.B.12;13.
^Aet.ii.7.1. (D.A.37).
' D.B.8.30,37; 10.6. , ’
' ' D.B. 2.3,5 (‘.a/ ) ; - a u , !  ‘e t n a  V7- ^
^  S  '  L ,  a i r .  ' c - t - n a  TT- r i A
 ^D.B. 8. 5 a r ic -  lr t.7  ’ ya av ^ ' C - ir  T-Tta r-6T.a o ^  a-J TTa-a -
62
So when Anaxagoras restored the control of Mind 
as a separate principle, he could use it only as a deus 
ex machina (Ar.Met.985 a 18).
interpreted by the atomists, parmenidean 
necessity becomes scientific determinism.
Theistic pluralism
Parmenides showed that if metaphysics is to be 
monistic, science must be pluralistic. He thereby 
created a delicate problem for the theological physicist.
Xenophanes is said to have argued that God must 
be one, since he is the greatest of all.^ If he were many, 
these could not be gods, since they could not each be 
greatest. Equality is no better than inferiority: he 
must not be ruled, and he must rule.'' He must therefore 
be one, but there must be other things, over which he 
r u l e s S t r i c t  monism, therefore, and pluralism both 
destroy him.
Ionian monism (in all its forms) involves a 
relation between the one divine nature and other things 
which is, according to parmenides, impossible. To the 
Sicilian Empedocles we owe an ingenious attempt to 
establish a polytheistic physics, consistent both with 
the new idea of ’being’ and with the nature of the 
divine.
^Simplic.phys,22.22.3 (D.A.31); (Ar.)de MXG 3.3.4 (D.A.28) 
’■(Ar. ) de MXG ibid.
( Ax*. ) de MXG 3.4.5 ( C n  ^  <-b i t  e- t a XX a  • a  -n r r - w  y
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Divine Equality
All six of his original substances are divine"^and 
all are equal; each retains its own quality ( ) eternally
distinct; none is supreme and none yields its privilege
) to another. ^ Their ’mortal* existence/ in which they 
grow to be One out of Many and Many out of One, is due to 
change of place, as they run through one another continual­
ly.^ All are strictly independent of and indifferent to one 
another; there is no tendency either to combine or to 
separate apart from Love and strife;^ Love and strife have 
these functions to perform with regard to the rest, but 
whatever their relative positions either in the mixture or 
out of it, they remain eternally themselves, what each is, 
it is in itself, and not in relation to the rest.
This divine essentia is not affected by combin­
ation and separation. Since there is no preference in the 
four ’roots’ themselves either for a mingled or for a 
divided state, the influence of Love and strife is neither 
an infringement nor a fulfilment of their natures and 
prerogatives, similarly Love and strife do not themselves 
conflict, but simply change places like the rest. There 
can be no trespass upon one another; none can overcome 
another; alternation between the one and the Many is 
dictated, not by the will of any one of them, or of any 
two, but by an oath. The rule of change and interchange 
is something which the elements have ’learnt’, in common 
obedience to a Necessity which is not an external force 
but a ’social contract’, by which the rights of all are 
permanently guaranteed: a common agreement elevated into 
Destiny: ’Divide and rule'.
^ D.B.59, cf.6.
17 . 2 7  T a u T a  77- / T A u - r y  , k k i  ‘’j X  ' n: y. y r - v y A y  û-A<r i
“ ' / " A  ^  a X I y  Â X X o  ^  r î a ç A  ^  os.
o f  .30# 2 //Vc-T/coj') >1 r  '
'17.9-13, 26.8-12, cf.35.14-5.
+ (26.11,17.6), (17.13),
(35.15) , yrx. /i:. c-4rS ^ p y ^ ( Jll 5 • 8 ) , L ' S X X < ^ X o y y  S(- BSoyTA,
(26.3-4, 17.34, 21.13).
^Cf.Ar.phys.252 a 7-9, de Gen.çorr.333 b 34. Either movement 
may be represented as the ’desire’of the elements : cf.35. 
5-6 (Love gaining) with 62.6, 110.9 (Strife gaining).
E.g. Strife is Strife even when not dividing the world, 30, 
35.3. of .17.34 ' ^ Z r ( V )  I c T .
y y r t 'T A ’I aiAAerZ- aU Cv
26.8, cf.35.14 J r . -  ^  J j â a a r .  , T-: / a S . a
64
Rule a Relation between Divine and Mortal Aspects of the 
Elements.
It is the divine nature to rule where it can/ but 
a divine plurality can rule only in relation to the mortal 
world it forms. There are two senses in which the elements 
can ’prevail* over one another; (1) in their combinations 
in mortal things, which are characterised according to the 
mixture of elements in them ""(which may from time to time 
vary)^; (2) in the world cycle, according to which the 
amounts of each element may vary in different places and 
at different times. These variations depend on the point 
reached by Love and Strife as they flow in and out of the 
mixture,^ and so prevail over one another in turn, not 
directly, but in relation to the world which they seek to 
influence in opposite ways. The cycle of time is fixed, 
not only for Love and strife but for all the elements, by 
Necessity and the oath.
AS a physical property, therefore, rule can be 
interpreted in terms of quantity and arrangement, without 
affecting the essential changeless being of the'elements.
As a divine function, ruling in turn preserves both the 
divine prerogative and divine equality, defining the phases 
of mortal existence, without diminishing the permanent 
individual quality of the divine. It thus serves to relate 
the divine and mortal aspects of the elements, as the only 
property, inseparable from the idea of divinity, which is 
both a feature of mortal existence and the reason for it. 
Wherever an element prevails, it prevails of necessity; so
cf •  ThUC .  V  •  1Q5 m/ y  !-S J- yAç  Tt Or-)cy A , Z nv v r t  ^  um> A \CA faico-t Ks _
''E.g. Aet.19.5 (differences in species), Theophr.de sensu 12 
(human characteristics), D.A.72, 86.
‘^ B.B.35.12.
'D.B.20.
 ^26.1 S '  iX f - T I 'a ja ,  U t ( .  a  a te  t e (17.27 tT r-f,’r i a h ' " < e  f )
I r\ A ^  >1 I I I ' * ' ?  3 ; ) ' '
<-A-t C-r y-c-yc-i A ' g  ^
35 ( ^ Gtt<-OÇ ) ^ ~n-X  e y,. r-y o-t> ^^ ovoib
O 1 i X A T f ~ i > S  ^ 4 /  P ir r C i O f  < r \ J
115.1—2 ecnv
à X . oA g  X a TCt t-g g , o fT O I j •
Of.116. Ar.phys.252 a 7-9, plat.Leg.889 b-c, Aet.l.26.1
(D.A.45) A , g i \ y  A y J fP C Y  S .T .A V Ev Xy y ^  y tZTv •
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both the immortal and the mortal nature of things are bound 
by the common ’decree*/ which secures both the independence 
and the domination of the divine.
Unity and Love as Moral and Religious Ideals
in the physical universe, Love and strife are both 
equally divine, but there is at the same time a moral and 
religious preference for Love over Strife, as the sources 
of weal and woe respectively,'” which finds expression in the 
divinity of Sphere.^ The One which is opposed to the Many 
is not the whole universe as opposed to the plurality which 
it forms, but the unified state of the world, when Strife 
is excluded, as opposed to its divided state, when Love is 
excluded. This new deity, a phanes in the monistic 
tradition, has joy through Love in his circular repose,^ but 
is liable to dissolution through strife/ he is (perhaps at 
all times except when totally dissolved) a holy and 
unutterable Mind flashing through the whole with rapid 
thought.^
So Love is queen^ over the divine souls ( )
in their state of bliss. Strife involves sin (bloodshed 
or perjury), which is punished by a divided existence in 
a divided world.^
 ^ 115.1. For the element of chance, see 103,104,
53,59; Ar.my8.198 b 29-32, 196 a 20 (de Gen.Corr.334 a 1-4), 
Chance is here opposed to design not to necessity, cf. 
Plato’s phrase k a t I  ^  A x S y r c Y  (Leg.889 c l).
^Ar.Met. 985 a 6 a i t i S a r ù v t» L
n Z y  . They appear to be the respective causes of pleasure
and pain for sentient beings, e.g. 17.24; 20; 22; cf. 
Theophr.de sensu 16 (D.A.86).
 ^27-31, 134 cf. 133.
 ^ m ry .a y y tS  yA iittpy , 27, 28.
50,‘ 31.
 ^134.4-3, cf. 133.
128, 115.5.
^ 115. Of.Eur.H.P.1295-8.
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Recapitulation and Transition; Mind or Necessity?
Divine Control. Monism and pluralism. Necessity.
It is the assumption of theistic monism, made 
explicit by Xenophanes, that there is a single element of 
rule and control in the universe, which is like the 
supremacy of a divine nature over the rest. This relation 
(which is at bottom causal) presupposes a physical 
continuity between the divine nature and other things, 
which are either derived from it or contained in it, 
dependent on it or known by it. Its universality is 
interpreted as something between a logical and a physical 
necessity, as a condition of life or as the direct reach 
of thought. It may wear different aspects, but it is 
essentially one thing.
The physicists endowed their primary substance 
with an ultimate power to develop and transform its own 
being and to rule over what has been transformed. As 
Heraclitus said of war, it is both ’father and king*.^
Xenophanes denies this power of divine self­
extension by identifying God with the whole universe, not 
with a primary substance. Nevertheless, the supremacy of 
the One God implies the existence both of God and of 
other things and a direct relation between them.
parmenides could not have allowed the One Being 
to be divine without admitting this relation and so 
implying the real existence of other things.
parmenides * monism denies any kind of change or 
plurality and so ends the supremacy of the One God.
The atomists reinterpret parmenidean necessity 
as a complete determinism.
^Byw.44.‘
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Theistic pluralism introduces a new conception of 
deity as a fixed number of eternal, changeless substances, 
each with a single inviolable which has in itself no
power of becoming other things or of controlling them. 
Change is in the mixture of these substances, and 
’prevalence’ can be defined in terms of quantity and 
arrangement, without implying the divine superiority of 
one element over another.^
At the same time this manner of prevailing in 
mortal things appears to be regarded as some substitute 
for the divine right to rule, which is interpreted 
democratically, as a function exercised in turn, according 
to the supreme disposition of Necessity, which thus 
emerges as a separate authority over and above the 
elements, and the real depositary of divine power.
unity and Love remain as moral and religious 
ideals, but without affecting the physical equilibrium of 
the universe.
The conclusion is that, whether the world is 
divine or not, the ultimate control of it lies with 
Necessity.
^The merely quantitive notion of prevalence is a development 
of pluralism, though it is perhaps implicit in the Milesian 
systems and in Xenophanes, in contrast with the Pythag­
oreans and Heraclitus. Cf.Ar.E^N.1176 a 1 ( in a passage 
showing Pythagorean influence)  ^ ^  ^ ^ 0
K - Z i  T i  o r  x j- r , T T b X Z  X j.  o y  T f A v T u j y  " j  r r r - f  Ô-^ C - t  C f  •  G O r g i U S  H S l  #  8
\ / C C / » / (I / / • »>,  ' t o  '
A o y e s  d y v A g r i j S  C - G n v   ^ 0 Ç  ^ 3  7 ' *  r y  K - a u  O é - i o T A - r A .
X rrz p -n -X A  . Heraclitus* comparison of fire to gold suggests 
that fire is much smaller in bulk than water or earth 
(Byw.22, cf.8), cf. the size of the sun (D.B.3), which is 
nevertheless the source of light for the whole universe 
(Byw.31 note, cf.34). in a secondary sense, however, the 
quantitative method of prevailing is itself a consequence 
of the Pythagorean theory of numbers; cf. parmenides 
D.B.15 S  & 6t7 •
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Mind. Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia.
Anaxagoras, though not deifying Mind, denies that 
it can change or merge with other things. It controls and 
knows, only by remaining quite separate.^ At the same time, 
each thing is that of which there is most in it, the 
substance which (in the Empedoclean sense) * prevails* in 
the mixture at that point.''
AS there is no physical continuity between Mind 
and other things, so these two ways of prevailing are quite 
distinct. There is mental causation, there is physical 
causation; they must be carefully related, but they cannot 
be reduced to one thing bearing the name *Necessity*
Diogenes of Apollonia, reverting to monism and 
ignoring parmenides, ascribes both physical and mental 
properties to his primary substance (Air), without any 
mediating concept except that of divinity.'^ His view of 
the divine intelligence as essentially practical and 
purposive marks him as a true product of the sophistic 
age.
D.B. 12, cf.Ar.de An. 429 a 18 g-rrr-i rru-y-r^ ^
^  1 ^ ^ A T ^ ^ ^Y V" /«/pi  ^f f Tirs/Tà i  C^ C in 7
'"D.B. 12 end g X c -ie rA fv  ^ g y fia X o 'r A7A ‘gy CrK-A-gTty / '
_ry ^  \  ^  \  A "S. ^  ^  3 ^
C l  • !  r T p i K T / .  rC p c r • • T  ^  ^   ^G T  D  ^  U  *  ^  /
AcZ simplic.p^s.27.2, 155.22 (D.A.41, B.l)
% K A g - n n j  C l  Kpxr-l A e m n r fA T rC y  Si x A ^ n Z  Arcr-y ^  .J 'e^-Sp-cry ,
Cf.AlOX.de f ato 2 ( D . A . 6 6 )  c^TD^ yr- h y S S y  -nZo v yxy('i,6g.
. J Û ,  * '  > /  I f ^ a' *
/c<. £/ ^ y * ^  fiX X (?Av'pd> Tb ~ n r \ j \ ^ ù ^ ^
D.B.5.
^I.e. arranging everything for the best, w  ,
D.B.5, cf.plat.phaed.97 c.
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Is Control a Soul-property?
(i) Directive Thought
1
Aristotle, reviewing early theories of the soul, 
points out that soul was regarded as the cause of (a) 
movement (b) perception, knowledge. It was therefore 
identified either with the most mobile substance (air or 
fire), or with the primary substance or substances (on the 
assumption that like is known by like).
This has given rise to the belief that conscious­
ness (perception or knowledge) was from the first a 
property of primary substance. It is also believed that 
the words used for the control of primary substance over 
the rest imply conscious thought.""
Heraclitus, no doubt deliberately, used the same 
word ) for the intelligent direction of fire that
Anaximander used of the . But this is no evidence
at all of the meaning it bore for Anaximander, who was at 
some pains to find scientific equivalents for divine 
anthropomorphic functions.
The steers and embraces all things, not in
virtue of mind or consciousness, but as the result of its 
own peculiar spatial and temporal properties. It is not 
even soul.^
^De An. 403 b 25 ff., 40 4 b 7 f.
^Anaximander ( ^ / h . A // ^
Anaximenes of.v  ^ Y"/C?% i  ^
t c o ^ ^ o v  T ^ . J  < x e ^ e > r   ^ cu . / j  ( A - r-r-A  P *  L l  l a  s. L - f - r  S  f ^ . S ' O Ç ^
Xenophanes n L - r ^
Heraclitus <-y Vt (To^ ov  ^ c r^ r j  ^   ^ K  ^  ( - y V »Tiiti/7X<r
c j  . 3< .^Tvc-i 7T)<rA.T6w o x o c o u  n '^ c i  k -<xj <j .
Parmenides
pmpedOCleS L IÀ r r r - ^ .r r4 < > ^ < ^ » (o  ^ ^ e > v o , e  / y  . 2 ^  ■
Anaxagoras *<«Tbrtr^.*7T-y K fx - r - r - tv ^ /i. -^ 3
. ' - ^ 3 '  /p / /  \  1
j j i o g e n e s  /cA /*.« dOf«H -n> T-j u  V o ^ ^ C . v  C - ^ O v  <> n  ^ urrt) ■^ v'
X y ^ Ç Lv rr\>j^  ^ 1/ ITÛ y ^ /Ct«-« /( f-^ y «<. f  ^ j7 v y 'T't—i y •
 ^Hippol • Ref. 1 .6.6. ( p. A* 11 ) ^* ^  ^
Of.Ar.Meteor.353 b 6 (A.27) Aet.iv.3.2 (A.29)
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Anaximenes» Air embraces the whole world, just as 
the soul which is air holds and rules us ( but
there is no evidence that he carried the analogy further 
than his departure from Anaximander demanded.we are »kept 
together» by the unity of animate life, not by the range 
of the senses or knowledge.
The Pythagoreans may have connected the soul with 
breath, and they may have held that the world breathes but 
they did not attribute the order of the world directly to 
divine intelligence.^ Number controls the universe through 
its own peculiar necessity, not as a thought which reaches 
everywhere, so long as all things are made of the primary 
substance, the universality of its control needs no other 
explanation.
perception and thought require not merely life, 
but organic life, not merely soul, but a subject, an 
individual soul. Xenophanes is the first to regard the 
One God as a sentient and intelligent being, whose 
perceptions and thought are co-extensive with the whole 
universe.
1 “IT|"DQ t. / / / « c / J V C  nt./» «I , - ,
irz r^y 'c r^c -i . Of • Ar.de An. 411 a 19
/c /C 4 Ttj i r 'fCHÇ ^ o ^ i o i ç   ^ cA tZ  i  ^  »C* T k tA A  TTt-ç  t o v  C » -
• Anaximenes seems to be saying two 
things, (1) that the human soul, drawn from the surrounding 
air, is able to control us; (2) that air and breath surround 
the whole world in the same way. prom this we may infer 
that air controls the world, as it does the body, by being 
both within and without. Its » embrace» should perhaps be 
interpreted in this sense, i.e. air encircles not only the 
world as a whole, but everything that is in it: it not only 
surrounds but entirely fills the world. The analogy with 
the human soul is therefore complete, without a reference 
to the intellectual faculties.
3 -
s
Burnet S.G.P. p.l08.
Not, at least, before Heraclitus, unless the idea of a
Sc-Ai is to be traced to Hippasus (p.11). The Pythag­
orean atomists ascribed motion to «^5; or (R.P.76 b).
According to philolaus, knowledge of number is divine, but 
number is prior to knowledge, P.B.6, 11 i
 ^ r  c I ' - » - ’ / »> / f
fctKJ 7 y  K-Xa  i • i 7 ^  ></TO y  »C ^  1> «-Vyt* f-V « K  JTo».i^7V
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Heraclitus seems to regard the direction of the 
world as a thought or a thinking which is not confined to 
any individual mind but is something » common», which may be 
an object to any mind in a near-fiery state, and which is 
a feature of all experience, even if it is not understood 
by all/ The changes of fire correspond to changes in 
mental state : life or soul is not a permanent underlying 
unity, but something which is passed on in the stream of 
consciousness.
God has two aspects, corresponding to the two 
aspects of fire and the * one wisdom»: (1) the divine 
intelligence which understands the U 'y c t (2) the itself, 
as it is exemplified in various ways in the world-process 
and in human experience/ These two meanings are not 
clearly distinguished, for the universality of the law 
requires that its legislative sanction should be present 
at every point where it is obeyed. The divine understand­
ing which directs all things is therefore omnipresent, as 
fire is omnipresent, though in a changed form. The 
knowledge of God is self-knowledge, as that self is 
changed.
There is nothing magical about this control of 
t h o u g h t I t  does not legislate for the world except as 
a property of its material substance. There is no deity 
who merely thinks, and it is so. There is nothing which 
is, merely because it is a necessity for thought.
Xenophanes» deity, who thinks thus, is the whole 
world (not a primary substance). A universal thinker 
thinks universal thoughts. Clearly all that he can think 
are the a priori truths of logic and mathematics. When 
Parmenides demonstrated that the same thing is, that is 
for thought, he ruled out the application of his necessity 
to the natural (i.e. the sensible) world.
The natural world cannot,therefore,be controlled 
by thought, except as a property of a primary substance 
that is capable of change. But thought now declares 
change to be impossible, and its necessity is seen to be 
independent of its validity for the natural world.
^Byw.l9, 91; cf.2, 1. 
''Gf.Byw.19, 96, 26-8, 36.
 ^contrast Bmpedocles D.B.lll.
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pluralism, viewing change as the mixture of 
changeless elements, cannot regard soul or mind as more 
ultimate than anything else, it must either (1) accept 
a composite soul, which is not essentially different from 
the composite body, or a soul which is merely a property 
of elements which form the body, or (2) it must selett one 
among other substances to be the soul.
Empedocles » views are not quite clear; the living 
thing is a combination of the elements, perceiving each by 
each, and Aristotle even thinks that each element is a 
soul.^ He also wonders whether soul is the »proportion of 
the m i x t u r e » T h i s  determines the nature of the composite 
thing, but it does not determine the mixture, which is due 
to chance or ultimately to necessity. The human soul may 
have a religious .and moral connexion with the divine Mind 
that flashes through the world with rapid thought, but this 
Mind too is dependent on a certain combination of the 
elements.^ The soul » s unity is a property of the mixture, 
not the reason for it.
Anaxagoras restores the control of Mind, by 
separating it from the rest; by remaining apart, it can 
distinguish the multiplicity that is in the mixture, por 
matter, to »prevail » means to have more of itself in the 
mixture.'^ por Mind, to » prevail » means (1) to know all 
other substances (2) by motion to cause them to separate 
and combine in larger amounts that are distinguishable by 
the senses, and so to account both for growth and for 
perception and knowledge in living things.
Diogenes supposes the divine intelligence to 
think purposively; since purposive thought would not in 
itself bind the world in an gg a priori necessity, he 
guarantees its universality^by supposing it to inhere in 
Anaximenes* Air. in this way he combines the control of 
a primary substance, not only with perception and knowledge, 
but with foresight and directive purpose.
 ^l097” r7de”AnT404~b”l ^  por the special importance of Pire 
cf.Gen.corr.334 a lü-3, Met.985 b 1; death is the separation 
of the fiery element, Aet.v.24.2, 25.4 (D.A.85).
^Pe An. 408 a 20.
^AS Aristotle says (Met.lQQQ b 4, de An.llQ b 13) God has 
less knowledge than other composite things, since he does 
not know Strife.
"'D.B.12.
^D.B.5
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(i i) The irrational
m  addition to its ultimate directive function, 
however this is interpreted, primary substance has certain 
primitive ways of behaving, without which the world would 
not exist, and which may or may not be associated with the 
divine power of control.
AS an original , it tends to develop into
interrelated pairs of opposites, which either conflict or 
have contrary effects, and require to be balanced, harmon­
ised or unified. This strife or opposition may be called 
justice or injustice, it may be attributed to all the 
world’s substance or to one principle only, but it is in 
either case a necessary condition of the formation of a 
world.
Parmenides (in the * way of seeming*) identified 
the contrary principle of harmony not with a merely 
rational or mathematical , but with the motive force
of love as an impulse to union between unlikes. In the 
pluralistic system of Empedocles both Love and strife are 
made separate MXXMSMX causes, but (in relation to primary 
substance) of combination and separation only.  ^ in addition 
there is (a) the common obedience to Necessity, and (b) 
the tendency of each element to * prevail * in relation to 
mortal things, as if each inherited the will to dominate 
as a legacy from the divine function of control.
 ^Cf.Ar.de An.4Q8 a 21 en fe T rA -n ^ fo f f 3
\ \ i f  y. ^  f C |/  ^ \ \ I /
Love and strife are motives, as such, only for composite 
things, for which strife produces conflict and Love the 
natural union of symmetrical things (D.B.22). For the 
simple elements, they are causes merely of coming together 
and moving apart (by necessity or chance, 59, 103), which 
in their consequences for the world involve the ideas of 
proportion and disproportion, order and the violation of 
order, strife, the impulse of the simple element to join 
its like, can in the composite thing be counteracted only 
by a symmetrical or proportionate mixture, which is adapt­
able to the nature of other things. Love may therefore be 
viewed as the harmony of any composite thing, but if left 
to itself would produce, not these adjustments, but 
complete fusion of the four elements.
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It now becomes clearer that the original 
aggression of the opposites, as it appears in Anaximander, 
is simply the attempt of each to arrogate the nature of 
their source, a tendency that is both derived from and 
checked by the , which can allow none but itself to
be unlimited, as Heraclitus saw, strife and its adjustment 
are both exactly the same thing, the expression of that 
primitive self-assertive vigour which cannot exist only in 
a single form, but must be carried on throughout the life 
of the world.
Transition between Soul and Material Substance
Just as the idea of proportion or measure ( )
can be interpreted either for mind or for matter, as a 
function of the reason or as a merely quantitative idea, 
so strife and love are capable not only of governing the 
behaviour of physical elements, but also of entering 
directly into a psychological and moral analysis.
Empedocles* Love and strife are not only physical 
forces, active in nature and in the ’mass of the mortal 
limbs *;^they are also motives with a moral and religious 
significance, both for the human soul and for the world. 
Nevertheless, as they govern behaviour and destiny, it 
is their physical function which is ultimate, since that 
alone is ultimately connected with the Necessity that 
rules the world.
From the opposite point of view, Anaxagoras forms 
a world by the action of Mind on matter, without postulat­
ing any passionate principle of behaviour. The separation 
of unlikes and combination of likes both depend (a) on 
Mind’s knowledge of what is like and what is unlike, and 
(b) on the power of causing motion that is inherent in 
soul. The process of combining and separating is selected 
not with any preference for mechanical causation (as in 
atomism), but in order to render the action of Mind on 
matter intelligible, in terras of causal principles which 
have a meaning for both.''
^D.B.20.
^It is because of this that Mind cannot be allowed to 
arrange everything for the best (plat.phaed.97 c).
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Atomism denies this transition of causal 
principles between mind and matter. Eternal motion by- 
collision seems to be necessarily connected with the idea 
of atoms and a void.^ Movement of likes or unlikes does 
not, therefore, depend either on mind to know them, or on 
soul to feel. There is (strictly speaking) neither ’strife’ 
nor ’harmony*atoms adhere according to shape and move by 
’like to like’ attraction, but this is not an independent 
motion, but the necessary effect of the ultimate material 
conditions, soul is only one among the atomic shapes; 
consciousness only one of the ways in which we are affected 
by o b j e c t s M e n t a l  events are phenomena, determined by 
physical causes; it would be nonsense to suppose that they 
can be ’necessary’ in any other way, e.g. that a human 
motive is in some sense continuous with a wider ’force’ of 
the same kind as itself. There is only one kind of 
causation, that which follows necessarily from previous 
material conditions, and this determines the world in every 
detail, every aspect.^
^Ar.phys.265 b 24 f A  r ) y T.Lv
a . jn de Çaelo 300 b 8 he implies
that they gave no further account of this motion, gimplic. 
ad loc. adds ^ ^  4 (Eeucipp.D.A#l6) .
Elsewhere (Democr.D.A.37) he attributes the ’war’ of atoms 
to their unlikeness ; ^  ^ A- ^
kA  ■ From this we may infer that there
is no active hostility among the atoms, but that atoms in 
a void could not remain still, and having no reason to 
move all one way (as they might if all alike) were bound 
to collide. Cf. Bailey Greek Atomists p.132 f. As Dr. 
Bailey remarks on p.lo2, soul atoms are spherical because 
this shape is ’least able to remain at rest’.
^ ’Harmony’ (the union of unlikes, cf. philolaus D.B.6, 10), 
is not mere fitting together, but involves either 
(proportion) or some special motive. For the ’war’ of 
atoms, see note 1 above.
O o
T?-* ^Aot.iv.8.5 A e v K itr im f >cA 7' ^  t v/ ( C-'n-y o i Aj t  t-i ^
f  . if  . lO TTrx; V^o^Trin-TT» v7T>}
 ^Of . 9 . 8 ^
iho<  ^ M  ri A t A x ' f r i r e f  x A . , ■7>C/-* / <^o
4 Leucippus D.B.2 ✓«L-v yive-ry~4 ,  A X iX  trt-vry. c-x X iy r^ K A ^ rr  ^f
(’for a reason and by necessity’). Qf.Ar.de Gen.An.789 b 2
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summary
Divine, or quasi-divine, control of the world 
may, with the early philosophers, assume the following 
forms :
(1) A soul-property, the all-embracing unity of animate 
life.
(2) A mind-property, some kind of thought or knowledge 
or rational principle, either separate or partially 
separate from matter, or changing with it into other 
forms of consciousness.
(3) Some a priori principle of form, which is itself 
intuited as necessary, and, for that readon or another, 
thought of as determining all existence, in so far as 
it is determined. (But it is, as parmenides shows, a 
confusion to think of what is necessary in itself as 
exerting an influence over other things, merely for that 
reason.)
(4) A natural necessity, based on the idea of a plurality 
of simple substances with invariable properties, which 
determine the properties of their combinations.
(5) A necessity connected with time, or the spatio- 
temporal order, as it is variously interpreted. (Gf. 
pre-philosophical notions of Qhronos, fate and destiny).
This control is, in each case, associated with 
certain primitive modes of behaviour, which condition 
the formation of the world, and can be interpreted either 
as physical or as psychical principles.
Atomism stands alone in its thoroughgoing 
materialism, but enforces a stricter notion of necessity, 
excluding chance and independent causes.
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B. PRIMARY SUBSTANCE AND SOUL 
The Human Soul. Unity and Analysis.
in the analysis of soul four kinds of unity must 
be distinguished:
(1) The unity of a substance which persists through change 
of state or combination with other substances (immortal 
soul, the subject).
(2) The unity of the (physical or) animate life which is 
continuous through the body as a whole, and perhaps with 
the life principle outside it.
(3) The unity of consciousness (common to states of 
perception, thought, feeling, etc.) which depends upon
(1) and (2) but is not itself complete or continuous (i.e. 
there may be interruptions, and there may be physical 
processes of our own of which we are not conscious).
(4) The unity of experience, the order in which the data 
of consciousness are combined to form an intelligible 
whole (i.e. not the continuity of consciousness, but the 
integration of its content). This may, at certain levels, 
include the direction of effort by will and purpose.
It is, I think, clear that the soul must be a 
unity in at least one of these senses, if not in all.
(2) may be the property of (1), the perpetual ’movement’ 
which, for Alcmaeon, was the sign of the soul’s immortal­
ity."^  This movement, located in different parts of the 
body, forms a single interconnected system as the set of 
functions which, in their relation to the perceiving 
subject, make up the conscious life of the soul. This, 
in relation to objects, is experience.
A^r.de An.4o5 a 30*
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Conscious behaviour and experience can therefore 
be analysed either as the functioning of this physical 
system, or on their own account, as they present themselves 
directly for introspection and observation, as Aristotle, 
however, points out, a genuine psychological analysis 
cannot altogether dissociate itself from physiology.^
physiology is studied empirically by medicine, at 
least by Hippocrates and his school. The philosophers 
bring to their examination of man’s the bias of their 
special theories about the universe, which is deplorable 
for the genuine physiologist,^ but suggestive for the poet.
I use the phrase ’physical or animate life’ to 
suggest the unity of Milesian , but on dualistic or
pluralistic views there is no single substratum of this 
kind; animate life is either thought of as movement (and 
associated as by Alcmaeon with the presence of an immortal 
soul), or it depends on the unification both of the 
physical elements and of consciousness by some formal 
principle which may be identified with the soul. There is 
therefore a tendency to fill out what % have called the 
’interruptions’ in consciousness either by thinking of all 
physical states as forms of perception (i.e. by supposing 
breathing to be one of the senses, and parmenides holds 
that even the dead perceive cold and silence)^ or, like 
Heraclitus, by making non-conscious states continuous with 
conscious, through their equal conformity with the
^ Ar.de An.403 a 5 f.
HippOCr . "  ^ 2Q : S>t- l-^Tyoi xA. «Tôliers'-' A; oA k
C  ^  ^ ^ ^ ^  ^ ^  ■»//'' z' c
^  7  à  '  C  (r> è  ( ' y  ^ O '  y  ® c - x  n v  y ^ y  r c (  • x . % X n> J  <■—»
fcy-T  ^  -r^v <y~y ^ Ç ui rrrv^ • 'n->y(-\ i t -  ^
( I l  i o  a - o t l i ^ y   ^ K y . â J c i n - ç  A o x A ^ (  7 , «< ^ ✓ A f  ' A f x A i
»/ |  ' r. C / A / > \ c
<<y (}(^yjrrr>^  ^ n.x* (-yé-yt-TX} r.ç^i^Tby Kjxy crr^ùe-y c ^ j y e t r ^ l - ^  . o T i y i
'' ^ ( ' - ï ’ . - I '  / ' T  /  j -  ^  ^  y
7  « T » « j f ( G T ^ i  7  7  ' ^ C '
n  G  7 t A  ^Y<riof T  t <Foi < !  e s  /
^ c-^ 7 ^ . . /ify w iP  r.CoTyv'  ^ tT C-6r,y fcA S ,^
0 xA ■ jSi t-w; •
 ^Hippocr. 7T. 23: breathing is one of the seven senses by
which we perceive hot and cold. c f .  the pseudo-Heraclitean 
account of sensation preserved by gextus (adv.Math.vii.126 
f. D.A.16)'. For parmenides, see Theophr.de sensu 3 (D-A* 
46), cf. D.B.16.
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The Milesians either offered no explanation of 
consciousness, or they regarded it as the same as the 
animate life. I have argued that, though the control 
properties assigned to the primary substances bear some 
analogy with conscious functions, the ascription to it 
of sensation and thought would have been condemned as an 
anthropomorphism, and that Xenophanes’ insistence on full 
consciousness without human parts was to that extent an 
innovation.
If, however, the human f i s  itself analysed 
in terms of more primitive processes that are the same 
throughout the world, sensation and thought will then be 
ascribed to man only in so far as his nature is part of, 
or resembles, the nature of the whole.
philosophical Conceptions of the ’Nature’ of Man (psycho­
physical and Moral)
Material definitions of intellectual and moral 
qualities may be put forward as part of a general view 
which explains all perception and knowledge as a relation 
between the soul and what is essentially like it. If 
primary substance is animate and even intelligent, or if 
the nature of things is universally adapted to the nature 
of soul (as on number theories), there is no reason to 
suppose that the physical condition causes the psychical, 
any more than the other way round.
For Heraclitus, a moist state of the soul is a 
foolish state: they go necessarily together, but neither 
is necessarily the cause of the other. Moisture mn the 
soul may cause it to become foolish, or foolishness may 
cause the soul to become moist, e.g. by indulging in 
certain p l e a s u r e s A  man’s is his in either
sense; i.e. what he is and what he does is determined by 
the attraction of liKe to like, and this may be explained 
either physically or psychically. Asses prefer straw to 
gold;^ this proposition is capable both of a physiological, 
a psychological and a moral interpretation, and none of 
its possible meanings can be claimed as any more 
fundamental than any of the others.
Byw.72, 7 3 ; 108. 
Byw.121, 96."'Byw.1
^Byw.51 (Ar.E^N.1176 a 7), cf.53, 54, 111
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There is, moreover, no reason to suppose that a 
man’s is fixed irrevocably in advance as if it were 
part of his physical make-up, a view which Heraclitus seems 
to be disputing no less than the religious idea of a divine 
soul and predetermination. Obedience to the city's law 
would no doubt produce comparatively ’dry* souls willing 
to face glormous death in battle no less than natural 
endowment. A man's life is not necessarily determined by 
his own intelligence, but the wisdom of another may serve 
as a form of understanding which is ’common’ to all.^ This 
conception of the soul, not as permanent substance, not as 
a group of faculties, but as the succession of its conscious 
states, is not physiological, but essentially philosophical.
The individual (Composite)  and its Relations
If, however, the world consists of a number of 
changeless elements, and soul or mind is a property of 
their combinations, mental qualities will also depend on 
the mixture of these elements. The Empedoclean view is 
that such mental and moral qualities as intelligence, 
foolishness, industry, impetuosity, all result from the 
way the elements are mixed in the body, which determines 
the accuracy of the perceptions, tempo of the blood, etc.  ^
This leads to the idea of a relatively permanent individual 
’nature ’ ( ) with both physical and mental character­
istics, for khich the individual is not himself responsible 
(except on the assumption of pre-existence and perhaps not 
even then), and over which he has no control, apart from 
his own physical reactions.
An individual nature or character of this kind 
is partly self-contained, in so far as it depends on the 
composition of the body and the way it is adapted to 
receiving impressions, and partly related to the rest of 
nature (a) through its preceptions, and (b) through the 
identity of the elements which compose it with the elements 
of other things. The rules which govern its behaviour may 
therefore be either general or particular, either (a) 
common to all living things or to all members of a species 
etc., or (b) applicable to itself alone, but in either case 
they are to be inferred from the behaviour of the elements 
both in this particular mixture and in the world as a 
whole.
^Gf.Byw.lll, 74; 102, IQI; 91,100. 
^ByW.llO /{A c-yoç cf.91.
JBheophr.de sensu lo, n  (D.A.86).
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Theophrastus^complains that Empedocles, explaining 
perception as he explains all mixture, by ’symmetry of 
pores’, cannot distinguish between conscious and unconscious 
mixing. This As a consequence which Empedocles appears to 
accept, when he endows all things with ’knowledge and a 
share of thought’ just as we perceive like by like through 
the ’effluences’ which flow from all things as they are 
continually perishing,^ so we forget as the thought itself 
flows away to seek its like elsewhere.All mental processes 
are instances of the material unity of each element, as it 
maintains its communications in combination or in separation 
throughout the world.^
NO Original Self-Consciousness of the Elements
Does this imply that the elements are self- 
conscious? If they were, it would explain (1) how like can 
know like, (2) how each element can remain itself even when 
completely unified in the Sphere, and (3) how each can 
respond to the impulsion of strife to seek its liEe, even 
in a different part of the universe. Apart from his 
poetical language on all occasions, Empedocles speaks more 
precisely of perception as if it were the sum of the self- 
recognition of each element - as if (as Aristotle says) 
each element were itself a soul
Yet it seems clear that soul or mind can exist 
only in a mixed state of the universe. It is the divine 
Sphere who is a Mind flashing through the whole.^ If, 
therefore, mind or soul can exist only when things are 
mixed, the self-consciousness of each element would amount 
to no more than the knowledge by likes which each composite 
thing has, and nothing is to be gained by postulating an 
original self-consciousness, over and above the material 
unity of each element. The consequence is that there is
^ Pe sensu 12, cf.Ar.de An.410, b 11-2.
^ D . B . l l Q . l Q  Tr/yry. )Aiç ' f <9,
 ^89; cf.plat.Meno 76 c, Theophr.de Sensu 20 (D.A.92,86). 
t D.B.110.8-9.
(Ac. ytv l-v n B ^ y T ^  y-. i - &  (T G  ! y
-r?' t A  O u ^ t t . y o S  ^ A y
’o C cA  j i y  fv ^^ 7TbTf,V Xt t o ■
109; Ar.de An.4p4 b 11, 409 b 24 f., 43)0 b 1 (see Hicks' 
note, p.221-2).
 ^D.B.134.
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no soul or mind in the universe when the elements are 
entirely separate, when they are together, there is either 
the complete self-knowledge of the unified Sphere (a state 
of things which is also completely pleasant)^ or the system 
of perceptions formed by the mixture of individual things, 
through which the elements are in conscious communication 
both v/ith themselves and with one another.
A ’nature of man’ which is constituted on the ’like 
knows like’ principle cannot be a strictly physiological 
conception, for even in composition the elements must remain 
part of a single world-process of coming to be and passing 
away, which is neither wholly physical nor wholly psychical.
Number Theories. The Soul a Harmony.
The discovery which led Pythagoras or his 
followers to assert ’all things are numbers’ was a musical 
one, that the harmonies of sound can be measured not only 
by ear, but by number, por this reason, and for various 
others, they declared the whole heaven to be harmony and 
number.
sound, like air or breath, is in a space which 
can be analysed mathematically. Tune, like the order of 
the heavenly bodies, is the spatio-temporal pattern formed 
by the constant intervals between its moving terms.
If the soul too is a harmony, it must be drawn 
from an which is capable of unification and adjust­
ment in the same way. The kinship of all life can now be 
given a new and more precise meaning than the mere 
homogeneity of a continuous.soul-substance. The unity of 
the animate life is only the beginning from which the 
complexity of man’s physical and moral nature can be built 
up, in a scheme which relates each soul to each and also to 
the whole.
^D.B.27-8, cf.17.24.
’•Ar.Met.985 b 23 f., 1090 a 20 f.
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Alcmaeon
The soul is immortal because it is like immortal 
things, i.e. always in motion like the divine moon, sun, 
stars and the whole heaven (Ar.de An.4o5 a 30). Men die 
because they cannot join beginning to end (Ar.probl.916 a 
33). Man alone has understanding, other creatures have 
only perception (Theophr.de sensu 25). All the perceptions 
are connected with the brain through certain passages 
and depend on the stillness of the brain.^ Health is the 
’symmetrical mixture of the qualities’ (Aet.v.30), which is 
preserved by of the powers, wet dry, cold hot,
bitter sweet, e t c T h e  cause of disease is t i
some excess or defect (D.B.4). Alcmaeon does not appear 
to have used the idea of symmetry or harmony to explain 
perception, or in any epistemological sense. According to 
Theophrastus, he did not use the ’like knows like’ princ­
iple (de sensu 2S).
philolaus
The world is composed of things limited and 
unlimited; since the are not alike, they need harmony
in addition.^ The unit is formed first { ^ ^ T . c j n A ç , r - n > ^ }, is 
the source of all else, and the same as the central fire 
( J Number, and the decad especially, is the source
of knowledge and control, harmonising everything according 
to soul and perception."^ It is strong in things divine and 
human (techXnical crafts and music). It admits no falsity 
but ohly truth; falsehood and envy belong to the unlimited 
and unintelligent and irrational nature (D.B.ll).
^Theophr.de sensu 26, cf.D.A.ll.
Aristotle (Met.986 a 22) interprets his saying X- r: 
a s  a variant of Pythagorean dualism.' uj JT ly u~> V
 ^D.B.6. On the pretext that knowledge of the essence of 
things is divine and not human, philolaus allows himself 
to be vague about first principles :
'  r  » c , « / , , '  T / ) / '  3
O i ^ o i d u  à 7*7 tC èyya(.7~t>v 7S /c ^  o( w  ^ tco ^ y ^
c- /  ^  ^ c ct y / ^ / # I f
&  r n - f l r y  f-rb ^  i (. 7^ o m ^  (ryc-yt-TX> HarfflOny IS T, (-UJV' ( ryy^Ci^
j y o v t o y r y ^ y D.B.lQ.
^D.B.5, 8, 7.
^D.B.ll.
^I.e. number is a deity which cannot deceive or be jealous, 
cf.Ar.Met.983 a 2.
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There are four o f  the rational animal: brain
(mind), heart (soul and perception), navel (natural growth), 
(procreation). Brain is therefore the of man,
heart of the animal, navel of the plant, of all
things (D.B.13).
According to old religious doctrine, the soul is, 
for punishment, imprisoned in the body as in a tomb (b.14).
To philolaus have also been attributed (a) the fable in the 
Gorgias (493 a f.), in which ’that part of the soul which 
contains the desires* is compared to a leaky jar, and (b) 
the doctrine criticised in the phaedo, that the soul is a 
harmony of the physical elements which compose the body
Simmias* argument, that if the soul is the harmony 
of the body it must be mortal, would not be valid for a 
Pythagorean, plato believed in separate mathematical number, 
but this is just where he differed from the Pythagoreans 
(Ar.Met.987 b .^4 etc.). The Platonic bias cannot, therefore, 
be used as evidence that the author of this theory had given 
up the idea of the immortality of . Nor has plato
shown, as Burnet asserts (E.G.P. p.295), that the harmony 
theory is * quite inconsistent with the idea that the soul 
can exist independently of the body*, unless we are prepared 
to accept the Platonic view that a number which could be 
embodied would be neither mathematical nor immortal.
philolaus believed that the body is composed of 
the hot and draws in the cold by respiration, and he had 
theories of the origin of disease (Menon, Anon.Bond.,D.A.27). 
His view of the soul, however, seems to have an epistemo­
logical and moral rather than a physiological base. Sextus 
(adv.Math.vii.92) ascribes to him a statement that reason 
(T7~ ) surveys the nature of the whole and has an affinity 
with it, since like is apprehended by like. The universe 
is also adapted to soul and perception (B.ll). The ’unlim­
ited and unintelligent and irrational nature’ is the source 
both of falsity and moral evil.
 ^plat7phaid786'T^7~CfTaFTHe ^ n T 4Ô7~F”30~MacrobTsTsc^.1.14. 
19: Pythagoras et philolaus harmoniam (animam esse dixerunt). 
( D. A. 23 ) .
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practice of immortality. ’Separation’ .
At some point in the history of philosophy, the 
belief in transmigration, i.e. the belief that the human 
soul passes into other animal forms, is combined with the 
religious belief in a divine existence of the soul apart 
from the body, though this is given a moral and intellectual 
rather than a religious content.
According to the view which Aristotle found in the 
Orphic poems (de An.4lQ b 29) the soul enters the body as 
we breathe, carried by the winds.^ The religious idea of 
immortality seems, therefore, to have required the withdraw­
al from the body of the animate life, whole and intact, at 
d e a t h I t  was believed that a similar withdrawal could 
occur on certain other occasions, e.g. in sleep, prophetic 
trances, religious ecstasy. A divine affinity was shown by 
the change which took place on these occasions in the 
conscious life of the soul, which then seemed to overstep 
human limits, both in the range and certainty of its 
knowledge, and in the vâvacity of its emotional states.
At ordinary times, the soul is occupied with the 
organic life of the body, the processes which preserve the 
living creature and orientate him in the natural world, 
prom such earthly functions and experiences the soul seeks 
release, not in part, but as a whole. Nevertheless, the 
deliberate practice of immortality, as it is recommended by 
philosophers, not in certain ecstatic moments but as a way 
of life, leads to discrimination within the soul itself, as 
it is occupied either with different physical functions, or 
with different ’natures’ or interests. The soul is no 
longer regarded as one thing, to be withdrawn as a whole, 
but divided according to its states and experiences, some 
of which are to be exalted at the expense of others. This 
is not, indeed, the withdrawal of the animate life from the 
body, but it is the withdrawal of conscious life and 
experience, as far as is possible, from a natural existence 
which is merely mortal and human.
^Kern t.37, p.112.
’•Cf. Jaeger on the » breath-soul’ , Theology of the Early Greek 
philosophers, p.84; Rhode, psyche, p.264, 346.
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Does all the soul, then, survive, or only a part, 
or (to put it another way) must the immortal soul be 
redefined so that it becomes only part of the living nature 
of man?
Religion has no preference for the rational over 
the irrational, and animals are included in the transmigr­
ation scheme/ philosophers who (like Empedocles) make no 
difference between mind and soul, define it in such a way 
that it is common to all living things
physiologically, no mental process can be quite 
independent of the body, since even thought is located in 
the blood (Empedocles) or in the brain (Pythagoreans).
But according to experience, as we consider the content of 
mental states, not their material definition, there is a 
clear difference between (for instance) our own bodily 
sensations and our awareness of external objects, or 
between those desires and activities which provide for the 
continued existence of the body and those which have a 
wider range or a different field.
If the soul merely does a rota through all the 
various animal species (as on the Egyptian theory according 
to Herodotus)\ it is perhaps enough to think of the soul 
as the somehow individualised animate life. If, however, 
sinking or rising in the scale is to have any meaning, and 
the practice of immortality any point, the immortal soul 
must be the same as the conscious subject, i.e. not the 
sum of its own states but itself a * substance’, the same 
through all its experiences yet capable, at on0e point or 
another during its round of lives, of knowing and choosing 
what is most consistent with t X  its own immortality.
^Animals are thought capable of ’religious’ experiences, 
e.g. prophetic dreams, Ar.de div.per somn.463 b 12. Cf. 
Apollo’s swan, plat.phaed.84 e 4. Theophrastus says that 
Alcmaeon was the first to differentiate between man and 
the other animals (de sensu 25).
 ^Act *iV.5 .12 7A Y ' ^ 7 \ «A ^^iTT'L/ciyN « A A  KÇ t T^yrx-V VoZy /c A '
L  7^ . Gf.Aristotle on Anaxagoras,
de An.4o4 b 1, 4o5 a 13, cf.404 a 27 (Democritus). Aet. 
iv.4.6 (D.A.1Q5)  ^B r n r t  ^oç 7 ^ ter'X •
 ^Hdt.ii.123.
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When philolaus speaks of brain as the of rnind,
and heart of soul and perception, he is not identifying 
either of these specifically with the subject. it is the 
same subject which knows, perceives, and (given certain 
conditions) has desires connected with natural growth. He 
does seem to mean that animals have souls and plants have 
not, but he does not mean that mind is a soul in addition 
(or another part of soul) any more than natural growth was
a soul in plants (or part of the soul in man).
NO Pythagorean, regarding number as the sensible 
universe, can separate knowledge from perception, and there 
is no reason, therefore, why animals ( an«< men who are incap­
able of mathematics) should not all have immortal souls.
But merely to be born and grow is not, according
to philolaus, to perceive and have a soul. He means,
perhaps, that the soul is essentially cognitive and not the 
same as the natural life of the body, even if, during its 
mortal existence, it is in some way implicated with it and 
conscious of its processes. The soul perceives and knows, 
the body is born and grows. Yet, since soul and mind are 
both connected with parts of the body no less than natural 
growth, he may also have held that the soul of the rational 
animal harmonises his body as a whole, and is the harmony 
of it, not in the sense that it cannot survive it, but in 
the sense that it is the reason for the body to be harmon­
ised as it is. so number harmonises everything ’according 
to soul’.
Though any living thing which perceives has 
therefore an immortal soul, its immortality consists, not 
in any and every state and experience, but only in those 
which are unconcerned with its own mortal existence and 
directed toward a more perfectly ordered nature. Since 
number is divine, mathematical science has a special claim 
to be so, but the nature of number is also perceived, in 
audible music and in the visible heavens.
 ^There is also the special motive  ^ i.e. in its
emotional and conative aspect, cf. plat.Gorg.508 a, Diog. 
Laert.viii.33.
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Morality is the attempt to relate this perfect 
order, which can exist only where there are no natural 
desires, to a mortal life which depends fundamentally upon 
them, and so may be part either of a rise to divine bliss 
or of a fall to the moral abyss of the / This
’unlimited, unintelligent, irrational nature’ must be 
eliminated as far as possible in any aspect, mental or 
physical; in this way the whole life of man can be 
embraced, like the universe, in a single harmony, directed 
by the four-square rule of the divine.
so, according to Orphic dualism, the Titanic and 
Dionysiac elements in man are not separable parts, but 
genuine of the migrating soul, which is both mortal
and sinful, and immortal and divine.^
’partition’ psychology
I have argued that the soul, in so far as it is 
immortal, must be the same as the conscious subject, 
capable of leading different lives and having different 
kinds of experience, not all of which are consistent vfith 
its divine nature. This subject cannot, however, be left 
simply as a metaphysical ’ego’ without further character­
istics. The soul is thought of as both active itself and 
affected in certain ways, and therefore as characterised 
by its own states and activities.
By ’partition’ psychology I mean the division 
of the soul into different parts, faculties or quasi- 
subjects (whether separable or not) which correspond to 
differences in psychical states and activities as these 
are classified in various ways. A s Aristotle puts it 
(de An.411 a 27): ’Since knowing, perceiving and opining 
are of the soul, and furthermore desiring, wishing and 
all forms of appetition, since movement in space belongs 
to the creature in virtue of soul, also growth, prime and 
decay: do we think and perceive, do and experience each 
of these with the whole soul, or with different parts 
of it?’
^The question how far these ideas are pre-platonic will be 
raised presently.
 ^plut.de esu earn.996 c (Kern p. 231)
I T y . S h  T y v  S f y - f ' X  < G t ry X  A  T a  ^ 7 *  niwTX>\i TB A t-j y/< • •  ^ ' Y f ' *' ^ S (
f  ^ ^  I /  \ » /  ' • / ? ' '  #  n  •> i  I  ^  r  ^
 ^ 7*]*^ Y ^  ^  i <n/ J J v ffCoy
e f  / T a - L i O '  l i T ^ y i t - S  f  v  é ^  f a  y  k . - t A  . ^
Cf .prod.Tim. 41 d (Kern p.225) T.t^ vikm  U  f,; 7*rC
 ^ 4 / o v  u.6-*/c A h  A t X  T-jS. t t a t I  > f - < r < .
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This way of thinking is not confined to 
philosophers, it is encouraged by three factors : (1) 
physiological association (2) symbolical and pictorial 
representation (3) linguistic usage.
The popular conception of the soul as a group of 
motives, qualities, propensities and powers in fixed or 
varying relations to one another, owes much to their 
physiological connexion with different parts of the body, 
o t  with different physical functions. The class of 
impulses called ’hunger’, ’thirst’, etc. are assigned to 
a part of the soul as they are to a part of the body.
Other can be similarly located as physical movements
within the body, related to perception through the sense
organs, with thought at the centre (heart), or in a 
commanding position overtopping the rest (brain).
philolaus’ scheme of the rational animal is a 
remarkable combination of physiology and symbolism, 
recalling Hesiod or Orphic representations of the world as 
the body of zeus. It illustrates both the return to myth 
and (perhaps) that fondness for the blackboard which plato 
deplored in mathematicians.^
philolaus offers a scheme of the rational animal, 
not of the soul alone. There are, however, traces of 
another classification in the anonymous fable of the 
Gorgias (493 a f.), which compares the body to a place of 
burial and ’that part of the soul to which the desires
belong’ to a jar with or without holes, as the case may be.'
The reference to the recalls philolaus ’ xA
a /  ^ I  '  A  r \  n  , , \  n  4- 4 n  4  4 - f  4
y O 7 TXyJ [a/s.fO, and the jar itself is perhaps
(pf
U.<Ku-< I 
X 'A ’a ie
 ^ A 
«»•/
^ Cf.philolaus D.B.13, plat.Crat.40Q c. Attempts are made to 
fill the jar from a similarly perforated sieve, which is 
the fYAi (? the perceptions). The allegory belongs to the 
same school of thought as Sextus’ ps.-Heraclitean theory 
of sensation (D.A.16). See also pp.91, 124, 255 and the 
concluding chapter.
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reminiscent not only of the Danaids but also of the
cauldron or urn ( ) in which the scattered remains of
Dionysus were, according to Orphic myth, placed by the 
Titans, and later given to Apollo for burial at Delphi/ 
According to proclus (in plat.Tim.35 a)^ the divided body 
of the god was thought of as the divided soul, the 
undivided heart (which Athena saved) as . This is
clearly a later interpretation, but it may point to the
true prototype of Plato’s of the soul. More
detailed ’chopping’ is implied by Aristotle’s phrasing 
of the question in de An.411 a 27, and by his argument 
about the segments of animals (411 b 19).
' This adaptation of post-mortem myth shows that
religious doctrine of the hereafter might be philosophic­
ally as well as allegorically interpreted as a permanent 
truth about the moral nature of man. There is, however, 
surprisingly little evidence before plato that unusual 
moral deterioration was symbolically connected by Pythag­
oreans with the transmigration scheme, as'a transition, 
here and now, to ’another form of life’ plato regarded 
Ty rryiXcLiXy as un extreme of lawlessness
to which the individual might, in certain cases, even 
permanently revertbut the ordinary doctrine seems to be 
that this nature is something common to all living things 
- the mortal and bodily aspect of the whole series of 
lives to which the soul is bound until it regains its 
lost divinity, sin perpetuates mortality, but does not 
otherwise transform the soul. There is a purgatory of 
pain, but this is either in the hereafter, or equally 
part of all mortal existence.
 ^Kern t.35 p.Ill, t.210 p.230.
^Kern p.228.
 ^Eur.Med. 1039. Cf.Ar.E_^.H45 a 23 ' c.:  ^ ^
Y'vt>yrAJ XA 0^7 ✓ , o n 7
But this is Aristotle’s own inference, based on a Homeric 
line. Enpedocles regarded himself as a god (D.B.112), but 
the rest of mankind are all equally sinful and woebegone 
(124,136,137 f., cf.A.62).
plat.Leg.701 b-c. Qf.Iambi.V.p.174 (D.Anon.Pyth.D.3) .
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Language
Both Greek and English tend, by their use of 
substantives, to foster a belief in mental entities which 
are themselves subjects, acting and behaving in certain 
characteristic ways. But Greek has tv/o peculiarities of 
its own: (1) the use of quality-adjectives as nouns, 
combined with an early rhetorical tendency to metaphor and 
personalisation. (2) since the subject need not be 
expressed apart from the verb, it may be ’divided’ accord­
ing to the activity of the verb: e.g. ’it thinks’, ’it 
perceives’, but there is nothing to show that ’it’ is the 
same in each case.^ just as a cognate object may be 
supplied from the meaning of the verb, so a cognate subject 
may emerge : ’mind thinks’ and ’soul perceives’. Aristotle 
suggests that we turn these nominatives into datives; we 
should say, not ’soul perceives’, but ’man perceives with 
the soul’ The result is that soul, or any ’part’ of soul, 
becomes an instrument or a faculty instead of a subject, 
but we must still ask, do we think, perceive, do and exper­
ience each thing with the whole soul, or with part of it?
To this we must add native (especially Sicilian) 
fondness for wordplay, fable and ’etymology’, encouraged 
by the Heraclitean doctrine of the as revealed in the
ordinary speech and deeds of men (Byw.2). Use (or misuse) 
of Heraclitus is seen in Epicharmus, and in the Gorgias 
fable a soul-flux is combined with the Italian or Sicilian 
pore-system, cf. the pseudo-Heraclitean account of sens­
ation preserved by Sextus (adv.Math.vii.126 f ., D.A.16)^ 
These and similar passages (cf. the Hippocratean r r . f . ^ ' r y ^  ) 
are especially important as evidence for the transmission 
and ’contamination’ of Heraclitean ideas.
 ^So Xenophanes writes , /.L* L' l r ' , as if
we should otherwise think that only the appropriate part
of him did so. parmenides can refer «n and to
two different subjects.
*-pe An. 4p8 b 13 (but his reasons are different).
 ^Burnet eGP p.153 thinks the metaphor of the coals lit up
by the fire may be genuine, but this is perhaps a little
too Aristophanic to be true ; clouds 9 4-7 (referred by the 
scholiast to Hippon, D.A.2), Birds 1546; cf .Hippocr.
29, and the anecdote of Heraclitus and the stove (Ar. de 
part.an.645 a 17, D.A.9). The metaphor is first attributed 
to Xenophanes, Aet.ii.4.13.14, D.Â.38.
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The joint effect of myth, metaphor and physiology 
is seen in the use which Gorgias makes in the praise of 
Helen of the ’image’ theory of perception and emotion.
In this theory he combines the Pythagorean idea of a 
’ colour surface ’ ( /fX with the E m p e d o c l e a n  and
also follows Empedocles in regarding emotion (or pleasure 
and pain) as part of sensation. This earliest version of 
the sense-datum can literally impress itself upon and 
inform the soul, not only with a certain visual image, but 
with an appropriate emotion, i.e. we see alarming or 
amiable sights as if these emotional tones were part of 
the content of our perception, and our emotional response 
with regard to a particular object therefore guaranteed.
’What we see has the nature which it has, not the one we 
wish’ (15). Reason cannot, therefore, control emotion^ 
any more than it can control sensation.
Gorgias illustrates this by selecting examples 
of emotional behaviour which has no rational ground, but 
depends entirely on an immediate visual impression, and he 
uses language that is highly metaphorical and suggestive. 
Even before the engagement, the alarming aspect of battle 
array can make men flee, i.e. fear coming through sight 
displaces the habit of obedience to law, though that is 
strong, and causes neglect both of honour and of future 
advantage (16). Fearful sights can quench and banish 
thought and consciousness ( ) for the time being;
they can cause sudden attacks of vain distress or madness 
hard to cure (17). On the other hand, pleasant visions 
can be manufactured by artists and sculptors, to inspire 
love and longing no less than real bodies. So (all things 
being considered) it is not surprising that Helen’s eye 
delighted by Alexander’s body conveyed to her soul the 
excitement of love. Love is either a god and therefore 
irresistible, or it is a human frailty or folly (
.A )> ^ misfortune, not a fault (19).
 ^Ar.de sensu 439 a 30 -* /e i
C, Of f A  X  vC X  t r y / .
plat.Meno 76 t-cr,./ Me r
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The persuasive power of is similarly described
as a quasi-physical or ’divine’ property (8-16); quite apart 
from any foundation in truth or reality, it can produce 
astonishing changes of opinion and emotion in the soul, 
analogous to the effect of drugs upon the body (14). Again 
for the sake of clarity, Gorgias gives instances of the 
effect of false or fictitious : poetry, magical
incantation, meteorology.^
The success of this playful encomium depends on 
eliminating as far as possible the individual nature and 
agency of Helen, and so on an analysis (a) of sense and 
emotion in terms of externally received ’impressions’, and 
(b) of moral action in terms of conflict between these 
impressions and other ideas which are not immediately, or 
not as vividly, represented to the • In place of
reason and knowledge, there is the quasi-sensory appeal of 
, and we are left with the general conception of a 
’nature’ that is defined, not by the ultimate difference 
between reality and appearance, but by the supreme law 
which governs both - that the strong shall rule and the 
weak be ruled.
SO Aristotle (E.N.lllQ b 9 - 11) denies that acts 
are compulsory ( )  merely because the impulse which 
prompts them is derived from an external object. So plato 
in the Protagoras (352 b f.) criticises the popular notion 
that, in spite of knowing the good, we are overcome by 
pleasure, or by each motive in turn according to its 
relative strength at the moment when it presents itself.
prom the opposite point of view, Antiphon the 
Sophist defines virtue in terms of moral conquest, even 
denying that one who has no contrary impulse is .
, D.B.58,59, cf.44a).
To the theory of knowledge we shall return, but 
the reader is now invited to begin a consideration of some 
of the plays of Euripides.
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MEDEA (431 B.C)
Restatement of problem
(1) How a metaphysical or cosmic law of justice can become 
a psychological necessity.
(2) HOW this necessity is related to human nature, human 
character, human will.
(3) HOW, in certain cases, it can be associated with a 
divine element, not merely in the human soul but beyond 
it; how this in turn affects the conception of the true 
ground of the moral law.
Retrospect (Aeschylus)
Olytmmnestra had something to gain by the murder 
of Agamemnon, it was no spontaneous reaction to injury 
(the advent of Cassandra could not in itself have provoked 
the revenge), but a crime long premeditated, we see her 
as if at the end of a long vigil, roused and impassioned 
less by the memory of a past act than by anticipation of 
the act to come. Similarly her own death has to wait 
through the long years to Orestes* manhood.
This slow fruition was the feature of zeus* 
justice, of a curse reborn by generations, psychologically, 
it is the long brooding of a crime (cf. Sophocles* Electra). 
Only the pursuit of the Erinyes is immediate, the madness 
which is the result of crime, but not the cause.
The mental excitement which preceded the murder 
was not the compelling strength of a human motive, but a 
direct reaction of the mind to the deed which it has been 
brought to contemplate. It is related to the previous 
crime less by the tie of human memory and resentment than 
by a supernatural hate which is, in the moment of revenge, 
lodged with the individual who executes it. The law of 
Zeus is mediated by forces which are capable of becoming 
part of the human mind, but have also an independent 
existence.
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M edea
Medea*s injury is still fresh; it cannot have been 
received more than a day or two previously, and she has not 
seen jason since. There has merely been time for the nurse 
to become apprehensive for the children and predict revenge, 
for Medea*s threats to be reported to Creon, and for her 
own grief to begin to pass into a more active phase.
The metaphor of sickness is first used to express 
the strained family relations (16), but for Medea it is no 
mere metaphor, she has * submitted her body to grief*, 
refusing food, weeping continuously, with eyes on the 
ground and deaf ears, like a rock or a wave of the sea; 
her thoughts are with her former country and home which 
she betrayed for jason, who now repays her in kind. The 
complete isolation of Medea and the genuine difficulty of 
her position are stressed as much as her own violent and 
stubborn temperament. Her affinity with the animal and 
natural world is suggested in metaphors.^
* She has learnt by experience what it is, not to  ^
be bereft of country.* *She will not put up with wrongs.* 
These two facts constitute Medea’s crisis, and the link 
between them is the perfidy of jason. Her passions cannot 
be robbed of their object, but passion itself can change : 
the force that was Medea’s love (which according to jason 
compelled her to save him* )^  is now her hate; it is not 
replacement, but transformation, and the change is poison 
to her whole emotional nature. She has ceased to be able 
to distinguish between what she hates and what she still 
might love.
The paidagogos brings news of the proposed 
banishment, and of Jason’s too easy acceptance of his 
children’s misfortune. This is a shock even to the nurse, 
whose fears are confirmed by Medea’s cries off-stage, 
indicating that the storm of wrath is about to break.
: 28-9, 92, l0 6-8 , 187-8. 
"34-5, 38-9.
530.
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prologue and parodos forewarn us of Medea’s 
emotional mood, of which there is at first little 
indication upon the stage* Her first appearance to greet 
the chorus reminds us of her , The nurse had doubted
whether she would come out, forgetting that her mistress 
regards citizens very differently from servants; she has 
to that extent learnt to conform to Greek usage. As the 
play develops, her passions and her astuteness are 
displayed alternately.
TO the Chorus she presents herself as a notable 
instance of woman’s insecurity and inferiority in the state 
of matrimony, she pictures herself as an ordinary wife, 
entirely dependent on her husband, spiritually broken by 
his desertion, and appeals to them not to interfere with 
her revenge, as if in common defence of the rights of 
womanhood. But no definite plans for revenge are yet 
revealed.
creon’s advent, with the sentence of exile, is 
the second blow, which rouses her dormant energy and sets 
it irrevocably in the direction of revenge, she has only 
a day in which to plan and to execute; she is compelled 
to think, to act; she is mentally saved and her enemies 
are thereby lost.
She tells the pitying Chorus that her self- 
abasement before creon (like the fawning of Clytemnestra 
upon Agamemnon) was simply a ruse to gain time, not for 
departure, but for revenge. why do we not instantly hate 
Medea for her duplicity? Because she really is what she 
pretends to be, a lonely and oppressed woman, facing 
tremendous odds. To the Chorus, she drops the mask at 
once, in full confidence that they will approve both her 
intention and her methods. Her intention is that father, 
daughter and husband are to die; she does not mention the 
children. But she can form no definite plan until she 
herself has some avenue of escape. (Her own safety is 
necessary if she is to enjoy a full triumph over her foes).
jason himself arrives, to do his duty (financial­
ly) by his wife, as if it were an act of charity. The 
exile was not part of his original plan and he may be 
genuinely vexed at her precipitating the banishment of his 
children. But there is, at this stage in the drama, no 
sign that they are essential to his happiness. Drama is 
economical in its effects, exploiting each aspect of a 
situation in turn; the plight of the children is still
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being used to increase sympathy with Medea; their death, 
though feared by the nurse, has not yet been proposed.
The ambiguity of Jason’s attitude is turned to account 
later: ’You care for them now,’ says Medea over their dead 
bodies, ’but then you rejected them.’ (1401-2)
The ’debate scene’ follows, with frankness on 
Medea’s side, and perhaps on Jason’s. Medea’s argument is :
(1) Her services to jason, and his pledges to her, are a 
permanent claim upon him. (2) She has no refuge, for she 
alienated her friends for his sake. (3) Even if he did 
show his gratitude by marrying her, no woman can be happy 
in the possession of a husband who has deserted her. why 
is there no stamp on men’s bodies to show whether they be 
false or true? Jason’s argument is : (1) Her services to 
him were due to love, but he consents to acknowledge them.
(2) He has repaid her by bringing her to a civilised coun­
try where she has (a) learnt the meaning of law and justice 
(b) gained a reputation for wisdom. (3) He has married 
again not for amorous reasons but from a desire to provide 
for his family. If she were not so interested in their 
connubial relations, she would realise that she was better 
off than before, not worse. But women are all alike - bad.
Aigeus is shocked by Jason’s behaviour. He offers 
Medea asylum in Athens, if she can reach it. As she teaches 
him the oath we are reminded of her kinship with the divine 
Helios (746).
Medea, encouraged, reveals her plans to the 
Chorus, first the death of the princess, then of her own 
children* ^  f • ( 7 9 7 ) . The Chorus
forbid her, (a) in her own interest (b) in the name of the 
law of humanity. Medea speaks of the children’s death as a 
necessity, which the chorus cannot, understand, since they 
have not experienced the injury, she explains that it is 
the means to inflicting the greatest possible amount of 
pain on her husband. ’But you,’ the chorus point out,
’will become the unhappiest of women.’ Medea dismisses 
the consideration as irrelevant. ^
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Jason returns, pleased at the prospect of keeping 
his children in Corinth; the point of Medea’s revenge * 
becomes clear - and of the Chorus’ warning. The sudden 
restoration of conjugal harmony (for until now, the nurse 
told us, Medea has been a submissive w i f e i s  strangely
touching, as a glimpse of earlier days. Even as Medea
dissembles, her tender feelings are roused, and we are 
prepared for the struggle to come.
If, in the first shock of grief, Medea .seemed to
hate her children, her natural affection now returns. The 
soliloquy shows that she is affected mainly through her 
perceptions, the sight of the children’s smile, the smell 
of their flesh.^ she alternates between the two impulses, 
until the stronger prevails and she sends the children into 
the house. The struggle begins again, but she suddenly 
reflects that it is now too late to turn back. The bride’s 
death is certain; the children are doomed to serve either 
her revenge or another’s.^ Anger already has the mastery 
over her designs; with this thought she confirms its mastery 
over her will and purpose.
Medea has not, from the first, planned her revenge 
whole before her; she has felt her way, exploiting each 
opportunity as it arose with instinctive cunning, not with 
deliberate foresight. After the news of the bride’s death 
she tells the Chorus (as in 781, lo6o ) that she must kill 
the children herself, to prevent their being killed by a 
less loving hand (1239). That this is no mere excuse is 
shown by Jason’s dash to rescue them (1304). How Medea 
herself intends to escape is left vague. This lack of 
perspicuity in the plot (cf. the question of the value 
jason sets on the children) is the sign that we are being 
carried forward by , not by the clear light of reason, 
and that Medea acts solely for her vengeance, not for hex 
self-preservation. Her ultimate safety is not part of her 
plan at all, but due, twice over, to the provision of the 
gods.  ^ She might have planned for it, but she did not ; it
^13 (i.e. in Corinth, at least).
^1040-1, 1071-2, 1075.
" 1059- 61 , cf. 780-4, 1236-41.
"''Medea is curiously inconsequent on this point, cf.1236-41, 
and 390 r  . Luck is in any case
divine, but Aigeus comes straight from Delphi and he comes 
straight to Medea, who can be the means of fulfilling the 
oracle for him (7 1 7 -8 ) .
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is a condition of her own planning, a means to ensuring 
the success of her revenge, but not its ultimate aim. As 
Aristotle with his usual relevance notes,- both the Aigeus 
episode and the dragon chariot are improbable, and discon­
nected with the main action as it is brought about by human 
means. If Medea could have foreseen the dragon chariot, 
would she have had the heart to kill her children? we 
shall never know, but we do know that she nerves herself 
with the thought that she cannot leave them behind with 
impunity; her own life she might risk, but not theirs. And 
even if she foresaw some help from her heavenly kinsman, it 
seems clear that the miraculous could only have happened 
after her crime, which links her, paradoxically, with the 
divine.
The Mastery of Anger
1Q78 S tAruJ o'l A ^
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IS Medea’s conduct an example of the behaviour which 
Socrates declared impossible, and which Aristotle later 
analysed as ?
When Medea says that she knows the evil she is 
about to do, she means that she knows the pain it will 
cost her, not that she knows she is doing wrong, but is 
overcome by anger so as to do it. At the same time her 
original decision was formed under the influence of anger.
She does not set out on her revenge with the full 
knowledge that it will destroy her own happiness, for that 
is already destroyed; she sets out to inflict the maximum 
amount of pain on jason, and willing the end she also wills 
the means, she refuses to contemplate any other course, 
conflict arises only when it is too late to draw back, when 
passion is already master both of her will and of the course 
of events, when she argues that she must save the children 
from a worse fate, this is not self-deception, but it is 
nevertheless a sign that anger has overcome her natural 
affection to the extent of enlisting it as an additional 
motive for the crime.
: poet.1454 b 1, 1461 b 20.
^  124Q — 1 (Pj* <A\iAyK.>j K.A-7- Ô  ^ f rrr-i i" f- ^  ^
‘■ A  A cA '  y. y /
K -T 'b v  a - v ^  f - ^  o I TTf~f ^ ( f y  o *  << /A  C-w '
loo
Her action is not purely passionate, for it 
involves meanstaking, and the belief that she is right to 
pursue her revenge. This belief is not only the result of 
her present passion, but follows from general principles : 
that all oaths must be kept, and that all wrongs must be 
avenged, when conflict arises, she is capable of enduring 
a greater balance of pain over pleasure in order to achieve 
the object which has become identified with her purpose.
But her action is not in the ordinary sense deliberate, for 
if is the strength of a present passion which prevents her 
from reflecting on any but a single aspect of the case.
She deduces her action from a single rule, that enemies
must be punished, without considering (a) that it is 
inconsistent with her other habits of thought and conduct, 
and (b) that it will cause her additional pain. She draws 
conclusions from her own premisses with remarkable lucidity; 
when she cannot listen to any other argument, we realise
that her reason is completely dominated by the single
passion.
Anger has control over Medea^s reason in two 
senses: it determines the principle on which she acts, the 
end for which she plans, and it determines the means which 
she takes to it. she is incapable either of admitting any 
other general principles, or of any other planning, even 
of planning for her own safety. Her (apart from her
knowledge of magic) is not the philosophical trait of 
seeing two sides to every question, but like Aristotle’s
^, an intuitive perception of what is needful in the 
particular circumstances, to gain an end dictated by some 
special desire. But at the same time she intuits the need 
for vengeance, not merely as her own wish, but as an 
absolute necessity.
The principle ’all wrongs must be avenged’ is not 
an ordinary moral rule, for it does not admit of an 
exception, por a human being, it is a form of excess 
which is never timely;""as Heraclitus says, passion buys 
its object at the cost of life.^ Yet, as we are reminlded
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at intervals through the play, it is the law of Zeusi Not 
now a metaphysical necessity, but a law of retaliation, 
and not (we may provisionally suppose) a law for all human 
beings, but only for a nature like Medea’s, which can brook 
no injury, and is therefore compelled to purchase revenge, 
at the cost of something dearer even than life.
Jason’s desertion involves perfidy of a peculiar 
kind, well recognised as such by Zeus, though men are often 
blind to it. That zeus should care neither for human laws 
nor for individual happiness is not surprising. But how 
can a human being come to be regardless of both, experienc­
ing as an absolute necessity the need to retaliate to the 
utmost of her power?
Characterisation or psychology?
How far should Medea’s action be attributed to 
her nature, or character, and how far to the influence of 
in this particular mood? And how is her experience
to be related to human nature and human experience in
general?
During the course of the play, are we learning 
more about Medea, or about women, or about barbarians, or 
about the human passion called anger?
Are we being shown how a nature of a certain 
specific kind will react to its wrongs, or how a single 
element in the soul can, in certain circumstances, 
overcome the rest, so that a human being will, in these 
circumstances, revert to a behaviour that is not human 
at all?
preliminary
If we say, it is the nature of X to do so and so,
or to be affected in a certain way, we may mean (1 ) that
it is one of the natural characteristics or habits of X, 
which may or may not be the prevailing characteristic; or
(2) that it follows from all X*s natural characteristics 
and habits, taken as a whole, that he will behave in a 
certain way.
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The word nature is sometimes used as synonymous 
with character to mean the sum-total of qualities which 
determine individual behaviour in any given situation; it 
is sometimes used to indicate natural characteristics (due 
to heredity or environment) as opposed to characteristics 
that have been acquired by training and habit, character 
is usually used to include both, i.e. the natural qualities 
of a person as they have been developed and modified by 
circumstances, training and habit.
There is, I think, no modern definition of 
character that is strict enough to support the view that 
character determines action in any sense which rules out 
the freewill of the individual, as it is normally 
understood. When moralists say that x*s behaviour is 
determined by x ’s character, they seem to wish to say that 
X’s behaviour is, on any given occasion, determined in 
accordance with the situation by the sum-total of his 
motives and qualities. But all that they succeed in 
showing is that x*s behaviour on any given occasion must 
be determined by one af x*s motives, i.e. one among the 
sum-total of his motives, prom this alone it cannot be 
inferred that the sum-total of X*s motives is something 
which determines the particular motive he acts from on 
any given occasion.
A similar vagueness invades our thought upon 
characterisation in drama, we believe that drama 
illustrates character, we observe persons on the stage 
behaving in some characteristic manner (e.g. an angry man 
talking and acting as if he were angry), and we believe 
that there are certain fixed laws of human behaviour, 
that action is, in any given situation, determined by 
character, we believe that this is something which is 
equally true for all dramatists, and we talk of ’charact­
erisation’ and ’psychological insight’ in the same breath, 
as if psychologists were wholly concerned with investig­
ating the thing which we call * character’.
It will be remembered that the argument of this 
thesis is (1 ) that before the development of moral 
psychology, the conception of human character and human 
nature which Euripides is exploring is derived from the 
êârïy~physicists, and (2 ) that the dramatist himself is 
responsible for developing these conceptions in terms of 
human experience, and so of recasting them in a form in 
which they can be used by the moral philosopher, in so
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doing he is not entirely dependent upon his own original 
thinking, but using his traditional material and continuing 
the ideas of his predecessors. This inheritance, 
intellectual and artistic, is the medium through which he 
passes to a new form of art and a new dramatic conception.
Retrospect (Sophocles)
The character of Oedipus or of Antigone is, in 
the course of a Sophoclean drama, shown in the form of a 
habitual reaction to a changing set of circumstances, and 
we are thereby able to ascertain that character is, in 
these circumstances, the cause of the tragic outcome, we 
do not know in advance that character is an entity which 
determines all behaviour, but we observe that the disaster 
is brought about by a series of actions which are all 
characteristic of their agent in the same way. They are 
characteristic, in so far as passion of some kind predom­
inates in them, but they are not caused solely by that 
passion: the whole nature of the agent is also ’brought to 
bear», a nature with its full complement of motives and 
affections, coloured throughout by the prevailing charact­
eristic, but not excluded by it or dominated by it. Even 
if, as in the Ajax or Trachiniae, the tragic act is the 
product of a single mood induced by special causes, it is 
never pure anger, or pure lust, which brings disaster, 
for these passions are never shown in sole control of the 
course of events, but always in conjunction with noble 
qualities and lofty aims which sc/een the single nature of 
each passion behind the complexity which we call the 
individual character.
Euripides accepts the idea of habitual or 
characteristic behaviour as a presupposition of any 
tragedy that is to be convincingly played, but he does 
not accept it as an ultimate and irreducible fact about 
human beings.
It is Medea’S nature to be affected violently 
by her passions, but it is the nature of the passion 
which affects her to demand a course of action which 
cannot be said to conform to her character or to her 
nature, taken as a whole, any more than the effect of 
a disease can be said to conform to the normal state of 
the physical system.
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Medea’s Nature
That Medea is habitually uncontrolled in her 
emotions is something that we might have inferred from 
the violence of her present reaction, even if we had not 
been expressly told so by her nurse. It is essential for 
the drama that Medea should possess a character of this 
kind, in order that she may react in this way, and follow 
with remorseless logic the demands of the single passion. 
But we are interested in Medea’s character rather as it 
is affected by her present suffering, than as the cause 
of it.
Medea is not behaving contrary to Medea’s way 
of behaving, for the nurse anticipates an attack on the 
children. She is not behaving altogether unlike a woman, 
for the Chorus are prepared to go part of the way with 
her. That she is a barbarian who has not properly 
assimilated Greek customs, and a wise woman who cannot 
properly reason, explains still more. Nevertheless, the 
situation to which she is brought, in which she must 
inflict more pain on herself in order to inflict rather 
less pain on her husband, is so paradoxical that no 
single account of ’natural’ or ’characteristic’ behaviour 
will fully explain it.
It cannot in any circumstances be regarded as 
’natural’ or ’characteristic’ for a mother to kill her 
children, even if she is a barbarian. Euripides often 
generalises that love of children is common to all 
mankind.^ That Medea’s revenge requires her to violate 
this instinct, and that she is able to do so, is a sign 
that we have to account for a behaviour more primitive, 
more universal, more necessary, more unexceptional, than 
the strongest affection known to human nature or to the 
animal world.
633-6. cf. fr.346N (Dictys):
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Human or Divine?
Medea’s revenge, through the conflict to which 
it gives rise, drives apart two aspects of her nature, a 
human and (so we will call it) a divine, we are reminded 
of this divine element as she teaches the oath to Aigeus, 
just before the scene in which she proposes to kill the 
children. Medea the woman, murderous, treacherous, 
friendless, yet draws the nature which impels her from 
the pure light of the universe, and is able to invoke him 
as her ally.
The dragon chariot is, as Aristotle points out, 
an artificial device for completing the action of the 
play, as it has been brought about by human means. As 
many others have pointed out, it also indicates the 
’apotheosis’ of Medea, who, twice ravaged as a woman, is 
now divine enough^ to offer the usual compensation to 
Corinth for the crime which she has herself committed, 
as it passes into the catalogue of crimes performed by 
man but rightly to be laid at heaven’s door.
Medea’s divinity, springing from the double wrong 
done to her human nature, is both the cause and the
consequence of her tragic act. It is a feature of the
complete domination which has obtained over her mind,
combined with the nature of the crime which she has been 
forced to commit as a means to its satisfaction. The 
result of the conflict with her human instincts is, for 
Medea, final; her nature is now determined, once and for 
all, on the side of the victorious principle.
It is only the divine nature for which it can
be a law, to brook no injury. Only a god can visit 
with utter destruction. Medea’s tragedy is that she 
must behave like a goddess, while still suffering as a 
woman. It is no one-sided punishment; Jason’s cry was 
heard, before it was uttered. Medea is not pursued by 
an Erinys, for she pursues herself.
10 6
Anger as a Human Motive
in the Protagoras (352 b), Socrates objects to 
the opinion of the many that a man can have knowledge and 
yet be overcome by pleasure and by each emotion in turn, 
on the ground that knowledge, whenever it is present, is 
a ruling principle : to speak of a man who knows as being 
’overcome’ by anything else, or of anything else as 
’ruling the man*, is therefore a misuse of language.
He then analyses the experience called by the 
many * being overcome by pleasure* on the hedonists own 
assumption that pleasure is the good. If x has knowledge, 
X will know: (a) that pleasure is good and pain bad, 
except as a means to greater pleasure : (b) how to secure 
for himself the maximum amount of pleasure, not only now, 
but in the long run (356 b). To be overcome by pleasure 
therefore means : to choose a smaller amount of pleasure 
rather than a greater, merely because, by some quasi- 
optical illusion, the nearer pleasure ’looks bigger’.
But the man who knows will not be deceived in this way, 
and so cannot be ’overcome by pleasure’ (356 - ?)•
Euripides has, by a similar paradox, shown what 
it is to be overcome by anger, or pain (since anger arises 
from pain and is the desire to inflict pain in return),^  
on the injured person’s own assumption that pain when 
inflicted on oneself is bad, but good when inflicted on 
the enemy, if x has knowledge, X will know: (a) that 
pain is an evil, except as a means to inflicting greater 
pain on the enemy : (b) how to inflict the maximum amount 
of pain on the enemy. To be overcome by anger therefore 
means: to inflict a greater amount of pain or evil on 
oneself in order to inflict the maximum amount on the 
enemy, and this overbalance of pain to oneself may even 
be thought a gain in so far as it is a means to the 
desired end."" Socrates would no doubt have argued that 
if X knows that pain is an evil, he cannot act thus. 
Euripides seems to be showing that reason itself may be 
perverted by taLs. and that Medea ’knows* the evil 
[wlêcn ) only when it is already too late.
 ^Ar.de An.403 a 30 (T Aw ^  Y Ti TP/irvjnotZ
' M@d>1362 /IV S' y fu fj. '(-j-r-iis .
 ^Cf7Ar.E.E.1225 a 31-3 (philolaus D.B.16), 1246 b 15, 
1248 a 9.
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I do not wish to contend that these two arguments 
are exactly parallel, but that the method is similar: 
starting with an initial postulate, we proceed to a highly 
paradoxical but necessary conclusion, in the one case by 
Socratic logic, in the other by dramatic probability.
philosophy is accustomed to assuming such 
simplified sets of conditions as ’if x knows’, ’if X is 
angry*, ’if x has a nature of a certain kind’, and to 
deducing their consequences, without regard for any other 
characteristics which x might have, if he were a real 
person.' in this way general notions are formed of human 
motives and human conduct, similarly the dramatist, by 
postulating a nature of a certain kind in a certain 
situation, can demonstrate a truth not about persons and 
situations of that kind only, but about a human motive 
or passion ’as it is in itself’: not as it in fact occurs 
in this or that person, but as it would be if it were the 
sole motive dominating human behaviour, we learn from 
Medea, not merely what barbarians do if provoked, but 
where anger would lead if it were not controlled. This 
is shown by a sort of psychological syllogism, a conclusion 
that follows from its premiss by a necessity which none 
but the injured person can fully appreciate, if Medea is 
’unlike’ us, it is because she alone can whole-heartedly 
accept the revenge principle, and demonstrate its effects, 
by reacting with complete consistency and fidelity to a 
passion which is common to all mankind.
Anger as the strife principle. East or west?
According to Aristoxenus^ the Pythagoreans viewed 
anger with especial distrust as disruptive of , and
wished to eliminate if possible from the whole
world (it was here that Heraclitus disagreed with them)f
^ Cf.Ar.poet.1451 b. According to Aristotle, Socrates was 
virtually the first to attempt general definitions of 
ethical terms, since the Pythagoreans lacked an appropriate 
method, Met.lo78 b 17, cf.Met.987 a 20, M^.1182 a 11, 
E.N.1132 b 21.
 ^iambi.V^P. 230 ( D.pyth.sch.p.9 ).
 ^Byw.43, 46, 62.
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According to the g u s t o , r e s t  is good, movement 
evil (Heraclitus on the contrary declared rest to be the 
state of a corpse)^ Aiming at an even^life both physically 
and morally, they avoided mental disturbance of any kind: 
if anger or grief is roused one must go away by oneself and 
’ treat the passion* -ri ) until the mind is again
still and calm. The stories connected with this rule are 
late (Archytas, c.400 B.C), but the view of the passions 
as is at least as old as Gorgias, and is probably
implied in Alcmaeon’s theory of health as . cf. the
Pythagorean use of for both soul and body (Cramer
An.par.1.172, D.l end).
They held that the living creature is naturally 
froward,^ with a manifold of impulses and desires, needing 
the control of a superior being, i.e. God, who is the 
source of political institutions, law and justice. There 
is no greater evil than anarchy : one must reverence first 
the gods, then parents and the law, and abide by inherited 
customs even if they are not quite so good as others.
License )^  causes vain and violent desires
in man, woman and child, go Medea’s nurse (119 f.) speaks 
of the difficult tempers and violent mood-changes of those 
who are accustomed to rule and not be ruled, i.e. morality 
and self-control are the same as obedience to law and 
external authority, ghe concludes (as she must for an 
Athenian audience) that it is best to live on equal terms 
with others, for excess is never timely
128) m  190 f. she blames the men of old for not
iA-t K
^Ar.Met.986 a 25 
Aet.i.25.7 (D.A.6 ).
H f  VVol iambi.V.p.196 (D.Pyth.sch.D.6).
^Ibid.197.
 ^Ibid. 174 (jD.3) S'l ^ 7. ■ • X/-*
/ y» V »  /  ^ j , 1' >! , / ^ - C
T h  K - t U  ( - îT  A  V A  O  T A  S  A ir j (  ,  ^  7  ^ 6 - S T A a  S i u  t, v  , <Cj u - o  ç  T> i  b z( .
This is the earlier view of morality, cf. the prometheus 
myth, plat.prot.322 b f.
^Iambi.V.p.176, stob.iv.25.45H,1.40H (D.3,4), cf. plat.Leg.
701 b-c, Soph.Antig.1113-4.
^iambi.V.p. 2 0 6 (D.8 ).
 ^Of.627 f. por the importance attached by Pythagoreans to 
(A , cf. Iambl.v.p.l82 (D.5), Ar.Met.985 b 30.
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inventing music and songs ’of many strings'^to stay the 
griefs which bring death and disaster, i.e. Pythagorean 
musical therapeutics are too recent a discovery to be of 
any assistance to Medea. Even if they had been invented, 
one may doubt whether they would have been any more use 
to her than the friendly advice or ’chiding’ [ you 
on which the Pythagoreans also laid special emphasis, and 
which is attempted without success both by the nurse and 
by the Chorus (29, 811-3).
h IK 7 V E ^ f✓
in the first stupour of grief, Medea is like a 
rock or a wave of the sea (28). The first words we hear 
are a prayer for her own death (97), and the nurse tells 
us that from this beginning she will soon light up the 
cloud of lament with greater wrath. How will a soul like
hers { react to the spur of wrong?
(106-10). Medea then imprecates death upon father and 
children together (113), and in 144 prays that the fire 
of heaven may strike her through the brain.
The Chorus echo ; zeus. Earth, Light (148). Medea invokes
Themis and Artemis, keeper of aaths for men: it is not
possible that she will stay her wrath for a small thing 
(168-72).
/  c \ ____z -»'■ /I / '
T ^  t> C i u  TT~b V  ’ w f  V T - r ^ o f  7 Ü  A  i  A  c S / o f
fcX<J Ç y  U. rco 'u e-, S y c j t X u i y . ,
lO6 Ç  ^ O^yVz-r-v-o/•
Z / a /» C. > /w (-J Of a fjA. cu y ,j f  c^f / A V A Ÿ’ ^
ju.Cn ( ' e y , • T , ' 0%>T ' ^ F y A C e - T B U
I Z , 'z Ç /
^ t - y  a A  0  S ' r r < { A y . ' ^ v o ^  i  u  s  k .<a t a G~a  u  s  r o ç
"^</co7(r/ V ;
The progression of elemental forms is Ionian; the word 
vJcjz^  is Heraclitean,^ and it is Heraclitus who saw the 
world process paralleled by changing states of soul."^
see page’s note, p.85 of his edition of the Medea. 
^lambl.v^P.197 (D.5), 231 (D.9).
^Byw.20, 77 (D.B.30, 26) ^
 ^By w .68 (D.B.36) y '^ c  y s r ( - ^ S g < ^  ^
' I f c  y y  i-A y 'y f - T A >   ^ C-J / - f  ^  ' Cf # D. B. H 5
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Euripides’ language is metaphorical: to interpret 
it as allegory or symbolism would be unpardonable, yet 
behind metaphor is always an association of ideas and 
images: their interplay is the ’soul* of poetical language. 
By the use of images the poet does not put forward a 
theory, but he can suggest a certain attitude or approach, 
which is the lyrical counterpart of the thought which is 
to be unfolded through the dramatic action of the play.
Even if the metaphor of ’kindling cloud’ were to 
suggest no more than an approaching thunderstorm, the effect 
of this and the whole passage is to form an image of Medea’s 
wrath in connexion with zeus’ justice.
Zeus is no longer the unfathomable omnipotent, 
saviour and author of world harmony, from whom proceed 
human law and justice at the last. He is again the thunder­
bolt: primal god of nature’s justice,Oîra:i;h earth and light, 
Themis and Artemis, guardian of the oath which is, apart 
from human law, the sole guarantee of conduct among men, 
and the measure of Medea’s wrong.
According to the Pythagorean a man’s
wife is his suppliant, for he has taken her from the hearth 
) and by the right hand ). This is the
pledge which jason gave Medea, and no plea of expediency, 
or anomaly of human law, can alter it. so, when Medea 
wishes to make sure of her refuge at Athens, she binds 
Aigeus with an oath, stronger than the human laws which 
she is about to violate, or the ties of friendship between 
neighbour states.
Aigeus swears by earth and the light of Helios 
and the whole race of heavefa (7 4 6 , 752); if he breaks his 
oath, he is to suffer the fate of the impious (734). So 
Medea now calls upon earth and light, Themis and Artemis, 
to witness the perfidy of jason, but Zeus is ’steward of 
oaths’ (170), since he holds the penalty.
%ambl «V.P.84 ( P. 4 ) yuyAiK.A ov ^ ^  Ç re é-,v r»] / A u Too  ^ ‘refif>S y’*"C "
c~ £T! A f Ay o j>f-r b JL  ^ 7 A'j 'f, s ^ , A-  ^ , Qi* Ar .Qec .1344 a 8 ka ^ o't h
A o \J C î v  ^  //Cf-T'/v' c' 6 T  Ç ^ ^  ^ K  t C T  ^ y
of » piog.Laert. viii. 33 c t^<<ov r 7-» Sifo.Atoo S'u -r^rtr A , a
oçicioy . of #Empedocles D.B.30, 115 .
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HOW do we reach zeus? Not through deep pondering 
on the mystery of the universe, not through dreams or 
guilty fears in the watches of the night, not through long 
years of waiting and the final ’lesson* to the sinner; not 
through the hate of the dead or a supernatural anger which 
inspires the human agent, then leaves him to learn in his 
turn the meaning of sin. we reach him instantly and 
directly through the kindling of Medea’s anger, itself 
pictured as an elemental force, a conflagration, which no 
merely human power can quench or stay.
When Medea appeals to zeus, her nurse infers, not, 
like the chorus, that zeus will be her advocate, but that 
Medea’s own anger will not pause for a little thing.
so we have passed from a metaphysical law of 
’justice’, mediated by transcendental powers, to the 
psychological necessity of retaliation; the necessity 
which Medea says the Chorus cannot experience because they 
have not themselves suffered the wrong.
The strife principle is therefore the same, 
whether it is found in nature or springs immediately 
within the human soul. Euripides has conveyed this to us,
by the images he Uses to describe the rising of Medea’s
anger.
Medea’s soul awakens, not merely to consciousness 
but to wrath, a living witness to the tnuth
-, Eut we must not father this entirely upon
Heraclitus. Even if the imagery and approach are to a 
certain extent his, the Xoyo<, is not. The one wisdom is 
both willing and unwilling to be called zeus: even if the 
thunderbolt steers all things, and if fire in its advance 
will judge and convict all things there is no place in 
Heraclitus’ system for a natural law which is in effect a 
moral 9
'Byw.46, 62, 42. 
"Byw.65, 28, 26.
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’quench rather than a conflagration.’ "
’Fight for the law as for the city wall.’  ^ ’one must insist 
upon what is common, no less than a city upon its laws, and 
even more, for it prevails as far as it wishes and is 
enough and more than enough for all.*" ’Wisdom is to speak 
the truth and act according to nature, as one has the 
insight.’  ^ ’The sun will not overpass his measures, or 
the Erinyes, allies of justice, will find him out’.^
’It would not be better for men to have all they desire. ’ 
’It is hard to fight with for it buys with life. ’ ^
If all things are fair and good and just for God,"^  
the divine nature cannot receive an injury, or react 
directly to a human crime: the purposed punishment of man 
by flood or fire or any other natural phenomenon is 
therefore out of the question, justice is done through 
a quasi-physical change in the man himself: fools perish 
by their folly; violent passion may be a form of ’death’ 
to the soul.
Euripides’ conception is still too mythical to 
be genuinely Heraclitean, for he is still using the 
Aeschylean notion of divine anger roused by human wrong, 
though he now transfers it to the individual soul. Eor 
dramatic purposes, Euripides never gives up the idea that 
right and wrong have a meaning for God as well as for man. 
The point that I have tried to make here is that in the 
Medea he is using some philosophical conception which 
relates the soul, or changes of soul, to the physical 
elements in the world-process, so that what I have called 
the strife principle (the need for retaliation) is 
something which may spring directly in the human soul, 
not as the interplay of world forces which are quite 
apart from it, though they may be related to it in some 
other way (i.e. by quasi-mystical ’inspiration* or 
possession)•
 ^Byw.103 (D.B.43)T 
^Byw.lOO (D.B.44).100
Byw.91 (D.B.114), omitting a sentence which I believe 
be spurious.
to
 ^Byw.107 (D.112). 
^Byw.29 (D.B.94).
 ^D.B.llO (Byw.104). 
■'Byw.105 (D.B.85). 
*Byw.61 (D.B.102).
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in the absence of any clear physical theory, which 
for the dramatist is impossible, mystical and religious 
sanctions are still needed to convey the notion of an 
absolute necessity. These are partly inherited from the 
dramatic conception of Aeschylus, partly taken over from 
Pythagorean or Empedoclean mysticism, and deliberately used 
by Euripides as a challenge to the moral and religious 
conscience.
Mythical Heredity. Helios.
The lyrical suggestion of the opening scene is 
carried on, as the play develops, through Medea’s 
relationship with the divine Helios.
This mythical ancestry would in itself have little 
importance, if it were not for the close connexion, shown 
through the action of the play, between the progress of 
Medea’s revenge and the assertion of her divine kinship 
and prerogatives. The objective reality of the connexion 
is proved, beyond all doubt, by Helios’ final intervention 
on her behalf.
He is first mentioned in 4o6, where Medea, now 
bent on revenge, recalls her divine descent, in 746 she 
causes Aigeus to swear by Helios, and in 764 she invokes 
him, with zeus and justice, as her ally. This seems to 
remind her that she can use his gifts of robe and crown 
as a means of destruction, and the consuming XM X flames ^  
lit by her poisons provide a strange pictorial link with 
their heavenly donor. His final protection, if not a 
vindication of her action, is a direct result of it 
(following the appeal of the chorus, 1251), and confims 
Medea on the emotional plane where she has already 
accepted the consequences of her vengeance in the 
transformation of her own soul.
 ^Vividly described by the messenger (1187) as a ’wondrous 
stream of all-devouring fire’. The metal of which the 
gifts are composed, gold, has both a colour- and a value- 
significance, cf.Heraclitus, Byw.8,22,51. It is perhaps 
fanciful to see a reminiscence of Heraclitus in 967-8:
Of. A v t m  Byw.lo5. Heraclitean language is used in
1218 ^ /cA  ° Çofjuoyef j cf *Byw.77,20
and Eur.fr.971N.
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Mythical heredity, as it is worked out through 
the action of the play, has less a physiological than an 
emotional base, as if the divine in Medea were simply a 
change of state, to which she is lifted through the 
intensity of her anger, so that in this mood she can both 
draw upon the primitive motive force of the natural world 
and experience its necessity as a law of her own nature.
By making good her revenge in defiance of all 
human claims, Medea demonstrates that the strife principle 
can, given certain conditions, become a primary law of 
human conduct, determining action wholly in accordance with 
the emotion to which it corresponds in the human soul. The 
conditions under which this law becomes operative for a 
human being require, however, a fresh starting point.
The reader will also have wondered whether Medea’s 
translation does not illustrate the effect of Empedoclean 
Strife on the human , as it drives the elements to seek 
their like, thus discovering an affinity between Medea and 
the fire which is at the circumference of the world.The 
sin of oath-breaking recalls Empedocles, but according to 
his rules the elements should have loathed Medea’s crime 
as well, not aided and abetted her.
in the strangeness of the final scene, where jason 
and Medea meet again in the equality of mutual knowledge, 
perjurer and murderess face one another with their irrecon­
cilable ’arguments’, each representing a crime by which the 
soul is exiled from happiness, jason, protesting in spite 
of the evidence of the dragon-chariot that Medea is an 
abomination to both gods and men, is left on the stage still 
appealing to zeus and declaring his intention never to cease 
from doing so. It is the cry of a lost soul, but through 
it zeus escapes final identification with the principle of 
Medea’s vengeance.
 ^Eor Empedocles^ view of the~îsible sun as a reflection of 
the fiery hemisphere, see Burnet EGP pp.238,298; a similar 
theory may have been held by the Pythagoreans who believed 
in a central fire, called ’watch-tower of Zeus’ etc., Ar. 
de caelo^fb 1 f., D.pyth.Sch.B.37, EŒP p. 296 f. The direct 
connexion of the sun (a) with divine justice (b) with the 
human mind, is perhaps nearer to Heraclitean doctrine, cf. 
plat . Crat . 413 b 2 O rX j - j s i v  , TX.VZ 7r//pz • - m u T 7 > y
C i A . l e y r o i  K-pC. j e A o y T A  6 rr / 7-f o rrx-V ✓ T a  < s y T A  . Cf * ByW . 29 , 3 4 and 
Ennius’ Epic^Q^rmus, D.B. 48-50a, in which ’sol’ is given as 
one of the four elements and identified with mind.
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Medea’s 6o<j>,A__, The ’Spirited’ Character•
The metaphorical and mythical elements which we 
have been considering might not in themselves suggest 
rival philosophical theories, or the development of a new 
psychology, if it were not for the repeated references 
through the play to Medea’s , and to a certain ideal
of character which her action may be taken to exemplify.
In 214 f. she tells the Chorus that she has come 
out to avoid their censure: for some persons are both
out of sight and in public, and others have won a bad name 
by their quiet way of life, since men judge by appearances 
without testing the heart. A stranger should conform to 
the city’s ways, and even a citizen should not be self- 
willed and disagreeable out of mere . Her own
behaviour is due to the suddenness of the disaster which 
has overwhelmed her, in that her husband has unexpectedly 
turned out to be a villain.
She continues in a similar strain to Creon (295). 
NO one should teach his sons to be overwise, for apart 
from the charge of idleness, new wisdom is never welcome : 
either you will be thought useless by fools, or you will 
be disliked by the seeming-wise persons whom you have 
displaced. Medea herself has roused a variety of hostile 
emotions; she is regarded either as a quiet person, or as 
the opposite ( Ç  ^r^ ,s t^ ot-ou 304).
m  539 jason reminds us that Medea has a 
reputation for throughout Greece. Aigeus certainly
knows it (677) and is glad to take advantage of it.
In 807, after revealing her plans for murdering 
bride and children, Medea concludes by telling the Chorus : 
’Let none think me poor-spirited or weak, or quiet, but 
the opposite character: grievous to foes and kindly to 
friends, for their life has the best repute’ (807-10)•
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The second of these passages contains a direct 
allusion to sophistic education, and recalls Plato’s 
account of Socrates' unpopularity in the Apology, it is, 
however, unlikely that Euripides was using Medea as a 
mouthpiece to defend his philosopher friends against 
popular misconception. His purpose seems rather to have 
been (1) to suggest a contemporary context of thought, 
and (2) to raise the question how far it is possible to 
infer a man’s heart (or true nature) from his appearance, 
or normal behaviour in society.
Aeschylus assumed an early period of morality, 
previous to the establishment of law and justice in the 
proper sense. These come with rroÀ.reXc< , and morality can 
thereafter be identified with obedience to the city’s law 
as it is derived directly from the divine. This view of 
morality seems to have been accepted by at least some 
Pythagoreans ( iambl.VjJP.174).
Euripides on the contrary assumes a later period, 
when ’law and justice’ are already established (537) and 
may themselves be subject to criticism by the standard of 
’natural’ justice.
Through Medea’s gradual revelation of herself as 
a ’spirited’ character, we are enabled to estimate (1) the 
failure of any attempt to base human morality upon the 
essential justice of the strife of nature, and (2) the 
danger of any attitude which merely condemns as immoral 
behaviour which is in accordance with this essential 
justice.
In the allusion to the there may possibly
be a reference to an alternative ideal of character, not 
developed in this play, but associated with another ’wisdom’ 
which Medea disclaims. The confused nature of the charges 
brought against philosophers"suggests, moreover, that 
failure to distinguish the various forms of and their
practical consequences may be a serious source of trouble 
in a community.
-A direct reference to does not occur until 285, but
the earlier charges of and (216-8) suggest
popular views of the ’philosophic’ temperament. Cf. the 
huntsman’s warning in Hipp.91-3.
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Por a community, as for an individual, it is vital 
to know not only a man’s real beliefs and his true character, 
but also the full implications of such beliefs and of such 
a character, since these may, in certain circumstances, be 
embodied in action which has a serious effect on the well­
being of others. A further suggestion is that in action of 
this kind, rather than in his normal or habitual action, a  ^
man’s ’true’ nature and essential moral quality are revealed!
The action of drama is naturally action of this 
kind, so that for drama, at all events, it is true that to 
know the man is to know the consequences of his creed.
Knowing the Man
In her first speech to the chorus, Medea seems to 
associate herself with the misjudged , but at the
same time she is anxious to explain that her previous j
retirement and apparent unsociab&ity were not due to 
philosophic aloofness or emotional reserve, or to deliberate 
quietism. Her spirit is, on the contrary, utterly broken, 
since her husband, on knowing whom her all depended,"" has 
now turned out to be a villain.
*por there is no justice in the eyes of men; 
before receiving an injury, they hate at a glance, without 
testing the heart’ (219-21). This remark, applying loosely 
both to and and to Medea, anticipates Creon’s
attack in 271, and also raises the major issue of the 
drama; how,indeed,is such a test possible? As Medea says, 
knowledge of character is something akin to’divination’  ^
(239).
’0 zeus, why have you given clear signs to men, 
when gold is counterfeit, but nature sets no stamp on men’s 
bodies, to distinguish the villain?’ (516-9).
^Since this revelation comes only with time, and in 
circumstances that are especially testing, it perhaps 
corresponds to the gradual evolution of zeus’ justice in 
Aeschylus. This is yet another application of the 
Heraclitean angle,
" 228 (O.C.T)  ^ 7 " ' Ta y - a yiyy u> S n. tC u-Jyof .
^Cf.Hippocr. 12.
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*Now I know, though then I knew not (1329). 
Both Jason and Medea are deceived each in the other, in 
spite of long and intimate acquaintance. Greon and the 
Chorus are both deceived in Medea; perhaps the spectator 
also feels in the end that his sympathy was misplaced.
The apparent contradiction in Jason is not hard 
to explain on the assumption that he has always acted from 
the motive of expediency, and up to the present his 
interest has not conflicted with his duty to Medea. He 
is also such a firm believer in *law and justice» that he 
belittles his own injury to Medea on the ground that a 
virtuous woman would not have unduly resented it. Medea*s 
conduct requires, however, a more complex explanation.
The * Irrat i onal* Bernale
According to the Pythagorean , women are
»bad*, a view to which Euripides constantly subscribes both 
verbally and in his presentation of the more unrestrained 
types of female character.
jason* 8 action provokes retaliation in Medea 
because, as a woman, she has an irrational nature; yet the 
religious sanction is on the side of Medea, so that her 
wrong is at the same time a challenge to the ultimate 
justice of the universe. As they are worked out together 
in the action of the play, these two aspects of Medea*s 
vengeance react on and influence one another, so that the 
irrational in Medea is seen less as a common element in 
human nature (or in feminine nature) than as something 
non-human in its extent and power, a point of contact with 
wider primitive forces whose primary and necessary law 
(interpreted for a human being and enforced by the prompt­
ing of a human emotion) may contradict human law and 
destroy human happiness.
The initial sympathy and cooperation of the 
Chorus show# that Medea*s revenge is not in itself 
inconsistent with womanly feeling. When, however, her 
revenge conflicts with the laws of men and her own 
happiness (812, 818), the non-human and irrational aspect 
of her impulse is clearly revealed.
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Medea*s motive appears inhuman, not because it is 
inconsistent with human nature, but because, when univers- 
alised as a necessary principle, it ceases to remain a mere 
part of human nature, but is seen both as a wider and as a 
stronger force, conflicting with and overcoming what is 
human, so that the will which has asserted this principle 
over all other claims and affections ceases to be human at 
all, and becomes either bestial or divine.
The religious sanction, supported by the aid she 
receives from Helios (and perhaps from Apollo), is a 
dramatic means of illuminating the non-human aspect of 
Medea*s feeling, so that its continuity with the irrational 
in nature is confirmed, both as an emotional state which 
corresponds to the primitive urge for * justice* and as a 
psychological reaction by which the female is shown
to be in the wider category of the * irrational * and 
* unlimited*.
If it is not regarded in this way, the physiolog­
ical motive fails to account for the course of events in 
the play.
Inadequacy of the physiological Motive
Medea herself claims that when a woman is wronged 
she becomes murderous, and that women are naturally * con­
trivers of all ill*.- jason regards her resentment as a 
prime example of the incontinence of women, which has 
perverted all her thought (586 f., 6 0 0 -2 , 1367-9).
Not all women, however, even barbarian women, 
murder their children when their husbands are unfaithful. 
Either Medea*s nature is such that she reacts to this 
motive with especial violence, or there is something in 
the circumstances of the injury which renders the provoc­
ation unusually extreme.
Î ^ Ç “ Î09~cf7cî^n7~2867 Ibuse~0F“w0min”^ igins in Hesiod 
Theog.590 f. Orpheus was said to have become a woman- 
hater, Kern t.234 p.247, t.76 p.22, t.115 p.54, t.139 p.42 
(see note 4 p.148 of this thesis).
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Since Medea*s love for jason caused her to desert 
home and family and even to murder her brother (167), it 
is not surprising that her present reaction should be in 
excess of the ordinary, a U  j
oùi' 627 f. ). Medea herself, however, 
never mentions her love for jason,^ but always her services 
to him, and the oath which he has failed to keep. Her 
reasons for resentment given in the debate scene are (1) 
his ingratitude (2) his perjury (3) her helplessness, since 
she has, for jason, sacrificed every connexion which might 
have been of use to her in her present emergency. This has 
the double effect of rendering his injury the greater and 
of throwing Medea back upon the only resources she still 
has, her and her , through which she is able to
reach out to assistance of which there is at first no hint 
in the play.
Medea regards jason*s unfaithfulness not as a mere 
personal insult and deprivation, but as a fundamentally 
immoral act : the complete abandonment of a benefactress to 
whom he is bound by the most sacred of obligations, who 
has sacrificed everything for his sake and is therefore 
completely dependent on him. It is because of this that 
Jason must in his turn be robbed of everything he holds 
dear, and Medea*s personal safety secured by her divine 
progenitor, who both witnesses her wrong and plays, in the 
end, a kinsman*s part.
Jason argues (1) that since love compelled Medea 
to save him, her services could hardly be described as 
disinterested, but in any case (2) he has repaid her by 
giving her the opportunity to learn *law and justice*. If 
she had learnt her lesson properly, she would not have 
resented his behaviour and so brought her exile upon 
herself. The sanctity of the oath is, therefore, matched 
against the moral expectation that women should be virtuous. 
If Medea were not * bad* she would have recognised that his 
plans were expedient for her as well as for himself.
1 Except in the general exclamation to Greon, 350.
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Medea*s answer is to point out that the happiness 
which Jason conceived never could have been happiness for 
her (598). If it were not, however, for the supreme 
validity of the oath - the stress which Medea lays upon it 
is seen also in the Aigeus episode - it might not have been 
clear that jason*s reasoning conflicts with an ultimate 
natural fact: this fact is not, as jason thinks, that women 
are incontinent, but that they are revengeful, owing to the 
affinity of their nature with the irrational element in the 
universe. The extent of their revenge depends, accordingly, 
less on innate * badness* than on the extent of the provoc­
ation : if this is extreme, the revengZe will also be extreme, 
as if by a primitive law of cause and effect, which operates 
through the human will but which cannot, in certain cases, 
be controlled or modified by it so as to conform to the 
other motives and desires of the human agent.
From Jason*s fate we learn that a plea of 
expediency, or an appeal to convention, is insufficient to 
safeguard human laws and human happiness, in face of the 
violation of an ultimate religious sanction and an ultimate 
natural principle. From Medea*s fate we learn that an 
appeal to this religious sanction, and action in accordance 
with this natural principle, are equally destructive of 
human law and happiness, and therefore in themselves an 
insufficient guide to human conduct.
God is not the source of * law and justice* as 
jason understands it. Medea, with her divine backing, has 
a better claim to represent what is . yet this
justice cannot be made the basis of a moral law for man.
Conclusion
Medea*s may, therefore, be regarded in the
following ways: (1) as a particular knowledge or skill, in 
poisons or magic; (2) a woman*s cunning to contrive ill when 
wronged (409); (3) a general ability to gain any end she 
desires by unscrupulous means (clever speech, deception, 
subterfuge); (4) as typical of all forms of which go 
with the * spirited* character, and depend on the acceptance 
of the strife principle as a valid rule of human behaviour. 
This in origin is Heraclitean, but includes later sophistic 
adaptations of the general creed . so (3) may be
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regarded as a form of rhetorical or sophistic cleverness.^
Euripides* choice of a woman to voice the gospel 
of the * irrational * shows Pythagorean influence; it is then 
worked out rather from a Heraclitean standpoint. The use 
of mythical and religious material suggests a pseudo- 
Heraclitean or Sicilian source.
There is also the suggestion that in general
may vary according to its use and the attitude of others. 
Medea*s skill has been good for Qorinth in the past, and 
may still be good for Aigeus. Aigeus, the enlightened 
Athenian, has no fear or suspicion of Medea*s >
though the chorus express doubts of her reception at Athens 
after the murder.
Use of the pivine
The early physicists (as shown in the last section) 
used the notion of the divine to support the idea of a 
universal and primary control, as a property of primary 
substance in relation to the world it forms. The human soul 
or human nature exhibits this same relation through its 
continuity with primary substance in its original form.
Apart from particular differences in each theory, this has 
the following general consequences. (1) Human nature may 
be contrasted with the divine, as mortal and perishable, or 
in some other way inferior. (2) There is in human nature 
itself an element or aspect which is divine compared with 
the rest, analogous to and derived from the divine nature 
of the whole. (3) Through this aspect or element, the laws 
and processes which explain the rest of nature can be made, 
directly or indirectly, applicable to human behaviour.
So, for Heraclitus, though the human jOoç has no 
wisdom compared with the divine, there is yet a fiery state 
of the soul which is wisest and best, and in general it is 
true . For Empedocles, any mortal compound
must be contrasted with the divine elements, yet these 
elements also exist in the human body forming an ultimate 
which determines the character and behaviour of each
man.
Taken with (1) it recalls Gorgias* comparison of the power 
of speech to the use of (Hel.Enc.14).
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Euripides, in the ways which I have tried to 
describe, uses the concept of the divine to suggest: (1) 
a common basis between the soul and the wider forces of 
nature; (2) an absolute necessity of behaviour, experienced 
within the soul, but only in virtue of its connexion with 
a divine element in external nature; (3) the domination 
within the soul of a single element or motive through which 
this divine necessity is mediated.
Although the philosopher or physicist knows that 
action must always be in accordance with this natural 
necessity, this is not always clear at the level of 
experience.^ Since the dramatist is presenting, not a 
physical theory, but human experience, his analysis must 
proceed at a conscious, not at an unconscious level, i.e. 
under conditions which reveal this necessity as it is 
actually felt within the human soul, both as the pressure 
of a motive, and as the validity of a general rule of 
behaviour.
On the basis of such an extreme situation,^ where 
a universal physical necessity is raised to the level of 
the individual consciousness, genuine psychological 
principles can be formulated, so psychology takes over 
the concepts of physics, not through physiology, but 
through an abnormal human experience, in which the 
connexion with non-human behaviour becomes apparent.
From the Medea we may infer (1) that there is in 
man a nature ( ) or essential moral quality ( ]Soç )
which is distinct from his external behaviour though 
ultimately determining it; (2) that this nature, or this 
quality, is to be understood not only in the light of past 
behaviour through which it is manifested as a general 
character, but also in the light of its extreme consequ­
ences, through which its conformity, or lack of conformity.
^Heraclitus* saying ( )  suggests that the 
* divine* element in man is the necessary though unconscious 
conformity of the human soul with the divine . This
can be made a conscious principle of action only to a 
limited extent (Byw.loT /tocri \rr^",ovr^y ).
 ^go Aristotle bases his general theory of on observ­
ation of the effects of VAos in extreme cases, E.N.1147 a 
14 f. Cf. his account of in pol.1342 a 5 f.
124
with universal natural principles is displayed;^(3) this 
analysis, by which primitive natural processes are directly 
related to human experience, may reveal a basic soul- 
structure in terms of elements which are psychological, 
not physiological.
Medea*s Crime and Metamorphosis
Mystery religion has the idea of an * original sin* 
which explains either human nature or the conditions of 
mortal existence. (1) According to Empedocles, the crime 
of bloodshed or perjury precipitates the from a state
of bliss, and binds him to a series of mortal lives in a 
state of wretchedness. (2) According to the 
doctrine, the death and entombment of the soul in the body 
is a punishment for ancient wrongs. (3) The crime of the 
Titans accounts for the sinful and mortal nature of man, 
without implying the sin and punishment of a divine soul.
These mystical crimes are committed not by men but 
by : they are used to explain human existence, they
are not themselves explained by it. if similar violent 
acts are done by men, this is part of their inheritance of 
misery and causes no further alteration in their condition.
By analogy, however, an exceptional and extreme 
state of sin in the human soul may be regarded (as by 
Plato) as a * reversion* to the old Titanic nature,^ which is 
punished not by mere continuance of mortal existence, but 
by the soul*s own destruction of its chance of happiness.
Before plato, the dramatist has shown both the 
cause and the consequence of such * daemonic* acts, when 
they are performed not by but by human beings,
caused by the complete control of an irrational motive, 
the irrevocability of the act appears as a transformation 
of the nature of the agent, which becomes * divine* in its 
utter repudiation of the human, and in the extremity of 
self-torment through which this repudiation has been 
brought about.
1 Jason** s"moral’weSn^s'”is revealed as his self-interest 
clashes with this primitive (divine) necessity. 
^Plat.Leg.701 c 1.
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That the irrational element in the soul, as the 
medium of divine punishment, should be made itself divine, 
is no more a contradiction than that a pure divine soul 
should commit a crime for which it is then punished by- 
association with a sinful and mortal element. By accepting 
a view of divine behaviour which contradicts the notion of 
divine purity, Euripides shows that what is divine for 
myth, for physics and for physiology, is not divine for 
the religious and moral conscience.
Jason compares Medea to a lioness or scylla;^ just 
as the divine soul is punished by human existence, so the 
human soul is reduced by sin to the level of the beast. 
Yet, for Medea, the analogy is not perfect, since it fails 
to express those relations through which the divine 
affinity of her passions is most clearly revealed.
Medea in the dragon-chariot is divine, because 
she is unassailable, both in body and in mind; not because 
she has lost her humanity, but because she has herself 
inflicted the utmost possible revenge upon it.
The tragic act which is also a ritual ttJc9o  ^ is 
performed, not by a , but by a human being who
becomes one, either through the action or through the 
suffering.
^Med.1342-3.
^This dual aspect of the tragic action is, like the rest, 
a development of Heraclitean mysticism, perhaps mediated 
through a Sicilian or Italian source (see also concluding 
chapter). For Euripides* interest in Heraclitus, cf. the 
story that he lent his book to Socrates (Diog.laert.ii.22, 
ix.lO).
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HIPPOLYTUS (428 B.C.)
Aphrodite
. *powerful and not without a name, among men and in
the heavens^she is a cosmic force and she is Qypris, a 
goddess who can be named and known, and who demands that 
her worship and recognition shall be co-extensive with her 
power: of all *ho behold the sun*s light from East to west 
* those who reverence my power i honour, those who are proud 
towards me I overthrow.* The rest of the play witnesses 
the truth of the second part of this declaration.
Aphrodite*8 behaviour follows from two assumptions 
first, her supreme power, in which she resembles the I
parmenidean and Empedoclean deity rather than the goddess 
of myth (cf. the nurse's description 447-50); and secondly, 
the common characteristic of gods, that they are pleased |
with receiving honour from men (7-6).^ The divine right to 
rule includes, therefore, not the mere unreflective activity’ 
of a natural principle, but a demand for conscious recog- !
nition by men both in deed and in word: failure to give j
this is an offence, apart from any violation of the moral 
code.
The blending of the physicist*s goddess with the I
goddess of myth has the result that (1) she is related to j
human experience through the passion of love, not through I
any wider notion of * harmony * ; (2) her universal control !
over nature, vested in an individual will and combined 
with a wish for human recognition, becomes absolute power, 
wielded despotically with no other aim than self-assertion; 
(3) since (unlike a mere physical element) she demands what 
it is within men*s power to refuse, she accepts the rule of 
retaliation as an alternative means of self-assertion, in 
so far as this is limited and modified, not by the action 
of another deity, but by the freewill of men.
ipor Aphrodite , see Hdt.i.lo5, 131, iii.B;
pausanias i.14.6; pindar fr.lo7 (O.C.T); Plat.gymp.180 d; i 
Orph.Hymn.55; Bir.phaethon fr.78lN.  ^ !
 ^Of .106, 1402, and Empedocles D.B.17.28-9 X J u
r f ny y fy ^ f- (T , c f. 3 0 . 2 ^
Y Cf-
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So a divine will which corresponds to the human 
passion of love is seen to be nearer the element of strife 
than of Harmony. This is not, however, mere inference 
from human behaviour,^ but follows from the pluralistes 
interpretation of divine power as a function exercised in 
relation to mortal things, re-anthropomorphised by the 
dramatist (as by the sophist) as a form of despotism.^
Again, when the influence of a human passion is 
set over against the will which resists it, its range as 
a universal power in nature is quoted, as if the sum-total 
of this force could be concentrated at the single point, 
where it enters into combination with the human soul. To 
resist the passion is to resist * the goddess*; its strength 
is measured in terms of the pressure which she exerts not 
merely from within, but from without, through the contin­
uity of her power over the whole of nature, which is 
collectively brought to bear in each individual case.
There are other elements, and other gods, but for 
the purposes of the revenge they are eliminated by the law 
of Zeus which forbids one god to interfere with the revenge 
of another (1328 f.). Aphrodite expressly repudiates the 
motive of jealousy (20): the issue is between her and the 
mortal who has wronged her. Hippolytus* devotion to 
Artemis merely makes his neglect of Aphrodite more delib­
erate and conspicuous; it suggests, moreover, an aspiration 
which is contrary to the theory of polytheism; a man must 
worship all the gods, not take his choice.
: The correspondence between Aphrodite*s behaviour and the 
human passion might have been clearer in the original 
version of the Hippolytus: the divine as well as the human 
revenge might hav^~been seen as the spontaneous retaliation 
of 'despised love*, jn the play as we have it, phaedra*s 
motive (as well as Aphrodite*s) is concern for her reput­
ation.
^E»g* ThUC.V.l05 ri 7? -n, T-c. /.X
 ^ a i  C X  '
 ^This law seems to correspond to the self-contained 
independence of the Empedoclean elements, which prevail 
in turn without opposition or conflict.
lo4 'I'lo r> KUU 9^ <-3iru3v'
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The theme of the Hippolytus is the revenge of a 
goddess upon a mortal. This revenge involves meanstaking, 
and it involves the sacrifice of another mortal, who is a 
devotee of Aphrodite and has recently built a temple to her 
(31). Aphrodite does not follow her own rule of rewarding 
reverence, to the extent of foregoing her revenge (48-50).
Does Aphrodite inspire Phaedra's passion, and then 
leave it to the human actors to bring about an end that she 
has merely foreseen? Qr does she also direct the course of 
events to the fulfilment of her plan? 'Most of the way I 
have already cleared* (i.e. there is something still to do, 
23-4). * I will show the matter to Theseus and it shall be
revealed* (42). Then * the father will slay the son* through 
Poseidon's curse. If the use of the first person means 
anything, the goddess is still working through the action 
of the play, at least as far as the revelation to Theseus.
phaedra and the Nurse
phaedra herself points out that the women of her 
family, have been addicted to fatal loves (337-45). As an 
explanation we know that this is inadequate; it nevertheless 
serves two purposes in the play. (1) It is an important 
element in phaedra*s thought until her mind is changed by 
the nurse. (2) It gives the semblance of a natural basis 
for her passion, which is otherwise contrary to her normal 
ways of thought and action.^ It is a condition without 
which Aphrodite's action would have seemed too arbitrary; 
it is not, however, the connexion on which the emphasis 
falls through the dramatic action of the play.
we already know that Aphrodite has caused phaedra 
to fall in love, and that this tends to the destruction 
both of Hippolytus and of phaedra herself, we view her 
love, therefore, less as it arises naturally out of 
phaedra*s past, than as a force potentially in conflict 
with her nature, since it is not amenable to her control 
and tends to her destruction. This is confirmed by 
Phaedra's shame and distress in 239 f., and by the account 
which she gives of herself in 373 f.
^Cf.Medea's habitual lack of restraint, which is a necessary 
condition of her behaviour in the play, but not the determ­
ining cause, phaedra, on the contrary, is habitually 
cf.338, 431.
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In this speech phaedra declares her belief that 
the root of human error does not lie in the mind (
377); although we know and understand the best, we 
fail to carry it through, for various reasons, she does 
not include among these reasons, the compulsion of passion^ 
and she believes firmly in her own capacity to deal with 
her present situation in the light of reason.
»
Her plan is this % (1) to hide her plight, and keep 
silence. (2) To conquer her folly by exercising the virtue 
of sobriety ( rw 339). (3) When she found
that she could not overcome Cypris ( 4ol) she
decided to die. she justifies this decision by dwelling on 
the evils (a) of exposure (b) of setting a bad example (c) 
of a guilty conscience, she dies, to avoid being caught 
shaming her husband and children; a sound and just mind is 
the one thing that rivals life itself. Time holds up a 
mirror to men's vices : she wishes to escape such a revel­
ation.
With superb skill the dramatist has indicated in 
this speech the strength and weakness of a virtue that 
depends entirely upon ^ . phaedra values above all 
things her good name and self-respect; for these she is 
prepared to sacrifice her life and she claims considerable 
credit for doing so. Although her love is a shameful evil, 
and if it were known would certainly defame her, she is 
nevertheless prepared to regard it as a legacy from the 
past, and to vindicate her own 'good and just mind' (427) 
by the only means of escape still left her, suicide. This 
plan she feels is creditable (329, 4o2), and her desire to 
gain some comfort from the applause of her auditors is, 
alas, the motive for breaking her first rule, silence.
Her arguments are not quite the arguments of virtue, for 
like Aphrodite herself, she values above all; but
(except for her delirium at the beginning of the scene) 
she is at least e^ f^^ cry^ i^n control of her own mind and 
action and pursuing steadfastly a course which she 
believes to be the best.
 ^379^f1 To prefer pieasure to the honourable (382) is not 
the same as to be overcome by pleasure, a state which 
phaedra expressly repudiates; she is not pleading moral 
weakness, but declaring her own intention to prefer r. 
at all costs.
 ^Gf.Antiphon*s definition of , D.B.58, 59. The use
o{ the word in 389 suggests that the corrupting
argument of the nurse might be thought of in the light of 
Gorgias' comparison (Hel.Enc.14).
130
'Second thoughts are wisest.' in the first flash 
of horror, phaedra*s nurse divined the truth that her 
passion does not arise from innate weakness or inherited 
depravity, but is the work of some malignant power who is 
so far above the gods that even they must (on occasion) 
bow to h e r O n  second thoughts, however, she decides that 
it is safest to yield to the goddess, and so becomes 
Aphrodite's ally in the attack on phaedra.
phaedra had argued that we know the good, and 
that if we strenuously exert ourselves we can achieve it.
In her own case, she knows the right course of action and 
she is determined to pursue it at all costs. She cannot 
overcome her love by self-control, but she can at least 
defeat it by death and so assert the supreme value of a 
good mind.
phaedra is firmly convinced of the validity of 
her own reasoning, and her silence had at least ensured 
that no one could dispute her conclusions. She now expects 
nothing but approval, but in revealing her 'path of thought' 
391) she has laid herself open to attack by 
argument, as well as attack by her own passion.
The nurse argues (1) that to advocate suicide as 
a cure for love is to pronounce sentence of death on nearly 
everyone. (2) It is better to yield to Cypris since she 
is more violent when resisted. (3) She is a universal 
power in nature, and as students of art and literature 
know, even gods (such as Zeus and Dawn) have fallen in 
love without any loss of divine status. (4) phaedra's 
moral standard is higher than that commonly assumed in the 
practice of men. It is right to keep evil secret, but one 
must not, as phaedra believes, take overmuch trouble to 
carry out the good every time.^ Phaedra's misfortune 
constitutes a case which might well be an exception. A 
man 'does well', if he has a greater proportion of good 
than of evil in his life. (5) Phaedra's state of mind is 
bad, because to attempt to overreach the gods is 
A god has willed it, so she must take heart. Since she 
is 'ill', she must resort to and other magical
means, which women have devised.
^359-62.
^467 T., - Phaedra's word, 381
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The chorus immediately side with phaedra, who is 
herself quite aware of the danger of <>' W.;
She reproves her nurse for making a speech which pleases 
the ear, but does not tend to glory and honour.
The nurse is quick to seize the advantage. In 
Phaedra's case a high-sounding speech would be out of place. 
Her situation calls for deeds not words, and the aim is not 
mere pleasure, since phaedra has already lost her virtue, 
she might as well preserve her life.
phaedra deplores such shameful talk. The nurse 
still contends that shameful words are in Phaedra's case 
better than honourable, since the deed which will save her 
is better than the mere name of virtue for which phaedra is 
proposing to give her life. (For phaedra, it is a mere name 
because she has already sinned, 507).
persuasion could go.no further, phaedra's 
despairing cry .. marks her
realisation that when love and logic point in the same 
direction, they are sufficient to determine the will, even 
of the most virtuous, when she declared that no 
could ever change her views about morals, she was reckoning 
without the possibility of an alliance between the love 
which she already felt and the supporting argument of 
another. The reasoning which she knows to be bad and 
immoral gains an entry to her mind through her love, and 
her love, supported by reasoning, is now able to override 
her will and previous purpose.
The nurse's argument is that, since phaedra is no 
longer , she ought to adopt a line of thought and
action which is in accordance with her passion, since her 
love has already gained the upper hand, it is inappropriate 
for her to think and act as if she were still a virtuous 
woman. If the alternative for a woman in love is death or 
dishonour, it is more realistic to choose dishonour.
Her conclusion amounts to this ; it is worthwhile 
to be virtuous, and it is worthwhile to be self-controlled. 
But if passion ceases to be controllable, it is not worth­
while to commit suicide in order to preserve the semblance 
of virtue, if reason cannot control passion, then passion 
must control reason; if ^ is not attainable, one must
be guided by • From this point of view nothing
could be worse than phaedra's plan, since it leads to her
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own death. By such a plan, phaedra pays lip-service to 
virtue, but in fact proves her loss of it. To relax the 
severity of her approach is not to prefer pleasure to 
honour, but a means of self-preservation in a situation 
where a strict moral standard can no longer be applied.
The weakness of the nurse's argument chiefly 
lies in her failure to put forward any really practical 
counter-proposal, instead she talks vaguely of 'a god's 
will» and hints obscurely at the Jtuse of magic.
phaedra consents to the use of a love potion, at 
least to the extent of asking for more information (516), 
but since the plan is not clear, and the nurse refuses to 
enlighten her, her will appears to be overborne rather than 
changed. Her steadfast purpose is gone, but it is not 
replaced by another; the nurse is responsible both for the 
immoral argument, and for its practical application.
Aphrodite inspired phaedra with an uncontrollable 
passion, but did not otherwise affect her freedom of 
thought and action, phaedra resists this passion, and if 
left to herself would have found a way of frustrating the 
goddess and preserving her own 'good mind'. This is 
destroyed by the nurse, who, by the mental poison of 
clever speech, substitutes an argument which both appeals 
to the reason and coincides with the passion which phaedra 
already feels.
Both the original passion and the argument which 
now supports it are contrary to phaedra's normal way of 
thinking and behaving, i.e. to what we should normally 
regard as her 'character'. Although there is a natural 
explanation for the force of each, in phaedra's heredity 
and in the art of persuasion, we are in each case reminded 
of an external influence, owing to (1) phaedra's resistance 
(2) the correspondence of both passion and argument with 
the intention and attributes of Aphrodite, as we have 
already become acquainted with them at the beginning of 
the play.
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When phaedra says that she could not 'conquer 
Cypris' ( Ko'rrç.^ 4Ql) she is using the phrase in a
purely conventional way; she does not think of herself as 
resisting a goddess, and she has no suspicion that her love 
is directly inspired by Aphrodite; she regards it rather as 
a family failing, a legacy from the past. The nurse, 
however, at once attributes her involuntary passion to an 
external power which is something greater than a deity 
(36o) ,  and in her reply to phaedra gives a description of 
Aphrodite's nature and attributes which suggests a concept­
ion somewhere between Empedoclean physics and mythical 
cosmogony. To resist Cypris is, she suggests, to resist 
this goddess, and a formidable undertaking.
in any other case the confusion between a general 
law of nature and a single instance of its application 
would have been false and sophistic; in Phaedra's case, it 
happens to correspond to the truth.
The effect of this coincidence is so striking 
that we must suppose it to have been deliberate. The nurse, 
with intent to save phaedra's life, reveals Aphrodite's 
true nature, in support of an argument which would normally 
have been false, to persuade phaedra to an immoral action. 
Aphrodite herself has anticipated the argument by making 
the false picture of her influence on the individual a 
reality in Phaedra's case. The nurse's premisses are in 
this case correct; we cannot, however, agree with her 
conclusion that it is better to yield to Aphrodite, since 
we know the goddess»*s intention to be hostile. Morality 
is thereby saved; yet since we know that phaedra, through 
the combined force of love and persuasion, is bound to be 
overborne by the immoral argument, the total effect is a 
terrible conviction of the power of evil, as if the 
malignant deity were still at work, even if she does not 
directly inspire the nurse's words.
 ^447-50. Cf.Eur.fr.Î898N ( S-' '■> ■ ),
Aesch.panaids fr.44N,^and orph.Hymn.55
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“-Just as the declared policy of Aphrodite (5-6) supports
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just as Phaedra's love is thB work of Aphrodite, 
realised as a human emotion, so the nurse's representation 
of her is the base of a vicious argument which can gain an 
irresistible influence over the human mind, both owing to 
its intrinsic plausibility and through its conformity with 
the emotion from which it springs. The goddess herself 
inspires the emotion, yet the emotion alone was insufficient 
to gain the mastery over the will; we see her influence 
again, in its decisive form, through the argument used by 
the nurse: not inspiring it, but projected from it, like a 
baleful presence brooding over the action of the play, 
determining events not by direct interference, but through 
the misguided efforts of the human agents, who recognise 
her power and yield to it, but achieve thereby not safety 
and happiness, but the effective operation of an immoral 
and destructive force.
Emotion, argument, action: these three stages do 
not, in the play, correspond to any single human will, for 
the love is phaedra's, the argument the nurse's: the 
purpose which they together represent is barely Phaedra's, 
since her mind is overborne rather than changed. The 
nurse's aim is the preservation of phaedra, to which her 
own action is intended as a means. The single will to 
which all three (emotion, argument, action) are related 
is Aphrodite's, so that the power which is not seen 
adequately in any one of them, is recognised and realised 
through all.
phaedra, as she plans death and revenge, recog­
nises the destructive tendency of Aphrodite's purpose, 
which she imagines to be directed against herself (725), 
and so, without knowing it, puts that purpose into operat­
ion against Hippolytus. Her own aim is to save her 
reputation, to which his death will (she thinks) serve as 
a means; there is, nevertheless, an impulsive element in 
her action, and in this above all she reflects the goddess, 
in the very moment when she at last admits defeat.
the general opinion of the nurse (444-6) that it is safest 
to yield to her, so the hostile intention of the goddess 
in this particular case contradicts this general conclusion 
and so brings us back to the rightminded view of convent­
ional morality, phaedra's case both supports the sophistic 
argument that love is a deity (cf.Gorg.Hel.l9) and robs it 
of its usefulness, since no general rule of human behaviour 
can be deduced from it.
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Hippolytus' offence
We know from the prologue that Hippolytus* offence 
against Aphrodite is not merely his refusal of marriage but 
his verbal abuse of her (13). He thinks that Artemis is 
the greatest of deities, and must be shown that he is wrong 
Aphrodite does not grudge them their companionship, but 
insists on her fair share of honour.
The huntsman regards Hippolytus* neglect of 
Aphrodite as a sign of , a lack of affability which
will bring him into disfavour with the gods, as it would 
with men. Hippolytus admits the force of the argument 
that human and divine correspond (98), but is no
believer in the * democratic * way of life. A man has a 
right to select his friends, and similarly to worship 
whichever of the gods he pleases (104).
Hippolytus does not only neglect Aphrodite, he 
makes a virtue of doing so. Moreover, it is a virtue which 
he alone (as far as Troezen is concerned) possesses; all 
other men, who lack his own natural and instinctive love 
of purity, are * bad* (81). This unique position wins him 
both the especial favour of Artemis and the especial 
detestation of Aphrodite; the extreme which pleases the 
one offends the other, all the more because Hippolytus 
himself sees the issue as between good and bad, light and 
darkness, worshipping the deity of his choice in such a 
way that he is bound to refuse worship to her opposite.
In this, Hippolytus has simply got hold of the
wrong philosophy; he is a Pythagorean dualist, in a world
of Empedoclean physics : he has achieved communion with the 
divine, but under a polytheistic system which affords no 
guarantee that what pleases one god will also please 
another; where the conflict of divine wills is resolved 
by no extrinsic harmony, but strict equality is guarded 
by zeus through a law which gives priority to the claims 
of individual revenge.
A man who asserts that he alone is naturally and 
spontaneously virtuous, runs the risk of setting up his own
nature as the criterion of moral virtue.
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Yet, as he returns from the green wood, fresh from 
the rapture of his ride with Artemis, Hippolytus reveals 
the intense charm and sublimity of his spontaneous, untaught 
* soberness*, which, he tells us, is shown in every detail of 
life ( 8 0 ) • He brings a garland for Artemis
from the sacred meadow skimmed by the spring bee and watered 
by rivers of Holiness ; he alone may lawfully weave a garland 
thence for the gold hair of the Maid of Heaven. In his 
strong love for his divine companion he prays to end life as 
he has begun it - little dreaming (as Aphrodite has already 
told us) that the gates of Hell are opened for him on that 
very day.
In the strangeness, the remoteness of Hippolytus* 
life with Artemis there is little that can be regarded as 
human virtue. He has achieved a companionship that is more 
than mortal, and for that he must pay the price, in loss of 
sympathy and understanding of the conditions of ordinary 
life, and of his fellow human beings. The nurse*s revel­
ation comes as a shock which strikes at the very root of 
his moral being: the result is a tirade of abuse aimed not 
only at phaedra, but at the whole race of women to which 
she belongs.
Hippolytus* rejection of Aphrodite is deliberate 
and consistent; his reviling of phaedra is a spontaneous 
and impulsive reaction to a form of assault from which he 
had thought himself immune, in his horror, he disregards 
his promise of silence to the nurse, and not doubting that 
phaedra is the chief culprit, attacks her with the bitterest 
language at his command.
In view of this onslaught, confirming her view 
that woman is (407), phaedra is perhaps justif­
ied in fearing that Hippolytus would fill the whole land 
with shameful talk (689-93), in spite of his direct state­
ment to the contrary (656-6 0 ). His destruction is 
necessary to save her reputation, and she must destroy him 
in such a way that Theseus will disbelieve any story he 
may tell. (Hippolytus admits later that Theseus is so 
angry that he would not believe the truth even if he were 
told, 1 0 6 2 ).
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To avoid exposure and shame, phaedra was prepared 
to gibve her own life ; she is equally prepared to sacrifice 
the life of another; her attitude now exactly resembles 
that of Aphrodite towards herself (48-50). At the same 
time she feels that he deserves to share her fate, in return 
for the insult he has put upon her; he will learn not to 
* stand high* over her misery.
Hippolytus* death is to be the means of avoiding 
disgrace to her family, and to herself in Theseus* eyes; 
her plan involves, however, putting the insult back on 
Hippolytus, and in this it appears spontaneous revenge 
rather than a deliberate plan to save herself. This 
retaliation springs less from * despised love* than from 
injured pride; Hippolytus* offence is not his rejection of 
phaedra*s love, but his assumption of moral superiority in 
a situation which would in any case have torn her self- 
respect to shreds, such abuse is the bitterest of all 
injuries to phaedra, who values the appearance of virtue 
even more highly than virtue itself, and who was prepared 
to go to the length of suicide to preserve the former, when 
she had already lost the latter, in ’virtue* she cannot 
compete, but she too has something to teach Hippolytus: the 
sting of an unjust accusation and the desolation of a social 
outcast.
Aphrodite cannot destroy Hippolytus as she has 
destroyed phaedra, by inspiring him with the passion of love; 
but she can use phaedra*s love as an instrument to produce 
the illusion of a similar passion in Hippolytus, through 
phaedra*8 retaliation when confronted with the same offence 
which led Aphrodite to form her original design, paced with 
his moral superiority and stung by his abuse, the impulsive 
action of the woman in love corresponds to the planned 
revenge of the goddess ; since, however, human nature is less 
simple and elementary than the divine, phaedra*s motive is 
less straightforward and direct than that of the goddess, 
por Aphrodite, destruction of Hippolytus is an end in itself, 
for which she deliberately plans, phaedra*s revenge is 
partly deliberate, in so far as it conforms to her previous 
purpose to preserve her reputation at all costs, and partly 
impulsive, an immediate response to Hippolytus* reviling, 
which arouses in her the further wish that he should share 
her shame and misery.
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These two aspects of phaedra*s revenge, the wish 
to save her own honour and shame Hippolytus, are reproduced 
in the later situation of the play, where Hippolytus is 
seen labouring under the very burden of disgrace which 
phaedra sought to avoid for herself. Aphrodite*s design, 
forecast in the prologue, now assumes clear shape : *her 
love shall not fall in this way; I will show the thing to 
Theseus and it shall be revealed.* But the love which is 
shown and for which Theseus kills his son is the false 
reflection of phaedra*s passion, which Hippolytus has 
brought upon himself by his own emotional response to the 
impact of the real thing, a further weapon in Aphrodite*s 
armoury is thereby revealed: the shock produced in a 
virtuous nature by the impact of vice can be used as a 
means of destruction, through the reflection of guilt on 
Hippolytus, and the stirring of righteous indignation in 
Theseus.
por phaedra * s passion and for the deception of 
Theseus Aphrodite claims responsibility in the prologue, 
and this is confirmed by Artemis at the end of the play 
(1327, 1406). AS Hippolytus* anger was roused by the 
reality, so Theseus* rage springs from the illusion, so 
swiftly that he kills his son with a curse, on the very 
instant that phaedra*s words enter his mind.
Theseus* Anger
Artemis, in her summing up at the end of the play, 
distinguishes Theseus* ignorance from the persuasive effect 
of phaedra*s accusation (1334-7). Not knowing the real 
cause of her suicide, her death seems to him the strongest 
evidence of the truth of her words. Love and grief are 
both on the side of phaedra; only a firm conviction of his 
son’s virtue could have saved Theseus from falling into 
error, and this, apparently, he lacks.
The tragedy of the scene between father and son 
lies less in Theseus* anger, which Hippolytus is able to 
understand and forgive (1041-4), than in his complete lack 
of sympathy with Hippolytus* way of life and character, in 
his willingness to waive all the evidence of his past life, 
and to believe him capable not only of an unchaste act, but 
also of such a signal breach of filial duty.
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A curse comes more quickly to the lips than a sword 
to the hand/ yet Theseus persists in his judgment of Hippol­
ytus even when he has heard his defence, in this defence 
Hippolytus gives an account of his own virtue and moral 
ideals, points to the lack of adequate motive and ends with 
a direct denial, on oath. He naturally fails, however, to 
give an alternative reason for phaedra*s suicide and motive 
for accusing him if he were in fact innocent, and Theseus 
still chooses to believe the dead wife rather than the 
living son.
This revelation of Hippolytus* loneliness, of what 
it means to him to be ,  s e e m s  to concentrate all his 
suffering and all his virtue at a single point : deserted by 
the goddess he loves, disgraced in the eyes of his father 
(who he feels would not have behaved in this way towards a 
legitimate son), his is the hopeless sorrow of a virtue 
that is unable to prove itself, yet unwilling to retaliate.
In his defence, Hippolytus disclaims both the art 
of public speaking and the wish for tyranny, which is not a 
desirable end for the (1013-5). His own
consists in knowing (a) how to reverence the gods, and (b) 
how to choose friends who would be ashamed either to do 
evil unprovoked, or to return it (996-9). He would never 
mock a friend, but be the same to him absent or present.
With these *best* friends (the few before whom he is skilled 
to speak, 987), he would wish to lead a happy life, active 
yet free from the dangers which beset tyranny (1017-20).
He has never known love and has no desire for it; his first 
wish is to win a victory at the Hellenic games (with those 
cherished horses which are soon to drag him to death through 
his father*s curse).
 ^Hippolytus says later that otherwise Theseus would have 
killed him on the spot (1413, cf.1041-4). He likewise 
regards it as pointless to break his oath, since Theseus 
would not in any case believe him (1062-3).
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In this speech, and throughout the scene, Hippol­
ytus» virtue is set on a much broader basis than in the 
earlier part of the play. His respect for his father, his 
mild reply, his piety in keeping his oath, his restraint 
when speaking of phaedra, his complete absence of anger 
though not of bitterness, representation of his
charactéyàs &en. A claim which in less testing
circumstances seemed exaggerated and presumptuous, even 
offensive, is now borne out by the facts, and, in contrast 
with the dark suspicion which is resting on him and the 
tragic consequences which we know are soon to follow, serves 
only to increase our pity for the lonely victim of false 
slander and undeserved calamity.
In this scene there is no special mention of 
Artemis, but of Hippolytus* general piety and his choice of
the best men for his friends. As a moral and political aim,
this is the old aristocratic ideal transformed by the new 
Pythagorean philosophy - if indeed the rule against return­
ing evil for evil is Pythagorean, and not socratic. as a
way of life, it runs counter both to democracy and to
tyranny, as to polytheism; it is rooted in the chastity 
(lack of passion) of the individual, but extends to his 
relations with his friends and place within the state. It 
is both a religious and moral, and a social and political 
ideal, and voicing it Hippolytus is no longer the mere 
lover of Artemis, victim of Aphrodite: he is essentially 
a * philosopher prince *, passionless victim of his own 
rightmindedness, as it conflicts with ignorance and passion, 
prejudice and cruelty, in the human mind as well as in the 
divine.
m  his attack on Hippolytus, Theseus classes him 
with the followers of Orpheus who confine themselves to a 
vegetarian diet and honour the smoke of many writings (952 
f.) * All such I bid quit the country, for they go hunting
with holy words, contriving base deeds.* Hippolytus* 
res-gained reply he takes as an attempt to play the * wizard 
and sorcerer* (1038), and to prevail upon his soul by a 
display of mild temper, when Hippolytus appeals to the 
gods as he is tempted to break his oath, Theseus execrates 
his *ho^-iness * ( ^ -A Z f  -rX lo64).
That he has in fact any dealings with the gods he disbel­
ieves (948); he refuses either to reppect Hippolytus* oath, 
or to consult soothsayers, or to wait for time to reveal 
the truth (1051, 1055).
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Since there is no indication elsewhere that 
Hippolytus is an Orphic, and since he is not in the least 
attempting to exert magical influence by his mild speech, 
we must suppose that here, as in the rest of his accusation, 
Theseus is misrepresenting his son. Denying ^is real 
(his outstanding virtue and communion with the gods, 998-9), 
he accuses him of a form of religiosity which has, perhaps, 
a superficial resemblance to Hippolytus* way of life, but 
no similar natural base, and so might well become a cloak 
for immoral activities, as Theseus claims. ^
As a quality of character, Hippolytus* has
both a religious and a moral aspect : there is his chastity 
which has, through his communion with Artemis, become a
sublime and holy thing; there is also his general piety and.
wider , which he claims is not merely acquired but
natural and instinctive (79). This claim is substantiated 
through the test which he is now undergoing, by his refusal, 
in spite of the provocation, to resist or return evil at the 
cost of lowering his own moral standard. To * seem base* is 
for Hippolytus (as for phaedra) the keenest pain (1071), 
yet, having lost the appearance of virtue, he counts it 
worthwhile to preserve the reality.
In relation to others, however, this rests
on a sharp distinction between good and bad, virtue and 
vice, which does not correspond to the beliefs and practices 
of most men. go the huntsman disapproves of his refusal to 
worship Aphrodite as a form of social discrimination (%:
) which is likely to make him unpopular with 
both gods and men.
Most men are ready to retaliate with a charge of 
hypocrisy upon a creed by which they are judged morally 
inferior. Theseus, like pentheus in the Bacchae, is 
antagonistic to any form of religious enthusiasm which he 
suspects of being a cloak for vice, and retorts upon a 
superior spiritual force with a charge of * enchantment * or 
moral deception. Misled by phaedra*s accusation, he not 
unnaturally sees Hippolytus * attitude as * holiness* of the 
wrong kind; yet his willingness to confuse the two kinds, 
combined with his refusal to accept an oath or consult 
soothsayers, shows him to be fundamentally out of sympathy
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with the religious point of view, just as the extreme 
lengths to which he carries his revenge are in sharp 
contrast with Kippolytus» moral ideal, neither to commit 
nor to return an injury.
To pardon Hippolytus would, he feels, amount to a 
defeat unworthy of his past exploits, which have been signal 
examples of the punishment of vice (976-80). 'If, after 
receiving this injury, i let you defeat me, isthmian Sinis 
will not bear me witness that I killed him .. nor will the 
rocks of sciron by the sea declare that I am grievous to 
evil-doers.» so Medea wished to be thought 'grievous to 
foes and kindly to friends, for the life of such has the 
best repute' (Med.8o9-lO).
Theseus' action, whether personal revenge or the 
judicial punishment of a ruler, springs from excess of 
anger and accords with a rule which (as Euripides has 
already shown) is no moral law, but the mere rationalisation 
of passion and cruelty. Deceived as he is by phaedra and 
Aphrodite, Theseus does not, like phaedra, escape all blame, 
and his anger rather than hers reflects the hard vindictive 
nature of the goddess. Like Aphrodite, Theseus deliberately 
intends to destroy his son; his autocratic rule and the 
deadly weapon at his command give him a power (the human 
counterpart of hers) to translate this intention directly 
into fact.
ThesBus' anger has the appearance of being directed 
against a guilty passion, yet, as retaliation, it is seen 
to spring from a motive essentially the same in kind; both 
as it carries out the intention of phaedra and Aphrodite, 
and in its own nature, it is in conflict with the real 
virtue of Hippolytus no less than with the semblance of vice 
against which it is directed. In this it differs from 
Hippolytus' own outburst against phaedra which, though a 
failure in , leads to no further revenge on the
part of Hippolytus, though it has the unfortunate effect 
of driving phaedra to death and revenge. Artemis reproves 
neither phaedra nor Hippolytus for this, though she reviles 
Theseus (1320-4). Hippolytus himself, however, regards his 
father's anger as intelligible and justifiable in view of 
his beliefs (1041-4), and is able not only to forgive, but 
to pity his father's misfortune even more than his own 
(1405-9).
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Artemis condemns the swiftness of Theseus’ anger 
and declares him (1320), yet in view of her own
acquiescence in Aphrodite's design, although she knew of it, 
she must needs pardon Theseus, who acted in ignorance (1335) 
in the hearing of Hippolytus, she does not blame his father 
but advises reconciliation (1435).
With her old enemy, Cypris, she does not mean to 
be reconciled, and is already plaînning revenge (1420}2). 
Even Hippolytus, though at Artemis* request he forgives his 
father, wishes that men could bring a curse upon the gods 
(1415).
Artemis
I suggested earlier that in the Hippolytus a 
Pythagorean (moral) dualism is being asserted in a universe 
governed according to an Empedoclean version of divine rule. 
Artemis accordingly holds a somewhat ambiguous position in 
the philosophical framework of the play.
Like Hippolytus, she accuses Aphrodite of immoral­
ity ( ^  T 7 ^ v o Z ç y ^ ( 1400), stressing the pious and good mind 
which drew upon him the anger of the goddess (1390, 1402, 
1409). She reproves Theseus, explains the normal regard of 
the gods for piety, promises divine honours to Hippolytus, 
and reconciles him with his father. Nevertheless, there 
are elements in her own behaviour which are almost equally 
immoral. She herself admits that it was shameful to allow 
a man she loved to be destroyed (1332), but explains that 
there is a ’law' among the gods not to thwart one another's 
will; fear of zeus held her back; she proposes, however, 
to avenge Hippolytus by slaying another mortal, one who is 
dearest to Aphrodite.
Artemis is the natural antagonist of Aphrodite, 
and in her present role appears morally superior, through 
her support of Hippolytus’ virtue and her declaration in 
favour of piety, as far as love and harmony can be restored 
in the present case, she restores them, yet this superior­
ity, such as it is, gèves her no other advantage over 
Aphrodite, and would not in itself encourage men to 'follow 
the divine'. Artemis, like the other gods, lives under the 
same laws as Aphrodite, and apart from her relation to 
Hippolytus’ virtue her behaviour does not differ essentially 
from that of her rival.
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In this play, the chastity v/hich Artemis and 
Hippolytus have in common is made the basis of a passionless 
purity in a human being, from which the whole of virtue 
flowers naturally and spontaneously, like the untouched 
meadow sweet with bees and fresh from the river-dew of 
from which Hippolytus offers worship to the divine maiden 
whose face he never sees. The fragrance of such a soul 
mingles fitly with the divine perfume (1392) which relieves 
the.broken body of Hippolytus, but which leaves him in the 
moment of death to the bitterness and darkness of the 
unknown.
Hippolytus cannot curse the gods and he forgives 
his father, but he has two words of reproach: for Artemis, 
that it is not hard for her to leave a long friendship; 
for Theseus, let him pray that his legitimate sons may 
resemble Hippolytus (1441, 1445).
part of Hippolytus' virtue consists in knowing 
how to choose friends whom would prevent either from
doing evil unprovoked or from returning it (997-9). This 
is not yet a philosophically reasoned principle; it is the 
inspired intuition of a natural love of good: a good which 
corresponds to nothing on this side of the gates of death.
'All life is painful and there is no rest from 
labour. Yet that other thing which is more loved than 
life lies clouded in the embrace of darkness. And so love 
clings to the earthly gleam, since we have no experience 
of any other life, and there is no certain knowledge 
( ) of the world below. Myths carry us idly on.'
(189 f.)
In her delirium phaedra longs to drink from cool 
mountain springs, and to share the wild life of Artemis 
(228). The Chorus too once called on Artemis when beset 
by the pain and weakness to which a woman's ill-constituted 
frame is liable, and now she is among the gods
(161-9).
The goddess who helps women in childbirth might 
have eased phaedra*s pains, but did not. From opposite 
points of view both phaedra and Hippolytus face Aphrodite 
alone, without any divine ally.
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Phaedra's virtue springs from her high birth and 
her sense of the moral responsibility that goes with it. 
This is her (1301), a love of honour that is
rooted in respect for human society, but not inconsistent 
with human passions or the impulse of revenge.
Hippolytus' virtue rests not on pride of birth 
(for he is ), but on the natural purity of his mind
through which he reaches out beyond the human to the 
divine. The virginity which links him with Artemis is 
not a mere physical fact, but a quality of soul, which is 
both the source of his human virtue and the counterpart 
of divine
In his address to Artemis (73 f.), Hippolytus 
makes access to the sacred meadow depend upon a natural 
untaught virtue shown in all things alike; the garland is 
given without impiety (83) owing to his unique role of 
companion to the goddess. This speech has been prefaced 
by Aphrodite's complaint in the prologue of Hippolytus' 
refusal of love and hostility to herself, and is immediate­
ly followed by the scene with the huntsman in which this 
hostility is clearly demonstrated. Hippolytus' answers 
show that he regards Aphrodite as in essential conflict 
with his own moral and spiritual ideal : his.virginity (lo2) 
though not made explicit in the earlier speech, is accord­
ingly seen to be the base of his virtue as a whole, as it 
is of his communion with Artemis. Taken in its context, 
the allusive and symbolic langua^ge of the earlier passage 
becomes fixed in its interpretation, through the mutual 
antagonism not of Aphrodite and Artemis, but of Aphrodite 
and Hippolytus.
His rejection of the one goddess and worship of 
the other throw into clear relief that element in Hippol­
ytus' own nature upon which his moral and religious life 
is built. The symbolism of the meadow, the insistence on 
his virtue as a natural dower and the connexion of both 
with his self-dedication to Artemis, suggest  ^ yet
suggest it in a wider and more spiritualised form than 
Aphrodite's original complaint implied.
The transition between mere physical chastity 
(implied by Aphrodite's accusation) and its spiritual 
counterpart (implied by the worship of Artemis) is so 
subtle that it is almost unnoticed, though this in itself 
is enough to raise Hippolytus' opposition to Aphrodite 
above the merely natural, on to the moral and religious 
plane.
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Hippolytus is not merely , he is in
a wider sense (9^9) a,nd through this exceptional
moral superiority has attained divine communion. His 
refusal of love, on the physical plane, goes with a 'virgin 
soul' (1006), i.e. a soul untouched by moral evil, through 
a natural restraint which owes nothing to teaching or 
indeed to any intellectual faculty. Through this sensitive 
and instinctive aversion from evil, he is emotionally in 
tune with the divine purity of Artemis (although, as we 
shall see, the spiritual quality which prompts a man to 
supreme moral virtue has little effect upon the conduct of 
a divine being).
SO Aphrodite attacks not Artemis, but Hippolytus, 
on the score that he refuses physical love on moral and 
religious grounds, she expressly states that his compan­
ionship with Artemis is not offensive to her; her revenge 
upon Hippolytus is in no way a revenge upon her rival.
Yet she assails Hippolytus for behaviour which seems insep­
arable from his worship of Artemis : for a physical attitude 
which, through its spiritual dedication, has become a 
cardinal point in his moral sensitiveness : for a moral 
attitude which appears to be self-regarding, because of 
the connexion of that self with the divine.
Because in his own nature he finds a spring of 
virtue set apart from human wisdom, Hippolytus rejects love 
as a moral evil, and refuses worship to.the goddess whose 
demands are inconsistent with his chosen way of life.
Apart from its divine sanction and the moral intuition to 
which it gives rise, such separation from general usage and 
reliance upon an individual criterion would have little to 
recommend it; we cannot, however, condemn as a 'prig' a 
young man who has, as a literal matter of fact, ridden side 
by side with Artemis, and whose 'natural virtue' makes the 
categorical demand: do no evil, whether unprovoked or 
provoked. By action in conformity with this principle 
Hippolytus makes good the claim that by following his own 
nature he is also 'following the divine*.
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The Orphic Artemis
Although there is little except Theseus* accusation 
to connect Hippolytus with Orpheus, some light is thrown on 
his character by the Orphic conception of Artemis.
In orphisra, Artemis is essentially a goddess of 
the other world, identified with Hecate, and with Kore in 
one of her aspects.^ in the case both of Artemis and of 
Athena, love of virginity is associated with virtue.^ so 
Socrates, etymologising in the Qratylus (4o6 b 1 -5 ) ,  
suggests that the name of the goddess may indicate one or 
all of three things ; (1) her soundness and orderliness 
(r: ) owing to her desire of virginity (
ryi ) , o v (2) hor quest of virtue ) ,
or perhaps (3) her hatred of the sowing of seed by man in^ -»—  
( Tcv oi^ oTTov c t j ^  TaZ ^ i / y u v o c ^ n : . ,  ) • proclus, commenting 
on the passage, attributes her care of the unborn young to 
a virtuous tendency to ’make perfect’
Much of proclus* orphism implies Platonic doctrine; 
yet the use of divine virginity as a moral symbol is 
appropriate in a religion (Orphic or Pythagorean) which 
regards life in the body as essentially evil, and aims at 
the release of an immortal soul from the cycle of birth. ^
The virgin soul is 'inviolate*/ or untouched by 
moral evil. Divine virginity, as an essential and permanent 
attribute, might well symbolise a state immune from the 
evils inherent in the life-process as a whole. It suggests, 
however, a special hostility not to the whole of natural 
existence, but to the cause of it : not to birth, but to the 
means of birth, and to the physical rather than the moral 
and emotional aspect of love.
 ^Kern t.41-2 p.113, t.l88 p.215. Hippolytus has been init­
iated in the mysteries, (?) at Eleusis (Hipp.25-6). These 
were according to one tradition founded by Orpheus (K.t.lQ2 
-3 p.30), the 'father of mysteries', cf.Aristoph.progs 1032, 
Diod.Sic.v.64.4.
 ^K.t.l87""8, cf.1 7 5 . Hippolytus 1302 7/*"' TTocy9(-\rc-ie^ 7«T*^
K . t.l88 p. 216 Krf-h 7 / 'Tf'tif-^rou^’y ^ ç ^  { &-ij o y  D Ç *■ oCj <4 . Cf.t.187
p .  215 7^^ rc^-, ' c-7y  ^ - rc - \c ~ g i , Ttsfs ^
y f '  ' '
^u>o,^ Tijr e,i T» <5> dof (X’7TD »c ocr-t. (TT-^ 0,1/ ^ayujyc-,v’ •
^ of.K.t. 232.5 p. 245 me - t -o ^  ^n-Cv ± L £ Z C ^ -
Hipp• 1300 0y. Orpheus called love ,
K.t.361 cf.Hipp.348. of.the views of the nurse, esp.189 f.
^  -no i ^ - Qf. j B y Plat .L e g . 735 C  1 -  yoZ s /cL \xr>6Tyj^y
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Hippolytus* disapproval of love and women^would be 
intelligible against a religious background of this kind.
His position is, however, unusual in that he has no need to 
escape from the evil of his own nature, or to anticipate a 
* better lot * in a future life, por the religious mystic, 
release from his own sinfulness is a necessary part of his 
spiritual exaltation, and the bliss he attains is but the 
foretaste of another world. Hippolytus has, on the contrary, 
achieved a fully satisfying spiritual life in this world, 
and withdraws himself from a part of human experience, not 
as a way of escape from the ills to which flesh is heir, 
but because it conflicts with the essential purity of his 
own nature, through which he has, without forfeiting his 
humanity, attained a concrete and personal relation with 
the divine.
The dramatist, drawing his material directly from 
myth, applies its conceptions to human life directly, not 
through the medium of philosophical abstractions or of 
religious symbolism, if Hippolytus had abused phaedra 
merely because he worshipped a chaste goddess, or aimed 
himself at a life of spiritual perfection, he would have 
been guilty of unclear thinking, not of tragic inexperience 
of the nature of human passion and the conditions of human 
life.
Hippolytus condemns love, not because the chastity 
of a goddess is a symbol of moral virtue, but because the 
same quality in himself is the spring of his own virtue, an 
essential part of the life which he has consecrated to her. 
in this life we see, not the attempt to mould human clay 
after a divine pattern, not the result of a so-called 
religious asceticism: we see the same form of virtue which 
was symbolised by divine , arising naturally from a
similar quality in a human being, i.e. from a physical 
renunciation which is not a mere means of attaining spirit­
ual well-being, but which corresponds to a state of soul 
which may itself be practically identified with the whole 
of moral virtue.
phaedr.247 d 1; Eur .Hipp.9 49 , cf.1113
V H» P. 131 4 T=C»f •
 ^Kern t.234 p. 247 (Clem.Alex.vi.2,5.4) •
c: 5. /toù ç ' y . o v  U U  . According to Hyginus *
version (K.t.121 p.37), the hostility of Venus caused 
Orpheus' death at the hands of enamoured women; his tomb 
became a shrine forbidden to women (Gonon fr.45, K.t.34)
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A state of soul may be said to be » virginal*, 
either in the total absence of physical desire, or, 
metaphorically, if the soul is untouched by moral evil of 
any kind. These two states coincide only if (a) an avers­
ion from love is also an aversion from moral evil, or if 
(b) the absence of physical desire can be identified with 
a generally virtuous state of the human soul.
Hippolytus claims a virgin soul in the first 
sense (1 0 0 6 ), and a natural which corresponds to
the second, which qualifies him for the worship of Artemis 
(73 f ., cf. the avoidance of evil/prompted by x: TJ; , 998). 
The connexion between the two, however, is shown partly by 
his worship of Artemis, and partly by the development of 
the drama as a whole.
symbolism or psychology?
In the earlier part of the play, Hippolytus* 
antagonism to love appears to follow from a * virgin soul* 
in the second (metaphorical) sense, which accounts for a 
certain dissatisfaction which we feel with his moral 
attitude.
AS the attribute of a divine being, literal and 
metaphorical senses of virginity are inseparably blended, 
though an especial aversion from love follows strictly 
from the former rather than the latter. In a human being, 
a physical state cannot become symbolic in the same way, 
since we are dealing not with essences and abstractions, 
but with the moral nature of man. Apart from his worship 
of Artemis, the direct connexion between Hippolytus* 
chastity and his natural would be neither apparent
nor intelligible; we should be at a loss to understand how 
antagonism to a single passion could be consistent with 
the general moral sensitiveness which he claims.
we need to explain (1) how an aversion from love 
can be equivalent to an aversion from moral evil, and (2) 
how a physical state can both correspond with a general 
moral quality, and spring from the same root in the nature 
of Hippolytus. It is not enough to say that his chastity 
is part of his general virtue; that he avoids physical 
love as one of the things that are evil; that the physical 
corresponds to the moral through a merely symbolic or 
metaphorical link between them.
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As virginity and virtue are combined in the 
essential being of Artemis, so they are fused in the nature 
of Hippolytus. He avoids physical love because it is 
inconsistent with the one, he abuses it because he sees in 
the one the pattern of the other, and at the same time feels 
a connexion between them in his own nature, which is more 
than merely symbolical, as if the absence of physical 
desire were the spring.of his moral sensitiveness, as it is 
of his nearness to the divine.
Hippolytus avoids love, because he instinctively 
recognises a moral danger, a force which is the contrary of 
the natural source of his moral and religious life : not 
because he has experienced it in his own nature, but because 
he feels instinctively that it would contradict his own 
nature: (to know evil, it is necessary only to know the 
good). This force he is willing to acknowledge as a 
goddess, the antithesis and natural enemy of his own. yet 
the direction of his attack shows that he is as unacquainted 
with the emotional and moral implications of her power as 
he is with their physical expression. ^
If Hippolytus had known that, where love is 
concerned, it is human to err and divine to destroy, he 
might have forgiven phaedra and been less haughty to 
Aphrodite. The behaviour which seems to contradict his 
claim to arises from inexperience of the nature
of human passion and exclusive concentration upon his own 
way of life, so that he condemns as evil that aspect of 
love which appears to contradict his own virtue, without 
realising its essential evil, as it exists, a potential 
destroyer, in the moral nature of the rest of men.
The essential immorality of the passion which 
Hippolytus opposes is revealed gradually during the course 
of the drama; as a complement to this, his own character 
is, in the second part of the play, tested through action 
which supports his claim to the natural possession of 
moral virtue.
% That Hippolytus connects Aphrodite with the physical rather 
than the emotional aspect of love is shown by his remark
(1Q6) o v C (- if V'uw T7 g-r-oç
151
i
Natural virtue. Human or Divine?
The first half of the play throws emphasis upon a 
single aspect of Hippolytus* integrity; his deliberate 
hostility to Aphrodite and his impulsive abuse of phaedra 
follow from the central importance of this aspect both in 
his way of life and in the constitution of his moral nature.
If this emphasis gives the appearance of an extreme, 
a form of excess which contradicts the notion of ,
the answer is that natural virtue, like divine virtue, is 
necessarily an extreme of this kind. As there is no point 
of compromise between Artemis and Aphrodite, so there is no 
*virtuous mean* for Hippolytus, since the conduct which for 
most men would depend on self-control and moderation, dep­
ends for him on the total absence of contrary desire.
He should not be blamed for carrying a natural 
tendency * too far*, since virginity is not a concept to 
which the idea of moderation can be applied. As the found­
ation of his moral sensitiveness, his instinct for purity 
in any form cannot be regarded simply as one among other 
* natural * impulses, and the whole course of the drama shows 
that the spring of natural virtue is, in the strictest 
possible sense, a moral emotion.
Euripides has shown how the total absence of one 
desire can lead to an extreme of moral virtue, just as the 
complete domination of the same desire leads to an extreme 
of moral evil. Neither represents a normal form of human 
behaviour; the first is shown through the character of 
Hippolytus, the second through the nature of Aphrodite, as 
it is expressed through the action of the drama and the 
conduct of the human agents in the play.
The course of events in the play is controlled by 
Aphrodite. Through the devastating effects of her * despot­
ism* not only on Hippolytus but also on the human agents of 
her revenge, we are the more willing to believe that Hipp­
olytus* restraint springs from the absence of a similar 
influence from his own nature. His speech to Theseus is 
not only a defence against phaedra*s accusation, it is the 
exposition of a character, every part of which is in con­
trast with the behaviour which destroys him - even with his 
own, in so far as he was drawn into the causal nexus of his 
own downfall by his abuse of phaedra. And as Aphrodite*s 
revenge is sustained by passionate behaviour in every form, 
so Hippolytus* refusal to return evil, even in the complete
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reversal of appearances, shows the supreme worth of a 
virtue which can, through its natural base, not only 
conceive such an ideal, but also achieve it.
By her revenge, and the means which she takes to 
it. Aphrodite proves Hippolytus* charge that she is the 
worst of goddesses: by his own behaviour, as he bears the 
full brunt of her attack, he makes good his own claim to 
be the best of men.
So Artemis, at the end of the play, calls her 
rival , and states that the real cause of her
vexation was Hippolytus * good and pious mind. The rest of 
the gods take no pleasure in the death of pious men, though 
they destroy the wicked (1339-41).
If Hippolytus at first appeared to be setting up 
an arbitrary and individual criterion of virtue (contrary 
to the beliefs and practices of most men and disapproved by 
at least one goddess), his conduct is now seen to conform 
to a general standard approved by heaven, and it is Aphrod­
ite who seems to have behaved in an arbitrary and indeed a 
positively wicked manner, contrary to the general policy of 
the rest of the gods.
Nothing further could be done to justify Hippol­
ytus, though the general practice of the gods leaves much 
to be desired, or at least explained. Artemis* own propos­
al to honour Hippolytus but also to avenge him by slaying 
another mortal, leaves the suspicion that her own code of 
conduct is not very different from Aphrodite's, and even if 
the general policy of the gods is to honour piety, the 
exceptions are more evident than the rule. The one 
unexceptional law which fear of Zeus supports is a law in 
favour of exceptions.
The problem of piety is acute for polytheism, as 
Plato shows in the Euthyphro. Even the Pythagorean rule to 
* follow the divine' depends on the assumption that the gods, 
like everyone else, give good gifts to those whom they love, 
and contrariwise.^ why, then, should it be assumed that 
they love the virtuous, since their own behaviour is 
nothing exceptional?
' Iambi.V.P• 137 ( D.Pyth.Sch.D. 2) \-Tre-r ^«<.7
o ' i f  c  ■
153
The Pythagoreans seem to have assumed, not that 
there is an independent standard of virtue equally pleasing 
to all the gods, but that obedience to external authority 
and reverence for a superior power is in itself virtue, 
quite apart from the moral excellence of this ruling 
element.^ That gods should be 'wiser than men' {in the 
sense required by the huntsman) is no more necessary than 
that princes should be more self-controlled than their 
subjects, and no more likely; obedience to the law is 
exacted from the subject, not from the ruler.
If, however, an independent standard of virtue is 
admitted, or if the gods are regarded as natural forces 
rather than as the source of human institutions, the fate 
of the virtuous will depend upon the precise form of 
divine rule. Different ways of behaving will please 
different gods, and just as the tyrant does not always 
appreciate a good citizen, so a supremely virtuous man 
may fall a victim to divine despotism.
The moral inspiration which a man derives from 
worship may move him to conduct far in advance of the 
behaviour which he attributes to the deity. Even that 
quality of divine perfection which he sees as a moral 
ideal, need not prompt a goddess to the same virtue to 
which it prompts the man, since there is no evidence that 
a divine being possesses a moral nature at all.
The divine idea which Artemis symbolises is made 
morally significant through Hippolytus' conduct, not 
through her own. she herself behaves like any other 
goddess in a polytheistic system. The dualism which we 
seem to see in the opposition between the two goddesses, 
is shown only on the plane of human action, through 
analysis of the different kinds of motive which influence 
the human mind.
 ^Iambi . V .P # 1T 4 ^ , i
g. B  ‘ y-' f-v » . Y I O' 7~I /C t> lit C  ^7  1/ i (-> o ^  U> V>- goi K (*7 * V . Ç 7-, e StCf «y \/
ToiAyTyf K  e y u c> t -< g Ç  ^ js }-CT^ g  ^ ^  c ^ r <rjO. I { 7 ) j-  >
(175) <^ovTx> Çy  Ç( - i v ,^c 73 y g'<fy(->^or^ - y s  ^(T
y^yCe-JrvTT- lyBijv  ^  6» If 'ityoi Th o C ,t o T y-rt> Ç -n- rCuZf B t-^  ç  ^ oC-C-i
r'lSf^tBiL, T y S  £,ç*.vo'iy^f <= >r»y^ 7  /T-B V T O  ; TT d  y  i./ ^  t* rl T7t> v rb f - y  V S  fo ^
> /  
lo ^  ^ V
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This discrepancy between the natural and the moral 
aspects of divine behaviour affects the idea of virtue less 
than the question of its reward, piety merely becomes an 
unusual form of altruism, the faithful service of an 
ungrateful heaven, if, however, human morality depends in 
the last resort on the support which it receives from the 
gods, a different conclusion may be drawn. The 'natural 
virtue* of Hippolytus corresponds to nothing that is fully 
represented in the divine nature of the external world.
Moral Dualism. psychological survey.
I mean by dualism (1) the representation of a 
good which is different in kind from its contrary, evil, not 
merely opposed to it on the natural level; (2 ) the emergence 
of a motive different in kind from natural impulse, and of 
a moral principle which is not the mere rationalisation of 
passion.
The sequence of events in the play is so arranged 
as to bring out the essential nature of this dualism by a 
series of contrasts, which show moral and psychological 
connexions which would not otherwise be apparent.
Aphrodite's general statement of her revenge and 
particular grievance against Hippolytus is followed by his 
self-revelation in the address to Artemis, in which the 
virginal cast of his mind appears as a moral quality, but 
the ground of his objection to Aphrodite is not, in the 
conversation with the huntsman, very clearly or adequately 
explained.
m  the next scene the power of Aphrodite over the 
human mind begins to be revealed on the emotional and moral 
plane. Attacking phaedra both through her own emotion and 
through the persuasion of her nurse, she shows that the force 
of passion is not merely the emotional reaction of the 
individual, but also its rationalisation for argument; her 
universality can be represented not only as a necessary 
influence over the emotions, but also as a compelling 
argument to persuade the mind. Phaedra's ability to resist 
the former, but not the combination of both, shows the link 
between emotion and thought in moral purpose.
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The sophist prodicus is reputed to have said that 
desire doubled is love, and that love doubled again is 
madness.  ^ Phaedra's state of mind as she is brought before 
us is the exact opposite of Hippolytus' , in that
she is completely swayed by the single passion which he 
lacks; the contrast is emphasised by the scene of delirium 
in which the wild life of wood and mountain is seen through 
the strange distorted medium of phaedra's longing. The 
tragic inconsistency of her vision with the reality of 
Hippolytus' life with Artemis points to the essential 
opposition between the emotional states of each, and as the 
root of phaedra's ^ delusion is the desire which Hippolytus 
lacks, so freedom from that desire is seen to be the spring 
of natural virtue in Hippolytus. The connexion which began 
as symbolism is seen to be psychologically real through the 
presentation of its opposite, and its moral significance is 
at first pointed in the same way.
Since, however, Phaedra's delirium is caused not 
only by love but also by physical weakness (since she is 
starving herself to death), her sane mind still retains its 
strength of purpose through the habit of virtue and 'way of 
thought' which would have given her a means of escape from 
Aphrodite. This is overborne by the nurse's argument, and 
when, after the scene with Hippolytus, she shakes off this 
influence and returns to her former purpose, we find it 
changed and perverted by the change of circumstances and 
by the wish to injure Hippolytus. Death for phaedra is not 
now an escape from Aphrodite, but surrender to her; both 
her impulse and her deliberate purpose are now in conformity 
with the intention of the goddess.
phaedra shows the effects of the emotion to which 
she yields, not only by following the impulse of revenge, 
but by making bad worse in the attempt to save appearances. 
Both are in contrast with Hippolytus' refusal to retaliate 
(as she expects) and with his wish still to be, even if he 
cannot seem to be, the best of men.
 ^Stob.iV 20*65 //^ * f ZZ 7 «r, w
^  ft C"'fr7j <r ! U  g  B f-v 7  o<w/a(v' Y  ')f ^ B «6V
Gf.Eur.fr.l6lN (Antigone) ^ f  7^  ^hy  f-y-u^c .
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Her original plan of suicide, as an attempt to 
foil cypris, wore the aspect of . Now her action
follows not only from the aim to avoid exposure, but also 
from the very passion which she wishes to conceal.^  The 
nurse's contention that she is no longer is proved
both by the impulse to destroy Hippolytus and by the use of 
this means to preserve the appearance of her own virtue.
Euripides seems to be showing thaÿ the acceptance 
of a moral standard which has no corresponding base in the 
nature of the agent means that, in any conflict between 
appearance and reality, the agent will always prefer to be, 
rather than seem to be, bad. The fear of seeming bad may 
normally deter a man from wrong action, but if the mind is 
already under the influence of passion, may lead to action 
worse than the evil which is being concealed. This fear is 
perhaps the false which phaedra condemned (385) but
which her action now shows in contrast with the of
Hippolytus, which, as a direct aversion from evil itself, 
cannot lead to inconsistency between end and means.
Phaedra's case is exceptional in that, in her, the 
habit of virtue is overcome by the strength of a passion 
for which she is not responsible, and her wish to avoid 
disgrace is the only motive now left to her. So Hippolytus 
keeps his oath partly because he has nothing to gain by 
breaking it. without blame to phaedra, the reversal of 
situation between them, by which he is made to bear the 
shame which she wishes to avoid, shows the moral difference 
between the two kinds of as they are an essential
part of the character of each.
 ^The trans&formation of passion from^love into revenge, 
through the infliction of injury, is familiar from the 
Medea, jn Phaedra's case the injury is abuse, and the 
connexion of her impulse to retaliate with the spirited 
element which earlier opposed her passion, is now the link 
between passion and purpose in a nature still dominated by 
. The two forms of passion, love and revenge, go 
together in phaedra as they do in Aphrodite, although the 
motive which now dictates revenge was earlier able to 
resist her passion. The sudden release of that force 
which she has hitherto been controlling explains the 
lowering of moral standards which has distressed critics.
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The difference between natural and conventional 
virtue is not that the latter has no natural base, but that 
it has a different one, in phaedra's case pride of birth 
which demands a certain social position and respect from 
others. Yet the misfortune into which she falls illustrates 
the general danger of conventional morality, that it honours 
a standard of virtue for which it fails to provide an 
adequate guarantee, by condemning the passion which it 
nevertheless leaves as the ultimate arbiter of human action. 
Euripides' conclusion is not, however, that natural virtue 
consists in the unrestrained or 'natural' expression of 
this universal motive (such a systématisation of passion as 
he is prepared to see in some social institutions and in 
the behaviour of the gods), but that natural virtue is only 
to be found in a soul which is entirely free from passion.
Take away the social rewards of justice, suggests 
Adeimantus,^ and the behaviour of the conventionally just 
man will not differ from that of the unjust. The real 
virtue of Hippolytus 'shines forth' not only because it 
remains constant even when branded with social infamy, but 
through its contrast with the passion and of phaedra,
and with the anger and misjudgment of Theseus.
Theseus sees in Hippolytus' way of life the 
assumption of a 'godliness' which is merely the pursuit of 
the same ends as human vice, unhampered by the restrictions 
and conventions of civilised society. His present bbhaviour 
is not a lapse from virtue, but the revelation of his 
essential character, and not so much a contradiction of his 
religious pretensions as an indication of their true ground. 
He condemns as a menace to society not only Hippolytus but 
all men like him, and refers through the name of Orpheus to 
a current social abuse, private traffic in mystery religion. 
He attacks the view that women are more incontinent than 
men, and expresses his resolve to banish Hippolytus accord­
ing to his general practice of punishing wrong-doers.
 ^plat.Rep.363 a f.
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By generalising phaedra»s accusation in this way, 
Theseus provokes Hippolytus to a defence not of the purity 
of his religion, but of his moral character and its 
consequences in his dealings with his fellow men. Each 
point is relevant not only to the particular charge, but 
also to the exposition of that constancy in thought and 
action which would make any deviation from the path of 
virtue impossible, in any field. Natural virtue is 
incorruptible, because it lacks the incentives of passion 
which lead to moral downfall as well as personal disaster; 
it is permanent, because it contains a positive motive in 
the love of what is lastingly good and fair, such a man 
will do no wrong even when provoked; he cannot be false to 
his friends because he must remain true to himself; he 
will make both a loyal son and a good citizen; even a 
tyrant need not suspect him, since he has himself no 
temptation to rule.
The emphasis on friendship - with the best friends 
- suggests that the positive expression of Hippolytus' 
virtue is Pythagorean , combining love of good with
personal affection, and aiming at lasting happiness through 
social intercourse with the best men. So piety aims at 
establishing a similar relation with the divine, as his 
friendship with Artemis (here unmentioned) has already 
shown. Devotion to a lasting good should be itself lasting 
(the character of the motive being inferred from the 
character of the aim), and in Hippolytus* case is founded 
on a natural freedom from contrary incentive. Such a man 
should make a good citizen under any government, and win 
the approval of heaven, yet even apart from the political 
implication!s of the ideal, its social exclusiveness 
brings him into potential conflict not only with democracy 
and with despotism, but also with the divine government of 
the universe, if this is run either on despotic or on 
democratic lines. Theseus, the founder of democracy who 
is behaving like a tyrant under the influence of strong 
passion, and deluded by Aphrodite, illustrates the danger 
from both points of view.
159
Hippolytus* other wish, to win at the Hellenic 
games - clearly with his horses - is the natural and 
patriotic expression of the physical (aXthletic) ideal 
which his way of life suggests, as the chief human good 
at which a man of his tastes and leanings might be expected 
to aim. His devotion to Artemis is not mentioned, partly 
because it is irrelevant to the charge (and has already 
been mentioned earlier in the play, 87), and partly because, 
in the present emergency, the less said about his divine 
companion the better.^
Hippolytus* ideal, to do nothing base even when 
provoked, is the reply to Theseus* fixed determination to 
be pitiless to evil-doers. Even if the gods destroy the 
wicked root and branch (1341), similar ferocity in a man 
shows the infatuation of the ruler who has mistaken his 
own angry impulse for a principle of social justice, and 
of the father who allows a supposed conjugal injury to rob 
him of fairmindedness towards his son. Hippolytus* 
attitude of restraint, even of sympathy, towards his father 
is in striking contrast not only with the complete lack of 
response in Theseus, but also with his own impulsive 
condemnation of phaedra.
The death of phaedra is the turning point for 
Hippolytus, not only because it leads to his own death, but 
because it brings him down from remote spiritual heights 
to the level of human suffering, if youth and inexperience 
prompted his abuse of her, his present situation shows his 
virtue in its essential, and in its human, light, freed 
from dependence on his relation with Artemis. If phaedra 
intended him to learn , the lesson is learnt as he
experiences moral conflict for the first time : (2
T t l / ^ o r  a o , j c r c r ? i  y  t / ( j ’   ^ H   ^ (l060“"l) •
He is sent to his death on the same charge for which he 
reviled her, and his father * s bitter denunciation echoes 
his own misunderstanding of her real inculpability.
: At this point in the play, Artemis is conspicmous only by 
her absence, and Hippolytus* virtue is made to stand the 
test independently of any help received from her. The 
beloved horses are, however, still to be used as instru­
ments of destruction, and Hippolytus* skill as a charioteer 
is the immediate cause of his death (1219 f.). The lines
^Ty7*^ / 7 oc, i ec, ( TTrt f , / y  'j y  ( 1 2 4 Q - 1  )
are perhaps the most affecting in the play.
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Hippolytus » Youth
In Hippolytus* tirade against women, do we see his 
one lapse from virtue, or the essential penalty of his way 
of life? AS a contribution to his downfall, must it be put 
down to the influence of Artemis, or of Aphrodite?
Since both goddesses sanction revenge, a reaction 
appropriate to the one might well be made to serve the 
purpose of the other. Yet such abuse appears inconsistent 
with the moral standard approved by natural virtue : to do 
nothing base, even in return. • If half the human race is 
to be excepted from this principle, its validity seems 
seriously in doubt.
Hippolytus himself makes the curious remark that 
as long as women go on being bad he will go on abusing them 
(664-6), as if their ill-doing and his ill-speaking were 
connected as cause and effect, apart from his own volition, 
so that his language simply reflects their nature (or the 
nature of Aphrodite), not his own. As phaedra suggests 
(395-7), the tongue is an unreliable member, for, knowing 
how to blame others, it is itself to blame for most of its 
own troubles. There is no real wish in Hippolytus to 
injure phaedra (although, for her, evil talk is a positive 
injury), and her death fills him with amazement. ^
Either we must recognise a distinction between 
verbal retaliaition and the real injury which is inflicted 
on Hippolytus, or his unrestrained speech is at least 
partly redeemed by his later silence under much greater 
provocation. Nevertheless, the extreme bitterness of the 
attack, and its extension to all women, suggest that /'f-r 
(the unreasoning sensitiveness of youth) cannot always 
distinguish the correet application of the moral principle 
which it so clearly discerns. An antagonism to evil which 
springs from a physical aversion, spiritually developed 
but unmodified by human experience, lacks its essentially 
moral base, since it is not yet matured in the judgment 
and in the emotions.
^Although phaedra fears that Hippolytus will * fill the land 
with shameful talk* (692), there is no suggestion that 
Theseus might punish her, as, for instance, Minos punished 
pasiphae in the Cretans.
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Natural virtue, untaught, can be applied only in 
a very limited field; to follow in the wake of a goddess 
may be to exclude the lessons of experience, and to ignore 
the collective wisdom of the human race. Knowing nothing 
of moral conflict or of involuntary sin, Hippolytus fails 
to distinguish between fault and misfortune, and between an 
attack on evil itself and a moral judgment passed on a 
human being.
The curiously artificial character of the speech 
against women, the series of objectionable types all quite 
devoid of feeling and emotion, and the naive counter­
proposal for acquiring children, suggest an imagination 
completely remote from real life, go Hippolytus knows of 
the sexual act through hearing of it and * seeing it in a 
picture* (1005), and wishes that he could have been the 
spectator of his own misfortune, so that he might have wept 
(1078-9).  ^ in the same way the meadow from which he gathers 
his garland is made the symbol of his own purity.
This tendency to look at life * in a picture* 
suggests not only inexperience, but a habit of mind which 
cannot absorb the full colour of reality, owing to its 
concentration upon a schematic pattern of good and evil 
which, if applied to hu@an life, cuts across it in hard 
unnatural lines which ignore both its complexity and its 
changefulness. The acceptance of a symbolism which is 
psychologically appropriate only in early youth, leads to 
a rigidity which not only destroys happiness, but robs 
natural virtue of its full fruition by condemniijg in advance 
the conditions of moral development in a human being.
in a human being, virginity acquires moral signif­
icance, not, as in a divine being, from its essential 
permanence, but from the transience of the youthful bloom 
which alone makes such a renunciation unusual and decorous. 
Hippolytus* youth is the brief radiant that catches the 
gleam of an eternal spring; to end life as he began it is' 
the impossible prayer of a man who has mistaken reality for 
a dream.
i Either^because he would not then be experiencing it, or 
because he would then have had at least one sympathetic 
witness (cf.1074-5). This duplication of himself suggests 
the feeling of isolation rather than self-pity; his present 
role of is so unlike him that he wants his * other self*
to judge him unworthy of his misfortunes.
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Much may be forgiven the * strained h e a r t o f  
youth, which has not (as Aristotle s a y s b e e n  humbled by 
experience, and the wise, even if they cannot approve, will 
make allowances. So when the huntsmen, grieving for 
Hippolytus, doubt divine providence as they look on the 
ever-changing fortunes of men, the female Chorus prays the 
gods for a mind neither rigid nor insincere, so that ways 
may be easily changed to meet the morrow*s need, and good 
fortune be continuous, without pain (1102 f .).
The Chorus remember phaedra; but the untaught 
virtue of Hippolyta*s son still shows that freedom from 
passion would be the secret of human happiness, if it were 
consistent with the conditions of human existence. The 
intuition of would.be a safe guide, though it cannot
be realised while the law of passion remains in control of 
human destiny.
Hippolytus* mind is already shot through with 
streaks of the divine; Human only in his misfortune, he 
leaves us the unique pattern both of his virtue and of his 
unmerited suffering. The rest is lost in the shadow of 
Hades, or remembered in the half-light of stories and 
dreams. o -, T.c ^ U - r z - ^ c ^ , not yet the answer of the
philosopher, remains the question of the poet, who has 
seen that light flicker into darkness, yet cannot leave 
the darkness unillumined, without a story and without a 
dream.
Conclusion. uses of the Divine.
Through her part in the action of the play. 
Aphrodite appears not merely as a universal natural 
principle but also in her relation to the emotional and 
moral life of man. The necessity which she represents is 
shown as (1 ) the force of an emotion (2 ) the persuasion 
of argument (3) passionate retaliation in any form. The 
revenge, which demonstrates her power, is provoked and 
maintained by opposition to it, thus increasing the sense 
of external compulsion, and at the same time making clear 
the connexion between the human motives which lead to the 
death of Hippolytus.
 ^Hipp#118
 ^Ar.Rhet .1389 a 31 y ^ , ^ ^
'C
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By condemning natural impulse, society may promote 
either virtue or vice, according to the circumstances and 
the provocation, phaedra*s retaliation illustrates 
Aphrodite*s original reason for revenge, and also the 
danger of a divided mind which is moved both by passion 
and by the wish to suppress it.
The positive virtue which depends upon absence 
of passion is set in its clearest light by the reflection 
of this condemnation on Hippolytus. The social motive 
which, combined with passion, actuates both phaedra and 
Theseus, repeats the motive of Aphrodite*s revenge and 
contrasts with the genuine aversion from evil in Hippol­
ytus. His moral ideal contradicts the law of passion 
(embodied both in Aphrodite*s despotism and in the legal­
ised revenge of human society), and his unmerited calamity 
causes the power which destroys him to appear wholly 
vindictive and immoral.
Though passion is seen to be the root of all evil, 
the complexity of the circumstances transfers the blame to 
the divine rather than the human manifestations of it, 
since the deliberate purpose of vice is found only in 
Aphrodite. Theseus is ignorant of the facts, and phaedra 
herself a victim; to blame natural passion in man is to 
increase rather than lessen its influence.
AS the natural antagonist of Aphrodite, Artemis 
prompts that attitude to love which makes us doubt whether 
she is, after all, on the side of the angels. This doubt 
is confirmed by the unsatisfactory elements in her own 
behaviour and by Hippolytus* attack on phaedra. Abuse of 
Aphrodite may be justified, but to blame a human being for 
moral evil without regard to the constitution of human 
nature is itself a form of revenge which robs moral virtue 
of its essential superiority.
At the same time, through her relation to Hippol­
ytus* virtue and through the immoral role of Aphrodite in 
the play, she appears to symbolise an ideal which, if it 
could be put into practice, would be the antithesis of 
moral evil in all its forms, in this she resembles the 
Orphic Artemis ; Aphrodite, on the other hand, recalls the 
Orphic , whose function is now vested in a goddess
conceived on Empedoclean or parmenidean lines. Euripides* 
Aphrodite is, however, quite opposed to the moral and
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religious ideal of harmony, and her complete separation from 
Strife is seen to be a philosophical fiction. Euripides 
appears to have little sympathy with erotic mysticism, and 
for the natural world, as for its divine government, he 
holds to the principle of . He shows, however, a
Pythagorean dualism between the natural emotions and moral
Artemis is opposed to Aphrodite, partly on the 
natural level, in so far as she too accepts the rule of 
revenge and adapts herself to the divine equality of a 
quasi-Empedoclean polytheism, and partly as her superior 
in a moral dualism.
AS in Empedocles * system, divine rule (a form of 
self-assertion) can be exercised only in relation to mortal 
things. Aphrodite*s influence over phaedra means that an 
emotion can prevail in the human because it is directly
continuous with a divine force. Her revenge on Hippolytus 
and Artemis* counter-revenge on Adonis imply an extension 
of the strife principle, as this is displayed in various 
ways through the relations of divine and human beings.
Divine revenge on the individual is also a feature of Emped- 
oclean mysticism (D.B.115), but only for the crimes of 
bloodshed and perjury. In the Medea, divine justice 
sanctioned the punishment of the one crime by means of the 
other; in the Hippolytus, the law of zeus allows revenge 
upon a man who is especially scrupulous in keeping his oath. 
Euripides still seems to be asking, which side the gods 
really take in the moral struggle of mankind.
The ruling of zeus that no god shall directly 
thwart another suggests divine equality, yet serves to 
leave Aphrodite in sole control of the course of events, as 
she demonstrates the force of divine necessity in various 
ways. Her supremacy in the natural world is stressed 
throughout the play (cf. the final chorus 1268 f.), and in 
this respect she recalls Parmenides * goddess in the * way of 
seeming*, who governs all things from the centre of the 
fiery bands (D.B.12-3). In the other-worldly aspect of 
Artemis and her unique relation with Hippolytus, there is 
perhaps a faint reminiscence of the deity who greets 
Parmenides beyond the gates of day and night, and reveals 
a,higher stratum of reality.^
^The reader will also remember that virtue and Vice appear 
as two female characters in prodicus * fable of the young
Heracles (Xen.Mem.ii.1 .21-34).
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in this way Aphrodite and Artemis represent not 
only the conflicting principles of love and virginity, but 
also two different conceptions of the divine : (1) as a 
universal natural necessity (2) as a moral and religious 
ideal. This difference is confirmed by Artemis* function 
at the end of the play, where she is called upon to pro­
nounce moral judgment and assign divine honours ; she does 
not, like Aphrodite, operate through the earlier action, 
except in so far as she has helped to mould the nature of 
Hippolytus. The relation which exists between them is 
unique, and if a virgin soul is * natural* to Hippolytus, 
it is natural to no one else, whereas the universality of 
Aphrodite*s power is constantly stressed. There is no 
* natural impulse of asceticism* which can compare with the 
impulse of Cypris; there is only the sublimation of thought 
and feeling which, by turning from the human to the divine, 
raises both above the merely natural plane. Hippolytus* 
virtue is not (i have argued) a sublimation of this kind,^ 
since it depends not only on the deliberate acceptance of 
divine virginity as a moral ideal, but on a corresponding 
impulse in his own nature.
^I.e. not a separation of desire from the physical, as 
implied in religious ecstasy and philosophical idealism. 
The natural opposition between Artemis and Aphrodite shows 
that Hippolytus* virtue must spring from a root different 
in kind from , though it may be regarded as in part
a sublimation of the virginal instinct which is natural to 
the young, virginity differs as an ideal from celibacy 
in that the latter seems to aim at the autonomy of the 
reason, the former at the preservation of its own perfect­
ion. The virtue which springs from it is therefore bound 
to concentrate on self rather than on others.
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The philosophical interest of the play partly 
lies in Euripides* use of the unique aspect of Hippolytus* 
virtue and relation with Artemis to suggest a nature which 
is both turned towards a divine ideal and at the same time 
following its own natural bent, which is therefore perfect 
and consistent but remote from the rest of men and unsuited 
to the conditions of human life. This nature he associates 
with Pythagorean aims and with a moral principle which may 
be socratic in its inspiration. Yet the conclusion is, not 
that happiness depends on turning from the human to the 
divine, but rather on turning from the divine to the human, 
and that no abstract scheme of good and evil can be morally 
valid unless it corresponds to genuine psychological 
connexions in human nature.
Through the character of Hippolytus Euripides has 
shown (1) that human morality depends on emancipation from 
the law of passion, not because a divine soul apart from 
the body would have no desires, but because absence
of desire is the condition of supreme virtue realised 
naturally in a human being. Since, however, the ’nature* 
which achieves this perfection is no common inheritance of 
man, but the individual nature of Hippolytus, he has 
likewise shown (2} that virtue must have a different ground 
in other men; and the very incompleteness of Hippolytus* 
experience suggests the alternative in a developed judgment 
and adaptability to the changing conditions of human life.
por the goodness which cannot in any circumstances 
become base we can have nothing but admiration, but the 
fate of Hippolytus calls for pity rather than for imitation, 
and for warning as well as worship, in transferring a 
* daemonic * purity to the human scene, Euripides shows from 
a fresh viewpoint the danger of the religious and philo­
sophical tendency to condemn the physical conditions of 
human existence.
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The Conception of .
AS in the Medea, there is in the Hippolytus the 
suggestion that a man* s true nature is something not always 
shown by his normal behaviour, but revealed with time, in 
circumstances that are especially testing, so phaedra dies 
to avoid the * mirror* of time (428-30), and Hippolytus begs 
his father to wait for time to give evidence (1051). just 
as Medea craved clear bodily signs of a man's villainy, as 
for counterfeit gold (Med.516-9), so Hippolytus reviles 
woman as (Hipp.616), and Theseus wishes for
some clear sign to distinguish true from false friends: he 
suggests that every man should have two voices, a just and 
an unjust, the former to refute the latter, so that we 
should never be deceived (925-31).
The importance of this idea for the interpretation 
of the play is shown by its appearance at each crucial stage 
in the action, phaedra*s chief argument for preserving 
virtue is that loss of it runs the constant risk of detect­
ion, and knows that her passion, if revealed, would be taken 
as the sign of a vicious nature, it is this revelation of 
woman's wickedness that provokes Hippolytus* abuse, and 
Theseus is likewise ready to believe that, in spite of the 
evidence of his past life, he now has certain proof of his 
son's .
There is, in normal behaviour, a fatal ambiguity, 
cloaking the motives from which men act, and the moral 
pattern of their souls. A man's cannot, like his body,
be seen with the eye, nor heard by the ear, like his voice; 
it can be known only through his actions and not always 
then. Only in exceptional circumstances, when motives 
conflict or are abnormally exaggerated, and when the usual 
causal connexions are reversed, the essential nature of a 
motive or of a man may be revealed, and perhaps at the same 
time the structure of the human soul.
When the self-interest which had bound Jason to 
Medea led, through changed circumstances, to his alienation 
from her, Medea came to know the 'villainy* of Jason. Jason 
in his turn knew Medea, when the destructive rage which she 
had vented on others was turned at last upon himself. So 
we too came to know the force of anger 'as it is in itself, 
as it conflicts with human laws to destroy the happiness of 
victim and agent alike; such a force is 'divine', a point 
of contact between man and nature, a necessity beyond man.
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to which he is subject through the irrationality of the 
passions, and perhaps through the essential irrationality 
of the female .
Medea’s anger was not directly prompted by a deity, 
but her descent from Helios was interpreted partly as a 
physical, partly as an emotional continuity with a primitive 
natural force, through which the law of retaliation became 
a necessity of her own nature.
' V »< ISo phaedra, in addition to the 
, points to the common propensity of her family to 
fatal loves; her own love is directly inspired by Aphrodite. 
Its physical effects are shown in the scene of delirium; 
the moral analysis begins, however, at the level of conscious 
experience, and her emotional rather than her physical 
nature is shown to be in direct contact with the divine 
force which represents the universal necessity of the 
natural world.
Divinely inspired passion may ’drive out* reason, 
resulting in delirium or madness, in a way which suggests 
a divine conquest over the physical nature of the victim.
It may, on the other hand, influence action as a conscious 
motive, determining the will in such a way as to suggest a 
victory over the moral nature of man. '
The physiological explanation which is put forward 
seems independent of Aphrodite - unless, like Empedocles* 
goddess, she is responsible for the original combination of 
elements in the body and so for the innate tendency of 
which phaedra complains. Moreover, phaedra* s v/f*; is at 
least partly induced by her own plan of committing suicide. 
The influence of the goddess is accordingly shown less by 
the physical change in phaedra, as if this alone were 
sufficient to determine her thought and feeling, than by 
the alteration of her purpose,through the combined effect 
of emotion, argument and injury, each of which has an 
independent relation to the divine necessity which shapes 
her action,both in accordance with her own will,and in 
accordance with the will of Aphrodite.
Cf7Gorg.Hel.l5-19, where the involuntary (physical) effects 
of sense-impressions are used as evidence of their influ­
ence on conscious behaviour.
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Phaedra’s physical sickness is caused, not by her 
passion alone, but by her own opposition to it. it is 
therefore (1) a dramatic means of distinguishing the patho­
logical elements in her love (which affect emotion and 
reason alike) from the ’nature of the mind’ which is at 
first able to resist it as a conscious motive, and is then 
brought by fresh causes into conformity with the will of 
Aphrodite. It is also (2) the physical representation of 
a love which has penetrated - ç l s  (258),
so that the cravings of the unsound body are, like the 
moral taint, Both phaedra*s resistance and the
physical condition to which she is brought by it illustrate 
the essential character of her passion as an involuntary 
’love of evil* - in spite of the nurse, who argues that 
since her own opposition has increased her ,*the fault
must lie with her, not with Aphrodite. The influence of 
Aphrodite must, however, include not only the single passion 
but the way in which the whole nature is ordered as the 
result of it, and for the state of <rro^<r// (physical and moral) 
to which she is reduced Aphrodite, not phaedra herself, is 
responsible. At the same time the nurse is so far right, 
that the attempt to suppress her love leads in both cases 
to the victory of over reason, just as, in seeking
her own death, phaedra was turning to account the inherent 
destructive tendency of her passion as a physical klf.f , so, 
in destroying Hippolytus, the impulse of revenge becomes 
part of her deliberate purpose of concealment, and the full 
moral evil of her passion is thereby revealed.
 ^Hipp•359; cf.gryximachus* speech in plat.symp.186 a f.; 
Eur.fr.547N (Oedipus); 672N (Sthenoboea, cf.page G.E.P.
p. 126-/7^ % Ç f~ ,vov  ^  ^Sc->y(yt f^y<sT9-v^ '
Y  ^^ I '
1 C ' 2 ' 1 I ” / 1»'
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Cypris is associated with the bad only, in fr.388N,
331N, cf.339N, 1054n .
*Cf.fr.340N (Dict^) : C.,., Ah: y X X  .
^  I V  T 7 -X  ,r-r y ,  J  f .
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The conception of as the individual moral
nature of man arises partly from the dependence of thought 
and feeling upon physiological factors (as in Empedocles * 
system), and partly from their independent connexion with 
an element in external nature which can be viewed not only 
as a physical constituent but also as an emotional, even a 
rational, principle. Natural necessity is not, therefore, 
merely raised from the unconscious to the conscious level, 
but reinterpreted and introduced afresh at each point of 
contact with this external principle; and the idea of a 
composite human nature is developed, not through its 
correspondence to a plurality of elements in the external 
world, but through the conflict created in the individual 
consciousness by the pressure of a partly alien force - a 
conflict which may or may not be repeated in the divine 
nature of the external world. The notion of the * true 
nature* of man becomes, therefore, as ambiguous as his 
outward behaviour and appearance; it can be identified with 
the part or with the whole, the prevailing or the defeated 
element, the divine or the human affinities of man, 
according to the special emphasis which circumstances, or 
the dramatic presentation, suggest.
phaedra speaks of the ’nature of the mind* (377) 
as if it were independent both of her passion and of its 
physical base; except when delirious, she is able to 
reflect upon her condition and devise a plan, in virtue of 
which she can still claim to be . The line between
her * just and good mind* and her passion proves, however, 
to be less hard and fast than phaedra had thought : as her 
inherited tendency predisposed her to love, so her love 
predisposes her to accept the argument which supports it, 
and in the next serene even her , at first shown
in spirited resistance to her passion, joins with it to 
retaliate upon Hippolytus, in a contest with appearances 
which in fact displays the mastery of Aphrodite over the 
whole of her nature.
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In this .progression from the physical to the 
emotional and intellectual aspects of , there is unity
without predetermination; each state is conditioned by the 
earlier, yet requires a fresh impulse from without before 
it is finally fixed in the predestined form, phaedra*s way 
of thought, even when it opposed her passion, was not 
inconsistent with i t y e t  that opposition showed that the 
’nature of the mind*, grounded as it is in the physical and 
exposed to the influence of the passions, is nevertheless 
the last stronghold of human freedom: only when thought and 
emotion, passion and purpose completely coincide, her whole 
nature Isjseen to be determined according to the attributes 
and intention of Aphrodite.
The structure of the individual which is
revealed by this analysis is the key to our understanding 
of Hippolytus. The consistency of his character contrasts 
with the conflict in phaedra, and is analogous to the final 
determination of her nature according to the demands of 
passion.
I have already argued that, in a divine being, the 
connexion between virginity and virtue is purely symbolical, 
but that in Hippolytus, both and y&f
depend on the absence of (in the ordinary sense),
and that this is the psychological link between them. The 
concept of virginity is not, however, merely negative; it 
provides a positive motive in y (1302, cf .plat.
Crat. 4q 6 b 1 ; . This motive, eternally
appropriate to the goddess, but to a man,only in early 
youth, has become in Hippolytus a moral rather than a 
physical impulse, through the worship of Artemis which has 
given a spiritual content to the notion of virginity. In 
this way we pass, in the later part of the play, from
to moral fU/x , and from mere antagonism to love to 
moral .
 ^Because it sets supreme value on the appearance of virtue. 
Moreover, phaedra has chosen a means of death that must 
inevitably weaken the control of reason in her own nature.
172
Apart from the analysis of the effects of passion 
on phaedra, this transition would have been much less 
convincing. Even as it is, we are conscious of a certain 
artificiality in the grafting of and on the
physical stem of virginity, a lack of realism which is 
reflected in Hippolytus* own imagination and general moral 
attitude.
O e 6 t (  J f V T*;
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The impulses to love and to virginity are mutually exclus­
ive, but neither gives a moral right to condemn the other. 
If, on the other hand, virginity be regarded as a quality 
of soul at a higher level than natural impulse, it is 
doubtful whether this quality could ever be completely 
spontaneous, or, if it were, whether it could be identified 
with , since the unexceptional (physical) antag­
onism which it implies cannot take the form of a moral 
judgment without contradicting the very notion of virtue.
* Natural * virtue is not only committed in advance 
to regarding a whole class of natural impulses as morally 
bad, but is also tempted to reproduce in every field the 
clear unequivocal distinction between good and bad which 
it was able to find on the natural level.
por , as for , there can
be no exception. Hippolytus, in his defence before Theseus, 
is not claiming that all men*s acts can^ '^inferred from their 
character, but that his can, owing to its complete consist­
ency and lack of contrary incentive, in his case, virgin­
ity is the * clear bodily sign* of the inner man. But the 
penalty of this consistency is that the * evil * which it 
excludes from itself it must condemn in others ; internal 
conflict is eliminated, but the same conflict must reappear 
in relation to other men, and even with divine powers. By 
refusing to compromise with passion, Hippolytus provokes 
the attack which he cannot repel; his right as aggressor 
is proved only by his defeat, and his * true nature* 
realised by his own destruction, as a human being, he is 
a disappointment; as a , and as a supreme example of
unmerited suffering, he comes into his own.
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The Nature of the Mind. Idealism the Analogue to Natural 
Necessity.
(79) a6'ci( Ç t ^ x  X  V oi.X4 f  V T y
'7t> <1 y  C \r C~,v f-Ç 7".*. TTe^ w ^ ^
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Natural virtue is, like its contrary, grounded in the 
physical, though must here include a reference to the
emotions and to the mind: the * desire of virginity* has 
already become a moral motive through love of Artemis and 
the deliberate choice of her service as a way of life. The 
spontaneity of virtue is opposed, therefore, not to thought 
and purpose in Hippolytus, but to the teaching and influence 
of others; at the same time the contrast between natural and 
taught virtue carries with it the further suggestion that 
its starting-point is not the * nature of the mind*, but the 
instincts and emotions. The thought and purpose which 
spring from such a root will never be contradicted by alien 
impulse, yet they will lack the true generality which is 
the essential base of the moral judgment.
f ' p t . Here, and elsewhere in the
play, seems to refer either to a state of the
emotions, or to impulsive rather than deliberate action; 
cf.phaedra*s fear of seeming (430), and Artemis *
condemnation of Theseus (1320). The cause of human error 
does not, phaedra asserts, lie in the mind (377). Thought 
and purpose are, therefore, to be included in the notion 
of the individual , but the mind is at the same time 
regarded as a more general human faculty, through which a 
man may (perhaps) learn to escape the tyranny of his own 
physically conditioned temperament.
The consistency of Hippolytus* nature results from 
the absence of any alien influence on its development, and 
of the disturbing effects of passion upon the will, but his 
grasp of general moral principles is limited by his accept­
ance of an ideal which sets a higher value upon his own 
spiritual perfection than on his common humanity. This 
self-moulding, partly spontaneous, partly deliberate, after 
a divine pattern which is also the image of his own nature, 
brings about the exact correspondence between virginity and 
virtue which, in a goddess, is essential and permanent, in 
a man, the falsification of his moral nature and a denial 
of the conditions of his existence.
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phaedra»s love was love of the impossible; so 
Artemis leaves Hippolytus at the gates of Hades. Such 
intense development of the individual /vf,* may be freedom,
but it is also suicide; the imitation of a divine essence
is not the compulsion of a divine necessity, but it is its 
analogue; whether man follows the divine, or the divine, 
overmasters man, he finds nothing that can guide him safely 
through the maze of vicissitudes that make up human life. 
The virtue of a man is not the virtue of a youth, or of a
goddess; whether there is, or is not, intelligence in the
divine order of things, the human mind must learn adapt­
ability to the human lot; thought should be neither 
counterfeit nor fixed, neither mis-stamped nor set too 
precisely in its mould. Human character, like human 
fortunes, must » flow*, if man is to achieve secure 
happiness in the only life he really knows. -
U104-16, 195.
HECUBA (c. 425/4 B.C.) 175-192
The Ghosts. Achilles and Odysseus.
Hecuba»s Crown• Chance and Necessity.
Agamemnon»s complicity
Hecuba»s Metamorphosis. Nature and Necessity. 
Conclusion and Comparison.
175
HECUBA (425/4 B.C.)
There are no gods in the Hecuba, but there are two 
ghosts. The ghost of Achilles demands the sacrifice of 
polyxena, and the ghost of polydorus, seeking burial, has 
prevailed on the powers of the underworld to bring his body 
to his mother’s hands, as a result, Hecuba will see both 
her children dead on the same day (45-6).
The action of the play takes place, not at Troy 
itself, but near the shore of the Chersonese, just before 
the homeward journey. The relation between the Greeks and 
their captives is no longer one of active hostility, but the 
uneasy commerce of victor and vanquished, which precedes the 
more clearly defined bond between master and slave, some 
personal ties of 'friendship* already exist: Agamemnon, 
having Cassandra as his concubine, is now Hecuba's 
and even Odysseus can be reminded of the special debt of 
gratitude he owes the queen who formerly spared his life 
in Troy.
Hecuba's punishment of polymnestor is private 
revenge for a private wrong, but it is enacted against a 
background of wider relationships and transitions, which 
serves both to extend and to interpret the injury which is 
done the former queen, and the transformation which her 
nature undergoes as the result of it.
The Ghosts. Achilles and Odysseus.
The ghost of polydorus requires burial, not revenge. 
This small and distressed spirit has been drawn to the Greek 
tents by a fatal attraction to that mother into whose hands 
his body is to fall, not by chance, but by the direct 
influence of his own prayers on the rulers of the dead. The 
friends of Achilles will, he tells us, accede to his request, 
so that 'fate is bringing my sister to death' on the very 
day on which the sea is to reveal his own death to a doubly 
bereft mother.
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There is no collusion between these two ghosts, 
and apart from the connexion of each with the fall of Troy, 
there is no further link between the deaths of polyxena and 
polydorus. Yet the cruelty of the fate which combines them 
in the experience of Hecuba already appears, through the 
role of the ghosts, as part of a transformation wrought by 
the powers of Hell in their corruption of human motive and 
human endeavour.
in his life, Achilles was robbed of honour; that 
his ghost should demand a prize is exceptional, but not 
really surprising, it is merely unfortunate that, as a 
ghost, he can do no more, and no less, than drink her blood 
(536-7). we cannot blame Achilles for this, and polyxena 
herself is spared the further miseries of slavery.
The dead cannot be expected to care for the laws 
of the living, prom the point of view of the Greeks, 
however, the sacrifice demanded is clearly a crime, since 
to slay a captive (previously spared at the altar) involves 
bloodguilt (290-2, cf. Heraclid.961 f.). These aspects may 
have been mentioned in the Greek debate, but we do not hear 
of it. Agamemnon, suspected of favouring Cassandra's 
relatives, has little influence, and Odysseus wins the day 
by an appeal to motives of friendship and expediency; 
Achilles, who has died for Greece, is worthy to obtain his 
request, and if the dead are dishonoured, patriotism and 
self-sacrifice will be at a discount (303 f.).
There is no reason to condemn Odysseus merely for 
his use of the argument from expediency; we are repelled 
rather by the ease with whiéh he, a living man, disregards 
the wider claims of humanity and ranges himself beside the 
dead in his low valuation of human life and misery. If 
Hecuba argued that cattle, not men, should be sacrificed at 
the tomb (2o6), Odysseus makes it clear that he regards the 
barbarian captives in exactly this light. Even the dead, 
who are ostensibly honoured, are in little better case, 
since they too are to serve as a means to the preservation 
of a way of life from which all positive value seems to have 
disappeared. This, then, is the 'honour* for which Achilles 
died; a primitive blood-rite which, as a living man, he 
would have abominated, and which is granted to his ghost as 
a political device to inspire the living to a self-sacrifice 
which appears, in view of this outcome, equally pointless 
and primitive.
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just as, in the Hippolytus, Euripides allowed the 
ruthlessness of gods, who assert their privileges by 
destroying human life, to be reflected in the human motives 
which are the immediate cause of disaster, so in the Hecuba 
the gufiding motive of Achilles* life, the desire for honour, 
is perverted by his death in such a way that it must 
inevitably be linked with the worst, rather than the best, 
in human nature, as a ghost, Achilles craves blood; as a 
departed patriot, he deserves honour; as a he receives
a form of worship which combines primitive superstition with 
the contemporary sophistical creed of .
Odysseus argues (1) that it is both right and 
expedient that the brave should 'win more' than other men 
(3q8), especially in the shape of honours paid after death; 
and (2) that one's first duty is to one's friends, living 
or dead. Hecuba is no worse off than many an old woman in 
Hellas, and since it is to this stimulating policy of 
honouring the brave that the Greeks owe their success in 
war, if Hecuba disagrees, she merely demonstrates that she 
has her deserts.
Odysseus* argument assumes that, in this case at 
least, honouring the dead is equivalent to granting him 
some personal satisfaction, and that no other general 
principle is involved, since, however, the living and the 
dead crave different satisfactions, men cannot direct their 
public actions by the wishes of the dead without forfeiting, 
perhaps, those very values on which human life and happiness 
depend. The human motive corresponding to the ghost's 
demand is not, therefore, the true self-sacrifice of the 
patriot, who subordinates his own to the general good, but 
the hard assertiveness of the demagogue, who, arguing from 
expediency, identifies the interests of the dead and the 
living by denying that there can be any common human ground 
between the strong and the weak. Odysseus, as the ghost's 
emissary, is at the same time the fitting exponent of that 
'wisdom* which assumes a natural state of war, if not 
between man and man, at least between Greek and barbarian.
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Yet Odysseus acts in the name of friendship, and 
the sons of Theseus approve the sacrifice, if it were not 
for the sophistical evasion of his personal obligation to 
Hecuba, we should have no reason to share the chorus* 
especial dislike of Odysseus. But as it is, praise of 
Achilles sits ill on the lips of a man who, in Troy, stooped 
to every artifice to gain his own life, and who now makes 
it clear that there is no law of god or man he would scruple 
to break, no act he would hesitate to justify, on the same 
plea of expediency. His benefactress* change of fortune 
reveals both his earlier opportunism and the general basis 
of his thought and action; such a man is willing, in the 
last resort, to treat all other men as tools, i.e. as 
slaves.
The act is judged by its advocate, yet it is not 
the act of an individual, but a public decision of the 
Greeks. Achilles is a national hero, polyxena the daughter 
of a hated race; where victor sits in judgment on the 
vanquished, the code used is neither the law of justice nor 
the law of peace. The death of polyxena belongs to the 
transitional period, when the passions of war take a quasi­
legalised form in which their full barbarity becomes plain : 
hot-blooded killing becomes, not even legal revenge, but 
ritual sacrifice. This is not an act of revenge, although 
Hecuba attributes that motive to the ghost (262); it is an 
act of appeasement which resembles revenge in so far as the 
immediate agents are required, in the name of friendship, 
to revive a hostility that is past and to satisfy an anger 
that is not their own. It is a public act, for which no one 
person is responsible, yet it remains a crime , demonstrat­
ing that even legality, unfounded on principles of humanity, 
is a mere delusion and a fake, and that »a democracy cannot 
govern an empire*, not because human feeling is an unsafe 
guide in politics, but because no general decision can 
absolve the individual from those ties which bind him to 
his fellow men, whether slave or free.
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The Greek army, after its hard-won victory, is in 
a situation in which the advantage of the stronger provides 
the only intelligible criterion. The sons of Theseus see a 
clear issue between the supreme merit of Achilles and 
Agamemnon’s recent interest in Cassandra, but the speakers 
are evenly divided until Odysseus persuades the assembled 
Greeks that they too have an interest in repaying the 
national debt to Achilles, and that the death of a slave is 
a trifling boon to grant to their friend and benefactor, 
who now stands beside Persephone (134-40).
Given the initial request and the situation of the 
Greek army, the decision is intelligible, indeed inevitable, 
though the later reaction of the common soldiers to polyx­
ena* s courage shows that in their eyes at least a slave 
does not automatically cease to be a human being. It is 
Odysseus who, by interpretation of his personal debt to 
Hecuba, brings home to her the full meaning of her slavery; 
vanquished by force, she is now treated according to its 
law; a law which denies the common rights of man, and over­
comes the strongest human ’necessity* - the tie between a 
mother and her child.
In the conflict between these two ’necessities*, 
Hecuba feels at first that her maternal love must avail, if 
not to save polyxena, at any rate to destroy herself, for 
she will cleave to her, as the ivy to the oak.
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Odysseus does not know necessity, either as the compulsion 
of force or as the strength of the natural tie which it 
violates, but herrightly associates the word with the 
possession of human masters. It is the fault of his logic 
to assume that it is as natural and inevitable for the 
weak to submit as it is for the strong to rule.^
por sorrow, Hecuba is already dead (431); Zeus has 
destroyed her, yet keeps her alive so that she may exper­
ience further evil (232-3). in the next scene she will 
tell Agamemnon that there is now no further evil left for 
her to experience.
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For Hecuba, there is no escape; conquered by force, 
she returns the blow in kind, when occasion offers, polyxena 
escapes because, for her, death is not the worst of evils; - 
dying of her own will, she rescues her freedom,^ and by her 
courage stirs even her murderers to a sense of pity and 
fellow-feeling, which, as far as circumstances permit, they 
extend to her unhappy mother. Talthybius offers genuine 
human sympathy, and his account of polyxena*s noble end 
eases the burden of the mother’s grief, preparations for 
the burial lead, however, to the discovery of polydorus* 
body, and Agamemnon, sent to speed the obsequies of the one 
child, finds Hecuba intent on the body of the other.
Hecuba’s"crown. chance and Necessity.
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Both as the fallen queen of a fallen city, and as the 
mother bereft of her children, Hecuba is the supreme example 
of prosperity brought low by the wheel of fortune; with this 
reflection polydorus introduces her and retires, and Talth­
ybius muses similarly over her prostrate form. Hecuba 
herself, when Agamemnon pities her, claims that only Fortune 
herself could be more unfortunate* No woman could have 
suffered more, and there is now no further evil left for 
her to sugfer (783-6).
This suffering is not due to any assault aimed 
directly at herself, but follows from the fall of Troy and 
the fate of her children. She is not, like Medea or 
phaedra, the victim of a passion intrinsically violent and 
revengeful, but of the strength of her maternal feeling, in 
circumstances where such feeling is bound to be trampled 
and overborne. Her retaliation on polymnestor springs, not 
from his injury alone, but from the whole sequence of her 
misfortune, and the drama consequently shows the connexion 
of her revenge, not with a passionate or divine principle 
in external nature, but with blind chance and necessity.
'2 1 3 -5 , 377-8.
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This necessity is not, as in the earlier dramas 
which we have considered, shown on a cosmic scale, but has 
its essential basis in the relation between the Trojan women 
and their captors; yet its scope is wide enough to suggest 
the generality of human fortunes, and a non-human or super­
natural element in the part played by the dying or the dead.
Necessity coincides with human bondage ; but the 
gods, over whom law presides (800), are mentioned both as 
the sanction of those human laws which, Hecuba argues, 
should preserve a common basis even between master and slave 
( 7 9 8 - 8 0 5 ) ,  and again, as a vague power behind chance and 
reversal of fortune. Hecuba ascribes her woes to Zeus ( 2 3 2 ) ;  
Talthybius wonders if Zeus ’sees* or if chance governs all 
( 4 8 8  f.). The Chorus infer from Hecuba’s appeal to Agamem­
non that O' may produce sudden striking changes in human 
relationships (856-9), and polymnestor, with his strange 
mixture of knowledge and ignorance of divine lore,attributes 
the element of confusion in human affairs to gods who will 
that we shall worship them in ignorance ( 9 5 6 - 6 0 ,  1 2 6 8 ) .
Such ambiguity of divine function excludes the 
dramatic* use of divine intervention; Hecuba’s revenge is 
inspired not by gods, but by ghosts, and conforms, not with 
laws based on the essential equality of human nature and 
human fortunes, but with the ’natural necessity’ governing 
the relations of the strong and the weak. Agamemnon’s 
cooperation, no less than Odysseus’ indifference, shows that 
the reversals brought about by the chances of warfare 
sharply to be distinguished from a sound and proper human 
alliance, and it is part of this ’confusion’^ that the gods 
remain the nominal sanction both of a human law which 
cannot, in the circumstances, be applied, and of its grim 
alternative.^
I Hecuba claims that Odysseus, discovered in Troy, was her 
’slave* ( 2 4 9 ) .  polymnestor’s new friendship with the Greeks 
is reversed again by Agamemnon’s friendship with Hecuba, 
revealing once more the natural hostility between Greek and 
barbarian. ( 1 2 0 0 ;  cf.8 5 7 - 6 0 ) .
, 8 5 7 ,  9 5 9 .
7 9 9 - 8 0 1 ,  8 5 2 - 3 ,  9 5 8 - 6 0 ,  9 0 2 - 4 .  Agamemnon’s reluctance to 
assist openly has the result that the principle on which he 
ostensibly acts ( 9 0 2 - 4 )  becomes a rule of individual revenge 
rather than of legitimate punishment.
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The chance, by which a single day holds two 
disasters, depends on the activities of the two phantasms, 
which, though independent in themselves, are interrelated 
in the experience of Hecuba. Achilles’ influence with the 
Greeks reaches her as an act of inhuman oppression; poly­
dorus, through dreams and through the discovery of his body, 
inspires the revenge due to this climax of her sufferings, 
polydorus does not, like Achilles, demand blood, but 
through him Hecuba has direct contact with a world to which 
such deeds are appropriate, and begins the ’wild song of 
the fury’ which she has already learned ( 6 8 4 - 7 ) .  The 
Greeks do not question the interpretation of their night- 
visions; Hecuba does not doubt the validity of the dreams 
which reveal to her the treachery of the Thracian ( 7 0 9  f . ) /  
such prompting carries its own conviction, but the death of 
polydorus is avenged with a ferocity learned, not from the 
child-ghost or even from his murderer, but from the Greeks 
and Achilles.
in the drama, chance is the by-product of intent­
ion, ghostly or human, and necessity is mediated by minds 
which have, for one reason or another, become regardless of 
the ties between man and man. so the force which arises in 
the vanquished Hecuba is the same in kind as the violence * 
which she has suffered, and the revenge aimed at her 
personal enemy is nevertheless controlled by the general 
conditions of her slavery. Accepting these conditions, and 
working out her revenge on these terms,^ Hecuba too loses 
the last remnants of her humanity.
The barbarian polymnestor is repaid in his own 
coin, yet it is not a case of simple retaliation. Between 
polyxena and her mother, between Hecuba and her former ally, 
stands the might of the Greek army; the pitiless Odysseus, 
the weak but cooperative Agamemnon. Hecuba hits back, not 
merely as a barbarian and a mother, but as a captive and a 
slave. If the Greeks know how to reward their friends, the 
barbarians know how to punish their enemies, but in order
 ^For the spectator, polydorus’ ghost vouches both for 
Hecuba’s dreams and for the apparition of Achilles.
^It is significant that Agamemnon offers Hecuba her freedom; 
she expressly states that she prefers revenge ( 7 5 4 - 7 ) .
183
to win het revenge, Hecuba must reverse not only the wrong 
done by polymnestor, but the whole pressure of the Trojan 
defeat. The weaker must become the stronger, and out of 
her new conditions she must find the means to take the 
initiative in violence. There is no resource in justice 
and humanity, but only in accepting the terms on which she 
now stands to the Greeks, in order to gain Agamemnon’s 
support she is forced not only to accept his friendship, 
but to acknowledge its basis, in his liaison with her sole 
remaining child, Cassandra.
At the beginning of the play, Hecuba is no longer 
a queen, but she is still conscious of her claims as a 
human being and as a mother, pitted against a ghost, 
against a democratic assembly, and against Odysseus, she 
learns that she is indeed a slave and a slave without human 
rights. The sons of Theseus have already indicated the 
goodwill of Agamemnon and its cause; and it is to this 
unnatural bond that she now appeals.
Agamemnon’s Complicity
Hecuba did not hesitate to entreat Odysseus, on 
the ground of a personal obligation independent of her 
condition of slavery, but she hesitates before attempting 
to enlist the help of the already friendly Agamemnon ( 7 3 6 -  
5 1 ) .  only when the general arguments of law and justice 
have clearly failed ( 8 1 2 - 3 ) , she appeals to him as the
of the dead child ( 8 3 4 ) .  For sheer horror, this is 
the climax of the play, whether we think of the commander- 
in-chief who deceives an ally for the sake of his concubine, 
or of the mother who, in order to avenge her dead child, is 
willing to exploit the shame of the child still living. It 
is at this point that the chorus remark on the changes 
brought about by k . / . ,  in human relationships ( 8 4 6 - 9 ) .
in the name of such universal laws of good faith 
and justice, Agamemnon agrees to forwâfd Hecuba’s revenge, 
although he sees that the army would, it it knew, suspect 
him (how rightly’) of putting personal inclinations above 
public loyalties. Hecuba, ironically remarking that no man 
alive is fully free, points out a way in which he can help 
her, without inculpating himself in the eyes of the army.
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Agamemnon’s complicity is the sign, not that the 
relations of friend and foe may sometimes be determined by 
general human laws, but that, on so uneven a basis, these 
general laws cannot safely be applied, in accepting Agamem­
non’s friendship, Hecuba confirms her own status as a slave; 
in offering it, he is too late to rescue her humanity, but 
not too late to make himself her tool.
in this way, Hecuba’s use of Agamemnon is a form 
of revenge upon her Greek captors, and points to a further 
chain of catastrophe, whereby Agamemnon himself falls a 
victim to female savagery (cf. 1 1 8 2 ) .
For Agamemnon, self-deceived and deceiving, we can 
feel little kindness, and pity for the blinded polymnestor 
springs, at least in part, from the Greek’s disownment of 
any responsibility for the dual disaster, the crime which 
reduces both Hecuba and her victim to the level of the beast 
The violence which she has experienced, from the Greeks as 
well as from the Thracian, has made Hecuba what she is, and 
without the ’friendship* which is an essential part of her 
wrongs, her crime could never have been committed, poly­
mnestor is defeated by a slave ( 1 2 5 2 ) ,  but not without the 
cooperation of her masters, and Agamemnon, as judge in the 
debate scene, is put in the odious position of having to 
decide that polymnestor is no friend to the Greeks and that 
Hecuba’s revenge was just, so the dying Thracian prophesies 
not only the metamorphosis and death of Hecuba, but also the 
deaths of Cassandra and Agamemnon. Hecuba, beyond suffering 
now, remains unmoved ( 1 2 7 4 - 6 ) ,  but Agamemnon, stung to 
cruelty, orders the barbarian to be cast out on some island, 
and departs (the chorus still singing of necessity) to the 
doom which awaits him.
Hecuba’s Metamorphosis. Nature and Necessity.
After polyxena’s speech ( 3 4 1  f.) the chorus remark 
that to be born of noble parents is a potent and conspicuous 
’hall-mark’ 379) among men, and that respect for it
is increased by behaviour worthy of the name. The remark is 
appropriate, for consciousness of her high birth and the 
behaviour consistent with it determines polyxena’s attitude. 
Again Hecuba, after Talthybius’ report, reflects on the 
intrinsic nobility of her daughter’s character: is it not 
strange that good or bad earth may vary its fruits according 
to the treatment which it receives from men or from the 
gods, but a bad man can never be anything but bad, and the
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nature of a good man remains unaffected by misfortune? Is 
parentage or upbringing the cause of variation? Man can be 
trained to know the good, and so to know the difference 
between good and evil (592 f.).
These reflections apply obviously enough to - 
polyxena, yet we seem invited to consider their applicabil­
ity to Hecuba herself, if polyxena owes her nobility to 
birth or training, how is it that the same quality does not 
manifest itself, or manifests itself so unsimilarly, in her 
mother? Hecuba seems, indeed, a striking example of a 
nature that is, in one sense, destroyed by misfortune, like 
the good earth which, missing the care of men and gods, 
produces evil fruit.
is, once more, the conception of a permanent 
individual quality which is revealed, but not essentially 
altered, by the test of circumstances. Yet the ’nature’ 
which is revealed in Hecuba is not human at all; neither as 
a mother, nor as a queen, nor as a barbarian, can she be 
transformed, without further explanation, into the hardened 
fury in whose pitiless revenge even her own motherhood is 
submerged and finally forgotten.
Does Euripides intend us to perceive a contrast ; 
that polyxena’s nature is something which can be explained 
by her birth and upbringing, but that the same factors fail 
to account fully for her mother’s? polyxena has to die, but 
she dies (425); in the circumstances, she has the good
fortune to die when she should. Hecuba, the aged queen and 
mother, has passed beyond the allotted season of her days 
(231); robbed both of her city and of her children, she has 
no human resources left in herself, and her woes are beyond 
human capacity to bear.
polyxena dies, the epitome of young restraint and 
modesty; from the first, there is some element of shameless­
ness about her mother. Yet, since Hecuba has a genuine 
claim on Odysseus, her appeal to him does not lack dignity 
and power; even when, in the wildness of her passionate 
entreaty, she exhorts her daughter to utter every note of 
the nightingale, we may still agree with the Chorus (296) 
that no human nature could fail to pity her. But if Odyss­
eus is to that extent inhuman, Hecuba herself has no pity, 
either for polymnestor’s children, or for her o m  living 
child, whose fate she exploits and the tale of whose death 
leaves her unmoved. The fawning flattery and unsound basis
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of her appeal to Agamemnon, no less than the savagery of the 
Trojan ’dogs’ (1174), are already signs of the fiery-eyed 
bitch to be buried at cynossema; her unwillingness to look 
directly at the Thracian (966 f.) perhaps indicates that she 
has already begun to acquire those furious eyes.
Unlike the passion of love, maternal affection 
cannot be transformed,by a single injury,into the passion 
of revenge. Hecuba must be bereaved, not once, but fifty 
times, and the deaths of polyxena and polydorus drive her 
to frenzy, not only because they are the last, not only 
because each is the victim of wanton violence, but because 
in each case this violence is conditioned by, and even helps 
to define, her own change of fortune, (so the murder of 
polyxena is the public act of her Greek masters; her revenge 
on polymnestor the joint work of the Trojan slaves.)
Hecuba, like polymnestor, is a barbarian, but she 
is also a woman acting according to the law of passion, not 
of her own will, but of necessity. Hecuba, like Medea, is 
a barbarian, but it is her circumstances, rather than a 
divine element in her nature, which force her to behave 
like one. she is overcome, not only by maternal grief, but 
by her captors, and the ghosts which prompt her disaster 
reveal both its dual nature and its non-human trend.
Human nature sets a limit to human suffering: when 
this is passed, no other law than retaliation can mediate 
between the hell-hound and her prey. The ’nature’ which is 
revealed in Hecuba is just this, the avenging fury: it is 
continuous, less with her maternal nature, than with her 
wrongs, prom these she receives the impulse of necessity; 
there is no dual element in herself, and unlike Medea she 
suffers no self-inflicted pain. Her loss of humanity is in 
no sense an apotheosis, but a ’death* so final that it 
changes even her bodily form.
can human nature, then, be ’destroyed’ by misfort­
une? Yes, as far as a substrate which must resist, only 
because no further injury can be inflicted upon it. This 
is the true psychological application of the natural necess­
ity, which the Athenian imperialists failed to analyse, and 
which even Gorgias had disguised under a superficial ling­
uistic definition. Not even Plato has put forward so 
powerful a refutation of the immoral doctrine of rr4fo^c-^/d , 
and not even Thucydides set its consequences in a clearer 
light.
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The train of events which began at Achilles* tomb 
ends at Cynossema, but the chorus go forward to their life 
of slavery, and the uplifted axe awaits Agamemnon. The 
Hecuba, in spite of its artistic completeness, reads like 
an episode set in the midst of human history, and anticip­
ating the theme of the Aeschylean trilogy, we have a strange 
sense of looking forward into the past. The Eumenides are 
not yet reconciled, but pass from one world to another on 
the Greek ships; xoin: to , even our own present may
be tragically conditioned by events which can be generalised 
for any age, and for any dramatic conception.
Conclusion and Comparison
The common problem which arises in all three of 
the dramas which we have been considering, is the relation 
between the nature of the individual who performs the 
tragic act under some sort of psychological compulsion, and 
wider external forces in terms of which this necessity is 
to be explained.
The tragic action or suffering is always, in one 
sense or another, involuntary, in order to clarify the 
factors involved, the dramatist, like the philosopher, 
takes an extreme instance of a more general type of 
character or situation, and, illuminating it from every 
aspect, may appear to give more than one explanation for 
the same tragic outcome. I have tried to show that where 
this is the case, these explanations are inadequate if 
taken separately, but that, taken together, they contain 
a complete psychological analysis both of the tragic action 
and of the * nature * that is responsible for it.
NO dramatic conjunction can be merely haphazard 
or ’episodic*, and it is in the coupling of such causal 
explanations, all dramatically appropriate but none, by 
itself, wholly adequate, that we discern the relation 
mentioned above, between the individual and his necessity, 
by which we define the ’tragic conception’ of the play.
in the case both of Medea and of phaedra, human 
passion is represented as continuous with a divine 
principle in external nature, from which the necessity of 
retaliation can be deduced. But in the Hecuba, human 
fortunes rather than human passions are associated with 
this necessity, and the psychological pattern is therefore 
harder to discern.
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I have put forward the view that the main psycho­
logical question underlying the Hecuba is how far human 
character, or human nature, can be ’destroyed* by misfortune. 
I have also suggested that the violence with which Hecuba 
retaliates on polymnestor is the same in kind as the violence 
which she has suffered, not only from him but from the 
Greeks. It remains to ask, however, how far the infliction 
of force can strictly necessitate a similar reaction in.the 
injured person, and how far the reaction must depend on the 
intrinsic nature of that person, as it was before the injury 
was received. This is the very problem which Hecuba herself 
suggests by her train of thought after polyxena’s death : 
taking comfort from the nobility of her daughter’s behaviour, 
she considers it strange that human nature should not, like 
the earth, vary its fruits according to the fortune meted 
out to it by heaven.
It was Gorgias who held that there is a different 
virtue for every condition in life, for man, woman, child, 
old man, free man and slave.^ There is no evidence that 
Hecuba has previously been anything but noble and virtuous; 
she has a record of suffering, but, unlike Medea, no record 
of crime behind her.^ She is the mother of brave and noble 
children,^ but, unlike her daughter, she is old, she is a 
mother, and she now learns what it is to be a slave, 
polyxena’s high-born nature is not affected by the manner 
of her death, simply because she can use it as a means to 
vindicate her freedom.
Later, we are reminded that Hecuba is a woman and 
a barbarian; but her slavery is also a ’character’ stamped 
on her before her experience of polymnestor’s treachery.
It is a state imposed by fortune, not by nature, yet immed­
iately after Odysseus’ speech the Chorus laments;
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The very ambiguity of and 7-1. Y  ? (cf. 326) points to
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^Her one relevant act, the sparing of Odysseus, shows espec­
ial regard for the rights of the suppliant (245, 273-4).
) She is also the mother of paris (386). in place of the 
dramatic use of heredity in the Medea or Hippolytus,
Hecuba's nature seems to vary with the fate of her children. 
Even Cassandra's shame becomes an element in her mother's 
degradation.
189
the truth that if, on Odysseus* view, the captives now have 
their deserts r v A 331), their response to
this logic is conditioned not only by their natural 
* inferiority* as barbarians, but also by their enforced 
inferiority as slaves.
By repeating to Hecuba the line of reasoning which 
he used to persuade the Greek assembly, Odysseus makes it 
plain that she is being required to submit, in this as in 
all things, to the interest of her captors, on the implicit 
ground that her only good, as a slave, consists in such 
submission (228, 390). The victory of the Greeks has 
reduced her to servitude; she is now perforce ’persuaded* 
by an argument which turns this victory into a general 
principle of exploitation and oppression.
For those who have the mastery, the interest of 
the stronger may provide an intelligible rule. But what of 
the vanquished? How can the weaker learn conformity with 
such a law? up to what point can human natmre endure the 
form of compulsion which is being brought to bear upon it?
The infliction of injury on a slave may be an act 
of calculated self-interest, i.e. not itself an end, but 
only a means to some further advantage. But the injured do 
not always act from motives of expediency, and the converse 
of the rule of interest is the law of passion, for which 
the pain of the victim is not merely incidental, but 
directly aimed at.
Both the submission of the weak and the reversal 
of injury may be thought of as an elementary law of nature, 
but, in the case of a human being, neither can be predicted 
with certainty to the exclusion of the other. Medea, in 
virtue of some ’divine’ element in her nature, reacts 
immediately to the spur of her passions, but Hecuba does 
not feel the necessity of retaliation, until she has 
experienced to the utmost the necessity of submission.
The oppression of the Greeks had coincided, if not 
with Hecuba’s interest, at least with polyxena’s, but in 
polymnestor’s treachery there is no such consolation, as 
the work of a supposed friend, not of her masters, and 
proceeding from an obviously base motive, polydorus’ death 
calls, not for resignation, but for revenge.
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The necessity of retaliation takes the relation 
between strong and weak, not as irreversible, but on some 
sort of reciprocal basis which the logic of the oppressor 
ignores. Medea has her own non-human resources, but Hecuba 
is forced to use the help of those very masters who have 
reduced her to slavery, not because she joins hands with 
them on grounds of common humanity, but because the 
confusion of war has won her an ally in her daughter’s 
paramour. Even if, through cypris, nature reasserts her 
claims, the scene between Hecuba and Agamemnon shows how 
far this is from providing a basis of true human equality 
between them.^ Hecuba (with more justification than Clytem- 
nestra) now plays to the life the role which fortune has 
allotted her, in order to win the revenge which her whole 
nature craves, not merely as a woman and a barbarian, but 
because oppression can go no further ; she returns evil 
according to the measure of her woes, because there is now 
no further evil left for her to suffer.
AS the act of a woman who is also a barbarian, 
Hecuba’s revenge is dramatically plausible, but neither of 
these aspects is sufficient to account for the loss of her 
humanity, which is confirmed by her metamorphosis. Only in 
the retalxiation of the slave, whose enforced submission 
has already coincided with maternal wounds and loss of 
human status, can we discern the link between the prompting 
of passion and that wider principle of necessity which the 
drama as a whole exemplifies.
The reversal of human fortunes, the element of 
confusion in human affairs which obscures both the intention 
of the gods and the clarity of human reason, represents the 
necessity which ruins Hecuba and at the same time provides 
means for her revenge. The gods, over whom Law rules, have 
this alternative to willing worship, and the laws which rest 
on the human basis of common fortunes and a common nature, 
can be transmuted by violence and wrong into nature’s own 
law of passion and revenge, go the general principle of 
reversal and confusion provides the reciprocal basis which 
we sought between strong and weak, either preserving 
humanity or destroying it, according to the circumstances 
in which it is applied.
841 (2 f f ~ t r r o r \  S  ,
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The uncertainty of its application is part of its 
very nature, but the necessity which presses hard upon 
Hecuba in the name of zeus or chance, follows the interpret­
ation of her human masters, so that the wrong inflicted on 
the slave precedes the rebound of primitive passion in the 
wounded mother, in the framework of the drama, her 
retaliation, no less than her submission, appears as a 
necessity, largely because she passes from the one to the 
other; the psychological compulsion which drives her to 
revenge is measured by the external pressure to which she 
has already succumbed, and which is only a part of the 
total force which now overwhelms her.
That the dramatist wishes to demonstrate the 
effect on Hecuba’s nature of the transition from the one 
necessity to the other, seems to be shown by the order in 
which the two deaths enter her experience, which is the 
reverse of the order in which they in fact occur and are 
revealed to the spectator. Only as the ultimate wrong, can 
the child’s body provoke the revenge which turns oppression 
itself into a means of retaliation. Through the hardness 
of her earlier submission, we are enabled to measure the 
force of the motive which induces her to accept and to 
enact so faithfully the part of a slave, using even 
Cassandra’s concubinage as a last throw upon the scale.
The laws which failed to save polyxena are now nominally 
respected, but their ground has changed; for in place of 
the human equality and divine asylum which even a slave 
may claim, there is a great dive below shame and humanity 
- below Troy’s smoke*- to the poignant horror and deadly 
appeal of that unhallowed cypris.
A further transition between Hecuba’s fortunes 
8uid her passions is provided by the respective roles of 
the two ghosts. That her woes exceed human measure is 
first shown by Achilles’ demand, and polydorus, profiting 
by the occasion, evokes a response more in keeping with 
Achilles’ requirements than with his own. it is part of 
the general obscurity of the divine pattern that neither 
ghost intends harm to Hecuba, or personal revenge; but as 
each step in her catastrophe emanates from the underworld, 
so the current of her passions is drawn below human level.
K vL4 row /lo^ou f<.eirOV tO^C-
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AS Troy’s queen, as the stricken mother, Hecuba 
exemplifies in her fortunes the supreme law of reversal 
which she also reveals in her revenge. The psychological 
necessity of her tragic act is confirmed by her metamorph­
osis, disclosing a nature which alone can be claimed as a 
permanent and unalterable , not because it accords
with the general character of woman and barbarian, but 
because it conforms to the general principle of necessity, 
by which her revenge is at one and the same time the 
reversal of her woes, and their completion.
The wheel of fortune is turned by human hands, but 
both the role of the ghosts and the continuity of Hecuba’s 
nature with that of the hell-hound and give a darker
content to the abstract general principle which we have 
learnt to recognise under the names of Zeus and chance, of 
’law’ and ’justice’, of nature and necessity.
The Thracian too has his Dionysus. But we, if we 
are Greeks, may still reverence the gods, in ignorance of 
ourselves and of the future - except in so far as both are 
revealed by the demand of Achilles, by the argument of 
Odysseus, and by the prejudged verdict of the accomplice, 
Agamemnon.
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HERACLES (c.423-420 B.C.)
Heracles’ Madness. The Rationalistic fallacy.
The tragic power of the reversal in the Heracles 
can escape no one, but interpretations of the play have 
differed so widely that here, if anywhere, we must test the 
conclusion stated in the last chapter; that not in the 
single explanation, but in the dramatic conjunction of 
s f v e r a l ,  lies the key to full understanding of the tragic 
act or the tragic suffering. An event such as Heracles’ 
killing of his children cannot, in the nature of things, be 
written off either as the work of a jealous goddess or as 
the aberration of a lunatic; it is beyond the scope of any 
one chain of causation, as it is of any isolated physical 
or religious theory, if Heracles is mad, what is there in 
his madness that has eternal significance %for mankind?
How can Hera’s victim find, from the heart of his woes, the 
conviction that god is perfect, and these, unhappy poets’ 
tales?
All ’rationalistic’ interpretations seem to ignore 
three facts ; (1) that medical case-books cannot be converted 
into tragedy merely with the addition of a few poetic ’trap­
pings’; (2) that the chapter in his history which is closed 
to Heracles is nevertheless presented both to the Chorus and 
to the spectator (first from the machine and then by an eye­
witness) in the centre of a dramatic whole of which it forms 
a carefully related part; and (3) this presentation (which 
is private to the Chorus and to the spectator) accords in 
all essentials with the tragic experience of Heracles him­
self when he finally awakens to a realisation of what has 
been done.
During the scene of madness, as it is reported by 
the messenger, pity is roused less for ’a great mind sudden­
ly stricken’ than for Megara and the children, with whom we 
have waited so long and lovingly for Heracles’ return. Only 
through the mingled hope and despair of the earlier scenes 
can we feel with full intensity the bitterness of this end; 
of mother and child transfixed by the same arrow, of the 
golden head appealing in vain for paternal recognition. 
Through the emotions already roused by this double reversal, 
and through the divine revelation of the act which we have 
already witnessed, we can pass to a sympathetic understand­
ing of Heracles’ own mind, as the deed which he has done 
becomes part of his conscious experience.
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Even apart from the content of the , the
course of the drama shows that Heracles* madness is condit­
ioned by a set of factors including (1) the supernatural 
element in his paternity, ( 2) the descent into Hades,(3) the 
political situation in Thebes, and (4) the direct intervent­
ion of Iris and Lyssa, a consideration of these factors, as 
they are presented in the earlier scenes, must precede an 
inquiry into the relation between his tragic act and (a) his 
* nature *, (b) his ’destiny*.
The Earlier scenes• Megara and A^iphitryon.
Amphitryon introduces himself as and
father of Heracles, leaving us to put the two facts together 
as best we can. He himself is the grandson of Perseus and 
an Argive, but lives in exile in Thebes; his son has married 
into the ruling house, but has nevertheless left Thebes, 
wife and kinsmen in order to restore his father to his native 
country; as fee, he engaged with Eurystheus to clear the 
earth of monsters - either owing to Hera’s persecution or in 
accordance with destiny (20-1). All his other labours have 
been safely accomplished, but from the last, a descent into 
Hades to fetch Cerberus, he has not returned.
During his absence Thebes has fallen through 
faction to a foreign tyrant, who has killed Qreon and now 
seeks to kill Heracles’ children (as well as his wife and 
father) so that they shall not live to avenge their grand­
father. Shut out of the palace, Amphitryon, Megara and the 
children are now destitute and friendless suppliants at the 
very altar of zeus which Heracles set up to commemorate his 
victory over the Minyae.
Even in this prologue, there is a slight redundancy 
of explanation; Heracles has both a divine and a human 
father, and his filial motive in undertaking his labours is 
supported by Hera’s hatred, or by destiny. It seems, more­
over, odd that the removal of Cerberus to the upper world 
should be included in the task of ’taming’ the earth, and 
perhaps significant that, during his long absence on this 
last labour, the face of the earth itself has changed, and 
a new order sprung up in Thebes which does not recognise 
Heracles’ greatness. Only the greybeards, Amphitryon’s 
generation, come to sympathise with his family; Lycus, with 
no personal knowledge of Heracles, clearlÿ regards his 
prowess, like his parentage, as a local myth with no more 
significance than his own pretended descent from Dirce’s
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husband. He wishes to kill the children because they are 
Creon’s grandsons, and sees no reason not to kill them 
because they are Heracles* sons. Heracles himself, according 
to Eurystheus* report (553), is now dead and gone, and the 
foreign usurper, self-provided with a genealogy, has no 
interest either in supporting the Heracles myth or in 
respecting his memory. He derides, therefore, both 
Amphitryon’s boast of zeus’ share in his wife and son, and 
Megara’8 pride in her husband’s valour, pointing out that 
Heracles’ victories have been gained over animals and with 
the bow and arrow, whereas courage can be tested only in 
the hand to hand conflict of regular armed warfare.
Amphitryon, leaving zeus to defend his own part 
in Heracles (170), takes it upon himself to rebut the 
’sacrilegious’ charge of cowardice. Lycus is the coward, 
zeus unjust, Thebes out of her senses, Greece ungrateful 
and he himself a willing but feeble helper. Lycus retorts 
by proposing to smoke the suppliants out of their refuge; 
he threatens the Chorus, who reply angrily, professing 
themselves friends of the dead and endorsing Amphitryon’s 
view of Lycus. But Megara now takes effective steps to 
end an intolerable situation.
united in their wish to save Heracles’ children, 
Megara and Amphitryon have from the first had opposite 
attitudes to their misfortune. The death of her father 
has already taught Megara the uncertainty of divine favour; 
she believes Heracles dead and is unwilling to prolong the 
agony. Amphitryon, partly from an old man’s love of life 
and partly from a greater willingness to believe in the 
supernatural, still hopes for his son’s return; the wind 
of fortune may veer in their favour; it is wise, therefore,
to put off the evil day as long as possible.
Megara has hitherto given way to Amphitryon, for 
whom she shows the greatest respect. His lengthy defence 
of Heracles, however, combined with Lycus’ fresh threat, 
now moves her to take the initiative, when death is 
inevitable, it is cowardice to protract life; Heracles’ 
courage needs no witnesses, but she must see to it that 
his children do not disgrace him. Amphitryon, as an old 
soldier, has his own reputation to consider; she appeals 
to his , and for herself, she must find courage in
’representing’ that of her husband 294).
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perhaps unconsciously, Megara avoids appealing to 
Amphitryon in the name of that ’son’ whose courage he 
regards as an almost supernatural quality (174). But 
Heracles* children are indubitably his own flesh and blood, 
and as Heracles’ wife, she now makes that pride in his 
valour which Lycus had derided (15o) into an effective 
motive for meeting death in a worthy manner. This is her 
’defence of Heracles’ - a more eloquent tribute to the 
husband whom she believes dead than the wordy protestations 
of zeus’ bedfellow.
Megara enters the palace to array her children 
for death; Amphitryon waits to indict zeus, who came 
uninvited to another’s bed and who cannot even now take 
his responsibilities seriously (339-47). The chorus sings 
of Heracles’ exploits; Megara, returning, reminds us of 
his plans for the children. She cries to him to send help 
from the underworld; Amphitryon utters a last appeal to 
zeus; and at this point the wanderer himself puts in a 
belated appearance.
It must have been a serious shock to Heracles, 
newly restored to the light of day, to see his children 
decked for the underworld, in a rapid exchange of news we 
learn that Eurystheus has spread the re^port of his death 
and does not yet know of his return; that Cerberus is in 
Hermione, won by force, not as a gift from persephone 
(luckily Heracles had been initiated in the mysteries’), 
and that Theseus too was rescued. Heracles now proposes 
to give up his labours and devote himself to his family; 
for their sakes he will kill not only Lycus but all his 
supporters; Dirce shall run red with blood and ismenus be 
choked with corpses. The violence of these threats is 
often taken as a sign of incipient madness. Amphitryon 
points out the real dangers of his position, and Heracles 
at once reveals his native caution in having entered the 
city unseen. The conquerer of Cerberus does not think 
himself a match, single-handed, for the seething rabble 
of Thebes, though he disposes easily enough of the tyrant 
and his bodyguard (724).
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We leave Heracles as he sees himself in a new role, 
the saviour,not of Greece or of Thebes,but of his wife and 
children. Lycus goes into the palace to his doom, followed 
by Amphitryon, and the chorus is exultantly proclaiming, 
over the death-cries of Lycus, the backwash of destiny and 
the return of the old king, when the grisly apparition of 
Lyssa from the roof scatters the old men in terror, pear, 
not pity, is the keynote of Heracles’ madness, and it 
follows directly upon the consummation not only of his 
labours, but of his revenge.
The Descent into Hades. iris and Lyssa.
Lyssa, though unwilling, has been pressed into 
service by iris and Hera, and in the colloquy between 
’hound’ and ’huntsman’ we learn that Heracles has not only 
performed notable services for men, but has also a claim 
to the gratitude of the gods for his protection Xof their 
worship in critical times. The hostility of Hera can be 
accepted as traditional; but iris, after explaining to the 
Chorus that while he was performing his ’bitter’ labours, 
destiny kept Heracles safe (828) and Zeus prevented Hera 
and herself from harming him, gives no reason for her own 
hostility beyond the mere assertion that the gods will be 
nowhere, and mortals great, if he does not pay the penalty 
(841-2).
Since it would have been very simple for Euripides 
to suggest some plausible pretext for iris’ hatred, the 
fact that he does not must be regarded as significant, 
iris couples her own anger with Hera’s, and the impression 
given is that Heracles’ downfall, as it is brought about by 
the two goddesses, is not directly connected with the events 
immediately preceding in the play, except that the end of 
his labours marks the end of his immunity, is it, then, 
at all significant that his release from these labours 
coincides with a return from the underworld?
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Iris tells us ; now that he has completed the tasks 
of Eurystheus, Hera wishes to fasten fresh bloodguilt upon 
him (831); Lyssa is to make him mad, so that he will 
dispatch that ’fair crown of children’ across Acheron’s 
stream and so come to know both Hera’s anger and her own.
The lines which immediately follow (841-2) ? f
rX f /.y , if taken independ­
ently, suggest divine , but if taken in their context,
seem an indirect way of asserting the superior strength of 
the gods, in virtue of which iris claims right of revenge 
even against such a man as Heracles, in face of her own 
and Hera’s enmity, his continued prosperity would upset the 
balance of power between man and god; this hypothetical 
consequence may be read either as justification of his 
destruction, or as a mere statement of its inevitability.
Lyssa points out that if the remark is intended 
as an argument for punishing Heracles, it is a bad one; 
since his labours have proved him a conspicuous friend and 
benefactor to both man and god, the gods will be morally 
’nowhere’ if he is destroyed, iris resents the moral lesson, 
and with an almost audible crack of the whip, reminds Lyssa 
that zeus’ consort did not send her forth either to preach 
or to practise (855,7). Lyssa is herself forced to
bow to superior might, but by calling the sun to witness 
her protest, draws attention to the nature of the crime 
which it is proposed to bring into existence.
This clash of views between iris and Lyssa not only 
stresses the moral turpitude of the former, but also shows 
that the device or ’contrivance’ (855) by which Heracles’ 
madness leads to the slaying of his children cannot be 
inferred from his madness alone, but depends on its hostile 
direction according to the divine purpose of revenge which 
has long preceded it. Madness herself has to be coerced 
into destroying Heracles, and cannot be identified with any 
motive of hate or anger which may emanate from the two 
goddesses. The causes of Heracles’ downfall which antedate 
his madness are,therefore,less likely to be physiological, 
pathological, or in any sense medical, than moral and 
mythical, and it is to his divine heredity, as to Medea’s, 
that we must look for an explanation of his ’nature’ and of 
the tragic act, in terms of a necessity which, combined as 
it now is with the idea of , it is becoming increasingly 
hard to delimit precisely either in a physiological or in 
a psychological field.
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The son of zeus
The apparition of Lyssa interrupts a choral ode 
(735 f.) in which the return of Heracles and overthrow of 
Lycus are taken as evidence that the gods care effectively 
for justice and piety; in face of this achievement, the 
Chorus are prepared to believe that he is the son of zeus. 
Shortly before (i.e. directly after his return), the old 
men were reflecting that if the gods had intelligence and 
wisdom according to human ideas, they would bestow a second 
youth on the virtuous as a ’token* 659),
restoring them to life when they have died, so that by this 
we might distinguish between good and bad men, as clearly 
as sailors know the stars among the clouds (655 f.). The 
ode ends with praise of the son of zeus, who has outstripped 
his noble birth by making human life safe from the menace of 
wild beasts (696-700)• Still earlier, while Heracles was in 
the underworld, there was some doubt about his divine birth 
(254-5), though none (except for Lycus) about his •
AS the earlier scenes have already shown the 
response of men to these heroic benefactions, so iris 
demonstrates the attitude of the gods. Hera’s hate has at 
least some recognisable motive, however inadequate, but 
iris, in supporting her for no very clear reason, emphasises 
the irrationality and gratuitous wickedness of a revenge 
which, even if not directly inspired by Heracles’ ,
nevertheless ignores it, and from the mere wish to make 
hate effective, brings into existence a crime contrary to 
the very idea of divine holiness, a purgatory to the human 
soul for countless aeons.
in so far as Heracles ’ points to a divine
origin, Hera’s wrath is not likely to be mitigated by it; 
her hostility rests entirely on the assumption that he is 
the son of zeus, and can only be increased by behaviour 
which proves this assumption to be well-founded. Iris, 
on the other hand, has no such original reason for hating 
Heracles, and appears, indeed, unwilling to confirm his 
paternity; she refers to him as ’him whom they call the 
son of zeus and Alcmena’ (826)  ^and chooses to regard him 
rather as a man who has overstepped mortal limits, than as 
a benefactor whose achievements are not inconsistent 
either with his divine sonship or with his destiny.
in 828 may be simply conventional.
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Iris» antagonism to Heracles arises, therefore, 
partly from her support of Hera and partly from motives of 
her own which seem quite inconsistent with Hera’s assumpt­
ions. In this she recalls the mean, vindictive spirit of 
Lycus, who, wishing to destroy the children as a potential 
threat to his tyranny, at the same time disputes Heracles’ 
claim to serious consideration as a hero and a demi-god.
The low-born usurper and the ’lackey of the gods’ both 
belong to the new generation of despots, who punish men for 
virtue rather than for vice, and for whom justice means 
not even retaliation, but sheer unprovoked cruetly and 
aggression.
Attacked by Lycus, Amphitryon had chosen to defend, 
not the divine birth of his son, but his • The
situation in the earlier part of the play is a continual 
challenge to zeus to prove his fatherhood - in which, after 
Heracles’ return from the underworld, the Chorus are/willing 
to believe.
It is clear (1) that the fatherhood of zeus cannot 
be verified by any ordinary test, and (2) that it implies, 
and is implied by, the hostility of Hera. Even if it is 
uncertain whether Heracles should be called the son of Zeus 
or of Amphitryon (254-5), it is certain that, if he is 
Zeus* soh, he is Hera’s stepson; if his escape from Hades 
demonstrates the former connexion, his ensuing madness shows 
its corollary; each relationship is confirmed, yet strangely 
invalidated, by the other.
For if zeus never clearly answers Amphitryon’s 
challenge, neither does Hera avail herself of the machine 
to confirm^ for us the cause of her jealousy; instead there 
is iris, who seems as doubtful as ourselves of Heracles’ 
paternity and who carefully refrains from attributing his 
labours to Hera’s persecution. Bitter as these labours are, 
they are nevertheless glorious; undertaken for the sake of 
the human father, they support his claim to be the son of 
Zeus. Amphitryon ascribes them to Hera or destiny (20-1); 
Heracles himself sees them as part of a life blasted from 
birth by Hera (1263 f.); iris states that they served as a 
shield from Hera and herself, ascribing this immunity to 
zeus and destiny (828-9). Her own hostility seems to suggest 
that it is through the which proves him Zeus’ son,
that he incurs the divine hostility which proves him Hera’s 
stepson.
201
How seriously are we to take iris? Her speech 
from the machine has been called a second prologue; yet it 
is not a prologue, since it marks the turning point of the 
play, not the beginning of a fresh action; it explains much, 
yet leaves much unexplained. The chorus (1311-2), in spite 
of having witnessed iris* spirited display of her own host- 
ility, gravely agrees with Heracles that Hera, and no other 
deity, is responsible for his misfortune. Does the * lackey 
of the gods* overestimate her own importance in claiming a 
hatred of Heracles independent of Hera*s? Hers is certainly 
not the guiding will behind the events in the play, as 
Aphrodite’s was in the Hippolytus.
Iris is Hera’s emissary; she can express the force 
of Hera’s hate without committing herself to a statement of 
its cause, and at the same time she has a point of view of 
her own which is intimately connected with the sequence of 
events in the play.
(1) The Escape from Hades
Release from his labours coincides for Heracles 
with an escape from Hades, which to mortal nature is forbid­
den; moreover, he won Cerberus by force, not as a gift, and 
it is easy to see that, even for one initiated in the myst­
eries, such an issue might fail to meet with the approval 
of heaven, just as there is enough in the earlier events 
of the play (so much we must grant to the psychiatrists) 
to account for Heracles’ madness even without direct divine 
instigation, so there is enough in his latest exploit to 
arouse divine jealousy, even without the original grievance 
of Hera, iris’ enmity, although like Hera’s it dates from 
an indefinitely distant past, is easier to interpret with 
reference to its immediate context, not as divine antagonism 
to all human progress, but as the virtual impossibility of 
such a transgression of the bounds of nature and mortality.
A ’second youth’ might be granted to virtue by gods endowed 
with human wisdom, but not by those with some regard for 
natural law. when Heracles’ children are to be sent across 
Acheron’s stream (839), we cannot but be reminded that their 
father has just recrossed it (770); although no precise 
connexion is stated between these two events, iris’ motive 
seems to unite Heracles’ escape with its ’penalty’ more 
closely than does Hera’s, who merely wishes to inflict the 
utmost harm on Heracles.
2 0 2
Hera acts from sheer feminine jealousy, directed 
personally against Heracles; iris turns this jealousy into 
a general principle, which the order of events in the play 
both reveals and confirms, that only god can claim immunity 
from the strokes of fortune. The penalty which she exacts 
is both a revenge and a reversal; it draws a clear line 
between man and god, which Heracles’ escape from death had 
blurred.
The general connexion between Heracles’ return and 
the death of his children is that the end of his labours 
marks the end of his supernaturally guaranteed immunity; 
the immediate transition is provided by the revenge on 
Lycus, whose attack on his family has anticipated the 
’invasion’ of the two goddesses against Heracles himself.
(2) The slaying of Lycus
just as the fatherhood of zeus is not a subject 
for normàl verification, so the lapse of time spent by 
Heracles in the underworld cannot be measured in terms of 
years or days. He descended in the heroic age; he returns 
to a world of political unrest and sudden revolution, in 
which man himself rather than any four-footed beast is the 
menace to human security and happiness. How will the tamer 
of the earth react to his new environment? How will his 
be shown in this his ’second youth»?
The first signs are not encouraging. Although 
concern for his family’s safety is very proper, and no one 
can grudge Heracles his revenge on Lycus, the proposal to 
redden Dirce and fill ismenus with corpses can only fill 
us with apprehension. This is not insanity, but a natural 
response to strong provocation, the extent of which is 
determined not by reason, but by the immense size of that 
bow and club; Heracles seems to be floundering in an attempt 
to find a new use for the conquering arms, which have saved 
Greece and Thebes, and will now destroy Thebes (andGreece 
too if need be) to protect his family. If, to perform his 
labours, he abandoned his loved ones, to save them shall be 
his last and most glorious achievement - yet what is needed 
here is not further glory, but adjustment to duties and 
activities on a much smaller scale, it is the perennial 
problem of the ’returning hero’, and fresh from the travail 
of the underworld, the injury done his family assumes 
enormous proportions in Heracles’ mind. It is not yet 
madness, but, in the circumstances, it resembles madness.
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That Heracles mistakes small things for great is a 
striking feature of his later madness; but a far more tragic 
feature is the extension and misdirection of his newly 
acquired motive of revenge. From lycus his mind passes to 
the arch-enemy Eurystheus, for whom he has toiled patiently 
so long, without a thought of this easier, quicker way.
Lyssa can achieve Hera’s purpose, only because she 
finds in Heracles a motive corresponding to the anger of the 
two goddesses; its reversal of direction against Heracles 
himself is part of the change of fortune by which iris takes 
over from Lycus the role of antagonist against Heracles.
The Backwash of Destiny ^
Lycus ’ death is hymned by the chorus both as a sign 
of divine justice and as an unexpected reversal of fortune ;
’justice and the backflowing destiny of the gods’ have 
sealed his doom, as son of zeus who has proved his prowess 
by returning unscathed from pluto’s house, Heracles will be 
more than a match for the low-born tyrant, ’as this trial of 
arms will show, if the gods are still pleased with justice’ 
(809-14). At this point iris, like an apotheosis of the 
slain usurper, rises to announce a divine expedition, not 
against the city but against one man, and Heracles becomes 
the victim of his own revolution. The revenge on Thebes 
will never take place, for the supposed revenge on Eurystheus 
has preceded it; the wave of destiny draws back, only to 
sweep forward again with a stronger tide.
After Lyssa’s entry into the palace, the mood of 
the Chorus changes to profound despondency, as they mourn 
for the shorn flower of Thebes and for Greece who will lose 
her benefactor, concentrating on the immediate movements 
of Lyssa (879-84) rather than on the story of hate behind 
them, they resume their previous theme of reversal; ’swiftly 
god overthrows the fortunate; swiftly the children will be 
slain by the father’ (885-6). This is the work not of just 
gods but of unjust Furies, savage demons of madness that 
are destroying the seed of Zeus (889-90). The cries of 
Amphitryon are heard, as the cries of Lycus were heard 
before, a prelude not to the well-deserved death of an alien 
tyrant, but to the joyless dance that in a moment more will 
shatter the very fabric of the palace as the storm-blast 
sweeps through it, like a battleground of gods and giants 
(905-8).
^738 . The translation is professor
Cornford’s.
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This ’turmoil of Tartarus’ ( 9o7),
already represented both as a divine revenge and as a 
reversal of human fortune, is now described by an eye­
witness in such a way as to stress the revenge motive in 
Heracles and its quasi-fortuitous direction against his own 
children, in the act of purifying himself from the blood 
of Lycus, Heracles, suddenly brain-struck, reflects that he 
has another enemy who is still alive, and with the ferocity 
which is characteristic of his new mood, turns aside to 
pursue the work of revenge to its fatal issue. Heracles is 
now mad, yet his madness is a continuation of his earlier 
way of thinking; just as Lycus’ injury roused an exaggerated 
impulse of revenge in the conqueror of Cerberus, so, in the 
sequel, these revengeful schemes are measured against the 
scale of actual performance, and what before seemed a 
terrifying possibility, now becomes the delusion of an 
overstrained mind.
Does this mean Jhat Heracles’ earlier achievement 
was the mere product of a fevered imagination? No one but 
Verrall could ever think so. The journey to Hades is, for 
the purposes of the play, accepted fact, the journey to 
Mycenae pure fantasy; the glorious success of the one 
venture is set against the pitiful frustration of the other 
- which, for the mind which experiences it, is a second 
descent to Acheron.
Heracles is not only destroyed by the two 
goddesses, he is also mocked; but the element of burlesque, 
mingled by the master-hand in the bitter cup of tragedy, 
serves only to bring the son of zeus nearer to us at the 
very moment when the horror of his act might have alienated 
all sympathy. The mad Heracles is at first so like the 
Heracles of comedy (and of the Alcestis) that even his 
servants wonder whether he is mad or joking;Hhen, by the 
swiftest possible transition, tragedy takes over as he 
fails to recognise the faces round him. And as on the 
earlier part of his ’journey’ Heracles’ imagination outran 
the facts, so in the killing of his children the horror of 
the reality far exceeds the deed of destruction which he 
believes himself to have accomplished.
:Cf7~hi”joki^at’^6l57'"when Heracles ascribes his victory in 
the underworld to his having been initiated in the 
mysteries.
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The mad career is finally checked by a shape 
resembling Athena, who by hurling a rock at his breast 
prevents Heracles from killing his father and causes him to 
sink into a deep slumber, in the following scene between 
Amphitryon and the Chorus (where the atmosphere again 
approaches comedy), the emphasis still falls on the human 
father, who, as the sole survivor, warns the old men against 
waking Heracles, lest by killing his father he incur fresh 
stain of kindred blood 1076). This is the
clearest declaration of his relationship to Heracles that 
Amphitryon has yet made; the Chorus remind him of his own 
guilt in slaying his wife’s kinsmen (1077-9, cf. 1257-60).
Theseus
Heracles awakes in a state of mental confusion, 
first imagining himself back in the underworld; then, as 
he gradually learns the truth from his father, the mention 
of Hera warns him that some great disaster has befallen 
him (1127-30). He is contemplating suicide when Theseus 
arrives, brought by a rumour that Lycus is waging war on 
Heracles. He too recognises the work of Hera (1191).
At Theseus’ request, Amphitryon implores his son 
to unveil his head and restrain the ’wild lion’s anger’ 
which is making bad worse by prompting him to further 
bloodshed (1210-3). There is no response, and Theseus 
himself addresses memorable words to the stricken hero; 
there is no darkness so black as to hide his misery, and 
Theseus does not shrink from sharing the misfortune of one 
who rescued him from the world of the dead. The man who is 
noble ( j must learn to take the falls of the gods and
not refuse (1228).
Heracles and Theseus agree in ascribing Heracles’ 
woes to heaven, but disagree in the response which each 
considers suitable. To commit suicide is, in a sense, to 
resist the gods, to refuse the burden of ill which they 
have put upon him; even if they pay no heed to his threats, 
his stubbornness can match theirs, and will carry
him swiftly down to Hades, whence he has just returned.
The eye of enlightenment sees not only his earlier madness, 
but also his present mood, as part of the heaven-sent 
fatality (1238,40): unwilling to endure heaven’s fall, he 
is yet willing to assess it by heaven’s canon, and so to 
ensure the success of Hera, who wished’to fasten fresh 
blood upon him as the slayer of his children’ (831).
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In his reply to Theseus (1255 f.), in which he 
undertakes to prove that life is not and never has been 
worth living for him, Heracles again refers to his ambiguous 
parentage, attributing his evil destiny first to Amphitryon, 
who married his mother Alcmena under a curse, and then to 
zeus, who begat him to be hated of Hera - although he 
regards Amphitryon rather than zeus as his true father. 
Hera’s persecution began in his cradle, and has culminated 
in his present suffering, as the slayer of his children 
he will be cast out not only from Thebes and every other 
city in Greece, but from the world of nature itself : why, 
then, should he live? Hera has accomplished her purpose, 
though she forfeits thereby all worship and esteem; in 
sheer jealous spite she has destroyed the benefactor of 
Greece, himself guiltless.
Heracles refers to his divine birth, less as a 
natural fact, than as a necessary explanation of Hera’s 
enmity, and with the same redundancy of explanation which 
we met in the prologue, includes the misdemeanours of his 
human father as a contributory cause of his ill-starred 
existence, o f  Zeus - ’whoever zeus may be’ - he is hardly 
conscious as a father (for the sanctity and affection of 
such a relationship belong to Amphitryon), except in so far 
as that fatherhood has brought upon him the hostility of 
Hera. Qf his many troubles, only two (the first and the 
last) are directly attributed to Hera, yet all are reviewed 
as part of the legacy of evil, which makes life virtually 
impossible for him. There is no escape from a goddess whom 
he has offended merely by being begotten, and Hera’s 
jealousy works for his ruin as implacably as any other form 
of predestined misery. Now, through his own act, he must 
suffer a purgatory of which human exile gives the foretaste: 
execrated and cast out by men, who once extolled him, even 
the elements of nature will find a voice to spurn him from 
them, till he becomes like ixion upon the wheel. Heracles, 
as we know, has been initiated in the mysteries; he has 
looked upon Hell, and Hell itself holds fewer terrors than 
the life he contemplates. He has befriended Greece, but 
Greece cannot help him now; he is in the grip of a 
religious pessimism, which robs him of courage as it blots 
out hope.
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There can be no doubt that Heracles’ interpret­
ation of his destiny accords, at least in part, with the
dramatic presentation of his act which we have already
witnessed, and that it springs, not from a ’persecution- 
mania’, but from a tragic experience which the events of 
the play have anticipated and in the main confijgrmed.
His loneliness has been apparent from the begin­
ning, in his strange mission, in the destitution of his
family, in the hostility of his beloved Thebes. He is not* 
like Theseus, with an army at his beck and call; the son 
of an exile, he has worked for his father’s return, and 
for the good of mankind, without himself enjoying any of 
the fruits of these labours, beyond a certain amount of 
reputation. Now, his labours over, he returns from another 
world to find the hand of man and god raised against 
himself and his loved ones. No longer protected by zeus 
and destiny, the natural rage of his response to lycus’ 
injury is turned against himself by his divine foes, so 
that Hell itself, over which he has just triumphed, seems 
the only refuge from the torment of living, and the 
revengeful impulse against the human taskmaster, which 
madness translated in such disastrous terms, becomes a 
stubborn antagonism to god and his destiny, which can find 
expression only in self-extinction. Flushed with victory, 
the mad Heracles plotted revenge on Eurystheus; conscious 
of utter defeat, he can retaliate only against himself, 
so making heaven’s crime complete.
But zeus has not entirely abandoned his son to 
Hera; in place of lycus there is Theseus, in place of iris 
there is Athena, and though Thebes is barred to him for 
ever, a friendly Athens waits, with promise of lovingkind­
ness during life and divine honours after death. Theseus’ 
offer is no mere charity, for Heracles has well earned his 
gratitude and the gratitude of Greece. It is Theseus, 
accordingly, who, by acknowledging the debt, reinterprets 
that destiny of toil and suffering as one of benefaction 
and deliverance; friends must repay when friends are needed, 
since when god is helper, he alone is sufficient.
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Second^Escape. çhance and Courage.
The opening of Theseus’ speech is unfortunately 
lost, but his argument seems to be that if the gods, in 
spite of the crimes that can be listed against them, can 
put up with their life on Olympus, Heracles can endure the 
strokes of fortune, from which no mortal, and perhaps not 
even god, is immune.
Theseus sees that the religious viewpoint which 
his friend has expressed is founded on an inconsistency : 
he believes that he is the victim of divine persecution, 
and at the same time, by divine standards, himself a sinner. 
Conscious of a private burden of misery and of a crime which 
threatens to cut him off not only from men but from the 
whole community of living nature, he sees both future and 
past as punishment for a sin of which he is essentially 
guiltless, and death the only escape from an existence 
cursed at birth. Theseus, by ascribing the sin to ,
contrives to shift the emphasis from Heracles’ individual 
destiny to the common lot of mankind, and by quoting the 
gods as fellow-sinners, seeks to lessen his feeling of 
religious horror at his own act.
Heracles does not entirely accept Theseus* 
argument, for he refuses to take comfort from the poets’ 
tales about the gods, and in that moment seems to rise to 
an intuitive disbelief in divine wrongdoing that can hardly 
exclude the mythical elements in his own story. To Hera’s 
attack he will refer again (1393), but its causes and 
implications cannot be generalised as a revelation of the 
divine nature; no one would pray to such a goddess, and 
her persecution, taken as a fact of human experience, 
becomes merged in the conception of > those bitter
blows that are beyond prediction and control, yet are part 
of the human lot and, as suchj to be endured.
Theseus’ friendship, not Theseus* theology, has 
rescued Heracles, when the first despair has passed, he 
sees for himself that suicide would be the act of a coward: 
’he who cannot stand against misfortune, cannot stand 
against the foeman’s spear’ (1349-50). S o we return to the 
old issue of courage, and in his grim acceptance of a life 
of sorrow, Heracles’ labours become for all time the symbols 
of human toil and human suffering, go the which, in
its struggle with the beast, saved Greece, and in its 
impending struggle with man, might have all but destroyed 
it, becomes, in its final contest with the divine adversary.
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the truly human quality of courage and fortitude. Broken 
by madness and sorrow, yet cheered by friendship and guided 
by reason, Heracles may be truly hailed as the son of zeus, 
when he has learned what it is to be a man#
*I have tasted countless labours, of which I have 
refused none, nor ever let the fount of tears fall from my 
eyes, nor did i think to come to this.. but now, it seems,
I must be a slave to fortune* (1353-7). But he can now 
plan for the future : Aniphitryon will bury the dead, and 
Theseus help him carry Cerberus to Argos, for he dare not 
be left alone (1387). Indeed, he needs the help of his 
friend even to rise; fortune has brought low the glorious 
physical strength of Heracles (1396), But if his knees 
are stone, his heart is still human, and after a last 
harrowing embrace of the dead and of his father, the play 
ends on a less serious note as Theseus gently mocks the 
dejected hero, and Heracles, after promising to bring his 
father to Athens, compares his own progress to that of a 
ship in tow (1424), perhaps unconsciously using the same 
word which he applied earlier to the children who clung 
to his robes (631). Heracles is now helpless as they, but 
the metaphor takes on a new significance, for he goes, a 
storm-battered wreck, to the haven of Athens.
Use of the Divine. Hera or Chance?
In the Heracles, such general ’philosophical* 
discussion as there is centres in the question of divine 
conduct and the divine nature. Amphitryon, in the first 
.part of the play, censures Zeus as an adulterer and a 
faithless friend (344-7); Heracles, in the second, castig­
ates the vindictive jealousy of Hera (1303-10, recalling 
Lyssa 849-54). Theseus argues that not even the gods, if 
poets* tales be true, are immune from evil: they make 
marriages in forbidden degrees and bind their fathers in 
the struggle for despotic power (1314-9). Finally Heracles 
(1341-6) dismisses all such stories as inconsistent with 
divine perfection, yet he appears to come to this conclusion 
in spite of, even in consequence of a belief in Hera’s 
persecution of himself ( 1340 r ' .
1392 j  T7À^y(=vTi^ )•
210
The philosophical or religious belief that god is 
deficient in nothing^is not at first sight inconsistent with 
the idea of as a dominant factor in human existence, and 
can in turn be associated with the thought of a superior 
power without directly raising the issue whether such 
instances of * divine * intervention can be ascribed to the 
same ’gods* that are the objects of our religious worship.
The Euripidean challenge is due, less to a wish to discredit 
popular religion, than to a consciousness of the widening 
gulf between the idea of divine perfection and the role 
required of the gods not only by the traditional mythology, 
but by ordinary human thinking in its interpretations of the 
human lot, and by the religious convictions that spring from 
and are bound up with the deepest tragic experience.
Heracles’ final rejection of the poets’ tales might 
have been taken as a poet’s warning - for Euripides’ charact­
ers often voice what seems an inverted comment on their own 
story - if it were not for the incompleteness of such a 
verdict in the light of his own tragedy, as it is, the 
poignancy of his pronouncement, coming directly from Hera’s 
victim, finds an echo in the human heart, that remains 
untouched by the rationalistic explanation. The philosopher, 
who denies the poet’s tale, will soon be denying the facts 
of experience; to suffer, yet to disbelieve, divine wicked­
ness is the final liberation of the human spirit from the 
shades of Acheron.
In its dramatic context, the effect of this passage 
is to detach Hera’s revenge from its mythological setting in 
the story of Heracles and to place it in the general scheme 
of reversal of fortune, for which the structure of the plot 
and ambiguities of explanation have already prepared us, and 
at the same time to dispense with the notion of a crime 
isolating Heracles from the rest of the human race, as part 
of the common lot of man, rather than the particular destiny 
of the individual, misfortune should serve not to separate 
men but to bind them to one another, and Heracles’ resolution 
to stand firm in the face of this as of all other adversity, 
restores him to Greece as a pattern of heroic courage, who 
now, in his direst hour, may appropriately meet with a due 
return for the benefits which he has conferred: for Theseus
^First attributed to Xenophanes, (Ar.)de MXG 4.3, (Plut.)
S t r om .4 (D.A.32) x —« ^ f f-  ^  ^ if-ju i ^ $ y ^ ^ o v < ^
 ^ • at) o ^ ,ov C  7rt> ^  S  ^  ■ C-sr\ f-C c Ô du> ^  o $
r . cf.Hj^ F.1341-6, xenophi D.B.11-2.
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is but restoring the life he owes, and for Athens it will 
be a ’fair crown’ to represent Greece in repaying her debt 
to Heracles,
partly as a concession to the rationalists, partly 
in opposition to them, i would contend that here in the 
Heracles there is a deliberate attempt by the poet to recast 
traditional beliefs in a fresh mould; to present not only a 
problem but a solution, not by removing inconsistencies but 
by sharpening them into a paradox, obscure to reason, yet in 
conformity with experience and, on certain emotional heights, 
clear to the oracle of the soul as the ’hidden harmony’ of 
living: , that mixture of good with ill, unjust
with just (incompatible yet inseparable), that is the ground 
and ultimate law both of human nature and of human existence.
Myths are remade, not by dismissing tradition, but 
by forming transitions along which the mind can pass from 
the old to the new; by contrast and juxtaposition, by repet­
ition and lyrical reminder, by connexion of motive, by 
formal argument and analytic symbolism, thought and emotion 
are led by intricate paths, through almost the full orbit of 
human suffering, to the comprehension of a whole which, in 
its artistic completeness, can satisfy where it fails to 
convince, and convince where it fails to satisfy.
Where Heracles stands self-contradicted, believing 
at onj^ e and the same time both in divine perfection and in 
divine persecution, we, like Ixion held in suspense, can 
believe in neither; but, like Theseus, we know that no man 
can escape misfortune, where Heracles can, in one and the 
same breath, claim both zeus and Amphitryon for his father, 
we, like the chorus, cannot truly say whether he is the son 
of either; yet we know his courage and his suffering; we 
will befriend him as a man, grant him honours as divine.
Hera has overthrown the first man in Greece, yet Greece 
shall raise him, and through this^^reciprocal benefit confirm 
his destiny both as zeus* son and^the benefactor of mankind, 
so divine revenge is made, not predestined woe, but the 
flow of fortune; the first escape from death holds the 
penalty of god, the second, the full meaning of mortality.
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The Heracles, moreover, contains a unique instance 
of the use of the machine, not for prologue or epilogue, 
but in the centre of a Euripidean play, iris gives an 
account neither of previous events nor of all that is to 
come, but only of the madness and the child-slaying - a 
vengeance so unexpected and irrational that it seems to 
require, not divine knowledge to enlighten human ignorance, 
but human wisdom to enfold and interpret the divine. Hera’s 
responsibility for the crime is never for a moment in doubt, 
even for persons who have not witnessed the intervention of 
iris and Lyssa; that intervention enters the sequence of 
the action, not as the first or last word on Heracles’ fate, 
but as itself requiring further interpretation in the light 
of what comes before and after.
The first explanation given by Heracles links the 
divine revenge with the facts of his own birth and destiny. 
The one finally accepted generalises it as the work of • 
Which accords most nearly with iris’ statement and with 
the structure of the play as a whole?
The immediate response comes from the chorus, who 
have just been rejoicing in the death of Lycus as a 
’reversal of time’^ indicating the existence of just gods, 
and Heracles’ return has been spoken of, in terms that 
suggest the mystical doctrine of proof of his
and divine sonship. At this point Hera’s revenge 
appropriately follows, and although iris never directly 
confirms the point, the Chorus appeal to zeus on the ground 
that the slain children are his offspring. They naturally 
see the event, however, as a second instancejS of reversal 
- ’swiftly god overthrows the fortunate’ - though reversal 
of a very different kind, the work of mad unjust Avengers : 
an interpretation which is more in accord with the proximate 
activity of iris and Lyssa than with Hera’s longstanding 
grievance.
we have here two instances of reversal, each of a 
different type; (1) the long delayed but richly earned 
punishment of the prosperous villain, (2) the swift but 
undeserved calamity of the prosperous hero. The second of 
these is tragic, the first is not, but the similarity of 
the pattern points the paradox, that only the second can be 
attributed with any certainty to an external divine power.
^  ) ( r l 777, cf.740.
7 68—  7 0 ^  ' v i y ^ ^  O i  o X f -  TT y  y(. , T r -
' ' \ ' I / ' */l
fcç ^  7 TM  ^ A  <yt-fv A /< <TT cO»' T o y  O y T ,  o y  .
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The fairly close correspondence between the choral 
accompaniments of the two killings preserves the common 
pattern, which the revelation from the machine reflects from 
the one to the other, contradicting the assumption of just 
gods, but continuing the mystical and mythological ideas 
which the chorus, somewhat prematurely, associated with the 
death of Lycus. In itself, Heracles’ revenge on his pusill­
animous enemy might have been quite an insignificant matter; 
it acquires significance from its coincidence with Heracles* 
return and the conclusions drawn from it. These conclusions 
are, mythologically speaking, correct and consistent with 
the disaster which follows; nor is there any inconsistency 
in the double reversal, taken as a document of human nature 
and human fortunes. The inconsistency arises, when both 
reversals are attributed to divine agency, and not only 
compared but taken together as the work of divine power and 
a revelation of the divine nature.
The inconsistency arises when Heracles* revenge, 
as well as his safe return, is attributed to zeus or to his 
prowess as son of zeus, and when Hera’s revenge is made to 
appear not only the consummation of her personal feud with 
Heracles, but a thoroughgoing act of divine jealousy.
iris’ explanation is, that as long as Heracles was 
performing his bitter labours, zeus and destiny protected 
him; his successful completion of those labours exposes him, 
therefore, to Hera’s hate and her own. The cause of this 
hate (distant or recent) is left in obscuro; there is no 
mention of antecedent events, and the revenge on Lycus 
(which has no clearly defined place in the mythological 
scheme) can be viewed either as part of Heracles’ success, 
or of his downfall, according to the factors with which it 
is associated.
The Chorus is certainly right in connecting 
Heracles’ return from Hades with ’that old love of thine,
0 zeus’/ though wrong in regarding his revenge as part of 
his triumph. - Or, in the light of its sequel, has not 
the triumph itself, and the safe-conduct of Zeus, turned 
out to be illusory?
"802-3.
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Zeus ; Father or Adulterer? Amphitryon ’s Challenge•
It has already been said that Hera’s jealousy 
implies, and is implied by, the fatherhood of zeus; yet in 
the play the one is accepted as certain, the other remains 
a matter of grave doubt and perplexity. overthrow,
whether studied revenge or sudden reversal, falls within the 
scope of the same motive, and can be clearly classified as 
an act of divine jealousy. But the part which Heracles* 
return appears to assign to zeus makes the whole notion of 
his fatherhood seem vague and ambiguous.
Heracles’ return was timed to give the appearance 
of an answer to prayer; to Megara, he had seemed zeus 
saviour himself, and the illusory nature of that rescue 
does much to impress upon us the limitations of the divine 
fatherhood. The Chorus carry the illusion still further, 
as they infer from Heracles* escape from pluto that, as son 
of zeus, he will be successful in the contest against Lycus. 
iris’ sudden intervention shows both the truth and the error 
of this inference, and the revenge on Lycus which according 
to strict mythology is no part either of Zeus’ protection 
or of Hera’s persecution, is made by the dramatic sequence 
into the crisis of his destiny.
To what purpose are fatherly care and divine ,
if the one is to end in murder and the other in madness?
During the first part of the play, deliberate 
efforts were made by Amphitryon to provoke Zeus (to whose 
altar they have fled) to a sense of responsibility towards 
Heracles’ children; he seems, indeed, to challenge his 
divine on this very issue of parental care (339-47,
498-501, 170, cf. Chorus 888-90). What is a father, if he 
guards his son’s public career but neglects his private 
happiness, and,above all,neglects to preserve the line, his 
own offspring? Amphitryon’s role as protector of Heracles’ 
children at once gives him the better claim to be the 
’father’ of Heracles; Megara too, since the death of her 
own father, looks to him for guidance and counsel (81), and 
he invariably addresses her as (88,95,515). After the
children’s death he claims even kindred blood with Heracles 
(at least as a possibility, 1074-6), and his continued 
presence throughout the play serves to keep alive the old 
doubt and the old question; what meaning, if any, can be 
attached to the possession of a divine father?
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The implied accusation against zeus is that, in 
failing to protect his dear ones, he is proving himself not 
a lawful father, but a mere adulterer. This is confirmed 
by Heracles* attitude in the second part of the play : his 
awareness of Zeus as a father is limited to the one act 
which earned him-. Hera* s hate, and Hera (he complains) has 
destroyed the benefactor of Greece because she grudged Zeus 
a perfectly normal conjugal infidelity. Her jealousy falls 
on Heracles because he is Alcmena^s son, not because of any 
subsequent filial favours shown to^him or his family; the 
ties which bind a human father to his children, can have no 
meaning for the divine.
The unity and mutual devotion of the small human 
group before us is in curious contrast to the divine hate 
and indifference which destroy it; Amphitryon*s challenge is 
a reproach not only to zeus but to Hera, since he stands in 
exactly the same relation to Alcmena as she to zeus. A man 
may suitably boast of a divine rival, yet a goddess should 
not be piqued by a human ( 1 3 o 8 - lo ) ;  moreover, only the 
guiltless suffer. Both Amphitryon and Zeus have transmitted 
a curse to Heracles through Alcmena (1258-64);  Megara too is 
the innocent purveyor of doom to her children, since Lycus 
attacked them as Green's grandchildren.
in these converging lines of misfortune, there is 
little trace of heredity (even Lycus claims an ancestor who 
does not belong to him); the central thought is the uncert­
ainty of divine favour, the certainty of fate, and of the 
overthrow commonly attributed to divine jealousy. Both 
Megara and Amphitryon have a personal history and viewpoint 
which illustrates the general theme,^and even the children, 
robbed of a glorious future (46o-75, 135 -7 ) ,  make an 
independent appeal that is yet subsidiary to the main action. 
They ask when their father will come; robed for death, they 
fly to his robes, and when Megara obediently 'leaves go*, 
they cling all the more, and fatherly love does not refuse 
them. Their eyes are fixed on his face, when the dreadful 
change comes over it; each is slain in some way that recalls 
his father's ambitions for him,"'yet one has the courage to 
run right up to the madman, and claim, as a son, that false 
inheritance.^
^Megara, 63 f., Amphitryon, 508 f.
"^462-73 cf. 982-100. Throughout the play, the 'irony* of 
the main theme is supported by a large number of dramatic 
details and repetitions, e.g. the chequered role of the 
arrows, first argued over by lycus and Amphitryon.
 ^I.e. the club, 471
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Divine jealousy is always the stepmother; it moves, 
not, like divine justice, with the line of the race, but 
slantwise, through the wife and mother, upon a victim whose 
essential innocence is reflected in his complete ignorance 
of the act which madness drives him to perform. The second­
ary causes which might have obscured the main motive, repeat 
its direction and extend its field.
After the disaster Amphitryon, forgetful of his 
boast, speaks as if he not zeus were Heracles* father by 
blood, and the retort of the chorus suggests that his own 
guilt may have been an Erinys to his son. Heracles refers 
to this guilt not as an alternative but as a contributory 
cause of his unhappy life, so that the act which might 
conventionally have inspired the Erinyes is absorbed in the 
general pattern of divine jealousy. Amphitryon, whether he 
would or no, shares the blame as well as the bed of zeus.
Lyssa and the Erinyes. Heracles* Destiny.
There is a further consequence. Lyssa, as daughter 
of Night, is either one of, or sister to, the Erinyes, but 
as the child of noble parents she objects to the task set 
her, and is coerced thereto by iris in the name of Hera 
(857). Her objection is, not only that Hera's revenge is 
improper, but that her own function is an improper medium 
for it (845-6).
That Lyssa's function is akin to that of the 
Erinyes is pointed out by the chorus (889), whose frantic 
appeal to zeus also suggests that these hellish powers have 
been in some way misdirected, we next hear of them through 
Amphitryon* s fear of being killed by his son (1076) and the 
Chorus* remark on his own guilt, to which Heracles later 
refers as the first cause of his misery (1258-62). Finally, 
as Heracles is waking, possibly still mad, the Chorus 
reproach zeus (1086-7): why does he hate his son and bring 
him to this sea of troubles?
But for the remonstrances of Lyssa, the combination 
of hate and murderous madness would naturally suggest divine 
retribution rather than jealousy; iris seems anxious to give 
this impression, and the same colour is later lent by 
Amphitryon's part in the story. Heracles feels his misfort­
une not only as a divine hostility roused by his begetting, 
and so continuously directed upon his life from without, but 
also as a curse inherent in his birth as the child of an
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ill-omened marriage. Both begotten and born to misery, he 
receives indirectly from both * fathers * a woeful inheritance, 
in which retribution and jealousy are inescapably commingled, 
and as he contemplates the past in the light of the future, 
even his great services to man become useless and irrelevant, 
since toil and trouble, pain and exile, have been destined 
for him from the beginning. Hera, usurping the justice of 
Zeus, makes it appear that even Heracles* labours were 
ordained by a necessity which she, not zeus, controls.
Does zeus, or zeus* wife, control zeus and destiny? 
Is Hera*8 jealousy to outweigh the benefits which Heracles 
has conferred on Greece? iris knows the answer,^ though she 
takes her opportunity and whips lyssa on. The success of 
Hera*s outrage is a sterner challenge to Zeus, and to Greece, 
than was Amphitryon*s.
Fears of further bloodshed are in fact unrealised, 
and Athena*s intervention, which saved Amphitryon, is perhaps 
Zeus* reassertion of a prior claim in Heracles* destiny. It 
indicates, at least, the ejection of lyssa from Heracles* 
breast; at most, the provisional nature of Hera's victory.
The last Round. physiological Application.
Heracles* interpretation of his destiny accords with 
the intention of iris and Hera, for although he does not 
specifically attribute the child-slaying to Hera, he sees 
the consequences of the bloodguilt as her final victory. His 
protest echoes lyssa*s; his decision to return to the under­
world, and the similarity to mystical doctrine of his views 
on his own existence, recall the Chorus* interpretations of 
the contest with lycus, as a mystic in which, as son of
zeus returned from the dead, he is likely to be the victor.
(1191). iris, rising suddenly over 
the palace with the Gorgon daughter of Night, sets a fresh 
foe in the field against Heracles, under whose influence he 
will himself call up the Deaths from Tartarus - unjust 
frantic Avengers who, in this masquerade of retribution, 
unite madness with its motive both in Heracles* breast and 
in his divine tormentors. The chorus* metaphor is both 
symbolism and psychology, for Heracles is carrying out, under 
lyssa's guidance, those schemes of wholesale revenge which 
he planned as a sequel to the slaying of lycus.
 ^828-97 Amphin*yon7’~liki'’Hiracles, associates the labours 
with Hera (20-1). The last is still unfinished (1386-7).
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The wish to be revenged was not madness, but a 
natural response to injury, unnaturally exaggerated by his 
victory in the underworld. Heracles returns to the light of 
day,not the great friend of the human race,but its potential 
enemy; provoked, he responds with a thirst for blood that 
springs from, but contradicts, his divine .
How is this shown by the drama? It is shown (1) 
by the continuity of mood between Heracles* revenge on Lycus 
and his supposed revenge on Eurystheus, and (2) by the 
correspondence between iris’ plan of revenge and Heracles* 
own experience and intentions when he finally returns to 
sanity.
;^asks Theseus, and there is only 
one answer ; back to the great maw of Hell whose janitor he 
has so expeditiously removed. Amphitryon too begged him to 
restrain the * wild lion' s r a g e t h a t  prompts him to spill 
more blood - not, as was feared, his father's or his fellow 
citizens', but his own.
It is ^ not madness, that moves Heracles first
to revenge and then to suicide; but the frenzy, which is 
separable from the revengeful impulse, has nevertheless a 
kindred nature. Both are extreme forms of r r H S o i  ^ and excess 
of anger can, as we know from Aristotle, engender madness 
and ignorance of fact. Euripides, like Aristotle, seems to 
invite us to go to the c j . c < ^ X o \ o , for a full explanation.^
Lyssa enters Heracles* breast, and from Heracles* 
breast Athena dispels her. Her onrush is compared by herself 
to a rough sea, an earthquake and a whirling thunderbolt 
(861-3, cf. the Chorus* description of the shattering of the 
palace whether by Lyssa, Heracles or Athena (905-8, 864); 
Heracles* symptoms will be shaking of the head, rolling eyes, 
panting breath and unseemly bellowing (867-90, cf.931 f ., 
962). AS he wakes, the terror of Amphitryon and the Chorus 
and Heracles* first words probably indicate another 'pause*, 
while he fights to control his breathing and vision; he 
complains of 'hot panting breath* and general * waves * of 
confusion (1088-93).
^1246-7. 1210-4 ",J
/ O '  > \ / / 3 /  ) _ // f-77> < ^ i V , c > l r  ^ y o c - i e v
K.U- rc  ^  ^  y /(  ^ -
) E.N.1147 a 14 - b 9.
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According to Aristotle, the physicist will define 
anger as 'the boiling of the blood and heat around the 
heart* (de An.4Q3 b 1), and this seems to have been the 
generally accepted medical opinion on the location of the 
* innate fire* of the body.^ Empedocles identified the 
thought of man with the blood ground the heart,"" and if the 
circulation of the blood and respiration are one and the 
same process/ any violent disturbance in the region of 
heart or lungs might well be followed by symptoms of rage, 
increase of heat, physical and mental unbalance. Even if, 
as Alcmaeon held, thought is in the head, stillness is 
required for its normal operation. sleep, according to 
Empedocles, is the cooling or temporary separation of the 
fiery element.^
Hippocr. 7. 6, where it is conjoined with thought (v>--V-7 )
which rules the rest of the soul (10), gee
Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp.283-5. In plat.Crat.419 e 
Socrates derives from the * seething* and boiling of
the soul ( lé- 'T'ff  ^ Ævt, T'fi 'TaC’ TD T o  o y a ^ y c .  ) «
’'D.3.1Q5, cf. Aet.v.5.8 (D.A.97).
^D.B.lQG, ap. Ar.de Respir.473 a 15.
D. A.5-11, plat.phaed.96 a-b, Hippocr.ir. k«L.vl4 1
^  ^ y / c â ^  o c À o ç  ^ Ç O Y O V ' ^  T a C o ' o T t y  K -’*-* ^ ^  0 v tî tr cj tt»/- • AlthOUgh
Lyssa enters Heracles* breast, the first symptoms appear 
in the head: the head shakes, eyes are rolling and blood­
shot, mouth foams (867-8, 932-4), he pants and bellows like 
a bull (869). On almost any physical theory, increase in 
heat would be followed by panting (Ar.de Respir.473 a). 
According to the 5, the function of respiration is
to cool the innate fire, cf. the doctrine attributed to 
philolaus (Anon.Lond., D.A.27), that the cold breath is 
expelled owing to the natural heat of the body, philolaus 
made the heart the of soul and perception, reserving
the head for (B.13).
'^as death is its permanent departure in the separation of 
all the elements (Aet.v.24.2,25.4,0.A.85), cf. Amphitryon's 
comment on fortune (H.F.104) ^
According to Alcmaeon, sleep is the withdrawal of blood to 
the veins (Act.v.24.1, D.A.18).
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According to Diogenes/ from whom the latest in 
physiological theory may be expected, courage, pleasure and 
health depend on the continuous ventilation of the blood 
throughout the body; intelligence (centred in the air-filled 
ventricle of the h e a r t i s  impeded by any moist exhalation 
(’/A/^ir ) as in sleep or intoxication, since moisture crowds 
the air about the breast, preventing its proper distribution 
and at the same time increasing heat in this region,^ The 
same conditions would, therefore, both interfere with normal 
consciousness and produce anger, a conclusion which Diogenes 
draws in the case of children. Animals have less sense for 
similar reasons, and because they breathe the air as it 
rises from the earth.
Hippocrates (7?.%^ ^^  i G  ) "^argues that the brain
is normally the interpreter of the air-borne messages which 
it transmits to the rest of the body, but that if the air 
reaches it indirectly via the body it will be hot and 
impure, mingled with the exhalations from veins and flesh, 
and so inaccurate. If anything is to be learnt from the  ^
pseude-Heraclitean account of sensation preserved by gextus 
(which quotes the famous invocation of Zeus, Troad.885-7), 
consciousness depends on the continuity of our intelligence 
with the outer air through the * sense-passages *, breathing 
being the only * root* preserved in sleep. If, as Amphitryon 
suggests (966), the blood on his hand has affected Heracles* 
wits, it may well be that he has breathed too long the 
earth-enclosed air of Hades.
^Theophr.de sensu 44-5 (D.A.19 fin).
^Aet.iv.7.1. (D.A.20).
 ^Aet.v.24.5. (D.A.29).
 ^Theophr. ibid.
Aristotle,de gomno 457 a, attributes sleep and seizure to 
the same cause; the heat of the body causes the breath to 
rise violently and in its descent to inflate the veins and 
choke the windpipe. Sleep, though caused by heat, is 
cooling (457 b); when the warm bodily vapour has risen to 
its limit (through the veins to the head), the direction is 
reversed and men are unable to stand upright, owing to the 
withdrawal of heat; consciousness is lost, then imagination 
becomes active (b 25). without sharing prof. Blaicklock's 
view of Heracles as an epileptic (Greece & Rome xiv,48 f .), 
I am indebted to him for pointing out the resemblance of 
Heracles* symptoms to those of the 'sacred disease*.
^Sextus adv.Math.Vii 128-9 (Heraclitus D.A.16).
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Iris * brings wind and a great rain-storm from the 
sea* (Emped.B.5o), and according to Anaxagoras, earthquakes 
are caused, like the thunderbolt, by a convulsion of air 
(cf. 9o5), so that all the external phenomena
mentioned by Lyssa could be suggestive of the same physical 
process, repeated in each element and conveyed from one to 
another: sc.of a fiery eruption due either to direct impact 
between, or to violent acceleration of, the *up and down* 
movements in nature. Any attempt to reconstruct this process 
must be largely picturesque, but according to the klep^ydra 
analogy (used by Empedocles in his account of respiration, 
D.B.lOO), the descent of Lyssa, perhaps in the shape of an 
eddying cone as she looms huge over the roof then dives to 
a focal point in Heracles * breast (cf. 862),
should be followed by a corresponding upsurge of, say, 
aerated blood or vaporous heat, which, if normal outlets 
are blocked, is likely to produce a violent rocking movement 
and finally an explosion of comparable to the action
of a whirlwind over land or sea. In this reversal, or 
acceleration, of normal natural processes we may, perhaps, 
see a further likeness to the Heraclitean conception of 
dynamic nature : »0f fire the changes are, first, sea: of 
sea, half is land and half waterspout* (Byw.21).
 ^Aristotle Meteorol.365 a 14, etc., see Diels A.89 and 84. 
Of. Anaximenes A.7 fin., where earthquakes are caused by 
changes of density in the earth.
"'Cf. Heraclitus D.A.14 a, both sea and fire are enslaved to 
winds. Aet.ii.3.9 (D.A.14), thunder is caused by the 
whirling of the winds and clouds and the impact of winds 
on clouds, lightning by the kindling of the exhalations, 
whirlwinds through the kindling and quenching of clouds.
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The physical symptoms most clearly connecting 
Heracles* madness with are the hot panting breath,
of which he himself complains on waking (1092-3), and the 
subterranean * bellowing* with which he roars revenge on 
Eurystheus (869-70, 962). The most obvious difference 
(apart from the intervention of Lyssa) is the absence of 
immediate external provocation, and the physical change 
which precedes the announcement of revenge against Eurystheus 
distinguishes it from the genuine impulse of anger expressed 
earlier in threats against Lycus and Thebes (565-73). The 
two moods are connected in thought and feeling, but the 
external and physical origin of the second is emphasised 
in such a way as to show that, whereas the first is provoked 
by human injury, the second requires direct * divine* 
instigation.
The violent upheaval suggested by Lyssa*s similes 
is reproduced not only in Heracles* frame, but in the 
palace, as it rocks and falls as if beset by wind and 
earthquake, recalling battle-scenes between gods and giants, 
in which Heracles once participated (906-8, 1192-4).
Athena*s rock is a further link between the motions within 
and without, for it not only fells Heracles, but checks 
the course of his madness.
go the grandeur of the physical scene offsets the 
mockery of the achievement, and in Heracles* madness, though 
not in his revenge, we see the huge impetus that matched 
itself with beast, monster and giant - ranging the earth, 
even under the earth - now turned in reverse, , as if
hydra, lion and all his other slain enemies had rushed like 
phantoms through the unguarded gate to recontest the issue 
on phlegra*s plain.^ If the fantastic journey to Mycenae, 
and war on * fledglings *, reduced heroic àd absùrdum,
Heracles* former ally in that cosmic contest now restores 
him to his full stature. Heracles falls, but the heavens 
all but fall with him; as a * shape * ( ) visible to the
messenger, Athena stands halfway between fantasy and the 
real world.
^Aniphitryon mentions hydra (1189-90) and lion (1211) as well 
as the battle with the giants.
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The comparison of Lyssa*s onrush to commotion in 
external nature, and its extension to the interior of the 
palace (small compared with the Cyclopean walls of Mycenae 
but compared with the fortress of Heracles* breast),
show that the seeming triviality of his delusions is in 
inverse proportion to the magnitude of the physical 
disturbance which causes them, if man is the measure, 
Heracles certainly has a 'god within*, and the nature of 
the necessity which drives him to his doom is first seen 
in the physiological explanation.
Whether or not Euripides was following a medical 
opinion which would have regarded Heracles* bodily changes 
as the physical counterpart of in an extreme form, their 
expression in murderous rage is evidence of the close 
connexion. Lyssa causes him to kill the children (865, 835- 
7), but her reluctant submission to the will of Hera tends 
to departmentalise her activities in an instrumental 
capacity, as immediate cause of (a) physical and (b) mental 
in Heracles, so that she both propels and distorts 
an already existing motive, which is accordingly reversed 
as part of Hera*s revenge against Heracles himself.
Lyssa is bidden to inspire Heracles with * child- 
murdering confusion of the wits* (835-6), but she does so, 
not by causing him to intend the murder of his children, 
but through physically roused passion which takes the shape 
of intended revenge on Eurystheus; only after the scene has 
been transferred by a long and devious route to Mycenae, 
does the death-dance follow. The connexion in thought with 
the revenge on Lycus is made plain not only by the inter­
ruption of the purification ceremony, but by Heracles* 
point-blank refusal to continue it/ and by addressing his 
father he recalls their earlier conference on the best way 
to deal with the enemy in Thebes (585 f.).
 ^Heracles * piety is put f orward~by Lyssa as one of the 
reasons against destroying him (851-2); the call to empty 
and throw down the sacrificial vessels (cf. the children*s 
funereal fillets, 562) is the sign that his normal thoughts 
are to be reversed in some act of frightful impiety.
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Fresh from the underworld, Heracles was provoked 
no less by the ingratitude of Thebes than by lycus' injury; 
his father essayed by wise advise to stem the fatal * hurry* 
(586),and Heracles seemed surprised that his plans to choke 
is^menus and redden Dirce should be regarded as premature. 
The Chorus, hymning the fall of lycus, set the revenge in 
the frame of a ritual contest : by returning from Hades to 
displace the ^usurper, Heracles has proved the which
will ensure his victory. Lycus, in short, is slain by 
divine as it emerges from hell, apparently deathless
and invincible; as such it can be practically identified 
with the urge to revenge, which Heracles now sees as the 
crown and summit of his labours.
This identification is confirmed as we pass (1) 
from the evidence of divine birth to Hera*s revenge, and
(2) from the victory over Lycus to his resistless fury as 
»Hell*s bacchant* (1119, cf. 892-9)
The Heracles is not the only play in which Eurip­
ides will show that *Hades and Dionysus are the same *.  ^ If 
life and death are, according to mystic notions, reversible, 
and sleep a transitional state from which we may pass to 
either,^ Heracles' return to life, reversing the order of 
nature, makes a Hades of the living world, and even when he 
wakes from sleep not to madness but to realisation, he sees 
the world below as an escape from the peculiar purgatory 
which Hera has created for him here on earth.^ The contra­
diction of supposing that the warm-blooded mortal could 
survive a world that devours it, is matched by the trans­
formation of divine courage into the equally divine impulse 
of revenge.
 ^Heraclitus 127 ( Byw. ). Cf. 69 /-L .
^Heraclitus D.B.26 (Byw.77), cf. Byw.64 e h c .o e ^ '^ c - y t - y ^ c - ^ - j - e - ^
ÙÇ^ir^y^C-4  ^ O fC o C U . ^  C-^ £  o  ^ . Cf * Eur . H . F . lO 69
. Heraclitus 45 (Byw.) .
^I.e. complete and eternal exile from man and nature as the 
result of a * daemonic' crime (Empedocles D.B.117), cf. 
ixion's punishment in the underworld (H.F.1298).
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Like the divine soul, an exile and a wanderer, 
Heracles has refused purification, and * trusting in mad 
strife* follows with Lyssa the trail of blood. There is 
no need to seek a medical explanation, for the soul which 
can be alive in Hades, can be in Hades even when it is 
alive; it is akin, not to the bloodless shadows, but to 
the demons that minister to divine revenge. Heracles 
returns, like a dream at midday, to plunge into a private 
world of guilt and madness, for the Erinyes,who would 
pursue even the sun,are behind him, and Zeus, at whose 
altar he stands, cannot guard him now.
The fantastic paradox of Heracles* last labour 
is illustrated in the fate of Cerberus; unlike Heracles* 
other enemies, the * wretched hound* cannot be dispatched 
to the underworld, but must be dragged up to the light of 
day. contrary to the interest of man, this crazy victory 
seems to herald the reversal of all his earlier efforts.
In bondage to Eurystheus, the daemonic force of 
Heracles was nevertheless harnassed to the good of mankind; 
now, untrammelled and provoked, it reveals an affinity with 
the foe against which it has striven for so long.
A Question of Courage. Divine .
Does Heracles* victory over earth*s monsters 
merely imply that he excels them in strength and animal 
fury?
Lycus, who refuses to place Heracles and his 
achievements in a special category, makes light of his 
victories, over animals and with bow and arrow, on the 
ground that courage can be tested only against * the swift 
furrow of the spear*. Amphitryon in reply points out 
that Heracles has faced foes more formidable than Lycus 
imagines, but he tends to adopt the same general point 
of view, as he argues the importance of self-preservation 
in any kind of fighting.
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The Chorus, celebrating Heracles* battles, make 
much of the wild and ferocious nature of the foes against 
which they were fought, and the range of his wanderings in 
strange places, but they first praise his , as the son
of Zeus, on the score of the service rendered to man, in 
ridding human life of the fear of beasts (996-700). Heracles* 
accordingly seen to have two aspects : (1) the 
qualities required for and implied by the actual performance 
of his labours 357), and (2) the
function and effect of these victories, in * overcoming the 
beast* and so * taming* earth and sea in the interest of man
and (if we believe Lyssa) of god also, whatever the source
and spring of his (475), as friend and ally of god
and man he has a unique record.
In praising the revenge on Lycus, the old men are 
not consciously adopting a fresh criterion, for without 
considering the rest of Heracles* programme, they see the 
death of the tyrant as the work of just gods and a fresh 
benefit conferred on the city. The victorious escape from 
Hades is accordingly taken as final proof both of supreme 
prowess and of descent from zeus.
Before Heracles* personal appearance, his can
be defined only through the attitude of others towards him, 
and as a quality of his achievements. Believed dead by all 
but Amphitryon and the children, he lives in memory and in 
hope; the nature and quality of the man himself is yet to 
be revealed. This approach is necessary, for Heracles 
returned from the dead does not reveal himself as the friend 
and benefactor of mankind; |)e responds to the affection of 
his famiby, but he bends his whole thought and energy to the 
work of revenge.
The completion of his labours, the return from the 
sunless halls of the dead, the injury of Lycus and Thebes, 
convert the function of Heracles* and so change that
itself, in Hera*8 revenge we see the pattern of his 
own, and in Lyssa*s fury the daemonic power that fought the 
beast, in reverse against man and in the human frame that 
contains it. was he, then, son of zeus for this, to reveal, 
given opportunity and provocation, the deadly force of 
primitive passion? Is this the only legacy he receives, 
directly or indirectly, from the god whose victorious 
strength is within him?
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Or must we trace all the good in Heracles to his 
human relationships and affections, all the bad to the 
divine? Neither the course of the drama, nor his own views, 
warrant this opposition. If filial affection prompted the 
labours, regard for his family inspires revenge, and the 
divine injury has its antecedents in the human. Heracles 
himself attributes his misfortunes impartially to both 
fathers, and will not allow Theseus to comfort him by 
finding imperfection in the divine nature.
His madness, though not in the ordinary sense 
hereditary or constitutional, seems in some way the penalty 
(842) of his heroic qualities and achievements ; he himself 
sees it in line with his labours, viewed not as victories, 
but as hard struggles and pains. That Hera*s revenge 
finally comes through aliénation mentis is appropriate to 
a stepmother, for the causation is oblique rather thab 
direct, yet (if geus is both author of divine justice and 
father of Heracles) the form of * unjust retribution* which 
it embodies cannot be fully explained without a line of 
connexion with the divine element in Heracles himself.
This connexion is provided by the motive of 
revenge, which springs from the divine but divorces it
from its function, the service of mankind, was its function, 
then, not essential to it? How is the transition from 
friend to foe, and from father to madman, effected?
Heracles has hitherto been the friend of man, 
mainly because his enemies were also the enemies of the 
human race; each task, dictated by another, has brought 
personal struggle and personal victory for himself. Now he 
feels that, unless he responds to the provocation offered, 
he will no longer deserve the appellation . if
he could fight lion and hydra in obedience to Eurystheus, 
he can hit back at men in defence of his family (578-82).
It is a fresh challenge, met in the old spirit - * there is 
work for my hand* - and that in itself is enough.
It is this simple wholehearted response to the 
needs of the moment that so endears us to the Euripidean 
Heracles, but the needs are no longer so simple. Like a 
lion himself, the outraged father seems unsure whether the 
primary call is to be revenged or to protect his family; 
in theory, the one is subordinated to the other, but the 
confusion between the two motives has its tragic sequel in 
the form of revenge which he believes himself to be inflict­
ing on Eurystheus.
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If Heracles is mad when he returns from the under­
world, or if he was always mad, there is no tragedy. The 
tragedy of his madness lies, not in its separation, but in 
its continuity with the real world, if, in the logical 
form of ^ his argument, lurks confusion of mind as well as 
* irony * this is due, not to madness, but to the co-presence 
of two fresh motives which he is struggling to adjust both 
to one another and to his earlier way of life and thought. 
Like a ship setting out on a new voyage, he must guide his 
path by the same stars.
But the gods have appointed no clear boundary of 
virtue, such as unchanging stars provide; even rebirth is 
not an infallible criterion, just as the cycle of time - 
6- U 4 T?; J . i S v  gives Wealth pride of place over birth, 
so virtue itself shifts and changes on the upward or on the 
downward path.
Heracles has worked patiently for Eurystheus, but 
in personal contest he has learnt . Even a bene­
factor may resent ingratitude, and the threat to his family 
is provocation of the most direct and forcible kind. That, 
in madness, revenge has priority, even to the extent of 
reproducing the exact pattern of the injury which he has 
received, may mean that springs from a more primitive
source than natural affection, or it may point to the 
immediate physical stimulus of Lyssa*s shaking. The confus­
ion which visits this revenge on Eurystheus and reverses 
his purpose of guarding the children, must be referred back 
to his earlier announcement of his new task as analogous to, 
but superseding, the labours imposed by Eurystheus.
Amphitryon then approved Heracles* plans in princ­
iple f but it is noteworthy that Heracles himself saw the 
issue as a purely personal one. He argues, not that one 
ought in general to help friends and harm foes, but that if 
he could fight lion and hydra in the service of ah enemy, 
he can do as much and more for his family, indiscriminate 
revenge does not follow from this premiss, or from any 
general principle that he normally holds. The Thebans are 
to be punished not merely as enemies but as ingrates, and
^58 Ï " V é c is affibiguous.
 ^671. The thought of this stanza leaves it an open question 
whether, as things are. Hades admits only one-way traffic, 
or whether the doctrine of is being too indiscrim­
inately applied.
The Chorus praise only his intention to aid his family,585.
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the revenge on Eurystheus, even apart from his madness, 
would stand out clearly as a pseudo-purpose, shaped by the 
passion which now dominates his mind and so confuses end 
and means in the genuine purpose, in which the punishment 
of Lycus was instrumental to saving his children.
The proposed beheading of Eurystheus follows from 
the killing of Lycus, but we need to explain how Heracles, 
who seems partly aware of his surroundings at the outset, 
can reach the point of killing his children as means to a 
revenge quite different from the one originally proposed.
The journey to Mycenae brings him back to his own palace, 
but in the role of an enemy : either circumstances, or his 
own motives in reverse, draw the children into the arena. 
There is the well-meant intervention of Amphitryon; there 
is also (1 ) the reversibility of a motive, which seeks to 
inflict the injury from which it springs; and (2 ) the 
confusion of intention that goes with it, when the impulse 
of revenge gains the upper hand; for instead of labouring 
for his family, Heracles is seeking revenge on Eurystheus, 
and instead of punishing his Theban enemies he is bringing 
lion and hydra back upon his family.
The objection may be raised, that any ambiguity in 
Heracles* earlier language is sufficiently explained as an 
instance of the familiar device called * dramatic irony*, 
without supposing a causal connexion between his earlier 
and later states of mind. To this l would reply, that the 
full effect of in such plays as the Heracles and
Bacchae is by no means simple and obvious, and that in the 
Heracles it goes with a peculiar use of ambiguity and 
contradiction that is not merely verbal, but inherent in 
the structure of the play, and through which Euripides is 
developing the notion of from a psychological, as well
as a theological, point of view.
Even in the Hecuba, went with » as a
«movement* back and forth in human affairs beyond the scope 
of human knowledge, in the Heracles, the twin searchlights 
of divine and human explanation cross and recross to find 
their focus on the * blank page* of a mind, that has lost its 
own consciousness and control, yet follows a predetermined 
way, according to causes which the dramatist has set himself 
to unfold.
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gillQg justice, ^
The fall of Lycus was hymned as the work of just 
gods and of zeus* son, but Hera*s revenge reminds us that 
* divine justice* has long been a two-edged phrase. It has 
not been Heracles* way to hate human enemies, and he sets
himself to act, not on this principle, but on its opposite,
which in practice is at first indistinguishable from it. 
Madness forces the issue ; but the motive of revenge owes 
its extension not to Heracles* own nature, but to something 
which confuses it, not to his heroic strength and courage, 
but to the to which they have exposed him.
This distinction is made and kept through Lyssa*s 
intervention and his own ignorance. As son of zeus,
Heracles is the friend of man ; this is his and this
his . Yet is it not the divine in him that responds
to injury, that reverses his aims and finally, with Hera*s 
help, reverses Heracles?
Iris claims that through Hera* s revenge and her 
own, what is mortal is mastered by what is divine; since 
is mastered by physical , it would be equally
true to say the opposite - as if the hard-won*divinity* 
which Heracles brings from Hades were almost immediately 
overwhelmed by the conflicting currents of the world he 
re-enters, victorious over death, he yet falls a victim 
to natural necessity, to which that victory renders him 
doubly liable.
For the son of zeus who has beheld pluto*s throne, 
life and death have become convertible terms, but unlike 
the usual mystic correlations between divine soul and mortal 
body, Heracles * lives death* in the sense that Hades merely 
extends his natural powers, and *dies life* since that very 
triumph brings him back to a world, in which the notion of 
divinity is still ambiguous.
If, without springing from a common source, 
Heracles* and his are each in turn * divine *, they
can be related only by showing that the one is the death of 
the other. Like waking and sleeping, continuous but 
incompatible, they are reversible states, subject to a 
single justice: the harmony of the back-bent bow, whose 
name is *life* but whose work is death.
^Heraclitus 67 (Byw.) ^  ^ 73/ ^
^  cLTTO V T o y  f  ^  é S v t o i /  ^  (  o y  - T T '  ^  Y  r - w  T ~ F -y  .
^Heraclitus 56 (Byw.) and 67 /^oJ , c - ^ y o r
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What can cause such a reversal? Apart from Hera*s 
intervention, is the motive of revenge sufficient to over­
throw reason, or, as so many have thought, the sign that 
reason is already overthrown? The answer must be found, 
once again, in the Chorus’ interpretations of the contest 
with Lycus, as the work of a champion fresh from Hades. 
Heracles* guess, that he won the battle there because he 
had been initiated in the mysteries, made us smile at the 
hero * s notion of an * escape from evil *, but it also gave 
warning of the shape of ills to come, so steep a descent 
could hardly be made with impunity by a mortal frame, even 
supported by divine , and in the later reversal of
soul-body relations we see the penalty of extending his 
physical powers in this unwonted dimension.
If the motive of revenge is one symptom of that 
extension, the overthrow of reason is another, for it rouses 
the same passion in a more extreme form, but at a lower 
level of consciousness. Like the sleeper, Heracles retires 
into a world that seems, in view of his recent descent, to 
lie part-way between Hades and the clear light of day. The 
revenge on Lycus, insignificant in itself, acts as a pivot 
on which the universe can spin, setting Hera over our heads 
instead of zeus, and entombing the rescued from Hades,
through the very victory which it has won.
Heracles makes good his escape from Hades, but 
not from misfortune, for the divinity which he vindicates 
is no longer a guarantee of immunity, but on the contrary a 
precondition of the disaster which befalls him. just as the 
appearance of zeus* protection, given by his timely return, 
is replaced by the certainty of destruction, so the victor­
ious spirit within him, though dedicated to the safety of 
his children, finds its first and immediate expression in 
an act of revenge. Through the reversal which follows, in 
which Hera*s revenge is substituted for his own, the * second 
prime* which was to be the reward of virtue is seen to bear 
a close resemblance to the birth-throes of the divine soul 
involved in the /f.; .
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The original version of (as given by
Herodotus) is quite distinct from the Orphic eschatology, 
with which the doctrine has most in common, but
the evidence suggests that the Titan myth or its equivalent 
might be prefixed to almost any of these theories either 
separately or in combination. Birth or rebirth may be (a) 
the sign of man* s divinity, sin and death being the legacy 
from the Titans, or (b) part of the punishment of an 
immortal soul, for which life in the body is a form of 
death, or (c) an episode in the cycle of mortal existence 
by which the is punished, not through mere association
with the body, but through the strife and misery prevailing 
in the physical world.
The doctrine, though * very ancient *,
seems to have been revived under the influence of post- 
Heraclitean etymologising and the later pythagoreanism: it 
presupposes (a) the reversibility of life and death, and 
(b) a repetition of this relation in the conjunction of body 
and soul. In the Gorgias fable, certain bodily indulgences 
are compared %to a well-known punishment in the underworld, 
but the doctrine is not complete without an answering 
conception of the * divine* life of the soul.
is this to be found in or in ?
The latter theory is attributed, with , to
philolaus, though Alcmaeon, also a believer in immortality, 
seems to have been first in the field with his theories of 
health and disease. The view of the emotions as (at
least as old as Gorgias) presupposes the usual physiological 
inference from the abnormal to the normal, where the mutual 
interaction of soul and body is less strongly marked.
Religion teaches that madness is the consequence 
of * ancient wrath*, yet, in defiance of physiology, puts 
forward another madness which is release from the body and 
its ills, the madness of Dionysus. Heracles* madness is 
not of this kind - nor,indeed,is that of Dionysus - yet it 
is not pathological or hereditary. He is " A i i o o  
because, in completing the - n - h ^ / c  ^ , he has drunk of the 
wrong cup; he is released from death, only to reshape his 
immortality according to the pattern of divine T .
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The Awakening
The doctrine has an obvious physiolog­
ical reference which the Empedoclean daemonology lacks, 
but in both cases the sin for which the soul is punished 
is perpetuated in mortal existence, so that, for man, the 
penalty is prior to the crime, like a permanent physical 
necessity either in the nature of the individual or in the 
general conditions of his world.
we have passed from revenge to reversal, through 
the substitution of divine justice for human, and from life 
to death, through the physical which robs Heracles
of control over his own mind and motives. Now we are to 
look with his eyes on the world which madness has made for 
him, the external counterpart of the * penalty * which he has 
already realised in his own nature and unconscious 
behaviour.
The physiological disturbance in Heracles was 
compared to a convulsion of all the elements : an earth­
quake, a lashing sea, and the brain-splitting curve of the 
thunderbolt. Now he awakes to the sight of earth and sky, 
to find himself * moored by hawsers* in a sea of dead, and 
though the absence of certain characteristic features 
convinces him that he is not back in the underworld, the 
devastation amid which he sits till the end of the play is 
visible reminder that he is not far from it. As he 1 earns 
the truth, his first thought is to take his own life ; 
forestalled, he tries to hide in a darkness of his own 
making, and imagines a future in which the very elements 
will conspire to set him high on lxion*s wheel.
Is Heracles renouncing the upper world, or is 
the upper world renouncing Heracles? The gods whom he has 
upheld, the elements which he has * tamed*, have attacked 
him in savage fury, and now take on the bitter face of 
condemnation, wrecked close to land, he still rocks on 
the surge of his own anger, and turns back of his own 
accord the way he came.
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This attitude to nature is not in the ordinary 
sense * subjective *, for it conforms (a) to an accepted 
religious outlook, and (b) to the statement of Hera*s 
purpose which we have ourselves heard from iris. It is 
nevertheless the complement of a mood which carries over 
the symbolism of madness into his view of the external 
world, as if the same physiological causes were to a 
certain extent at work, and as if Hera*s purpose were now 
to be fully accomplished through his own impulse to self- 
destruction. If madness gives a clearer insight into the 
nature of things, and if Hera* s revenge represents a 
genuine divine purpose, then nothing can save Heracles.
Recovery
The impulse to suicide was not cowardice, nor did 
Theseus insinuate this; he iperely suggested that his friend 
was not behaving like * the famous Heracles*. Heracles sets 
out to disprove him, by linking his whole career to the 
destructive purpose of Hera. But in rationalising his 
%%% impulse he shows its essentially irrational basis in 
myth, superstition and resentment against a goddess on whom 
he proposes to cast the odium of his death, as a last 
gesture of unhappy .
Theseus remoulds past and future together, as he 
argues that Heracles* very misfortune* gives Greece her 
chance to prove that he still is, as he has always been, 
the friend of man. No man, and perhaps not even god, is 
exempt from .evil, for the poets tell many a tale of divine 
wrong to match Heracles*.
Heracles disbelieves the poets, but it is important 
to see exactly how much, or how little, he is disbelieving. 
Theseus* instances are of sins committed by the gods in 
their dealings, not wihh men, but with one another; Heracles 
repeats the instances and, as a * side-issue* to his own 
troubles, declares his conviction that the tales are false, 
since it is god*s nature to be deficient in nothing. He 
then accepts his lot, not on any divine precedent, but as a 
task of courage: the man who cannot face misfortune, cannot 
stand in the line of battle. It is Lycus * test, but with 
this difference, that Heracles has come to see that man is 
not, like god, self-sufficient : where success or failure 
does not depend on the individual, courage and the spirit 
of victory are not always synonymous.
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Of god*s relation to man he says nothing, but 
shoulders his burden of grief as he once shouldered the 
burden of Atlas : the homes of god and man must be kept 
apart* From his premiss that god is perfect so much could 
be inferred that we are little the wiser - indeed, we 
experience a further sensation of giddiness, as if the 
earth closed suddenly upon Tartarus or floated slightly 
upon air. For even the conclusion that Heracles himself 
draws cuts at the very root of his own story, since it 
questions, not his own mythical antecedents, but those of 
zeus and Hera.
If the gods can neither master one another nor 
make forbidden marriages, the relative positions occupied 
by zeus and Hera in the play are, as we suspected earlier, 
quite untenable. Amphitryon blamed zeus for immorality, 
but hitherto it has never been doubted that if Heracles is 
zeus* son, he is Hera*s stepson, and that if he owes his 
success to the one, he owes his downfall to the other.
Yet we have seen that, through the sequence of the drama, 
each relation is made to seem illusory in the light of the 
other; zeus * protection leads directly to Hera* s revenge, 
and as the rescue of the children creates a deceptive 
appearance of fatherly care, so Hera*s triumph seems to 
give her supreme charge of Heracles * destiny. Now the 
ways part again and we have, on the one hand, divine 
perfection (zeus?) and human courage; on the other, human 
suffering, Hera and chance.
Heracles does not mean to assert, like Xenophanes, 
that a deity corresponding to the idea of divine perfection 
exists, to the exclusion of the gods of mythology, but he 
uses it as a criterion of divine behaviour in two ways.
(1) The gods man worships must not be inferior to him in
, so that Hera»s revenge, though sufficiently factual, 
disqualifies her for human worship (1307-8). (2 ) unlike
men, the gods can never be immoral in their dealings with 
one another, or at variance among themselves, so that the 
stories which imply this are incredible. For both these 
reasons, Hera*s revenge should be attributed to chance 
rather than to god. But is god or chance supreme in human 
affairs? Hera»s revenge implies, either that there are 
two unrelated * divine* powers in the universe, or that she 
is not, after all, in conflict with zeus.
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Heracles (disbelieves the poets, not because they 
falsify human experience, but because they assume an 
impossible state of affairs among the gods themselves.
So his own tale can be disbelieved, only when reduced to 
its crudest mythological form; zeus the adulterer, Hera 
the jealous harridan. But whereas the philosopher uses 
the beliefs which he discards as negative basis for a new 
conception of the divine, the poet sets one against the 
other in a series of contradictions, converging on the 
general notion of human fortune and human .
NOW we are left with a final contrast between the 
clear-cut notion of what is divine and perfect in itself, 
and the dimly discerned power that wields in its stead the 
divine supremacy.
Divine and Human virtue
Though one god cannot master another, there is 
nothing to prevent the gods from exercising their despotism 
over man, so long a^ their methods do not reflect disharmony 
or deficiency among themselves, so Empedocles preserves 
the mutual independence of his deities by allowing them to 
prevail over one another only in their «mortal* existence, 
and in the Hippolytus the destruction of man was indirectly 
a means to the self-assertion of one deity over another.
At the same time the drama revealed a basis dualism between 
the moral ideal of divine purity and the natural necessity 
of revenge, shown not in the behaviour of one god as opposed 
to another, but through the different ways in which each 
might become part of the nature of a human being.
The same dualism reappears in the Heracles, but 
in a philosophical context which goes back to Xenophanes 
and shows little trace of the Empedoclean polytheism. The 
ambiguous relation between zeus and Hera suggests rather 
the Heraclitean adaptation of the new monotheism as a 
reversible but the combined physiological and
religious interest takes us forward again to the later 
Pythagorean!sm.
^ AS~if~the~^ônê~wîsdôm~which"is both unwilling and willing to 
be called zeus, might consent to be called Hera in one of 
its off—moments. Of # Hippocrates - n . 5
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The preoccupation with began in the Hecuba, 
where revenge went with reversal through the confusion of 
war and a necessity associated with the possession of human 
masters. In the Heracles, the blow of is aimed by a
goddess, and divine heredity plays, as in the Medea, an 
important part.
There is perhaps, no contradiction in supposing 
that the gods can cause men to comrait crimes which they 
could not wreak upon one another; yet it is not hard to 
give such causation the appearance of inconsistency, if it 
is treated like a human action, arising from and
deliberate purpose. Hera*s part ,may be regarded in two 
ways ; (1) as the divine intention corresponding to Heracles* 
involuntary act, or (2) as a general malevolence tending to 
his ruin which, as the result of his present act, he at 
first believes to be accomplished. This point of view is 
sufficiently close to iris* statement and the considerations 
advanced by lyssa to make it appear quite authentic.
Heracles* recovery presents a different viewpoint; 
god cannot sin against himself, and the present disaster 
is an instance of human fortune, not a revelation of the 
divine nature. How is this change of attitude effected, 
and how far is it consistent with his earlier opinion and 
with iris* statement?
Aware of Hera* s general hostility but not of her 
special wish to involve him in bloodguilt, Heracles saw 
her triumph and his defeat as complementary, without 
attributing to her the sin which he believes to attach 
to his own act. Hera*s offence is to have destroyed the 
benefactor of Greece out of feminine jealousy; his own 
cannot be cured by believing that the gods do even worse 
to one another.
Theseus uses this argument, not in order to 
discredit the gods, but because his reinterpretation of 
Heracles* destiny requires him to adopt the first view of 
Hera*8 responsibility, not the second. As involuntary, 
his act is a misfortune not a sin; if it is a sin, it is 
a * misfortune* to which god is also liable.
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Heracles accepts Theseus’conclusion but substit­
utes two fresh premisses : (1 ) that god is perfect, (2 ) 
that his own courage forbids him to refuse misfortune. The 
first belief, it seems, he has always held (cf. 852-3 ), 
regarding his own persecution as something of an anomaly. 
Theseus* * atheistical * argument shows him the only road 
to restoring consistency both in his conduct and in his 
beliefs; by dying, he would give final victory, and final 
blame, to Hera; by accepting misfortune as part of the 
human lot, he rescues god himself from the vast unreason 
of a suicidal crime.
’Leave Thebes for the sake of custom* (-.:
1322). This is all that is left of the guilt Hera wished 
to fasten upon Heracles, except the eternal sorrow, against 
which human courage reflects as the nearest imitation of 
the divine.
o y fz  yc -Y D i-pa  X k . ocy • But if in god
there is no deficiency, whence comes the evil that men 
experience as ’divine*?
Chance and Necessity
iris, in stating Hera’s intention, did not confirm 
the motive, which Heracles regards as her chief offence.
If this motive is mythical, and the act a misfortune not a 
sin, there is little left of the divine intention to destroy 
Heracles, beyond (a) the reversal which he has suffered, 
and (b) the essential difference between god and man which 
he now asserts, and which then seemed to be the base of 
Iris* antagonism to Heracles, imperfectly understood, this 
difference may be conceived as divine jealousy; but as a 
boundary set up simultaneously by thought and experience, 
it is a necessity which rules without self-compromise, 
either as natural justice or as the a priori demand of 
reason and the moral ideal.
-‘Fr.2lN (Aeolus)
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Chance is the ambiguity of natural justice, due to 
the limitations of man’s part in, and view of, the whole to 
which alone, as Xenophanes saw, the attribute of perfection 
can belong, either in its completeness or (as Heraclitus 
interpreted it) in its systematic unity. But where the 
logician will later separate the ’ways’ between thought and 
experience, the poet will divide them between Chance, the 
unknown master, and the essence that is not so - the utterly 
divine.
The problem with which we are still left is this ; 
although the conclusion of the Heracles couples Hera with 
chance, leaving zeus, perhaps, freed from his mythological 
entanglements and so on the side of divine perfection, the 
course of the drama shows that Hera’s connexion with 7^(7 
is inseparable from the role of zeus as guardian of divine 
justice and (at leasÿ up to a point) of Heracles’ destiny. 
Just as Heracles’ can be transformed into and overcome
by the passion of revenge, so the parts of zeus and Hera 
are contradictory but interchangeable ; Hera rules by 
deficiency of Zeus, and zeus retires before a usurpation of 
his own authority. Owing to this initial possibility of • 
substitution, we feel no surprise that Theseus is able to 
frustrate Hera’s ultimate intention by reasserting the 
other aspect of Heracles’ destiny, and so to blur the 
impression of an intention altogether.
Theseus is a newcomer on the scene, and Heracles 
has forgotten Lycus; can the spectator forget so soon his 
vision of divine immorality? If we are to take with Heracles 
that upward leap of disbelief that conflicts so strangely 
with,the horrors that we have witnessed, we too must find 
a way of correlating this conclusion with the pattern of 
events as they have been represented in the drama. The 
apparent carelessness of detail can reap its reward in a 
regrouping of the main lines of dramatic connexion, only if 
these connexions have been so shadowed and duplicated that 
a changed perspective can run right through the whole, and 
as if ’with a wet sponge’  ^blot out those nightmare memories 
that have no place in the waking light of a normal day.
’ AOSCh . As • 1 3 27"“30 fu>
( T / C / X  n ç  Uv
^  0 J  ^ <T TV o y ^ o ( ui X c-^  e y y ^ .
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With inimitable stage-craft, Euripides has 
contrived that it is Heracles who is mad, but the spectator 
who has the hallucination, iris, announcing Hera's aim, 
confirms in advance the objective validity of Heracles* 
tragic experience, yet, in her own right, slits the thread 
both of purpose and of destiny. In her duplication of 
Hera's hate we see a purpose which, in all but its immed­
iate effects, is quite illusory; so, for the chorus, she 
disappears like a mere reflection, caught against a hostile 
background, of the arm of necessity bent back to encircle 
Heracles.
Hera's revenge is the reversal, not only of 
Heracles' intention, but of the supernatural immunity 
against which Iris' venom is chiefly directed, with no 
personal grudge against Heracles, she has,like lycus,a 
general interest in overthrowing greatness, which Lyssa's 
protest converts to that immoral'pain at the sight of not 
undeserved good fortune'which also helps to characterise 
Hera's jealousy (855, cf. 1309-11). But when Hera's motive 
is seen to be mythical^ the hate of her satellite has long 
since vanished into heaven (872, 1311-2).
Zeus and destiny have brought Heracles to the 
end of his labours ; his timely return seemed part of a 
just and beneficent divine purpose, and it is the tearing 
down of this facade that gives an especially diabolical 
twist to the intervention (gf iris and Lyssa, as if the 
element of confusion which reversed means and end for 
Heracles were reproduced in the divine causation, by which 
the children are providentially saved only to be made 
instruments of divine revenge, in the light of Heracles' 
overthrow, such a sequence can but confirm his view of a 
persistently malignant purpose guiding his destiny; in 
the light of his recovery, the same connexion serves to 
assign Hera's blow to the supreme agency of .
^Ar.fihet.ii.9.3,5, B .N.1107 a 9-12, 1108 b 1-6.
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Eor even if the rescue of the children is the 
consequence of divine protection, and their death a means 
to divine revenge, the connexion between these two events,
though it can simulate purpose (on this side Zeus, and on
the other,Hera), is in fact quite unpurposed, as iris* 
statement clearly shows. The turn of fortune therefore 
resists identification with the caprice of a single divine 
will, or even with the opposition between two 'wills*; it 
appears rather as a freak phenomenon produced by the sub­
stitution of one will for another, and Hera's opportunism 
acquires the look, not of genuine purpose or planning for 
an end brought about primarily for that reason, but (as 
iris puts it) of a 'contrivance* ( 855): the
undesigned meanstaking of irrational passion which can
masquerade as purpose, through the sudden removal of the 
hand of Zeus from the helm of destiny.
Although Hera's revenge is in one sense fully 
premeditated, and up to a point fully effective, it can 
appear as a genuine divine purpose only in so fat as she 
is believed to have control over its antecedents and final 
consequences. Since iris' statement and Theseus' rescue 
disprove this, her action becomes analogous to that of 
Medea, the final form of whose revenge seemed determined 
by circumstances and her own passion rather than by 
deliberate foresight. Finally, when we come to believe 
that there can be no disunity in heaven, her individual 
will seems to disappear, leaving only the ironic shape of 
circumstance and the illusory 'rule* of passion.
The coincidence of iris' appearance with Lycus' 
removal gives the required shaping to the turn of fortune; 
each transmits the impulse of necessity to Heracles, yet 
neither has any permanent root either in Thebes or in mind 
and memory. Hera's hate and pseudo-purpose are, on the 
contrary, reproduced in Heracles' abnormal passions, just 
as Zeus guards and controls the achievements of his •
Between normal and abnormal, as between cha'nce and 
design, lies a residual element of confusion, which is the 
psychological counterpart of in the external change of
fortune.
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Cha£ce__and_the_Ru]^
' in tragedy, the field of chance is the concom­
itance of causes arising independently from the same total 
situation (in this case the absence of Heracles in the 
underworld) but converging in a direction already determ­
ined by a major change in the fortunes or mental state of 
the individual chiefly concerned, go Thracian treachery 
travelled beneath the waves to meet Hecuba on the shores 
of the Hellespont; so the petty tyranny of Lycus rose like 
some hateful excrescence on the face of earth, to inflame 
the passions of the returning Heracles.
Heracles* labours have already caused him to 
exceed mortal limits ; the peculiar nature of the last 
carries with it the backflow of destiny. Behind fortune's 
blow is the reassertion of natural law in a guise with 
which we have long been familiar, and the exchange of 
function between zeus and Hera is matched by the substit­
ution of passionate impulse for the consistent moral 
purpose which has guided the labours and formed the nature 
both of Heracles and of his .
Hera's intention may, perhaps, be regarded as a 
personalisation of , as a derivative and irrational 
force which can simulate a rule owing to the lapse of the 
major purpose to which it has hitherto been acconÿodated.
Its psychological counterpart is the liability of to
be affected in ways that fall outside the conscious control 
of the individual.
in all the dramas which we have so far considered, 
we have been shown the difficulty of applying the accepted 
principle of divine and human behaviour, 'love friends and 
hate enemies', in a situation which, for one reason or 
another, gives priority to the one half of it. such a 
principle, though it assumes rational form, presupposes an 
emotional basis of conduct which is essentially irrational 
and which can, given certain conditions, cause reversion 
to a non-human type of behaviour which destroys (a) the 
normal balance of character in the individual, and (b) 
that common ground of law and custom which is the only 
ressource of human nature against the powers and influ­
ences to which it is exposed.
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These influences, within and without, arise from 
the continuity of the individual with that of the
external world, so that in addition to the normal causal­
ity of human beings, we are faced with the possibility of 
conduct being determined, not by the whole system of the 
agent's nature, but by the more primitive reactions of the 
elements composing it, so that it is affected not only by 
an externally received impulse, but also by its own 
affinity with the ultimate law of the universe.
in a world in which war is 'father of all and king 
of all', not only is reason the slave of the passions, but 
the passions themselves are the slaves of one - the 
overmastering response to injury which turns the whole 
current of the nature which receives it: fixing its own 
end, it necessitates the means, preserving the semblance 
of human agency only by destroying those very objects to 
the saving of which human purpose and even the outraged 
instinct itself are normally directed. Anger may, like 
the other passions, enter constructively into the formation 
of human character, but as the response of passion as a 
whole to a primary injury, it is a form of suicide, for 
it can subordinate even the strongest natural affections 
to the punishment of their own wrong.
In the Heracles, the domination of passion is 
clearly shown as a mental sickness, yet even in the loss 
of conscious direction a semblance of purpose is preserved, 
by which we may assess the reversal not only of proximate 
intention, but of the whole tendency of effort which has 
hitherto guided and controlled A in the W w  interest 
of man. go, in the divine causation, we pass from the 
immunity assured by zeus in the performance of an ordained 
task, to a justice which is at first able to discriminate 
between friend and foe, then to revenge so frantic that it 
must be attributed not to zeus, but to his female counter­
part, as if the father himself were to suffer eclipse in 
the recoil of his own function against the son whom he has 
so far consistently protected. Disregarding this change 
of personality, the sequence of events shows the same 
interchange as we observed on the human level, between a 
consistently maintained purpose and the rule of passion, 
as if god himself were to confuse end and means in this 
'sleeping version' of his own authority.
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The analogy is imperfect, for where Heracles 
responds to provocation, zeus errs by , and where
the human mind is confused, Hera can make madness itself 
her instrument. Nevertheless, (a) the transitional aspect 
of the Lycus episode provides the required link between 
as it is seen in the external change of fortune and 
in the passionate 'rule* of Hera's revenge, and (b) the 
use of Lyssa as a means declares the essential nature of 
a passion which, whether as cause or effect, is a form of 
» death'.
Why, then, does Hera, not zeus, seem to be acting 
with knowledge, and if zeus represents a superior rational 
control, why does he leave such flaws in the design? we 
must suppose that to be acting 'with knowledge' is no 
criterion of rationality either for god or man, but moral 
purpose in man is a superior control, by which his life and 
character may approach to the systematic structure of the 
universe. The only answer given in the Heracles to the 
perennial question 'what is zeus?' is still the inevitabil­
ity of the alternative, either natural justice, or the 
guidance of human intelligence and the moral ideal.
Chance and Human intelligence. The Friend of Man.
The Heracles presents a unique instance of the 
redintegration of as human courage, through Heracles'
dual recognition of divine self-sufficiency and his own 
dependence on the 'common humanity' to whose welfare he has 
so conspicuously contributed.
Hecuba's nature was wholly marred by her misfort­
une, because her condition of slavery had removed or 
perverted what might have been common ground between 
herself and her captors. But the bond which has been 
forged between Heracles and the human race holds fast under 
the extremest test which could conceivably have been 
applied to it.
The blow of fortune becomes in this way not only 
a limit between man and god, but a harmony between man and 
man, and Heracles' can take XXIUÜI shape afresh
against a new background, not of divine immunity, but of 
the common lot of man.
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His recovery, though an act of his own will, is not 
an individual effort; he is guided and cheered by a friendly 
and intelligent mind, untainted by his own sorrow, yet not 
unacquainted with the darkness of the underworld.
It is Heracles who rescues Theseus from the under­
world, it is Theseus who restores Heracles to the light of 
day. In this partnership, which bestows on both the second 
life which would have been denied to either alone, men may 
discern a clearer virtue than in stars which pursue their 
immortal way behind the clouds.
Where only confusion 'reigns', purpose itself would 
be somewhat incomprehensible, whether mind or chance has 
produced so tenacious a design in the universe, for man both 
are needed to define the limits of his world.
For the purposes of the drama, zeus cannot be wholly 
identified with the perfect god which Heracles opposes to 
Hera and chance, but his insistence on the conception shows 
the final way in which the nature of a divine father may be 
realised in his son's • Heracles does not, like
Hipp'olytus, believe that he must not return evil for evil, 
but neither does he, like Hippolytus, wish to bring a curse 
upon the race of heaven, we are still left without certainty 
whether he is right to disbelieve in divine wickedness, but 
his knowledge of god is also self-knowledge, and when man 
owns himself a slave to chance, his own nature will pronounce 
him » free'.
The divine wisdom is not a purpose, the divine 
justice is not a judgment, but if zeus can be natural 
necessity, he can also become a controlling thought for the 
mind of man. Heracles' world, like that of Anaxagoras, is 
still in the making; his belief, like that of the great 
sage who 'cast down' the gods, may not be truer, but it is 
certainly better. 'For I know the thoughts that I think 
toward you, saith the LORD, thoughts of peace, and not of 
evil, to give you hope in your latter end' (Jeremiah xxix, 
1 1 ). And we shall never know,when the 'last word' has been 
spoken.
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• The philosophy of chance.
We began by assuming a philosophical context as 
far back as Xenophanes; we have ended in the heart of the 
fifth century controversy on the relative place of mind 
and chance in the nature of things.
Aristotle (phys.195 b 35 f.) groups views on chance 
in three classes. (1) gome doubt whether it exists, on the 
ground that all events have some determinate cause. The 
earliest thinkers did not refer to it at all; Empedocles 
uses it only occasionally. (2) gome (the atomists) use it 
to account for the origin of the world, but not for that of 
living things. (3) 'There are some who think that chance is 
a cause, but one obscure to human reason, something divine 
and mystic (196 b 5-7, cf. E.E.1247 b 6-8).
The movement of chance in human affairs is often 
represented in Euripides as a kind of cycle or alternation, 
comparable with seasonal growth and decay in nature ;^  in this 
case the reversal of fortune is the ' turn of Time' ( 
r: r r U . , 777), and so based on the oldest kind of religious 
necessityas it appears, for instance, in Anaximander, in 
the Pythagorean vrr-f/.r»; , and in Empedocles' cycle of the 
elements.^
E*g* fr.4l5N ( InO )  ^ ^
 ^ ^^7-1 , TBf; <Te ^ e
rz- • TiCv y-Ay ^  A
j y  1 4. e j 7 7 -  À i
c f .  Amphiaraus in the H ypsipy le  fragment, 757N (Page G -L .p . 
p.100), 330N (Panae), 252N et saepe.
^Cf. the Orphic X c - ' - i  . Kern t.54 p .130, and (Eur.)fr.
594n (perithous) ^ i r J y c i :
t//C TVJ ^  j  ^  u 7-V  (  f at c. TP V /< •
/-A.- 669-72, cf.22N (Aeolus).
Time may also be a sort of 'justice' revealing a man's true 
nature or worth, H.F.803—14, cf.303N (Bellerophon), 60N* 
but more often the want of a or is lamented, e.g.
H.F.669, fr.304N, 211N, 916n , 376n , 90lN-
248
These changes are not, however, like seasonal 
occurrences in being regular and predictable, and there are 
some among them that cannot be fitted to the analogy of the 
more or less organised sequences of nature. They compare 
rather with the sudden shifts of wind and wave and other 
meteorological phenomena, which are still a movement 'back 
and forth* or * up and down* but which seem to require an 
indeterminate disorderly background, like the original 
unrest of the which Anaximander turned to account in
the * separating out* of the powers, and which plato compares 
to the shaking of a winnowing-fan (Tim.52 e). ^
The pythagoreans^may have been the first to apply 
this conception to human fortunes, but a major influence is 
certainly the Heraclitean flux, with its dual connotation 
of exchange between opposites and of perpetual mobility, 
which his imitators carried to extremes in every possible 
field. A similar movement is required by pluralism as a 
condition of its own processes of separation and combination 
so the Empedoclean opposites * run through * one another 
continually, and the idea of seems to gain fresh life
from the analogy of sieving, i.e. of rapid rotation in some 
medium that is either porous (like the of the Qorgias
fable) or at any rate such as to facilitate the regrouping 
of matter according to its primary opposites.
 ^Cf7~the^dîsorderîy~up and down* movement of the desires, 
Gorg.493 a. Lycus* rise in Thebes is an instance of this
"roving* causation, cf. Ear. fr.lo48N
 ^ j  \ n  ^ y Æ / y
^ V  .i- y  ^ ^  T ^  ^ tl-v ^
77^:, 77;
^ Gf.Ar.fr.207 (Rose) T/ - r ^ i i  o
Ty tLv . (Cornford,
Plato and Parmenides, p.10, n.2). A similar view is ascribed
to Protagoras by gextus PyrA2_h.l.217 r-4"
. For Hippasus and gpicharmus, see concluding chapter,
p.303 f.  ^ ^  i  ^ ck^ '  ^  ^
cf. C i^ 'u La.r'*^ i^ s 0  . S  . 2- > ^ /tL* hi tA-t «vs c-v < 6 t~J Ar c iC j  A<v(, K •y at<^ lo ^
T1 <, D; i</ ^ o f i '  U6 ij>  ^ f> . S  C i  o*' A y  . ^  ( S' i - (
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So Euripides will speak of a universal law of 
separation/ such that not only the soul at death but any 
gift of fortune may take wings and fly up into the heaven 
which is (presumably) its home. As breath, the soul has a 
clear affinity with this region, but even wealth may have 
* wings * (fr. 420N) / and though the comparison of fortune to 
the winds may often be no more than metaphorical, there is
/A 4.   ___
 ^ ~ . c f .  the Chrysippus
fragment (839n , D.Anaxagoras A.112). The science of this 
and similar passages cannot be fitted to any one theory 
(see concluding chapter, p.303 f.). The parenthood of 
Earth and Heaven is Orphic (K.t.32 p.lQ5, t.112 p.176), and 
from their original union it seems to be inferred that the 
separation of soul and body at death is a physical 
in which each element is restored, like to like, to the 
appropriate parent, as the complement to its birth or 
nurture (Eur.guppl.531-6, etc.). it is easy but probably 
wrong to see Diogenes as the chief influence in the ident­
ification of zeus with '/I' • pro bus on Virg.Ecl.6.31
regards Euripides as a dualist who substituted earth and 
air as principia for the earth and water of Xenophanes 
(225N Antiope, Xenoph.p.B.29-30, cf.Eur.670N). Euripides 
makes the source of moisture, by which it both begets
and nourishes living things (839N, 941N, 898n, guppl.205-7), 
corn and water also being the basic human foods (892N, cf. 
Anaxagoras D.A.45,46). Earth and S y  , as joint and
, recall the Milesian notion of , but the marriage
symbolism of mythical cosmogony has reappeared under the 
auspices of a soul-body dualism which requires, over and 
above the particular mixture or dissolution which is birth 
or death for the individual, an initial controlling union 
from which the whole race sprang, so that the elements will 
not merely part at death, but return each to its like or 
parent. The human race is thus , * conventional'
differences being introduced by Time (52n Alexander). The 
community of all living things can be similarly inferred 
from their food, breath, blood and common parents (1004N, 
777N). Apart from the mythical imagery and the identific­
ation of soul with , this account of the origin and
nurture of living things is substantially that of Anaxag­
oras (D.A.117, 113, 42 fin.; cf.yitruv.8 praef.l, ap.839N).
’'So Heracles assures his family that he is (628).
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a striking fragment from the panae in which and
are made analogous sources of changefulness in human life 
and in nature.
such a theme admits many variations, but in general 
the movement of chance, if not attributed to direct divine 
volition, seems to be thought of not merely as analogous to 
the ultimate processes of nature but as in fact a by-product 
of the same spatio-temporal laws and so deriving from the 
same necessity. Views of it will therefore vary according 
to the kind of which is assumed in nature, and as the
Chorus in the Heracles point out (655 f.), it would make a 
great difference if death too were included in it, and two- 
way traffic established between earth and Hades, whether 
or not this was the aim of Heracles* last labour, his own 
return has a fatal effect on the equilibrium of his 
fortunes.
If we could determine (a) the kind of motion which 
Euripides ascribes to chance in any particular play, and 
(b) the part he assigns to mind, these two factors taken 
together might be a means of placing that play in a certain 
philosophical context - not, perhaps, that of one theory 
alone, but in more or less clear relation to the general 
lines of thought which link or separate theories and which 
may, for dramatic purposes, be more significant than the 
theories themselves.
3 3 0 N  ^  T U . u T - a V  ^ /Ctfiv " T t U }  1^  ^ e > T ^ v  71 , ^  f
f c , * !•' » Ci f ' r f r , » r  /
' f  o<€ i  «V ■fCotM«rv«r/v' W  ' T  i  ( r C r > J-V
r A/ , / : /, '
{ / ( - ^ c r v ç  T3 -‘y l* t t^  o 1/ C~7<. rT Z -^T T C -i ^
^ ^  i r v  T> ^  ( - t  Ç 77 y  K  *  c v  V  (—t j  of ^
/C ^   ^ 7-g. 77"» C-* '
dyTX^ C rrx -y y * -  -nZ y y r-y
 ^ Çf. <r
l > û ‘ r r y c ’  ^ T h / ' o t ç  77 y o  f - ^  f - T  À  X  «  y  ei ' ,  ^ .
Of# 3q4n ( Bellerophon) ,  Adespot.112. Tu s a . ^  ^
Htc. 5'^!.-ir
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By the time that we reach the fifth century, the 
streams of thought have crossed and recrossed to such an 
extent that it is possible, not only for Aristophanes to 
credit Socrates with the views of Diogenes of Apollonia, 
but for Diels to class the famous invocation of zeus in the 
Troades as an ’imitation* of the same philosopher. The 
confusion is not only in the popular mind, but in the nature 
of the case, for Diogenes* solution is like a sophistic 
compendium to more than a century of strenuous mental 
endeavour.^ Even a poet may find such simplification 
refreshing, but its true tendency is seen in the Helen 
rather than in the Heracles.
The attraction of the Apolloniate view is (a) 
its perfect clarity, and (b) the free play it allows to 
allegory and fantasy, in the revival of ideas and images 
common to Qrphism and the more popular brands of Pythag- 
oreanism. in their joint connexion with air it more or 
less identifies and ‘---r , but can be easily adapted
to the idea of a beneficent deity, whose attributes are 
seen in the ordering of nature, and whose care for man is 
marred by human failings not by the divine. To make doubly 
sure of providence, the divine may be specifically ident­
ified with any aspect of nature that is useful to man, e.g. 
Demeter and Dionysus, according to the wisdom of the 
sophist prodicus. (D.B.5)
Such a view is put forward by Theseus in the 
supplices (195 f.) and is an essential part of the dramatic 
purpose of that play. It reappears in the phoenissae as 
the ground of jocasta’s appeal in the name of (541-8),
and in Teiresias* homily to pentheus (Bacch.275-85); there 
is no doubt that for the purpose of moral and religious 
exhortation, as well as for the lighter kinds of drama, it 
is excellent.
Diogênês"îs"s5ïd to have combined the views of Anaxagoras 
and Leucippus (simplic.phys.25.1, on the authority of 
Theophrastus, D.A.5). Like the atomists, he adopted a 
subjectivist view of sensation (D.A.23, Aet.iv.9.8).
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Even Democritus held that the gods do all things 
well, and that in chance men worship the image of their own 
folly. Yet her image is there in the pattern of the 
Heracles, as the 'wanderer* who brings events to pass from 
the unseen worid,^ the amorphous dynast whose necessity 
overrules birth and wealth and physical strength, who set 
Lycus ex nihilo on the throne of Thebes, and who sends 
Lyssa invisible to destroy the house of Heracles,
The * Errant Cause*, Mind or Natural Necessity?
The conclusion of the Heracles, that nobility of 
mind is shown by a certain attitude to fortune, seems to 
emanate from Anaxagoras, whose fortitude in bereavement was 
expressed in the pregnant phrase ^I knew i had begotten a 
mortal *, This remark is quoted by/oalen in connexion with 
the curious practice of rehearsing in imagination all the 
possible afflictions of life, which some wise man has taught 
a Euripidean Theseus,^ He is also plausibly identified with 
that happy man who can keep his thoughts from evil by 
contemplating the heavens and the eternal order of the 
universe (Ar.E.2.1215 b 6, Eur.fr, 910N), and since there 
is no evidence that the earlier Pythagoreans preferred the 
contemplative to the active life, Anaxagoras may have been 
the first great intellect to insist on the supreme moral 
value of the study of meteorology (cf. its effect on 
Pericles, plat.phaedr.270 a).
^D.B.175, 119. Not that he excluded chance in the ordinary 
sense ^c?f ^ ■> B.269, t«j.c
b.293, cf.289). Cf. Leucippus B.2.
^Qn the analogy of natural processes (as in 839N Chrysippus), 
chance would be the succession of changing forms attendant 
on 'dissolution* and * mixture *. Although like comes from 
like, the connexion may be inferred rather than observed.
SO Lycus* persecution reappears in iris, and Heracles* 
revenge in Hera's, the lack of immediate causal connexion 
being compensated by the law that the death of one thing 
is the life of another. At the same time, since birth and 
death are (mystically) reversible, chance (bringing in this 
case the unknown from the known) is a link between forms 
of death rather than between death and life.
Vralen de plac.Hipp.et plat.iv 7 (D.A.33),/Êûr. fr.954N 
(cf. Alcest.903 f., Diog.laert.li.13). iambl.y.p.196
( D  • P y t d . Icli # D  • 6 ) 1^- , ‘~'s 1 f-i Twi/
/ > ^  ^ n 3 / / V r
•*-TT j^ o £  TT>(j  y t r y y  ^  J ^  7 7 m . y T > ^  è t
/i, ^ -rif y-if <ry e I y UvTTX tr c ^  i » t o V Ttr^
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The view that Mind does not, as a first principle, 
act purposively is nearer to the dramatic conception of the
than Diogenes * adaptation of it, since (a) without 
assuming an omniscient divine providence it allows man tp
* discover with time that which is better* (Xenophanes B.18), 
and (b) without referring mind and chance to the same source 
it leaves room for both in the same universe. Even if the 
master himself, who denies the superiority of human to any 
other intelligence,^ would not have set a special value on 
the activity of purpose, nevertheless, by making mind a 
separate impassive principle, he endows any manifestation of 
it with an original and inalienable power of initiating 
change, and his theory that sensation is by opposites has 
the unusual consequence that even pain need not be regarded 
as a mere necessary evil, but can be made an element of 
natural value for the living creature.""
The alternative, suggested by Diogenes* divine 
purposeful intelligence, is that providence may be seen in 
the ordering of nature, which would be sufficiently adapted 
to human needs, if human wisdom were not substituted for the 
divine (cf.Suppl.195-218). This is not, however, the view 
suggested by the Heracles, where nature herself requires
* taming* by human effort, and though ordained by destiny it 
is by no means clear whether this task receives full divine 
support.
The conflict between divine and human purpose is 
not at first apparent : Heracles* labours are supported by 
zeus and destiny, and even his return from Hades is a sign 
that the gods have for once consented to be guided by human 
wisdom. This proves to be a mistake, and the idea of divine 
providence never recovers from it. Either we have, in Hera, 
an evil divine purpose, or there is an element of confusion 
and lack of foresight in zeus, and irrationality in Hera, 
which corresponds to the operation of in the sequence
of events and the mental and reversal of intention
in Heracles. Although Heracles is reinstated as the friend 
of man, the human intelligence of Theseus takes over the 
role of supporting his destiny, and it becomes the task of 
human courage to uphold the sanctity of the gods as well as 
its own burden of divinely sent misfortune.
^Ar.de part.animal.687 a 7 Li - n
 ^ t; Ar.E^.115 4 b 7, Theophr.^__sensu. 29 (D.A.
94, 92).
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It may be thought that providence is likely to 
care more for the good of the human race than for that of 
the individuals who are its instruments, but this fails to 
meet the case for two reasons : (a) Heracles is not a mere 
instrument but also a friend, with a unique claim both on 
men and on gods for services rendered, as well as a strong 
personal claim on zeus; (b) Hera* s hate is, at all events, 
directed personally, and even if it were not, the state of 
affairs which she brings about is one which no divine will 
should be capable of producing. For both these reasons 
Heracles* individual fate becomes, not merely symbolic of 
all human effort for betterment, but also a test case : if 
he is destroyed, no man is safe, and the idea of divine 
beneficence must be replaced by that of divine .
This representation of divine purpose, as either 
jja) evil, or (b) confused and overturned, like the human, 
by events which it has either failed to foresee or failed 
to control, or (c) limited to one special end ^igned by 
destiny, seems quite incompatible with the idea of an 
omniscient divine intelligence arranging everything for the 
best in nature. It conforms rather to a belief that there 
is in nature some material element which defies separation 
by mind, so that no practical purpose, however comprehens­
ive, could ever control the infinite complexity of the 
whole. Mind knows all things in such a way, that there is 
always something beyond it, the itself, which Anaxag­
oras may have thought of as a feature of things ultimately 
impenetrable to mind and so analogous to the * divine and 
mystic* agency of ^ .
or can there be, apart from mind, a source of 
motion, from which chance and necessity originate?
^ÂrTphys.196 b 5-7 (loc. cit.). Ross (see note ad loc. 
p.515 of his edition) thinks that this may refer either to 
Anaxagoras or to the popular cult of . Cf. Aet.1.29.7
(D.A'66). schol. Aristid. yatic.gr. 1298 (D.ibid.)
e i r y f  y y  L U ;  C-?YUy - n y v c . X y  rCv , t c X X X
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Heracles* madness belongs, like Hecuba*s slavery, 
to a world in which war is * father and king*, for though 
Heracles is by nature and preference the friend of man and 
god, yet Lycus has made Thebes a hostile city, and Iris* 
reassurance to the Chorus is a declaration of total war on 
Heracles (825). In the teturn from Hades, fortune * s reverse 
has already begun, and the change of accustomed background 
corresponds to the falsification of human relationships 
brought about by the victory of the Greeks in the Hecuba.
Servius, commenting on Virgil Aen.7.337, quotes a 
statement by some Euripidean demon that she has more than 
one aspect: she is fortune, nemesis, fate and necessity.^ 
Lyssa, coerced, makes no such claim, but she plunges Heracles 
into a whirl of communicated motion, which is both the turn 
of time and the recoil of his strange destiny.
The violent shaking which Lyssa produces, and the 
suggestion of an eddy in her movements, seem to indicate 
confusion of the »up and down* ways in nature due to the 
entry of an extraneous motion which, coming directly from 
a divine source, may be thought of as a renewal of the 
primal unrest of the . in nature herself, such
confusion would be an abnormality, since even when related 
to her own ultimate laws it can be defined only as the 
negative of the order to which they have given rise and 
which for the time being they destroy. The sign of this 
destruction is (a) the inferior consciousness that goes 
with it in Heracles, and (b) his later sense of outlawry
from man and nature, which, carried to its farthest point,
would deny him passage over land and sea and set him 
rotating on a wheel like ixion*s. in the image of an aerial 
wheel there is not only a spatial *no man*s l a n d * b u t  also 
an eternal lack of rest or , both of which seem to
point past nature to the strife of the «v .
:Eur .fr7io22KT~* Secundum Euripidem/ in cuius tragoedia dicit 
furia se non esse unius potestatis, sed se fortunam, se 
nemesin, se fatum, se esse necessitatem.* Cf. Dio Chrys.
64.8 (Nauck ibid.).
^Qf. fr.448N, pro bus on virg.E£l.6.31 p.11.25 r.i"' L - n A
T T r AcL j  of ^  (V 6  V by  C  , '
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Transmitted through his own nature and passions, 
Lyssa*s impulse is in turn received from a superior divine 
power, who^is perhaps a link with the Pythagorean prototype 
of atomism rather than with the more materialistic conception 
of Leucippus. At the same time, since madness is not a 
normal psychical condition, we must look to the ways in which 
this necessity can re-enter the world as it is now arranged.
(a) There is the old notion of the , which
preserves the distinction between mortal and divine by 
reversing any tendency to encroach on its own prerogative.
(b) There is the notion of , which limits the
without sharing its nature, and which, as a principle of 
form, may shape it according to its own pattern, (c) There 
is the Heraclitean version of the wt- ç U Ç oç , which makes life 
and death, mortal and immortal, continuous and reversible.
(d) There is the classing of certain states as * death*, so 
that both physical v i c o ç and religious pessimism can be 
assigned together to the same world, which is not the world 
of normal human experience.
The cycle of mortal existence normally assumed by 
Euripides^is not concerned with individual survival, but to 
set human fortunes in their most general relation to an 
inevitable natural process, of which human activity may, in 
particular cases, become a part, e.g.^ in the act of burial, 
or in human cooperation with Time * s justice, in the Heracles 
there is a different , an exception to the general
rule which is nevertheless hailed as striking confirmation 
of it.
 ^The^Pythagorean Ecphantus of Syracuse held an atomic theory 
in which motion was caused *by a divine power which he calls 
mind and soul *, Hippol.Ref.1.15, R.P.76 b.
 ^AS in fr.839N Chrysippus, 757N Hypsipyle, Aleest.962 f.,
H.p.655-72.
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Owing to circumstances in Thebes, the return from 
Hades coincides with an act of punishment, in which Time 
reveals the essential of Heracles and the of
his opponent. This turns to divine revenge, which initiates 
Heracles into misfortune, revealing first a darker side to 
his » divine* nature, then the supreme wretchedness of his 
whole existence. On recognising his act he contemplates 
past and future together as a unified state of misery which, 
unless ended by death, threatens to become an eternity. 
Theseus then shows him that the burden which the individual 
cannot bear is tolerable when shared by the whole human 
community.
AS a reversal, Heracles* act is part of the TryfoLç 
which brings him back from the dead] it ends his divine 
immunity and plunges him into mortal suffering. Taken as 
a revelation of his destiny, it extends death to include 
his whole life from cradle to grave, suggesting a different 
cycle in which birth is death and the human soul passes 
alone through aeons of termless misery. This is shown to 
be an impossible conception, and we are restored to the 
normal world of common humanity, in which misfortune is a 
bond between man and man, as it is a limit between man and 
god. If god were to suffer, his suffering would indeed be 
infinite, but misfortune has shown Heracles to be, not god, 
but man.
The establishment of this boundary suggests a 
conclusion as paradoxical as He^racles* disbelief in divine 
wickedness ; that the misfortune which restores him to 
mankind is somehow better than the immunity which left him 
its potential enemy. Chance too is a sophist: taking as 
fee the dearest of our own, she makes us wise.^
^pr. 458N (Cresphontes) ^
\ c-y € Bi-4 TujV fyy-OJV <j t X'
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The necessity on which chance depends can be 
defined by two factors ; (1) the spatio-temporal scheme in 
which reversal occurs, and (2) the kind of reversal that 
takes place within it. m  the Heracles , both are variable 
according to the changing interpretations with which we are 
presented, but there are two fixed points ; the return from 
Hades and the intervention of lyssa, we know, therefore, 
that Heracles* madness is part of a ±n which death is
included as a phase of human experience, and that, outside 
such experience, the ideas associated with it have no power 
to mould events that cannot be counteracted or at least 
mitigated by the combined effort of human beings. If men 
will realise that misfortune, not war, is * common*, there 
will be no need to put even the blame upon god.
In Heracles* madness we see a world of spiritual 
death that is essentially * false*, and a world of physical 
necessity that is essential * real *, but experienced only 
acL \  This is the material with which
mind has to work, and with common purpose and common 
feeling, banish Destiny as an * empty name* out of the 
universe.^
^Aet.iv.9.8 (Leucippus D.A.32).
^Alex. de fato 2 \fye-^  yy / ^<yv.,
( / 1  ^ f ' >'
y\yC ' ( T U f ~ * X 4 K<rYo\r To LrTP -r t. y O pi. ,
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TROADES (415 B.C.)
The Troades might be described as a set of 
^^^i^^ions on the theme « r^ rC /
This is made clear by the prospect of Athena*s vengeance: 
in the hour of victory, god has changed sides.
First Poseidon, then the human figure of Hecuba, 
syrabolisex the spirit of Troy, that waste of suffering which 
the Greeks too must cross. Athena can express only the hate 
which pursues friend and foe alike - the caprice, the falsity 
of power that wears immorality like a crown, poseidon, as 
lord of the sea and Troy*s lover, can deduce destruction 
from its cause; in a city*s smoke it is written *he too shall 
perish*.
When a city is destroyed there is a desert, not 
only for the human soul but for the gods, whose compact with 
man is ended, but who can seek fresh alliances among them­
selves. It was in vain we worshipped, but when worship 
ceases, nature herself takes back those familiar forms.
There is justice, but it is not within the frame of 
law; what is done involves both agent and victim in a moral 
'eyyjyU. . Man has no resource in god or god in man; whereas 
Athena strengthened human hands for the sack of Troy, the 
weapons she will now use are those of thunderbolt and storm. 
This, then, is the which unites god with god, and
man with man, in common vengeance and common disaster.
AS queen and mother, Hecuba is still supreme in 
sorrow, and through her changing relations to each character 
in turn, has a continuous part in the series of episodes or 
phases of woe, by which the roles of victor and vanquished 
are seen together as a single wrong.
Cassandra, the clairvoyant, points out the superior 
miseries of the Greeks on a rather obvious level; her own 
extravagent joy at being a bride of death to Agamemnon shows 
that the mad priestess has the * divine* rather than the 
human outlook. Here, Greek and barbarian stand level in a 
union which provokes a curious sense of shared ,
and Talthybius* disgust at his lord*s choice anticipates his 
later horror at the child-murder which the victors consider 
needful to consolidate their ten years* work at Troy.
^Democritus D.B.ll, and plato passim.
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The note of revenge is sounded again when Hecuba, 
as if making common cause with the Greeks, implores Menelaus 
to punish Helen, since Helen represents , the witchery
that destroys men and cities (892-4, 967), it is an even 
more effective * way of justice* that leads her back once 
more to the land of Greece.
The fate of Andromache and Astyanax typifies all 
that is unnatural and * barbarous* in the outcome of war; 
there can be no more poignant symbol of injustice done and 
suffered than the child*s body lying in his father*s shield. 
Thia is pure sorrow, and pure wrong, inflicted not only on 
the innocent but on the unresisting. Men have killed Troy*s 
past, they seek to kill her future, but Hecuba reflects 
that suffering, not prosperity, is projected across the 
centuries by the poet*s song.
Trojans and Greeks together await the signal for 
departure - * one word with two forms* - and Hecuba is held 
back from the flames of her city. To the music of wild 
lament, Troy rises in smoke to crash again before our eyes, 
in the wake of its desolation, dare we deem ourselves 
*masters of the sea*?
26o I
ELECTRA (c.413), ION, ORESTES (4o8).
It is hard to resist the conclusion that the 
Apolline plays were written to discredit either the Delphic 
oracle or the false which it is taken to represent.
They are not tragedies in the full sense, since (except in '
lon)^ the god is shown in connexion with vicious or
unstable types of human character. i
I
The impulse of revenge, with its confused emotional 
background, is now presented less as a fundamental law of 
nature to which human beings must, given certain provocation, 
inevitably conform, than as a sickness of perverted minds 
which have reached the same * unnatural * state by a quasi­
natural process of degeneration, due partly to heredity 
and partly to the effect of crime on character. Ruin is 
hastened by the unscrupulous theorists who cause others to 
put into practice and so reap the reward of their own false 
persuasion. The individual can, it seems, neither combat 
these influences nor evade the consequences of cooperating 
with them, for where a god can in the twinkling of an eye 
reverse the relations of * friend* and * foe*, a human being 
similarly constituted has the makings either of a lunatic 
or of a rhetorician.
Euripides is still tracing the element of change­
fulness and confusion in human nature to its two sources : 
the instability of the emotions and the inadequate 
moral theories which promote and foster them, while his 
own belief in nature * s justice leads him to sympathise with 
even the most unnatural of her children, he sees their 
as inflamed, not healed, by the deceptive creeds of which 
Delphi*s claim to oracular infallibility may be taken as 
the prime example, as reputed god of healing and truth, 
Apollo is the arch-deceiver, for his mantic decrees are 
in essence a *private* wisdom, coinciding with all that is 
insecure and destructive in human nature.
^Even here the deceptive oracle is suitably given to the 
stupid and selfish xuthus. Creusa*s outbreak is the result 
of Apollo * s wrongs, past and present, and ion must be 
presumed too young to know any better i rX B c - , Ar.E.N.
1128 b 16-8, 1095 a 4).
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The wisdom of Apollo
Through his connexion with and M:/ ,
ApolloHs more or less the patron god of Italian philosophy, 
which (at least in its popular forms) tends to ground moral­
ity on obedience to the will of heaven, which constitutes 
( Iambi .v^p ,174 f. ). But in so far as these studies 
are influenced by Heraclitean and post-Heraclitean views,^ 
Apollo cannot be presumed to take a one-sided interest in 
his subject, and his behaviour is, therefore, of first 
importance in any comparison of rival •
According to the Hippocratean (appended by
Diels to the fragments of Heraclitus), both and
are human imitations of , which is equivalent to a
divine legislature^(11); man*s knowledge of his own nature 
is like , a form of inference (12), and it is part
of human folly that acts performed lawfully and unlawfully 
are one and the same; sc. we teach children 
K - A . (24).
The author of jpialexeis (D.ii.90, p.4o5 f. ) states 
that of the two opinions current on morals (a) that good 
and bad are different (b) that they are the same, he holds 
to the latter, since the same thing may be good and bad to 
different persons or to the same persons at different times,
e.g. disease may be *good* for the doctor, though *bad* for 
the patient (1.3). Orestes and Alcmaeon are cited as 
examples of variation in justice ; tL; i J r J r u . ^  S . A o c . o v
^ /tTt X  0  ^  K - p i j  A  X /(yu. c>-10.J y  ’ At o B  a-o ; ^ fi" f. f t  /Ca<-« pt o( u TT» i «y ^  ot~4 ( 3 . 9 )  .
His "spec ial~c one ern is also dietetics, on which the 
Pythagoreans laid such stress, both from the moral and from 
the medical point of view, iambl.y,p.2Q8 (D.pyth.sch.D.8), 
Eur.Suppl.205, fr. 892N.
Music is, in one of its aspects, equivalent to psychology, 
and so carried on in the art of the À o y p f . of. Gorgias* 
comparison between the effect of on the soul (sc. the 
) and that of drugs on the body (Hel.Enc.l4).
 ^This view of the divine ordering of nature seems due to 
Pythagorean influence, or to that of Diogenes, which is 
shown in other works of the same school (D.Diog.Ap.C.2-3a). 
But the insistence that even nature*s exceptions are 
according to her law, is Heraclitean.
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The Heraclitean theory of nature gives priority 
both to the divine , for which all is fair and. good and 
right, and to the , who knows what is * common*, as
opposed to the folly or *private wisdom* of the many.
The naturalistic and egoistical moral theories 
current in the fifth century seem to arise from a combinat­
ion of L ^ o c /o . /  with (both of which derive
indirectly from Heraclitus), but at the same time to accept 
the Pythagorean notion of as imposed by a superior
power, ? in its own interest, cf. Gorgias Hel.6
“p- c-v  ^f /I ^  ^ ^  f ï N. N. ^
TD ‘y<r<Toi/ t/rro T7-U /c ^  <r<7 ^ r  j  C/dC-/  ^ ^  S^r
f/ j c i s - b y  e m ; - ( . 6 c c ^ , is also identified with
the opinions of the many by which the ruler himself is not 
bound, cf. the doctrine attacked by the Anonymus lamblichi 
6 p. l o o , 5 (D.ii.89, p .4o 2 ) ,  who points out the fallacy of 
supposing that one man could be * stronger* than the many. 
Protagoras himself, as a thoroughgoing phenomenalist, seems 
to have viewed rather differently, since he allows
that one belief may be better though not truer than another 
(plat.Theaet.166 d f.); yet even he gives superiority to 
the eu ( T e j i ^ c , who is able to persuade others to his own 
views.
The debate in the phoenissae (409 f.) implies that 
the original Pythagorean idea of as a form of divine
rule has been modified to meet the new naturalism; where 
Eteocles argues that tyranny is and that it is
to lose the more and take the less (509), Jocasta 
replies by pointing to the equality preserved in nature and 
its subservience to human interest (541-6). The beneficence 
of the deity, seen not in but in the ordering of nature, 
might well have been put forward to counter the assumption 
that rule is primarily in the ruler* s interest and that 
divine or quasi-divine superiority is itself a form of
. According to the same or a similar view ( guppl. 
201 f. and Hippocr. 0 . 11), the divine intelligence
teaches men to imitate its processes, and where human know­
ledge fails, there is to guide us ( Suppl.211, TT-.L/o^ .r^ c
11—2).
 ^lSr7phoen3o3"fT7~’Thûc75T8274737ÏQ5 .2, of7~he debate"in 
the Antiope from which Callicles quotes, plat.Gorg.485 e. 
Archelaus of Athens may have been the first to develop a 
subjectivist theory of morals (D.A.1-2).
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Of what sort, then, is the wisdom of Apollo? Is
he the moral healer, the expert in whose skill is used
for his patient»s benefit rather than his own, making good 
some deficiency in human knowledge, according to laws which 
are universally acceptable to all mankind? Or does he 
fasten upon moral disease as a means to his own ends,
however those ends are to be conceived?
Or is he merely behind the times, applying crude
methods of cautery* and surgery, irrespective of the nature
of the persons most nearly concerned?
K pU  oc X  i y O  /CXV TJ-tlC-,!/ ACptT'e* ^  é-'îi'oC T  »<,ç . ^
In the ion, Apollo not only tells a lie, but shows himself 
twice ignorant, or once ignorant and once regardless, of 
female psychology, all but wrecking his own schemes by 
provoking the woman he has wronged to revenge and attempted 
murder.
in the Electra he decrees matricide, perhaps the 
most striking feature of the play is the virtual 
which follows the crime, as a prelude to the Dioscuri*s 
verdict that Apollo is chiefly guilty (1177 f., 1246, 1296,
1302). From this we are not to infer, like the author of
pialexeis, that right and wrong are variable notions, but 
that Apollo was, in this case at least, a blind guide.
C  ' ^ (1246). Is the oracle an
exception to Apollo’s wisdom, or does it reveal the
essential nature of a which can, through misuse of
its divine sanction, make the worse appear the better 
cause? Glytemnestra*s death is just, but the act of 
killing her is unjust, since it is jjunsuited both to the 
nature of the agents and to the nature of the god, whom 
it associates with criminals and murderers.
The sudden repentance suggests that, however 
debased the nature from which it sprang, so unnatural an 
act could not be done ’with knowledge’ in the proper sense.
The comes from Apollo, and the sobering effect of
actual performance is a sign that passion had obscured 
what Aristotle would call ’perception of the particular 
fact »•
Heraclitus 61 (Byw.)
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The act can be interpreted, as both vicious and 
involuntary, only as the joint work of brother and sister, 
neither of whom would have been capable of performing it 
without the other, where Orestes is misled by the oracle, 
yet, near the moment of execution, doubts whether an 
in the likeness of the god spoke so unholy a command (899), 
Electra, consumed by jealous passion, lures her mother to 
her doom and even helps to drive home the sword (1225). 
Orestes himself has not seen his mother since childhood, 
and he is not present at Qlytemnestra»s last colloquy with 
the daughter whom her own counsels and Aegisthus * harshness 
(again so bitterly corrupted.
The contrast with the noble nature of the peasant, 
on which Orestes comments at length ( A c
368 f. ), helps to show both brother and sister 
as degenerateshe weakminded, excitable, easily led, she 
frustrated and embittered by the pseudo-marriage with 
poverty, which denies her even the modest joys and comforts 
which home-life would otherwise have provided her.
Apollo’s worst fault is his ignorance or disregard 
of the inevitable effects of such an act on the human agents 
whose passions avail to carry it through, but not to support 
its consequences. His condemnation is that the oracle could 
have been accepted only by depraved or unstable minds, led 
by self-interest or sense of grievance, but requiring the 
spur of a religious emotionalism which turns, once the deed 
is done, to an equally wild orgy of repentance. It is from 
these associations that, while partly exonerating the human 
agents, we read in their nature the character of the god.
AS a notorious anti-feminist, Apollo might have 
been expected to support Orestes* claims against his mother, 
but Euripides is careful to show us that the vengeance is 
not a case of male against female reckoning. There is no 
justice here which can be elevated into a law of human 
society, and the divine sanction is, as in Plato’s Euthyphro , 
essentially subversive of accepted human standards. The 
wisdom of Apollo coincides with the of vice and the
of passion - ’just’ only because it is the principle of 
a nature formed by the earlier crime, which is now repaid.
of .1084-5 : I ' T ' A
550-1, 405, 422-3. '
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^  I K . M  ^ Kc*, ^  C-i  ^ C u  f  I ^ Ç (1244)#
Clytemnestra suffers justly, less because she has her 
deserts than because she has by her own act blasted the 
moral nature of the children who destroy her. go even 
Electra wins forgiveness through Apollo (1296), and is 
given her chief need, a husband and a home (1311). Orestes 
too will finally be acquitted, since Apollo will take the 
blame upon himself (1267). The god does not repudiate his 
responsibility, but does not such an advocate, and the 
equal vote, imply a verdict ’guilty but insane*?
In the Orestes, the hero is smitten with a strange 
disease: not only does he have hallucinations at which his 
patron has bidden him shoot arrows, but at times he cannot 
speak without uttering an antithesis or sophism in almost 
every sentence (386 f.). is Orestes even wearing the comic 
mask of the sophist, wild and pale?^ The scheme which he 
puts into operation is conceived by the same cunning brain 
that spun the earlier crime (l09o); again lunacy and soph­
istry go hand and hand, and Apollo, turning hate to love as 
easily as love to hate, proves to Orestes’ satisfaction and 
our own, that his was the voice that decreed the matricide.
The humour of the Orestes is the means of making 
madness, in this case, untragic ; of revealing its incongru­
ities and at the same time its affinities with the vicious 
and debased both in argument and in character.
In these three plays, though Apollo exhibits d 
certain callousness in regard to human nature, he acts 
apparently without ill-intent, in the Andromache, however, 
where passion and vice are similarly studied as degenerate 
human conditions rather than as a link with nature’s law, 
he actively aids his protege in murder and wife-stealing. 
Even in the Alcestis, again with the best intentions, he 
plays fast and loose with life and death, involving husband 
and wife in the impossible position, where one must live at 
the expense of the other. Alcestis, through her more rapid 
intuition of the horn of the dilemma, leaves her husband in 
a plight as unenviable as it is odious, and if it were not 
for the courage and commonsense of Heracles, Admetus would 
have no cause to bless the god, nor Alcestis any ground for 
congratulating herself upon her rescue.
^Of.385 (Menelaus) Z  ^ and the
conversation which follows.
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we may conclude, then, that Apollo’s wisdom is 
one which, in the name of nature, does violence to nature 
herself, and in the name of justice, enforces the law in 
those cases in which the law itself demands an exception. 
Although morality may ultimately rest on some divine basis, 
it is a retrograde step to resort to on moral
questions, and once law and justice have been given into 
the hands of the community, no ad hoc pronouncement or 
specific religious sanction can justify action that is 
contrary to accepted standards. Apollo’s may be seen
in the arts which men have developed from his teaching, 
but it is an not a god, that answers from the
sacred shrine.
The Art of illusion
we have been left with an alternative : either the 
god of Delphi is like a physician using his knowledge to 
promote not health but disease, or his art is, like the 
rationality of a disordered mind, a form of (El.971-
2 ) and his oracular utterances merely 
(1302).
Hippocrates tt. 12 seems to mean that human
nature is like because we infer seen from unseen,
unseen from seen, and our understanding is derived from 
that which has none, etc. Even if god is perfect in this 
kind of inference, his oracle could be a prediction, not 
a command, and the unveiling of what nature herself has 
hidden may, like raising the dead, be a doubtful boon to 
men.
The comparison of to was made by
Gorgias; just as some drugs destroy life, so can
with an evil persuasion drug and bewitch the soul (Hel.l4). 
The part played by the understanding in such cases is at 
best ambiguous; although consciousness and memory may be 
preserved and some form of ratiocination take place, the 
subject is not in the ordinary sense; so the sleeper
may string together words and images, and the drunken man 
recite verses of Empedocles (Ar.E.N.1147 b 13).
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The limitations of human knowledge give their
fatal power, but are not necessarily the sign of
knowledge. God should be wiser than man, but Euripides 
seems to be suggesting that is one of the many voices
of the irrational, the illusion of knowledge rather than 
the reality. It is either the illusion of knowledge or the 
knowledge of illusion; that it seems to have power to 
predict and even to control the course of events is no 
criterion of its reliability, for its characteristics are 
fixed by its source, and those who follow it take the easy 
road to destruction.
in the Troades, Helen was brought back to Greece 
as T T f J c L  , that fatal charm which man knows to be evil, yet 
against which he cannot steel his heart, in the Helen,
Helen of Troy is a phantom which Hera has made out of air, 
so like Helen of Sparta that until she flies up into the 
clouds, no one could say which is the ’real» Helen. Indeed, 
who can ever say, which is the true daughter of Zeus?
words, true or false, come without fee or toil 
from the deeps of air (fr. 978n ), and phenomenalism has 
created a problem, which will meet us again in the Eacchae. 
If god is an illusionist, where can we find the ’measure’ 
of his world?
Is there a single divine medium, in which the 
’idols’ of fancy, as well as those of experience, are born? 
Gorgias was no phenomenalist, yet he believed in the power 
of sight and speech to mould and control men’s minds, even 
without the basis of reality (Hel.Enc.8-19)
^ Cf7~Teïresïas’ remarkable story of the ’hostage’ (Bacch.288
f.). when Dionysus commands the Bacchanals to wreak 
vengeance on pentheus, he is a voice from air (1078).
 ^Cf. Bacch.303-5, where Teiresias attributes to Dionysus 
the power of routing an army which Gorgias assigns to y^/.f 
(Hel.Enc.16) , and his reference to (Bacch.325-7, cf.
Gorg.Hel.Enc.14 and 10). He also connects the god with 
(298-301).
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If ’what seems’, ’is’, and knowledge is defined 
as a practical ability to persuade, then he who can make 
appearance, can change reality. Berkeley held that the 
consistency of appearances is maintained by the goodness 
of God, and even Protagoras was prepared to affirm that 
one belief or sensation may be better (or more practically 
useful) than another.^ But if god can be ’what he wills’, 
where then is the norm for man?
T h e  simplest way to make a world, says plato, is 
to flash a mirror round every way (Rep.596 d). In the 
’mirror of Dionysus’^  we shall see nature herself ’reborn’.
^plat.Theaet.166 d f., prot.333 d (D.A.21a, 22). Cf. Bur. 
Bacch.311-2 (Teiresias to pentheus) A
T , . This is exactly protagoras’ 
position, 'cf. the key word (202).
^Kern t.209 p.227. The mirror in which Dionysus saw his own 
image before being torn to pieces by the Titans becomes a 
mystic symbol in connexion with his in the world
of nature. (Does Teiresias’ story of the ’hostage’ also 
eliminate the Titans?)
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BACGHAE (406)
With the object of establishing his own worship 
and revealing himself as a god to men, Dionysus has taken 
upon himself mortal likeness and the nature of a man (4 , 
53-5), a change which is of primary importance for the 
interpretation of the play. Throughout, it is the quasi- 
human personality of Dionysus that dominates the drama, 
that of pentheus being subordinated to it.
The Chorus do not allow us to forget the divinity 
of Dionysus, but it is in keeping with his human that
they are not satyrs or nymphs, but women of Asia, who can 
show us the character of the already established religion 
and probably something more, unlike the Theban women on 
Cithaeron, they are not ’mad’, but have accepted, heart and 
soul, a religion in which Dionysus is the chief, if not the 
only god, and in their relations with their beloved leader 
(whom they do not know as the god himself) the content of 
their spiritual life is still further elucidated.
Thebes, which is to recognise Dionysus whether she 
will or no, is essentially (39-40). According to
Cadmus, ©emele’s babe perished with her when the thunderbolt 
blasted her for lying about Zeus, and this explanation has 
been accepted by the whole family (23-31, 243-5). Dionysus 
has come to Thebes to vindicate his mother’s honour by 
showing to men the she bore to zeus (41-2); in the
circumstances, the revelation is unlikely to be a favourable 
one, and from the first the element of compulsion is 
conspicuous, semele’s sisters and the women of Thebes are 
already mad upon the mountains; the next step is to show 
himself to pentheus and all the Thebans, and thereafter to 
the rest of Greece. If the men of Thebes try to drive the 
women from the mountains by force, he will put himself at 
the head of an ’army’ of Bacchanals. This, then, is the 
purpose for which he has exchanged his own for human shape 
(53-5).
This shape is described in some detail by pentheus 
(453-9 ), who sees it as part of the major design to corrupt 
women. His constant harping on this theme is no doubt an 
idiosyncrasy of the curiously young-old king, but at the 
same time it draws attention to a much wider issue between 
Dionysus and his opponents, if not to the essential basis 
of the Dionysiac religion.
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Cadmus and Teiresias
Cadmus’ rationalisation of his daughter’â death 
had implied, not only the unchastity of women and their 
readiness to cloak it with a divine name, but also that 
such behaviour appropriately meets with a violent punish­
ment. whatever his own motive for inventing the tale, he 
has imbued his grandson with a firm belief in it (243-5). 
pentheus is not only ready to think the worst of all women, 
including his mother and aunts, but he is also eager to 
suppress the supposed evil with bonds and imprisonment, even 
with armed force, if need be. It was bad enough that Semele 
should sin, but she was at least punished for it; now some 
foreign magician is trying to make out that she was not 
punished at all, and in the name of the son she never had, 
teaching the women of Thebes to follow her example.
Cadmus has bequeathed both his royal responsibility 
and his sophism to his grandson, and now appears to throw 
both to the winds, pentheus rightly attributes the change 
to Teiresias’ influence (345), but his own conviction cannot 
be shaken by their joint persuasion, it is part of his 
tragedy that, having been brought up with so unfortunate a 
bias, he should first encounter, as apology for Dionysus, 
two such attempts to ’play the sophist’ with the god.
Teiresias’ improvement on the story of the mirac­
ulous birth is no less incompatible with pentheus’ precon­
ceived ideas, which so patent a fabrication would tend to 
confirm rather than refute. He moreover expounds Dionysus 
as the giver of wine, on the lines of prodious’ theory that 
men deify any features of nature that are especially useful 
to them; since pentheus has all the makings of a prohibit­
ionist, no argument could have been less suitable. It is 
also significant that Teiresias regards Dionysus as the 
counterpart of Demeter or ^7 , whereas corn and water are
more usually conjoined as the basic forms of human nourish­
ment, meat and winebeing viewed (at least by Pythagoreans) 
with some suspicion praising wine as the gift of sweet 
forgetfulness, the prophet shows that his is no more
than a refinement of the plain man’s opinions,"^ and though 
he mentions one or two minor points connected with the
^îâmbI7y7p72Q87~ cfriuF7supp^T^57~~fr7892N~andrinaxagoras ’
(Aet.i.3.5, D.A.46).
^Cf. the conclusion of Plato’s protagoras, where all three 
sophists accept Socrates’ amendment of the plain man’s 
hedonism.
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pentheus* attitude to Aphrodite is that of the 
: there is no sign* in the play that he has ever 
been initiated into her mysteries, but unlike Hippolytus, 
he has not the virgin mind. It is Aphrodite he attacks, 
for in Dionysus he does not believe, and the chorus rightly 
infer that only in some far-off island where the queen 
herself was loved and honoured, could the Bacchanals worship 
in security and peace.
The dream of the Chorus reminds us again of 
Empedocles* reign of bliss under Cypris, and shows how 
unrealisable is their longing under normal human conditions. 
The chief danger of an ecstatic mood is its liability to 
interruption, and when the spell is broken, the rending, 
tearing madness begins.
The exquisite beauty of the ode to Holiness shows 
the true meaning of the warning, that human subtlety is 
nothing to the gods, wisdom herself is not wise, since he 
who is ever pursuing great things may miss them when they 
are before his eyes. What has meaning and use for the 
common man is enough - but how could it be enough, if it 
were not seen and interpreted by the poet?
The capture
Dionysus is brought in like some creature from 
the wilds, and pentheus, commenting on his charm, makes 
clear that he does not himself possess it.^ The contrast 
in appearance between the adversaries is probably as marked 
as the contrast in manner, and it is soon apparent that 
the prey which pentheus has ensnared has in fact ensnared 
pentheus. So he will try, quite unnecessarily, to prevent 
his prisoner’s escape; in reality, it is his own escape 
which is impossible.
^No maidens will cut their hair for pentheus, but his 
charges against Dionysus are reminiscent of Theseus’ 
dislike of his son’s (Hipp.952-7).
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pentheus is shown once more as the ’uninitiate*, 
who stands at the threshold of knowledge but against whom, 
through his own hardness of heart, the door is barred.
Here is one who could tell him all he longs to know: what 
are the rites, and what is the god’s true form? when the 
god himself returns a true but evasive answer, pentheus 
accuses him of trying to provoke the curiosity which he 
already feels. Foiled, he returns in self-defence to his 
own theory, which he imagines confirmed by the admission 
that the rites take place mainly at nightthough the god 
correctly points out that evil can happen just as easily 
by day.
Teiresias, who knows his stuff up to a point, had 
faked the language of mystery in his admonitions to 
Pentheus, and the half-truth, half-nonsense of the earlier 
scene prepares the way for the genuine ’magician’s act’ 
which we now have from Dionysus, as well as the later 
handling of the mad pentheus. That the spell is worked 
mainly through a certain use of language seems clear from 
the effect which Dionysus’ replies have on pentheus; they 
cannot be merely ignored, but overthrow reason as they 
baffle it, gradually eliciting the response of pentheus’ 
own nature to the personality of the god before him.
Cadmus and Teiresias had confirmed him in error 
and provoked him to violence, but without affecting the 
main course of action; his nature has been shown as 
antipathetic to the folly of age, but he has not hitherto 
come into direct contact with any power that could 
seriously assail his reason or direct his passions. Now, 
having felt both the fascination and the impenetrability 
of the stranger, he cannot rest until he has probed the 
secret or killed it. since it is clearly impossible to 
do either, his violence and madness must steadily increase 
up to the point when he becomes the god’s plaything: 
himself the execrable evil that he pictured, and the god 
in his own former role of judge and hangman.^
^pentheus threateiyk the god with beheading (241), hanging 
( 246), stoning (^56f, and he attempts to stab him (631).
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This is the real meaning of 73 ; it is
a fight to the finish in which victory can never be won 
nor defeat admitted. The charge which pentheus brings 
against Dionysus cannot be refuted, except by turning the 
accuser himself into a , and the god into an
impersonation of his own victim.
Revenge
pentheus is not in any sense a pleasant young man, 
and his order to destroy Teiresias* fillets and mantic 
paraphernalia is matched by his threats against the curls 
and thyrsus of the stranger. So glorious a creature must 
be caverned in the dark (»Do your dancing there*, says 
Pentheus ominously), and although Dionysus can promise us 
he will escape, the chorus, not knowing him as the god, 
must have suffered acutely, prom now on they regard 
pentheus as a beast in human form, and their desire for 
revenge is no less fierce than the god’s, though for a 
different reason.
The futility of pentheus’ attack is shown by 
events within the palace, but the provocation to the god 
is measured less by our own knowledge of the stranger’s 
identity than by the anxiety of the chorus, who imagine him 
to be in real danger, in describing his escape, Dionysus 
still distinguishes his human and divine roles, but as he 
comforts the terrified women his relation to them as lover 
and guardian as well as god becomes apparent.
An attack on his worshippers implies hostility to 
Dionysus, yet, apart from mere refusal to worship, no 
violence can be offered to him directly, qua deity. ’In 
wronging me you lead him to prison,’ Dionysus tells 
pentheus (518), and not until the latter’s attention is 
diverted from the prisoner before him to the women on the 
mountains, does the god destroy him. prom this point of 
view it is dramatically essential that Dionysus and his 
human representative should be one and the same person, 
giving, by means of this literal identity, a clear and 
concrete meaning to the mystic union of god and worshipper, 
and forecasting the magical powers which even the Bacchailals 
possess of turning the tables upon their attackers. Both 
the persecution of Dionysus and his revenge imply human 
vulnerability, as well as divine inviolacy.
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That pentheus fails to realise the full import of 
events within the palace is not surprising, since he is 
himself the victim at which the whole deception is aimed.
The god intends not to convince and overawe pentheus with 
his magical powers, but to frustrate and confuse him; the 
element of miracle is evident only to the Chorus and to 
the spectator - and its true explanation is evident only 
to the spectator, to whom the god has already revealed the 
secret of his identity. Only the spectator understands 
that in attacking the stranger pentheus is literally, not 
virtually, attacking the god.
Dionysus’ account of these events is by no means 
clear, but a general impression is given that pentheus, 
though not yet mad, is made to behave like a madman through 
the violence of his own anger and the illusions by which 
the god misdirects it. To some extent the Chorus and the 
spectator are also included in the illusion, for in 
distinguishing his role from that of the god, the stranger 
contrasts his own and not only with
Pentheus’ mad rage and useless effort, but also with the 
measures of revenge taken by the god. The multiplicity of 
divine form that confuses pentheus is represented in the 
narrative by the shifting play of mood between the god and 
his captor, to which the half-illusory turmoil around them 
forms a common background. In binding the bull, pentheus 
sweats and mouths in animal fury; in pursuing the phantom 
he attempts to match his physical movements to the swift 
feints of an unsubstantial enemy. So the leap of fire from 
Semele’s tomb is made to reflect in the palace, and whether 
or not part of the building actually falls in ruin, we are 
left with the impression of a master-magician on the one 
hand, and on the other a victim half-impotent, half-deluded, 
but wholly at the mercy of the smiling stranger with whom 
he has become so fatally ’involved’, and from whom, as he 
himself complains (8 0 0 ), he cannot now break loose, even if 
he would.
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The stranger’s assumption that he and Dionysus 
are not one, but two persons, falsifies the position in 
two ways ; the god is not in fact rescuing a devotee, but 
retaliating on pentheus, and the stranger’s calm is not 
( - t r . y y ^ < £ b u t  the reflection of his essential divine 
superiority - a provocation the more subtle in that it 
coincides with pentheus’ own denial of the divinity of 
Dionysus, pentheus attacks the stranger in the belief 
that he is what he pretends to be, and on the same ground 
Dionysus shows the attack to be a moral evil. At the same 
time the divinity which pentheus denies and which the 
stranger disclaims confronts us as an active but ambiguous 
force somewhere between the aloofness of the stranger and 
the violence of pentheus.
The palace-miracle makes it clear that although 
the god chooses in human form to assume the part of 
there lies behind this smiling serenity a divine nature 
as savage as that of pentheus himself, and that the <ro<j> 
which he represents as forbearance (641) is in reality 
directed to a very different end. The contrast between 
the human and divine personae of the god, first made 
explicit in the scene within the palace, rearranges the 
triangular pattern of the contest so as to point out the 
affinity between the attitudes of pentheus and the divine 
revenge which they evoke, and to which they later serve 
as a means.
//
If the stranger had been, as he pretends to be, 
an example of human restraint and patience in the face of 
unprovoked assault, his conduct would have been, as he 
claims, supremely virtuous, and the part of the god who 
rescues him above reproach; as it is, the true measure of 
his pretended quietism, and the true purport of the god’s 
intervention, can be seen in the effect on pentheus. just 
as pentheus reacts with increasing violence first to the 
human personality of Dionysus and then to the revelation 
of his divine power, so the divine revenge, promised and 
foreshadowed by events within the palace, is adapted 
partly to follow and partly to control the swiftly 
developing moods and ’nature’ of pentheus.
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pentheus, son of £chion
Apparently oblivious of all except that his 
prisoner has escaped, pentheus nevertheless carries the 
marks of his encounter in the next scene, both in the 
hardening of his obsession and in the changed motive of 
his attack. At first he was chiefly concerned as a ruler 
with the punishment and prevention of a disorderly vice; 
now he openly invites and welcomes the vice, in order to 
have the opportunity of punishing it.
in this frame of mind he listens to the herdsman’s 
story, part of which he accepts (in spite of the element 
of miracle) and part of which he entirely disregards. 
Condemning the retaliation of the women as a , he
proposes to lead an army against them; at this point,.as we 
know from the prologue, Dionysus must effectively intervene 
His offer to bring the Bacchanals to pentheus is rejected 
as a trick; then, as the king persists in his call to arms, 
the god suddenly dissipates his violence by a second offer, 
to lead pentheus to the women on the mountains.
This sudden change from violence to curiosity, 
from persecutor to spy, is so striking that it clearly 
marks the turning point of the play. Attention has already 
been caught by the opening .. ( 8o2 ) and the offer
to bring the Bacchanals to pentheus; pentheus suspects a 
trap and then immediately falls into it, by accepting the 
offer to guide him to the Bacchanals.
The second offer is the exact reverse of the 
first, which pentheus would presumably have accepted, if 
he had wished to settle his quarrel with Dionysus peace­
ably. He sees it, however, as a device to perpetuate the 
revels; the second proposal he seems to regard as the 
stranger’s capitulation (8o3), since it accords with his 
own desire.
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At the beginning of the scene, he had wished to 
hear a horrific narrative, in order to have the stronger 
motive for punishing the stranger; now he will take the 
stranger as guide to view with his own eyes those wanton 
scenes which, in spite of the messenger’s report, are 
indelibly fixed in his imagination. Through his opposition 
to the god, pentheus has already fallen into the contra­
diction of wishing evil to happen, in order that it may be 
punished; it is but one step further to desire the evil for 
its own sake, and so to transform the anger and resentment 
of the outraged ruler into the to gaze upon these
painful sights, sitting quietly under a pine (813-6).
There is no reason to suppose that pentheus has 
from the first been actuated by a suppressed longing to 
witness the behaviour he condemns, and his transformation 
from stern moralist to contemptible spy is brought about 
by a subtler and far more sinister magic than the mere 
eliciting of a deep-seated, hitherto unconscious motive, 
just as the flame smouldering in semele’s tomb is made to 
leap up in the palace, so the slander which he has been 
taught, and which he has fixed upon the worshippers of 
Dionysus, now bears its bitter fruit in pentheus’ own 
soul. The young ruler’s attitude to the Bacchanals is the 
consequence of his unshakable conviction of Semele’s guilt, 
and as long as he denies the divinity of Dionysus, so long 
he must believe in the unchastity of women. It is the old 
error of condemning the female, for evil which the god 
here shows to rest entirely in the eye of the beholder.
The state of affairs which pentheus imagines is not so, 
but he cannot be convinced, any more than the god can be 
brought to admit that, even if it were so, it would be any 
reason for discontinuing his worship.
What, then, has Dionysus done? He has changed, 
not pentheus’ belief, but his emotional attitude to it. 
pain, the impulse to retaliate, has fled before the god’s 
sweet narcotic ; anger is transmuted to strong desire, and 
the spring of pentheus’ violence is seen to be the same as 
that of the imaginative bias which supports it. The ’true 
nature'of Echion’s son stands revealed, yet this is not 
what the god promised. The god promised to reveal himself 
to pentheus.
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’Revelation’ meant ’revenge’; yet pentheus’ 
longing is not merely a freak of his own nature. The 
poison is his own, but its sweetness is Dionysus, and 
the source of this strange is the warning of its
ultimate outcome, once again, the god and his victim have 
changed roles, and as pentheus’ sense of injury fades, the 
divine revenge begins.
Cadmus’ sophism has been converted, through its 
development in pentheus, to the obscenity of madness, 
pentheus is mad, not because he has been all along opposing 
a natural instinct in himself, but because he is inevitably 
overpowered by the attraction of Dionysus, yet irrevocably 
committed to a wrong explanation.
pentheus is deluded and mocked; but the element 
of comedy in his madness, which amuses the god, has, for 
the spectator, already been exploited by the earlier 
appearance of cadmus and Teiresias. The repetition both 
clarifies the purpose of the present scene and endows it 
with an unexampled tragic significance. All conflict has 
suddenly been resolved in this horrifying reconciliation; 
both the god, his victim, and the Chorus are perfectly 
satisfied with the course of events, but we are shown, in 
that instant, the grimace behind the comic mask, and the 
’true nature’ of the Lenaean Dionysus.
u O f  i f  o  Ç ^  &  Ù Ç
we have seen that pentheus’ picture of the 
Bacchanals was, like Teiresias» carefully rationalised and 
expurgated version, an extension of the plain man’s view 
of the ’escape’ afforded by Dionysus (773, 230-3). Like 
Jason, he misunderstands the primitive and passionate 
nature of women, applying civilised censure to conduct that 
is quite outside its range, yet his insistence on his own 
view of the revels, no less than the herdsman’s description 
and the songs of the chorus, aids our interpretation of 
the source and spring of the Dionysiac worship.
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The women of Dionysus are neither inebriated 
nor incontinent, but they experience, through the-divine 
madness, a fulfilment which links their nature to the 
teeming life of earth, as it flows with milk and wine and 
honey, and to the wild things on the mountains which they 
themselves either nourish or tear. This revivi^cation or 
’rebirth’, sensuous, emotional, magical, is an which
does not, like Aphrodite, bring female to male but rather 
sets them at variance. It severs the women from all 
normal relationships and connexions with their kind - 
from husband or lover or child - and unites them with the 
non-human forces in external nature with which their own 
female is essentially in harmony.
Dionysus absorbs the whole nature of his 
worshippers, and his madness, as experienced by women, is. 
identical with the total impulse of the feminine nature 
in its most primitive and elemental aspect : if woman is 
revengeful, so is Dionysus, and his claims, sweeping aside 
her normal interests and ties, are primary and absolute.
So Agave slays her son, and the god vindicates his mother’s 
honour by utterly destroying the family to which he is, on 
the human side, a ’kinsman’ ( 1250).
To aid his revenge, the god assumed human form, 
and perhaps for that very reason seems not out of place 
among the ’human’ beings whose essential humanity he 
destroys. The Dionysiac magic is a power which simulates 
natural growth, yet ignores both natural boundaries and 
natural ties - like the music of Orpheus, stirring and 
controlling nature, yet, as it cuts across nature’s limits, 
creating a world of illusion, akin to the monstrous and 
grotesque, the perverse and the obscene.
This unnatural element appears most clearly in 
pentheus, but it also permeates the whole play, as if the 
spectator must be wooed into taking magic seriously by 
seeing it in a context of buffoonery and sadistic folly.
SO pentheus’ ’commonsense’ explanation becomes an emotional 
obsessMon, and the violence of which his strange ’love’ 
is born is another sign of the identity of opposites in 
the Dionysiac continuum.
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The worship of Dionysus consists in movement ; 
dancing - the rush of life that is never still - the”"flow 
of the senses and desire - an emotional A -  - & beating
of the foot and a shaking of the head that is in tune with 
the primary pulsations of nature but destructive of all 
rest, and so, according to western ideas, of reason and 
intelligence, yet the god who makes this madness is ,
and the refrain of the Chorus suggests that revenge too 
is ’wisdom* (877-81).
in his representation of the Bacchanals, both in 
the songs of the Chorus and in the scenes on cithaeron, 
Euripides has emphasised the swiftness of the transition 
from joy and peace to destruction and cruelty, from love 
and longing to retaliation and revenge, just as the women 
on the mountains respond in their madness to the god’s 
call to revenge, so the Chorus, provoked by pentheus’ 
attack on their playfellow, accept calmly and reflectively 
not only the fact of his death but Agave’s part in it :
6 f  ^  £  (•- Ç (. f <3^  ^oO £  o y  K  o V ( 11 72) :  / k ^ j  ^  IT at. i \r (1193)*
Not only can the Bacchic ecstasy contain both moods, but 
the wisdom of the god and of the women of Asia can accept 
and praise both; scruples must evidently be rejected as 
part of a ’law’ that is ’outside justice’ (1009-16).
’justly has the god destroyed us, but in excess’ 
(1249). If the world in which Dionysus revelled was 
strange and unfamiliar, the world which he has laid waste 
is even stranger, and the divine form he now reveals bears 
little resemblance to the human shape he wore. So, in the 
hopeless and distorted future which he holds out to the 
human beings who have passed from ignorance to most bitter 
knowledge, we see the opposite extreme to the painless 
rapture of the Bacchanals. ’With laughing face’ Dionysus 
has tightened the noose of death ( lo 2 1 ) ;  now, as his 
victims grovel before him as to some Eastern potentate, 
we discern the forms of bull, many-headed snake and fiery 
lion ( 1 0 1 7 - 9 ) and behind them the winged horror of the 
Orphic god.
^Kern t.54 p.130 (Hieronymi et Hellanici Theogonia). of. 
the forms of protogonos (Zeus or phanes), t.54 p.131, 
t.56 p.134, t.58 p.139, and Echidna, Hesiod Theog.295 f. 
K.t.58 p.140.
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In each of the major plays that we have been 
considering, we have seen that human nature is linked 
through its passions with a divine element in external 
nature, and that there may be occasions on which this 
kinship necessitates (a) behaviour of a certain kind 
(behaviour which is shown to be non-human and primitive) 
and (b) a certain transformation of the human soul in 
consequence.
In the Bacchae, this pattern is made more complex 
but in some ways clearer, by the god’s own assumption of 
human form, as a means to the revelation of his divine 
nature, i.e.,as the drama shows, as a means to revenge.
This subordination of his human personality to a specific 
purpose, which is at the same time a revelation of his 
divinity, provides the first and clearest connexion between 
the divine madness, as it is able to possess and control 
human beings, and the destruction to which it inevitably 
leads.
Since the god also appears in the role of guardian 
and leader of the , there is no open rift between
the human which he assumes and the thought of his
worshippers; he is seen, as he is worshipped, divine in 
his beauty and fascination and dynamic power, yet the 
contrast between his assumed humanity and the divine nature 
which he will reveal is kept before us by three factors :
(1) his own tendency both to speak and to behave as if 
he and the god were two different persons; (2) the Chorus’ 
differing attitudes to their beloved companion and to 
Bromios, before whom they fall in terror; (3) pentheus’ 
denial of Dionysus’ divinity, but strong reaction to the 
personality and conversation of the captive stranger.
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The voice from the palace and on the mouhtain, 
as well as ’from the machine* ân the epilogue, shows that 
revenge is regarded as a peculiarly divine function; but 
the violence of pentheus and the revengefulness of the 
Chorus alike spring from injury associated with the human 
Dionysus, in his role of worshipper, the stranger can 
plausibly claim that injury to himself is injury to the 
god, but the literal truth of this statement gives a 
clearer, if no less ambiguous, content (a) to the emotions 
of the chorus, who not only resent impiety but also feel 
themselves robbed of a beloved object, and (b) to the 
reactions of the god, who is not in fact protecting a 
devotee, but punishing, as if it were a personal, physical 
injury, an insult to his own divinity.
pentheus, disbelieving in the god, believes 
himself wronged by the ravishing stranger, but this 
mistake is part of the general misconception which arises 
when the god himself takes on * the nature of a man*. In 
each case, the human role of Dionysus gives a more concrete 
and determinate meaning to the god’s influence over human 
beings, but at the same time, since he is not man but god, 
this influence is seen to be to that extent magical and 
illusory, and the divine reality a striking contradiction 
of the appearance he assumes.
The ambiguity of the god’s role in ’rescuing’ 
himself from pentheus’ clutches is the first indication 
of the dual nature of the ’laughing-faced’ Dionysus. The 
quiet attitude which he adopts is partly (like Medea’s) a 
cloak for revenge, but it is also a sign of the painless 
nature of the divine retaliation. Dionysus is genuinely 
amused (’Whatever will he say now?’ 639), and pentheus* 
mad is well matched by the god’s tender concern for
his interesting victim. So the rapturous anticipations 
of the chorus express emotional acceptance of revenge, 
just as is an accepted part of the Bacchic
frenzy.
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Did Bacchanal ever so sing? in adapting the pentheus 
myth to the ritual of , the poet uses the lyrical
utterance of the chorus to give reflective and conscious 
expression to the emotional continuity through which 
alone the dual nature of Dionysus can be harmonised and 
reconciled. For true lovers of the god, revenge is 
’wise’ and ’beautiful’ and so ’beloved’, and with this 
quasi-Socratic deduction they may rest content. They 
have experienced injury and were swift to resent it, but 
now, as for their sisters on the mountains, pain is lost 
in the joy of fulfilment; they can delight in the thought
of blood and madness, for this too is Dionysus.
SO the humanity of the Chorus, not mad but 
worshipping, supports the revenge of Dionysus as far as 
the journey to the mountains. Emotionally they share and 
reflectively they approve an act which only madness could 
perform. But just as their human acceptance confirms the 
dual aspect of the divine , so it modifies and mars
their humanity. If this is to ’know’ the divine, it is 
’not to know’ the human; human life must contain grief 
and pain as well as rapture, and to know each in part is 
better than to stand for ever ’above toil’.
AS a poetic and aesthetic experience, the
Bacchanal’s world is sacred and inviolable; as an inter­
pretation of life, it is immoral and illusory. A drug 
which kills pain, kills awareness of human suffering, and 
in the acquiescence of the chorus, no less than in the 
fate of the victims, we see the penalty of confusing the 
two worlds : illusion and reality.
In the Bacchae, Euripides has shown us Dionysus
without the mask; he has also shown us, why he was a
poet.
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Knowing the God
Does Dionysus destroy, because he is rationalised, 
or because he is opposed, or because he is unsuited to the 
West, or because he is indeed ’divine’? The poet uses 
words to build his world, the world of fantasy; the sophist 
uses the same magic to produce effects in the real world, 
to compel men’s minds, to change their nature, and to 
pervert their souls, if we are wise, we shall not wait 
for Teiresias to amend his t h e o r y w e  shall take the god’s 
own warning that, to those who deny his divinity, he will 
reveal the semele bore to Zeus.
What is as old as time and beloved by all is 
divine, but its essence, as of natural growth, is its 
spontaneity: wisdom, whether approving or disapproving, 
cannot formulate the creed of nature’s law. Yet, if his 
divinity is denied, Dionysus will retaliate by taking 
upon himself the nature of a man, i.e. he too will use 
6*^ /7 as the tool of power, and turn his own man-made 
image into a vehicle of divine revenge. Dionysus denied 
is the arch-sophist and arch-magician, his conduct the 
deliberate anthropomorphic application of a non-human 
necessity, his form the static concept of a grotesque 
primeval power.
SO, with pentheus’ denial, goes the wish to 
enchain the dancers,^to comprise them, mentally and 
visually, in the hard medium of his own imagination and 
desire, if the followers of Dionysus would, like those 
of Heraclitus, abolish ’rest’, in pentheus we see the 
folly of an attack on ’movement’: the attempt to halt a 
self-generated process : to grasp in a formula that which 
for ever eludes it: to fix the stamp of evil on the 
plasticity of nature, then 'to demand that it shall hold 
for ever the shape that it receives.
 ^Teiresias advocates his own on the score of its
utility, hinting that sorrow will ensue upon that of 
pentheus (309-12, 325-7, 367), but he purposely expurgates 
the darker side of Dionysiac religion.
(T
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There are those ( . ) who would make a
corpse of the living nature of man, and in pentheus* fate, 
as in the future of his family, we see again the ’ancient 
torment’ which is so strangely connected with his name.
But we see it not as the suffering, but as the revenge of 
the god, whose gift of alleviating human misery is, to 
those who have denied him, for ever denied, as the magical 
light fades upon the mountains, we are left to grope our 
way in the bitter knowledge, that barbarian hordes will 
invade Greek tombs, and not even in Hades shall we lie 
in peace.
’Know Thyself’. Dual Function of the Chorus.
That the Bacchae comes last of Euripides’ major 
tragedies is, I feel, something of an accident; it is not 
his ultimum dictum, which is found, if anywhere, in the 
Heracles; to regard the choruses of the Bacchae as in some 
way autobiographical is to ignore the central censure on 
those siren singers, that they are commenting on no mere 
ritual, but on real human events. Their remoteness from 
the suffering of humanity is the sign that they live, 
emotionally, , i.e. with an indistinct knowledge
of the particular, akin to that of Electra and Orestes : 
a permanent ’blissful ignorance’ that makes them potential 
criminals, in their charmed state they can look on 
pentheus’ head in Agave’s hands without a quiver, for he 
remains in their thought, as in her vision, the beast of 
prey who not only derided the god but threatened’ the 
freedom and safety of his worshippers. As their approval 
coincides with her misplaced rejoicing, it is made clear 
that, in all but the very act, they are his murderers.
For the women of Asia, there is no compulsion to 
worship Dionysus, and no , but the correspondence
between their passionate motive and the madness of their 
Theban sisters points to a further issue raised by their 
reflective recognition and ’universalisation’ of the 
principle involved in the divine revenge.
286
The One and the Many
In the second book of the Laws, plato discusses 
the very problem which faced pentheus, whether to exclude or 
admit the of Dionysus. Dismissing the story that wine
was given to man é n ) , to make him mad (672 d 5), he
finds a use for it as a means of softening and rejuvenating 
the souls of adult men - as fire permeates iron - so that 
they may be moulded and shaped by the lawgiver no less than 
in the ’senseless’ period of their young growth (671 b 8 f.)
In the century before plato, the Anonymus lamblichi 
rejects the idea that a ’man of iron’ might be found, with 
soul and body so impassive and impregnable as to assert the 
impulses of his own nature contrary to the interest of the 
many. The many, if ranged against him, would always be 
stronger; all rule (^ (f^ -^ ;) is preserved only in so far as 
it accords with law and justice, which have in their turn 
this natural base, that men cannot live in isolation from 
one another.^
The Bacchae seems to put forward a similar defin­
ition of the strength or validity of religious custom. 
Beliefs which are coeval with time can hardly be said to 
lack a ’natural’ foundation (201, 893-6), and in pentheus’ 
attack on Dionysus, human is pitted sharply not only
against the divine but also against , in so far as
this can be identified with ’the opinions of the many’. 
Similarly, in his , we may discern the concerted
strength of the many directed against an individual who is 
their self-declared enemy.
 ^Anon.Iambi.6 p.lQQ,5(1—6) /s ,
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From this point of view pentheus* attempt at 
repression represents, not the claims of law and order 
against the irrational influence of a new religion, but the 
self-assertion of the individual against the natural 
sovereignty of the group; his abuse of royal power in 
calling for arms against the women on cithaeron isolates him 
not only from the Asiatic strangers but from his own people, 
all of whom are prepared, for various reasons, to accept 
the worship of Dionysus. ^
It is for this that he is led in mockery through 
the streets of Thebes, in token of the god’s victory not 
only over pentheus, but over his city. As a , he
is not king but outlaw, not man but’enemy’, his death a 
revenge demanded not only by the god and by nature, but by 
the common consent and conviction of all mankind.
If and are thus identified, there is none
of us who has not acquiesced in the revenge of Dionysus.
Man is bound to man, not by but by not by
reason but by folly, and nature’s law, enshrined in madness 
and passion, receives from ritual the added sanction of 
custom and law and agelong usage, the strength of all men 
at all times banded together against the one.
By the justice of Zeus, man is eternally an exile; 
must he be for ever outlawed from his own human law? is 
there no escape from the guilt of ignorance but by the pain 
of knowledge? Know Dionysus, know his victim, know thyself.
The Old and the New
Although Dionysus appears in the Bacchae as a new 
god, with his greatness in the future, both Teiresias and 
the Chorus endow him with a past, not, only in relation to 
fifth century Greece, but stretching far back into the 
mists of time. The sanction of time creates a which
is quite independent of institutions for which a historical 
beginning in time may be either ascertained or presupposed, 
and the ’nature’ with which it is associated is similarly 
independent of, and prior to, the natural necessities which 
may reasonably be regarded as the basis of law and justice 
in the human community.
^  fCZcpL r  * TTaj.; 1295.
^According to the Anon.iambi, it is the of all that
makes the tyrant, who is the true ’man of adamant’ (7 p.101, 
11(12-6)). so Dionysus appears at the end of the Bacchae 
as the pitiless despot, from whose verdict there is no 
appeal.
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According to the view that man is (in
which the Anonymus lamblichi agrees with protagoras, ap.plat. 
P ro t .3 2 o  d f.), the creation of polity presupposes at least 
one earlier stage of human communications, during which the
(including language) were developed. The poets add 
another (indistinctly conceived by the sophists either as a 
potential state of utter helplessness or as the impossibility 
of living ) ; so Aeschylus describes human misery
previous to the benefactions of Prometheus, and Theseus in 
Euripides* Supplices talks of the ’confused and bestial’ 
existence from which men were rescued by some god (20l f .).
The relative happiness or misery of a ’state of 
nature’ will always be a matter of dispute, but it is 
significant that where the political theorist argues from 
the impossibility of certain states of affairs, the poet is 
prepared to talk as if the change to ’intelligent’ living, 
whether good or bad, is at least a real step in man’s 
history. Euripides seems prepared to go further, and to 
regard the reversion to ’irrational’ behaviour as a 
permanent possibility for the human race.
The usual ..type of ’social contract’ theory tends 
to take the individual, not the group, as the natural unit, 
and so to assume that the alternative to is either
or a solitary existence, without allowing for the 
kind of unity that is represented by the religious .
If, however, the group, not the individual, is the original 
’natural’ unit, egoism can appear only at a more advanced 
level, with the acquisition of ’goods that can be fought 
for’ ; the of primitive man is a very different
conception.
The past, like the god himself, may be reborn, even 
if this does not mean that the new is like the old in every 
particular. The of the Bacchanals may be as
illusory as that of primitive man is mythical, but the bond 
is the same, and though the universality of their experience 
is now sadly impaired by the advance of science, they can 
still claim that their way of life is ’as old (or as new) 
as time’.
^Cf. Jason’s claim, Med.536-8, and the theme of pherecrates* 
(421/20, V.Adam’s edition of the protagoras, p.125).
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They also claim affinity with r: ,
partly because they too are »a many», and partly because 
they live unreflectively, accepting what each day brings, 
with common beliefs and usages that serve as a link between 
present and past, between the civilised bond and the 
primitive, similarly wine creates, between man and man, a 
fellowship and equality that have no relation to the pract­
ical needs of a civic community; this god is not concerned 
with the hard necessities which build and preserve human 
life, but with the common pleasures which relieve and 
sweeten it.
Yet he is also concerned with » law and justice»: 
the justice of time which reveals a man»s nature, and which 
may, if that nature is hostile, inflict punishment by 
reversing the relation in which he stands both to the god 
and to his fellow men. so, if the ruler attacks the 
community, he becomes the outcast, through the retaliation 
not of an individual, but of the group, whose strength lies 
not in or in but in a , which is indeed
a , turning all men into aggressors, by
the outlawry of the one.
When the Bacchanals persist in their view of the 
mad pentheus as an earthborn monster, and pentheus persists 
in his own view of himself as sole champion of the city (962) 
it is a sign that he is, for the poet, neither, but a man 
stripped of the resources of civilisation, destroyed by 
those who havei^ with god*s help, fallen back upon the 
resources of the beast.^
 ^A^ion •  Iambi » loc.cit. :  S ^  t L i r  e  u i  t C
^i / VT7 < '<T  a  I ^  ^  f v  V ^ / t  ^  Th
^ î ^ y r l ^ c - ,  u r n -  ^ ,y(~Y ^  7 - t> ,A .7 a u
 ^Although pentheus is quick to exercise the function of 
punishment (cf. Cadmus » lament, 1322, and the herdsman»s 
fears, 670-1), he is not, as Agave points out, a »hunter»
( 1253) and is therefore as helpless in the contest
as pro-premethean man (plat.prot.321 c 5). It is part of 
the poet»s delicacy that Agave is never told of the 
for which she unwittingly punished her son (1121, cf.1301-2).
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Who, then, is the first aggressor? Dionysus has 
invaded Thebes, but pentheus, by insisting on his royal 
right of coercion, has violated a *nature* that is even 
more ultimate than the needs which founded the ^ .
Life, like pentheus, is a hard task-master, but if there is 
to be no end to sorrow, why should man strive to live at 
all?
Toil must preserve life, but Dionysus will renew 
it; past and future together create an eternity beyond the 
reach of time. To the wise it is madness, to the strong 
it is folly, but where all are fools, the mad too are 
* strong* and * wise*.
SO Antigone, trusting in the unwritten laws of 
Zeus, went as a bride of death to her mountain tomb, so 
Oedipus, once in Thebes and once in Colonus, obeyed the 
call of the lord of darkness, so a younger Theseus, with 
unshaded eyes, fought Creon because earth demands the 
bodies of her children.^
Lip-service is not enough, but who, in the light 
of the Dionysiac revelation, would dare to invoke this god 
as *ally*? (1343)
In the Bacchae, Euripides has shown us a 
that is complete and continuous, yet seen to be illusory, 
a murder which is approved by every known standard, human 
and divine, yet seen to be unnatural and immoral. He has 
shown the of the many and the art of the , the
knowledge of nature which gives at the same time mastery 
of the human soul. , He has shown wisdom without foresight, 
strength without intelligence, and a divine revenge that is 
rooted not in the individual, but in the common nature and 
common origin of the human race.
It is left for plato to show the city that can 
arise, not from »a many*, but in the individual soul, 
prom the dream of Dionysus, there is no awakening, and 
in the land which he has once blighted, no city shall rise 
again.
^Sc. o T, roZ Hipp.191. Gf.Heraclitus 127 Byw,
A iJ v o C o Ç  ^ e'77-w , .
^  Eur.Suppl.531-6.
291
Conclusion. The Unity of Opposites.
Ritual Combat ( ^ )
I have argued (1) that pentheus* * royal * urge to 
chastise implies not only a belief in the existence of 
evil, but also a wish that evil should exist, so as to be 
punished; and (2) that a similar *pleasure* in evil is 
implicit in any general condemnation of women. This ill- 
boding is revealed by the charm of Dionysus, which
renders the supposed evil overpoweringly attractive. That 
pentheus * antagonism at first increases from contact with 
the god is not a sign that he is at the same time opposing 
a natural instinct in himself, but rather that he is, 
after an » uninitiate* fashion, attempting to satisfy it. 
His sole bent, as Agave later points out, is one by which 
he is enabled (and indeed obliged) to * fight the god*.^
This contest is not, like Hippolytus* abuse of 
Aphrodite, an attack on a recognised deity, in the 
strength of another; it is not, like phaedra*s struggle, 
the suppression of a kindred impulse within himself. The 
god whom pentheus fights is not in his own heart, but on 
the stage; we see no common ground between the * nature * 
of the god and of his victim until, as pentheus* violence 
reflects in the limpid mirror of the stranger*s ,
the continuity of the human and divine begins to
be revealed.
In the course of the play, there are three 
striking failures on pentheus * part: (1) to acknowledge 
the divinity of Dionysus; (2) to modify his own view of 
the character of the revels ; (3) to recognise any limits 
to his own royal power. He feels the fascination of the 
god, but it is, for him, the fascination of evil; he 
fights, not merely because he will not, but because he 
cannot, yield, because here is a power which must either 
destroy his own, or be absorbed by it and subdued to his 
own will.
1255-6 ft ^  f - D y U - V  yUtJVev' /  0  1 0 ^  7 7 '
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The mutual attraction of incompatibles is a theme 
more familiar to the Greek than to the modern mind; as the 
central dogma of early Milesian philosophy and of Heraclit­
us, it is native to drama through the still more primitive 
ideas of mystery religion, yet how do we pass from the 
mere frame of a ritual combat, to a in which man
himself is seen to be engaged in a fight to the death with 
God?
HOW, in the first place, is such a contest 
possible? The Chorus instantly class pentheus with the 
earthborn monsters who ranged themselves against heaven, 
but their denial of pentheus * humanity is at least as 
false and one-sided as his own denial of Dionysus* 
divinity, whence does pentheus derive the nature or the 
necessity which makes him both a fit antagonist to the 
god and at the same time a true * tragic* victim?
Throughout the play, much is done through the 
symbolism of the name^to suggest that pentheus, by some 
accident of his birth, is inevitably on the * wrong* side. 
More, however, depends on the intimate connexion (a) 
between Dionysus* motive for revenge and pentheus* motive 
for resistance, and (b) between pentheus* natural bent 
for punishment (fostered and directed by his early training) 
and the exercise of his royal functions.
It is clear from prologue and epilogue and from 
Cadmus* reflections after the that the god*s
hostility is not directed especially against pentheus, but 
against his whole family, provoked by Cadmus* sophism, 
gemele*s son sets out to prove his divinity; pentheus, 
taking his stand on the same lie, sets himself to resist. 
Just as, on pentheus * side, condemnation of woman and 
denial of the god are combined in the same attitude, so, 
for the god, proof of divinity and revenge go necessarily 
together. The point at issue is whether Dionysus is born 
of a human or of a divine father (1340-1): whether his 
worship is supported by mere human vice and folly, or by 
the ultimate sanction of a *law* and a * nature * that are 
prior to and stronger than human nature itself.
 ^This in itself suggests the doctrine of the K i y . i , cf. 
plat.Crat.383 a.
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That the same lie is provocation both to god and 
to ruler, provides the initial ground of conflict between 
them; the god* s power of compulsion is matched by the royal 
^ his resentment by pentheus * indignation at the similar 
reproach which is now fastened on himself and on his city. 
Only when the two combatants are brought face to face, a 
further provocation is revealed, in the particular incompat­
ibility between Dionysus and pentheus. pentheus* resistance 
now becomes a necessity, both of his own nature, and of his 
role as antagonist to the god, whose assumption of human 
form has made the contest not only possible, but inevitable.
In so far as this incompatibility partly rests on 
an extension of the original lie, pentheus* attack is simply 
a repetition of the original insult; in so far as it depends 
on immediate and personal contact, it provides a fresh 
medium for conflict, which leads directly to pentheus * 
undoing. The human of the god now enters his imagin­
ative scheme both with the spur of strong desire and with 
the force of a superior reality; he fights, not in his own 
strength merely, but in the strength of the god whom he 
denies.
It is not, indeed, true to say that Dionysus 
becomes what pentheus makes of him, for Cadmus has had, in 
some sense, the *making* of both: apart from the initial 
community of motive,^ pentheus could not have taken up the 
divine challenge, nor the god have answered it. Dionysus 
can use the lie, partly because his own /-W is ambiguous, 
emotionally and physically; partly because discord in 
pentheus (duped as he is by a false belief and a false 
pleasure) is nearer to the * hidden harmony* of nature than 
the sober rationalism from which it sprang.
pentheus* attack must, under the god*s influence, 
intensify (a) because it is continually frustrated, (b) 
because the pleasurable element is gradually dissociated 
from his own retaliation, and made a means rather to divine 
revenge. The , suddenly substituted for murderous
rage, reorientates pentheus in relation both to the god and 
to the women on cithaeron; god and man are no longer 
antagonists, but each is made in some way subservient to, 
and master of, the other.
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Defeat or victory?
pentheus had anticipated pleasure from the 
herdsman»s account, but he ostensibly reacts only to 
the later half of it, with a call to arms against the 
Bacchanals; that anger is not unmixed with fear is shown 
by his abrupt rejection of the god*s first offer (8o5)
By leading pentheus* 
imagination into this painful cul-de-sac, the god brings 
about his acceptance, on the rebound, of its opposite, 
the journey to the mountains.^
If this is pentheus * response to the
earlier part of the herdsman*s description, it is also 
the resolution of conflict between himself and Dionysus, 
pentheus has achieved a capitulation infinitely more 
satisfying than the mere physical imprisonment of his 
victim. But by making evil his own, he has secured his 
own defeat and the god*s victory.
* Clothed in an alien garment of flesh* ^  the god 
is now in pentheus* own heart, in a form which clearly 
demonstrates the continuity of the physical passions with 
the spiritual ecstasy of the women destined to be his 
murderers. No longer ruler, but , pentheus is
transported by the * despotic passion* which enslaves the 
man, god*s dupe, fit victim for the * slaves* whom he 
despised.
The horror of this lies not in its
obscenity, but in its conformity to the modes of worship 
which it mocks by the substitution of a spurious vision, 
in dressing pentheus as a worshipper, Dionysus is his own 
mimic ; making him mad, he confirms his isolation, and at 
the same time his role in the greater contest which now 
awaits him.
The alternative seems to be that either the women must be 
made sane and brought to pentheus, or pentheus must be 
made mad and taken to the women; since pentheus does not 
understand the dilemma, he chooses the horn with hay on it.
o i J J o y v ^ T /  7 7 7-y > ^  # T-wi, i ^ T<lmp O d O C l  O S  B # 1 2 6 . Cf *
, Bacch.746.
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U v - Ç  o y L . \ 7 ^ u ' , The Dionysiac interpretation of Nature.
In this contest, the god is victor because he is 
a non-combatant; he takes the ‘mastery* both over pentheus 
and over his own worshippers ;^  pentheus, not the stranger, 
enters the lists as his human counterpart.
Dionysus explains that he will rob pentheus of 
his wits so as to induce him to put on women*s dress, and 
so make him a mock in the eyes of the city. His costume 
is a sign that he relinquishes royal dignity together 
with opposition to Dionysus. It is also a sign that the 
combination of and insanity in pentheus is a ,
partly of the genuine Bacchic worship, partly of the lie 
which contains the original element of mockery and so 
brings him into direct conflict with the worshippers.
in female dress, and in the role of spy, pentheus 
is diametrically opposed to the god as of the
Bacchanals: he is totally excluded from their experience, 
yet brought into hostile relation with it, through the 
which, like his former rage, is focussed upon the whole
B  / oL € 6^ .
pentheus* is the somatic equivalent of the
Bacchanal*s ecstasy; its swift and sudden flowering is 
enhanced by the mental intoxication which embraces I h  its 
scope not only the women on cithaeron, but the mountain 
itself (945-9). Though neither manifestation is as 
attractive to the spectator as the poetry of the Chorus 
or the herdsman*s description, the god is content: his 
victim is now *as he should be*, and pentheus, seeing the 
bull * s horns of his guide, shows that madness may be 
nearer than sense to a divine reality which is not in the 
world of everyday experience, but in a magically 
interlocked system of ‘private* worlds.
Cf. the rejoicing of the Chorus, 1037-8 «
Especially significant for the spectator in view of his 
own attitude to Cadmus and Teiresias, and to the 
stranger*s insignia (493 f .).
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private worlds can, as the god wills, clash or 
interpenetrate, in the dislocation of normal relations 
the Dionysiac scheme of nature lights up, as if by a 
secret flash of earth*s inner fire : the lurking Titan: 
the hidden veins of communication by which the parts are 
as one, though scattered wide throughout the whole. In 
the strange, luxuriant perversity of this surrealist 
reconnaissance, the of the god invests the
freakishness of pentheus* thought with a prophetic, even 
magical, significance.
The hostility which is the base of pentheus* 
is kept clear in his madness, like Gorgias* interpretation 
of Helen*s , the which Dionysus induces seems
to spring, not from a biologically adjusted , but
from a psychical tension which exhibits a totally different 
set of * natural * relations.
just as, in the case of mirror i m a g e s t h e  
are flowing two ways at once, so in pentheus* fantasy 
there is a continuous interchange between his own nature 
and that of the god. whether (a) a man*s enters as
an element into what he perceives, or whether (b) the 
perceptual image carries its own emotional compulsion, 
pentheus has, from the first, failed to discern that 
narrow limit which divides his own * kingdom of thought * 
from the equivocal yet impenetrable personality which the 
god remorselessly presents to him.
Where facts themselves are so elusive, and 
nature so ambivalent, it is vain to ask whether pentheus 
or Dionysus is primarily to blame for his catastrophe.
Yet we know that the contradictions which can and must 
coexist in the divine nature, cannot with impunity be 
‘incarnated* in the human being.
^Aet.iv.14.1-2 (D.Empedocles A.88, Leucippus A.31), and 
Empedocles D.B.l09a .
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According to Democritus, the gods have no being 
apart from their , for which air forms a medium;^
but the human body has a nature of its own, which is not 
adequately represented in the of Dionysus.
Somatic change may be produced through sensation or by 
analogous thought-processes, but it is also the assumption 
of the drama that pentheus* masculine is attuned
to a sterile anti-feminine pitch that contradicts (as 
Heraclitus showed) the of life and nature. Hence
the grotesque imposture of his picture of the Bacchanals, 
hence the which is the god*s answer, transmitted from
without through the perceptual and emotional framework of 
his nature, but adapted, at each stage, to the * royal * 
urge which masks his uselessness both as a plain man and 
as a moral being.
In the context of the drama, the inhumanity of 
pentheus is not immediately evident ; the ^
and the show of reason in his speech, hide the lack of 
genuine (sc. organic connexion between soul and body),
by which he is led into serious confusions in his relations 
with the external world. Even his stubbornness means, not 
that he is impassive to objects, but that he is affected 
by them in the wrong way; not that he is naturally hard 
and indocilis, but that, naturally impressionable and 
excitable,*’his grandfather * s upbringing combined with his 
royal inheritance has robbed him of the harmonising 
restraint of his own manhood. If Hippolytus owed nothing 
to teaching, pentheus owes almost all; his mentors may 
change their own minds, but they cannot change his : an 
argument based on utility or convenience may lightly be 
contradicted, but they have left a more serious contradict­
ion in the nature of pentheus.
Though of an age to rule, and so presumably to 
reason, pentheus is still emotionally dependent on a,nd 
, a weakness increased and exaggerated by the kind 
of reality with which he has to deal. * when the soul is 
foreign, eyes and ears are false witnesses *;^since his 
condemnation of the Bacchanals is by way of a ,
the vividness of his sensory experience merely confirms his 
imaginative error, and the god*s , by baffling his
intellect, convinces him of the truth of his own false 
argument.
 ^See Bailey, Greek Atomists, p.176-7.
"^Heraclitus 4 (Byw.).
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This lack of moral and physical integration in 
pentheus is revealed in his madness, by a sporadic survey 
of the mental and geographical field appropriate to the 
form of bodily death that will soon overtake him. The 
soul-body connexion might have become even clearer, had we 
Agave * s lament over the mangled remains - that assemblage 
of parts and blotted form that fail to make the man. To 
Cadmus falls the infinite task of (1218-21, cf.954-5)/
But Euripides has not, like the anthropologists, 
used his tragic medium merely to lead us back to the 
unspeakable identities of a ritual . Again he has
set the Pythagorean r . a g a i n s t  the Heraclitean Xoyo<, , 
and combines the doctrine with an Empedoclean,
rather than purely Orphic, notion of . Add the new
practical sophistic, based on the general tendency to 
explain and on similar lines : until nature
herself becomes a multiple construct of homoeomerous images, 
drawn one from the other, writ *large* or * small * either 
for the outer or for the inner world.
In nature, as in , seen comes from unseen,
like from unlike; yet the eye of reason and the logic of 
imagination both demand that like shall come from like, and 
seen from known, just as Anaxagoras extracts a material 
universe from * seeds* - like and unlike - so the poet leads 
us to infer pentheus* alter ego from its prophetic image 
thrown on the screen of the external world.
Both in his Bacchic costume, and in the forests 
of cithaeron, pentheus is revealed as well as *hidden*; by 
these changes of bodily form (first then
rr<y<r^ -ro'^  ), following up ths emotional inconsistency 
which Dionysus elicits, the poet indicates those defects in 
pentheus * nature which mar his humanity and link him with 
the god whose he is at last perceived to be. As he
is led to his doom, god and man are as closely intertwined 
as soul and body, but the harmony which exists between them 
is seen to be purely hostile and destructive. Only death 
can sever the partnership, claiming pentheus for man and 
earth, Dionysus for zeus and * starry heaven*.
^According to the commentators,the symbolism of is
also used in plat.phaed.67 c. see Kern t.211 p.232.
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For his revelation to man, the god requires two 
human forms - his own, and the torn body of pentheus.
That this body is also in some sense *his own* (
, 934) is shown by pentheus* change of 
external appearance: as pentheus is to his new form, so 
the god is to pentheus. as symbol, this new stands
somewhere between soul and body: as pentheus* costume 
copies the stranger*s, so his o i m former self is reversed 
and subjugated by the god. But just as his female aspect 
reflects not his own but its antagonism, so the god,
in producing the , is using a vehicle to which he
is essentially alien.
In this scene the spectator, as well as pentheus,
* sees double*: its effect is to efface the boundaries of 
personality betv/een god and man and to introduce a soul- 
body symbolism appropriate to the biformed which
they jointly suggest : one life, two *natures *, related both 
by likeness and by unlikeness, by love and hate, by * death* 
and mutual torment, as mortal partner, pentheus bears the 
full brunt of this discordant : yet, as his own
soul dwindles and withers before the relentless pressure 
of the divine anger, suffering redeems his humanity,^and 
the god, whether immanent or transcendent, is slayer, not 
the slain.
With this same double vision we see the folds and 
forests of cithaeron, the bands that think as one, the 
many hands that tear.
/
é ' T î ^ f Ta ^ ^
Seated upon the pine, pentheus is seen rather 
than seeing ( l o 7 5 ) ;  he is again seen in a way that gives 
visible shape to the inward change, both in himself and 
in his slayers. Many hands assail him, but whether as 
ruler or spy, superman or S{a , he is the * one over the 
many*, whose death signifies, by physical , the
distribution of one life among the group.
 ^This is shown partly by his own recovery at the moment of 
death, but more by the human love that mourns him ( J 
oa  T o v 1244) .
 ^For the significance of these magical hands (1227, cf.1069- 
71), contrast Anaxagoras* view (Ar.de part.an.687 a 7)
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If a lion were slain, participation in the divine 
revenge might have passed for supreme  ^ but if
mother destroys son, it is nature herself that is torn and 
mutilated by a premature . Recognition restores
human kinship, but it is kinship with sorrow; cithaeron 
gives back its dead, but withholds its magic power.
Only if such ritual is cathartic merely, is it 
consistent with human law and justice. Deny god an unreal 
medium, and he will mortify the reality, and we must look 
with Cadmus down the empty vistas of time.
There is no moral judgment in the Bacchae, for
its and are relative to a god wholly
unconcerned with normal human purpose and activity. Yet 
these are not all that life contains, and if normal patterns 
are shivered and broken, we should do well to remember that 
even in a world of there is no escape from the law
of zeus.
In addition to the Heraclitean conception of the 
\'oY»i , Euripides seems to introduce a subjective element 
into his definition of the divine, as he does in the Hecuba; 
a which is not relative merely to man, but goes back
to the earlier » justice of Time*. Even if the itself
implies, at any one moment, a two-way traffic in >
there are certain beliefs among men which must be referred, 
not to the * one wisdom*, yet to a collective experience and 
a common need beyond the thought and nature of the individ­
ual. These must not be accepted uncritically as a base for 
human conduct, nor subjected in their turn to a moral 
judgment, but conveyed in their proper medium either by 
statesman, priest, or poet.
The supremacy of the chorus in the Bacchae lies 
in the perfection of the poet * s medium; they are divine, 
as the Muse of Tragedy, but they too fail to pass the 
* pragmatic test *.
If the Bacchae was written a stone's throw from 
Hades, it carries its own warning ; death must not cast its 
shadow or its radiance across the page.
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CONCLUSION
The Mythical Tradition in philosophy
In the foregoing summaries I have aimed at 
following the thought of each play more or less 
independently, leaving the reader to discern for himself 
any general pattern, or recurring theme. My excuse for 
adopting this method must be that i do not suppose that 
Euripides* views, if written out in prose, would have 
constituted an original or first-rate or even a consistent 
philosophy.
It seems clear that, as a thinker, his place is 
not with Pythagoras or Heraclitus or Anaxagoras, but with 
the great mass of (mainly anonymous) writers who fused 
and adapted their theories in other fields - religion, 
medicine, the sophistic curriculum. His originality lies, 
not in the presentation of a fresh theory, but in the 
delineation of a fresh field for the philosopher: the
* nature of man*, not from a religious or medical, but 
from a moral and psychological viewpoint.
AS a poet and dramatist, he stands in line (a) 
with the mythical tradition in philosophy, (b) with the 
Aristotelian deduction of the cathartic function of 
poetry, just as the philosopher (so we are told and 
believe) seeks to substitute for , so the
poet works to recreate the , to gain a truer
imaginative and emotional insight into that unknown
* cause* which reason ever fails to penetrate, where 
reason herself proclaims a paradox, there still 
must lead and follow; where the philosopher signals
*no road*, there the poet will instinctively turn as 
a point of escape into the hall of dreams.
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I use the word * mythical* to suggest, not a 
certain origin for Greek philosophical speculation, but 
those psychical and theistic sequences to which i drew 
attention in the second chapter of this thesis. I use 
it to include (a) the divine attributes of (b) the
mystical soul-doctrines of Ionian and Italian philosophy 
(c) poet-Heraclitean doctrines of the Xoyos , as applied 
in physiology, rhetoric and various forms of etymology.
Although I am in main agreement with professor 
Cornford*s view of the *primordial images* embodied in 
Milesian and Pythagorean cosmologies, it seems to me that 
their reappearance in a fifth century poet is evidence, 
not of a common conceptual inheritance from a remote past, 
but of the existence, from Xenophanes on, of a strong 
undercurrent of religious or mythical thinking, concerned 
partly with the theological implications of his theory 
and partly with adapting the Ionian (primarily scientific) 
monism to its own (primarily symbolic) dualism. This 
thought may be called * philosophical* only in a secondary 
sense, in so far as it is elicited and provoked by the 
advance of science or philosophy, or marks the philos­
opher * s concession to a more popular mode. It is not 
specifically Orphic or Pythagorean, except in the widest 
sense of those all-embracing terms; perhaps it arises 
wherever a *new* wisdom blends with or challenges local 
cults and mysteries.
To this far from untainted stream, rather than 
to individual philosophers, should perhaps be traced most 
of the characteristic * revivals * of the fifth century;
the parenthood of Heaven and garth, 
the flux of fortune, the justice of time, the dichotomy 
of and . The transmission of these ideas is a
subject quite separate from the history of philosophy; 
they are essentially * exoteric*, but, in their application 
to human experience, they stand in the same relation to 
a systematic treatment of morals as the original myth to 
physical philosophy.
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The parenthood of Heaven and garth is connected 
in Euripides^with a corresponding notion of death as a 
separation of the same two elements, earth and ,
identified with body and soul respectively. This view 
first appears in the fragments attributed to gpicharmus/ 
whom lamblichus claims as a secret Pythagorean, adding 
that his gnomic utterances about life are the source of 
all later reflection on the same subject (V.P.226, 166). 
probus on Virgil E d . 6.31 classes Euripides as a dualist 
who substituted earth and air as principia for the earth 
and water of Xenophanes.^ Hippocr. tt. 7 expounds the
human soul as a blend of fire and water, a * part * of the 
body, m  Euripides, is also ^ the source of
moisture which fertilises the earth and so remains, like 
, an intermediate element and the proximate source of 
life - if we believe Heraclitus, of death also.
^See note on p.249. passages especially relevant are (a) in 
the plays; Suppl.205-7, 533-6; Bacch.275-83, 29 2-3;
Hel.34, 582-4, 614, 9Q6-7, 1014-6;
Troad.884-8; Hipp*447-50;
(b) among the fragments ; 839N (Chrysippus ), 898n (cf. Aesch. 
panaids 44n ), 484N (Melanippe), 225N (Antiope), 1023N, 1004N, 
195N, 971N, 757N (Hypsipyle), 330N (Panae), 52n (Alexander), 
777N (Phaethon), cf.lo47N; 941N, 919N, 944N, cf.98lN, 779N; 
also 892N, 91lN, 877N, 978n , 448N, adesp.112.
^ D.B.9, 22, cf.52-3 (Ennius). Epicharmus* views seem based 
partly on Anaximenes and partly on a soul-body dualism which 
bisects his process according to the two * extreme * elements, 
fire and earth; this might be due to the influence either of 
Heraclitus or of Hippasus, who asserted flux and made fire 
the first principle, while resisting the identification of 
soul and body with any known substances (P.B.7-11). See 
ROSS* note (Metaphysics vol.i p.177-8) on the * intermediate* 
substance which Aristotle mentions in Met.988 a 30 and 
elsewhere, plat.Theaet.152 e cites Epicharmus with Protag­
oras, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Homer as a disciple of flux; 
cf. his *weather-gods* (P.B.8, cf.53).
 ^225N (Antiope), Xenoph.29-30* Cf*Ar.Met.1010 a 5, which 
implies that Epicharmus had some difference of opinion with 
Xenophanes. Earth and water are first principles in the 
Orphic *Hieronymi et Hellanici Theogonia*, Kern t.54 p.130*
9 41n , etc. cf- the rain-ritual at Eleusis, p r o d . P l a t .  
Tim.40e (A.B.Cook Zeus iii.pp.299,454, Kern t.ll2 p.176).
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The identification of soul with and body
with Y i presupposes either a » crude or a highly sophist­
icated notion of , i.e. the body is that which feeds
and increases it, and the soul is likewise continuously 
renewed from the surrounding atmosphere, whether we also 
absorb rationality in this way (as Aristophanes* parody 
suggests)% and whether k.w will survive immortal in the 
immortal (Eur.Hel.lol4-16) , must be regarded as more
doubtful. '4. is not specifically identified with , 
and the ambiguity of zeus* function renders his occasional 
identification with the same element somewhat inconclusive.
The which produced these views cannot
be precisely located in time or place. The (geocentric) 
Pythagorean system with which they have most in common is 
that described by Diogenes Laertius (viii.24-33cf.Eur.fr. 
944n, 1004n porphyry). we should also remember Hippasus 
the *acousmatic * , who anticipated"^Heraclitus on flux and 
the fiery nature of the universe, and whose followers 
talked of number as or as i c y i T n ^ o ^  B f- t ru  o y y » ^ v o v  ^
(D.A-11); Alcmaeon, who distinguished intelligence from
^ Cf. the epigram attributed to Epicharmus (D.B.64):
HeracliC/ss'lUf) ^
Epicharm. D . B • lO  ^ 7/ tiw-  ^ ,.<yu.
^ progs 892. Here Euripides is made to pray
like one of his own hierophants; the genuine model is Troad. 
884-8. Euripides, like Aristophanes, satirises the cult of 
in its more extravagent aspects; these r r r - ^ . c c o J  
have always dogged the philosopher * s path.
 ^The compilation of Alexander polyhistor in the first century 
B.C., possibly from a fourth century source; see Comford, 
Plato and Parmenides pp.3,13. (D.pyth.sch.B.la).
Suidas (D.A.le,) . . nvf-f /cz«^vo
r c Z  . Tuylor ( Timaeus p.379) places
Hippasus in the middle of the fifth century.
Cf. Heraclit. 20 (Byw.) .. -rt- n, ^77
K<i . and Epicharm.D.B. 2. See also p. 248 n. 2.
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perception and linked the soul with the motions of the 
heavenly bodies ; gcphantus the Syracusan, who attributed 
the movement of his * atoms* to a divine power which he 
called and (R.P*76 b) , cf. the motes in the air,
Ar. de An. 4p4 a 16. prom the other side, Hippocr. Â.
11 shows the tendency to interpret the Heraclitean 
as a and to equate it with , which in the
ps.-Heraclitean account of sensation given by Sextus (D.A. 
16)^ is inhaled through the from a circum­
ambient Sextus quotes Homer and the invocation
of zeus in the Troades (885); cf. s Xv
(lOlôN); Plutarch quotes Menander * s imitation as an imit­
ation of Heraclitus (Byw.121). A similar mixture of ideas 
is to be found in the fragments of Epicharmus/ especially 
the forged (D.B.56-7), and in the derivations of
* justice* cited in plat.Crat.412 c f., which lead in one 
case to its identification with the sun, and in another 
with Anaxagoras* . The existence of so much confusion
is perhaps the strongest justification for the essentially 
popular system of Diogenes of Apollonia.
^ This account suggests either Empedoclean infiltration or 
a pre-Empedoclean prototype, cf. Alcmaeon*s theory of 
sensation, and the fragments of Ennius * Epicharmus, which 
contain a 4-element theory (aqua terra anima et sol), and 
a mind-body dualism between fire (drawn from the sun) and 
earth, por the connexion between Empedocles and philolaus, 
see Taylor*s discussion in his introduction to the Timaeus, 
p.18 f.
Gf the of Aet.i.28.L(D.A.8), and the fragments
of the perithous (Eur. or Qritias), 593N, 594n . (The 
Pythagoreans also identified the heavenly sphere with 
Time, Ar.phys.218 b 1-9, see Ross * note, p.596; Aet.i.21.1, 
D.pyth.sch.B.33). Of. the Empedoclean D.B.134,
and 135 A^r» y.^  Z i u  t  ^
A 7 •crrAf-TTry,
por these fragments and their relation to Euripides, see 
pickard-Cambridge*s discussion in Dithyramb, Tragedy and 
Comddy, p.363 f. The forging of Epicharmus is itself 
evidence of the continuity of this * exoteric * tradition.
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very little can, I think, be inferred from these 
*physical * passages in Euripides apart from their context 
in particular plays. They are not used to hold out hope of 
immortality or divine providence, except in a very abstract 
and general sense. They may be used to provide (a) a consol­
ation for death and misfortune (lex est, non poena, perire), 
as in the haunting fragment of the Hypsipyle (757n)/ or 
panae (330); or (b) a quasi-natural base for morality and 
common law, on the ground that all men are * one seed* and 
* created equal *,as in the Alexander (52n), or have certain 
primary duties, as in the supplices; (c) an incentive to 
virtue, in the extension of human cooperation and sympathy 
cf *777n (phaethon) w   ^^ The trend
of these reflections is the reverse of other-worldly; they 
recall rather Heraclitus* counsel, to hold fast to what is 
common, to live * according to nature * as one has the 
knowledge.
This wisdom cannot, in the fifth century, be 
assigned to any one philosopher or scho&l of philosophy; 
we can say only that it belongs to a tradition of thought 
which accepted flux, welcomed contradiction, admitted 
phenomenalism, talked of chance and necessity, yet explained 
both and as human imitations of nature and the
divine mind, or r,Z^  , hinted at in Protagoras*
myth of zeus and prometheus. understanding is god*s gift 
to man: it must not seek to be wiser than heaven; human 
nature is like the earth, good and bad, to be tilled and 
tended: it will reap its harvest, and itself be harvested.
 ^Amphiaraus loq. y'  ^ •
, ■' ^  ■> '  I ' n  ^  rX
A"-Ay e o ^ 1-, Ç O 6 . 0 0  7T o v  (-• f »  TUi v
Ci > ' *' 7 T •* •
rX' TV r *
^  c -y t  ^c-yV U J6T 7  K .U .y  i n j u . 0 ^  ^
'Tov y - X r  ■ r
<’T?V'/nv-  ^ <X7rr-^  S-Z f^ecr* Ç I c-'K-Ô7-y
^ t ^ v 'ù v  y < ^  o a ^ t - Y 71*» V y  X l i i y o r - b ' t ç
DC V
- c f . i 0 4 7 N
_ f- ' r ’ _ '
' w o^. tf"o»- j  A V à y  I y c - Y Y ^ t ^  >j t XTy  { ^
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It seems possible that Euripides, or the opinion 
which he represents, made a deliberate attempt to * rescue* 
the - and indeed the whole Heraclitean
philosophy of nature - from the correlated ideas of self- 
assertion and self-sacrifice which might (even to judge 
from his own p l a y s b e  exploited as military propaganda, 
by reverting to cosraogonical concepts which retain the 
patriotic appeal but at the same time set human life in its 
widest possible perspective. Both the potidaea inscription"^ 
and Gorgias* illustrate the tendency, seen in the
Heracles and supplices, to subsume the warrior*s duty under 
a general moral rule which is neither passionate nor 
inevitably polemic, we are required, not to love friends 
and hate enemies, but to act *as and when* we should/ the 
dead are given their due of immortality, but human sympathy 
is quickened, not with the dead, but with the living.
Human nature, like the women of Thebes, stands 
suppliant at Eleusis, to renounce ^ to surrender
immortality, in exchange for those common concepts and 
common laws which both limit and extend the life of man.
The frame of life itself must check the proud and raise 
the fallen; from within, rather than from without; not 
the cold clasp of the dead, but *God*s encircling arms*.
But is the child-bearing of earth, after all, so 
painless? Can Zeus, as the *mind of man*, make good our 
adoption? Only through gods endowed with human passions, 
known yet unknown, double-stamped with a mortal and with 
an immortal die, can the tragic experience be made to 
yield its true generality, in the revelation of that 
common *nature*, which both brings to birth the moral 
agent and defines the limits of his world.
^ Notably the Erectheus (36qn), phoenissae, and iphigenia 
in Aulis; cf. the stress laid on voluntary death as an 
expression of , phoen.998-1002, Heraclid.551,559 ,
Hec.5 48-50, Iph.Aul.1378-1401.
^  X i  ^ ' I Ç /*■'•/' f ^  ^ e I *G*i. 442.
see Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods, p.2^27
7 c  o  r o v  k o  A-y > ^ D Y T f~ ^  ^  C"-! e T V /coO K o  > Y c 7  y ro y -o Y  ^ 7» 7r-t>v ^ cT<^ vT»
^  Gorgias (D.B.6).
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It seems to be a part of this view that the gods 
should be connected (a) with , as conventional
guardians of certain elementary human rights, as in the 
Hecuba (800 f •, cf. that which is imaged in the
ordering of nature, phoen.543 f., and the social usefulness 
of contemplating it, fr. 910N) ; (b) with and all that
is lx<To<^ Xi , including nature in so far as the reality of 
things lies beyond human knowledge; (c) with certain biolog­
ical and emotional factors, common to man and the rest of 
nature, not directly amenable to human control; (d) with 
or , as the gift of the gods or even as zeus
himself (cf. prodicus* theory that Dionysus, Demeter and 
the rest are features of nature especially useful to man).
The opposition between and is implicit
in the Hippolytus and in several of the fragments (espec­
ially 840-1 Chrysippus), usually with the suggestion, of 
which there are still traces in Aristotle, that vice depends 
on the former whereas virtue requires a combination of both; 
the moral relevance of is both affirmed and denied,
and the general upshot is that although moral * nature* has 
ultimately a physiological root, it must -perhaps for that 
very reason - remain something of a mystery, not to be 
judged by rule of thumb but only to be tested by time, which 
has a way of * revealing* the good and the bad. That there 
are these ultimate moral differences between men is taken 
for granted;the question whether any general lines of 
demarcation can be drawn a priori, e.g. between men and 
women, or between Greeks and barbarians, raises more 
complicated issues.
See p.247 note 3. Time has, accordingly, a dual action 
embracing both and : it introduces conventional
differences of birth or wealth (52n Alexander), but oblit­
erating these again with its * just canons *, leads back to 
the original equality of human nature. (Cf. Heraclitus 
79 Byw. /UJ. -Lj ffn . (?) as its own opponent).
The praise of poverty as a means of avoiding disillusionment 
(285N Bellerophon) seems part of a similar attempt to base 
human values on the common natural necessities; cf. the 
universal humanism of the sophist Antiphon (D.B.44).
I.e. as a broad distinction, cf. Ar.poet.1448 a 2-4. There 
is also the view that good and bad are irrevocably *mixed*, 
21n Aeolus, 954n, cf. Antiphon D.B.44 B fn-?-,
o y  " 'w ^  U Ml x ~ 6  V pi y  c  £  A  y V  oO
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por dramatic purposes, Euripides accepts the 
convention that the female is, like the barbarian,
essentially irrational, but at the same time he shows that, 
on this score alone, no valid moral judgment can be passed. 
If the doctrine of panhellenism implies that Greeks, as 
free men, are nature's rulers over barbarian 'slaves*,^ he 
is not a panhellenist, and he shows that, if woman is 
normally inferior to man, she will, if roused, beat him at 
his own game.
practically all Greek thought about morals is 
influenced by the opposition between freedom and slavery.^ 
Socrates made reason master, on the ground that it could 
not be a slave; plato must have his philosopher kings, and 
even Aristotle fails to reconcile virtue with misfortune, 
or 'uncontrol* with knowledge. There is an ignorance which 
is not, in the ordinary way, apparent; it can be defined
by the physiologist, but for the plain man it means that he
can sometimes be aware of knowledge which is (in Aristotle's 
sense) merely potential, and be guided in action by a
of which the converse is true : it is actual, but he is not
aware of it.
 ^ Iph.Aul.1399-1401 this outrageous assumption is put into 
the mouth of its first victim, por Euripides, panhellenism 
means the observance of common laws and the avoidance of 
merely partizan disputes, Suppl.311, 526; cf. fr.853N, 
where obedience to panhellenic"’law is made one of the three 
virtues in place of the more usual (Pythagorean) injunction 
to preserve inherited customs (D.pyth.SchVD.3-4). His 
plays show, however, the impossibility of a sound barbarian 
alliance, and the grim alternative facing Greece in the 
later years of the Peloponnesian war may have brought him 
nearer to Gorgias, who was prepared to purchase unanimity 
among the Greeks at the cost of an invasion of Persia 
( , philostr.v^s.i.9.4, D.A.l, B.7-8). This was
in 408, the year Euripides may have left Athens.
^It is this opposition which, as the Greeks themselves 
showed, destroys the true universality of moral action.
If the alternative is to rule, or be ruled, freedom is 
lost for both parties (plato tried to obviate this by his 
definition of , Rep. 442 c 10).
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prom Anaxagoras* * separation* of mind we could 
not, perhaps, infer the Socratic premiss, that reason is 
the strongest principle in man. The 'greater* mind is the 
same as the * smaller*, and there must be much activity of 
in the human frame that fails to reach the individual 
consciousness. Yet if all is in the seed ( ), and if
growth and perception already presuppose , the human
personality is perhaps an infinitely composite construct 
of these tiny cells continuously enlarging and developing 
under the guidance of a 'knowledge* that is essentially, 
though not perceptibly, identical with the mind of the 
individual, go Aristotle says that although Anaxagoras 
seems to distinguish between v-/? and , he uses them
(de An. 4o5 a 15). It is not far from this view 
to suppose that knowledge of human nature is a form of 
 ^, or that the content of the human mind has a 
unique relation of likeness to a biologically conditioned 
^ w h i c h  is always inferred and never directly observed.
Euripides* treatment of character ( ) seems to
show that he has made this assumption, but he is using a 
that demands conflict as well as consistency, and 
ignorance as well as knowledge. He adopts, therefore, the 
fiction of a , by which man is related not only
to his own kind but also to non-human powers that are 
essentially irrational and destructive. It is this * nature * 
which is revealed by the tragic experience, in terms of 
action, passion and 'purpose* of which the individual may 
or may not be fully conscious.
The empirical philosopher, such as Aristotle, 
cannot ignore the poet's analysis, because it shows, in 
terms that cannot be denied, that there is, after all, a 
'moral problem*, on which the poet will always have the 
last word, because he, and he alone, can translate the 
findings of the physiologist into the language of universal 
human experience.
 ^Hippocr. IT. 12, Eur.Med. 239 .
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I have tried to show that, in Euripides, an 
elementary and universal natural necessity is raised, 
owing to some abnormality, to the level of experience 
and observation, and that the possibility of this depends 
on some admixture of the divine in the nature of the 
persons concerned. I would now suggest that in his 
analysis of this dual nature we can detect the following
* tripartite * division : (1) the body and its affections, 
including (a) physical strength or weakness (b) biological 
differentiation, e.g. sex, virginity, parenthood, and
any more specific variations, dictated by heredity or 
circumstances, that fall in the same category; (2) the 
emotions and passions, mainly love and revenge; (3) mind 
or reason. These parts are not, in Anaxagoras* phrase,
* cut off with an axe*; they have an analogy not (as in 
philolaus) with the areas of the body, or (as in plato) 
with the three classes in the \ but with the mythical 
cosmography by which he supports the conception of Earth 
and as universal parents, bridged by a * harmony of
opposites* (which Aristotle quotes in close conjunction 
with Heraclitus, E.N.1153 b 1). This cosmography may in 
turn be explained as an adaptation of the Heraclitean * way 
up and down* to the requirements (a) of Ionian physics, ^
(b) of Pythagorean or Orphic symbolism, we have here, in 
its correct mythical and poetic setting, the of
ideas and images which sounded so bizarre in the accounts 
of Sextus, Aetius and Diogenes Laertius.^
in his treatment of passion and the notion of 
divine justice Euripides is thoroughly Heraclitean; in his 
presentation of this justice he also draws upon Empedocles 
and the mystical tradition, but always with the implication 
that love and strife cannot be the separate essences that 
Empedocles supposed. At the same time he shows that the 
distinction between * rational* and 'irrational* modes of 
conduct is a real though relative one.
^Thuc.6.18.6, cf. Eur.Suppl.238-45, fr.2lN (Aeolus).
 ^Cf. Diog.Laert.ix.8, sext.adv.math.126 f., Aet.28.1 (D.A.
1, 16, 8). The hash which the doxographers have made of 
Heraclitus cannot be entirely ascribed to * stoic influence*.
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In specific cases, any element in human nature 
may be considered divine, either as determining the rest 
or as directly connected with an external deity, in 
general, however, the divine aspect of the <(L<r,ç is
not to be identiJTied with any one of its 'parts* , but 
rather with some principle of their combination or 
separation, like a common necessity interpenetrating all, 
evident only at the point where the impulse of each clashes 
with normal human interest and feeling. At this point it 
becomes identified with a wider principle in external 
nature, which may be related to the individual in a
variety of ways, but especially at the emotional or 
passionate level. Hence love of evil may really exist, 
passing into or out of the impulse of retaliation, which 
is the primary and universal form of this 'divine'necessity 
Rooted in injury to the physical nature, it demonstrates 
its source by giving rise to internal , and by
determining the nature as a whole according to its own law 
in clear opposition to human interests, when the nature 
is thus determined, its real and ultimate is revealed,
so that the 'real' nature of man can in some sense be 
identified with what is only a part of itself, the 
prevailing or 'divine* element which gives its character 
to the whole. And in so far as this nature can be 
universalised, it is the same for all; yet mind too is 
* common*, aiding the weakness of the individual.
It follows that the nature of man becomes an 
ambiguous concept - either all that he is, or all that he 
cannot alter. In the latter sense, it can be generalised 
either through quasi'-phi 1 osophical notions of , or
of divine revenge, or of , and demonstrated in the
drama through the shifting relationships between human and 
divine. In the Hippolytus it is shown that even an innate 
love of good, in"”so far as it rests on a physical base, 
can be destructive : the disharmony which is excluded from 
the nature of the individual will reappear in his dealings 
with other men and in relation to his natural environment. 
On the other hand, it is shown in the Heracles that the 
idea of divine perfection, combined with recognition of 
human weakness, can have its rightful place in man's 
self-realisation both as a 'slave of chance* and as a 
moral agent.
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The comparison of human nature to the earth is 
made in the Hecuba (392 f.), and carried through the play 
in the suggestion of chthonian influences at work and in 
the joint neglect of gods and men which parches the soul 
of the ^mater exhausta*. Hecuba*s argument, that Law 
supports the revenge of the weak, is the corollary of the 
Greek assumption that justice is the interest of the 
strong; such extremes admit no other meeting. So, in the 
Bacchae, the Chorus claim the sanction both of nature and 
of immemorial custom, and the nature which is revealed in 
the earthborn pentheus is not merely his own, offspring 
of strife, but the mixed thing that 'love* elicits,^ image 
of god and man in that last alliance, in which man, without 
reason, is rudderless, and the son of Zeus who is 'mildest 
to men* is forced into the role of supreme arbiter both of 
divine wisdom and of human folly.
The relation between and here implied
is similar to that of Hippocr. 11; the divine mind
teaches the human to imitate processes of which man has no 
direct knowledge.^ prodicus* theory of deity is, therefore, 
seriously misleading; the religious sanction points to 
those aspects of of which we are normally unaware -
the justice which is * outside * law, or the law which is 
* outside* justice, where the gods cannot teach, they will 
surely compel, and the poet's tale is thus doubly a 
À c y . ç  , not only explaining ritual, but also interpreting 
the secret oracle of human nature.
Empedocles D.B.61.
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The Sophistic __
The general tendency of this fifth century 
'rationalism* can be stated in the words of Bellerophon; ^
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The conclusion is that of the Heracles, and it is part of 
the poet's healing that these gods - the concepts not of 
man's normal mind, but of his deepest tragic experience - 
should not be merely ignored or rejected, but be made to 
stand their test in the full blaze of paradox and 
contradiction.
perhaps Euripides, as a disciple of Xenophanes, 
adopted a consciously similar attitude to the religious 
thought - popular or scientific - of his own time. But 
this cannot be all, for where Xenophanes, like plato, 
enjoins holy silence, Euripides, like Aristotle, prefers 
to roll the clouds of story back and forth over those 
wounds that life, like Achilles' spear, both inflicts 
and heals. His cathartic method, half empirical, half 
hypothetical, bears indeed a striking resemblance to the 
Socratic (plat.soph.226 b f.); a close parallel
is to be found in the Hippocratic writings, and above all, 
in the theory and practice of rhetoric.
That moral conflict involves not two terms but 
three (two combatants and an umpire) is clear from the 
analogy of the , but these roles are not fixed, and
it is the work of to show how they may be interchange­
able. The premiss, that for every there are two
% has in Euripides become a fundamental principle of 
dramatic method.
 ^292N, cf. 339 (Bictys).
pro tag, D # B . 6a, cf. Gorg. t o o  j> J s r - ^ £
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in spite of the ubiquity of Pythagoras, the whole 
faith of the fifth century lies, partly in Heraclitus, 
partly in the dualism of Anaxagoras. Moreover, zeno's 
dialectic had shown that, although for the Sun's passenger 
to the way of Being there is no return, the phenomena 
themselves provide a second way.
OV-77c j. «2 t Z»v
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Aristotle laid down the principle of contradiction, but 
for drama, he upheld the of paradox.
There is a of the known, and of the unknown,
that which cannot be, cannot be thought, cannot be stated. 
This too is the way of God, a soundless 'justice' that 
makes a better music than the spheres.
